1. These civil revision petitions are by the same defendants in the respective suits against the respective plaintiffs therein, seeking to set aside Cl. (2) of the order, dated 24 October 1989, in the respective interlocutory applications filed therein. The said interlocutory applications were filed by the respective plaintiffs for interim injunction. Those interlocutory applications are I.A Nos. 932 to 959 of 1989 in O.S Nos. 1330 to 1357 of 1989 on the file of the District Munsiff's Court, Thiru-mangalam. The suits are by different employees of the same defendants and they, inter alia sought for orders of permanent injunction, restraining the defendants from giving effect to the relevant transfer orders passed by the defendants against the said employees. The trial Court held in Cl. (1) of the respective orders in each of the said interlocutory applications that it had no jurisdiction to try each of the said interlocutory applications. But in Cl. (2) of the respective orders, it granted “in the interest of justice” interim injunction prayed for, for a month, to enable the respective plaintiffs to prefer an appeal against the above said Cl. (1) of the respective orders.
2. Regarding Cl. (1) of the respective orders, it is stated that the respondents-plaintiffs have preferred civil miscellaneous appeals to the proper Court. It is only with reference to the above said Cl. (2) of the respective orders these revision petitions have been filed in this Court.
3. Now, the question is whether the above said Cl. (2) of the respective orders can stand, when the lower Court itself held that it had no jurisdiction to try the said interlocutory applications.
4. It is settled law that when a Court holds that it has no jurisdiction to try a proceeding before it, it cannot pass any order regarding the said proceeding. Any such order even if passed will be a nullity. Vide the decision in Kiran Singn v. Chaman Paswan [A.I.R 1954 S.C 340] and R. Venkataswami Naidu v. South India Viscose Ltd., Ltd., Coimbatore [A.I.R 1985 Mad. 257]. So these revision petitions have necessarily to be allowed and the above said Cl. (2) of the respective orders have to be set aside.
5. However, the learned counsel for the respondent, in each of the revision petitions, contends that these revision petitions themselves are not maintainable, in view of the fact that appeals lie thereto and that S. 115(2) of Civil Procedure Code provides specifically that where an appeal lies, revision will not lie. The said counsel contends that respective orders sought to be revised are only orders passed under Order 39, rule 1 or rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code and that hence appeals lie against the said orders under Order 43 of Civil Procedure Code. But, I do not think that the said orders could be construed as orders under Order 39, rules 1 or rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code. The said Cl. (2) of the orders, being one absolutely without jurisdiction, cannot fall under Order 39, rule 1 or rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code.
6. In this connection, the following passage from the decision in Amarnath v. Jhandu Lal [A.I.R 1983 P. & H. 291], may also be usefully referred to:
“But when jurisdiction is misused, exceeded or withheld by a Court and the product of its deliberations do not conform even to semblance of the order envisaged under the provision of law then the power is there with the revision Court to put that Court back to its jurisdiction.”
7. Further, it has also been held that whenever any such order is passed when the Court itself had held that it has no jurisdiction to try the matter in question, this Court sitting in revision can even suo motu revise it under S. 115, Civil Procedure Code. In this connection, the following passage in the decision in 5. Sundaram Pillai v. P. Govinda-swami [A.I.R 1985 Mad. 199], may be usefully seen:
“In any cause, the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 of Civil Procedure Code cannot allow an order, which amounts to an abuse of the powers vested in the trial Court, to stand once such an order comes to the notice of the High Court.”
Even under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, such an order can be set aside. Further when Court exercises jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, even the restrictions embodied under S. 115(2) of Civil Procedure Code will not be attracted. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, contends that even when the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction to try a proceeding before it yet, it can pass any suitable order under its inherent power under S. 156 of Civil Procedure Code. This contention has no merit. The power under S. 151 of Civil Procedure Code can be exercised only when there is a proceeding lawfully before the Court. In Raja Soap Factory v. S.P Shantharai [A.I.R 1965 S.C 1449], the Supreme Court held as follows:
“Section 151 preserves the inherent power of the Court as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. That power may be exercised where there is a proceeding lawfully before the High Court; it does not, however, authorise the High Court to invest itself with jurisdiction where it is not conferred by law.”
The learned counsel also sought to rely on the decision in Shankar v. Krishnji [(1969) 2 SCC 74 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1]. But the merger spoken to therein has absolutely no application at all to the facts of the present case. The civil miscellaneous appeals said to have been filed by the respective respondents herein against Cl. (1) of the above said respective orders are against the decision holding that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the said interlocutory applications. But these revision petitions are against the injunctions granted under Cl. (2) of the above said respective orders. So (1969) 2 SCC 74 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1 (vide supra), has no application. Further the observations will also not affect the hearing of the appeals.
8. In the circumstances, these civil revision petitions are allowed and the respective orders sought to be revised are set aside. No costs.