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Judgment Summary — Second Appeal concerning trusteeship of Dharmaraja Koil, Arkonam

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns three suits relating to the trusteeship and management of the Dharmaraja Koil, Arkonam. O.S. No. 175 of 1968 was filed by the plaintiff (the present appellant) as trustee, seeking a declaration that he is the trustee of the temple and an injunction restraining Murugesa Chettiar (the first defendant) from interfering with management of the temple properties. Earlier, Murugesa Chettiar filed O.S. No. 170 of 1967 claiming to be the lawfully constituted trustee and seeking a declaration and injunction, or alternatively delivery of possession. Murugesa Chettiar also filed O.S. No. 180 of 1968 as trustee against one Kanda Pandithar for recovery of rent due to the temple.

Because the common question in the suits was who was the lawfully constituted trustee, the suits were tried together. By a common judgment dated 30 April 1971, the Additional Subordinate Judge, Vellore, declared Murugesa Chettiar the lawfully constituted trustee and decreed O.S. 170 of 1967 and O.S. 180 of 1968, while dismissing O.S. 175 of 1968. Separate decrees were drawn for each suit.

The appellant appealed only the decree in O.S. 175 of 1968 by preferring A.S. No. 277 of 1971 in the District Court, North Arcot at Vellore. The District Judge allowed that appeal on merits, holding that the appellant was the lawful trustee. The first respondent (Murugesa Chettiar) then preferred S.A. No. 512 of 1973 to this Court; this Court allowed that appeal on the ground that the District Judge's judgment was "too scrappy and too summary" and remanded for fresh disposal. On remand the District Judge again decided the merits in favour of Murugesa Chettiar and dismissed the appellant's appeal. The present second appeal challenges that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal is maintainable in view of the decree in O.S. 170 of 1967 in favour of the first respondent, which was not appealed against, so that the finding in O.S. 170 is final and operates as res judicata in the proceedings arising from O.S. 175 of 1968.
  2. Whether the appellant could rely on precedent and prior appellate practice to contend that the identical question of trusteeship being agitated in separate suits and appeals keeps the question alive and obviates the need to separately appeal the decree in O.S. 170 of 1967.
  3. Whether the respondents are estopped from raising the preliminary objection of bar by res judicata because they did not raise that point earlier at the appellate stages or on remand.

Arguments of the Parties

First Respondent's Arguments (Murugesa Chettiar)

  • Raised a preliminary objection to maintainability of the appellant's second appeal on the ground of res judicata: since O.S. 170 of 1967 (the first respondent's suit) resulted in a decree declaring him to be the lawfully constituted trustee and that decree was not appealed, that finding is final and conclusive and precludes relitigation of the trusteeship issue in the appellant's suit.
  • Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Lonankutty v. Thomas (A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1645) as controlling authority for the proposition that an issue directly and substantially decided in a former suit, and not appealed, bars subsequent proceedings on that issue.

Appellant's Arguments

  • Contended that because the identical question of trusteeship was being agitated in his appeal before the District Court and in this Court, the question remained alive and it was not necessary to file a separate appeal specifically against O.S. 170 of 1967.
  • Relied on the Full Bench decision in Panchanadavelan v. Vythinatha Sastrigal and other authorities (including Faramananda Velan v. Vaithinatha Sastrial) to support the view that an appellate court is not precluded by res judicata from deciding the issue when an appeal in a related suit is pending.
  • Later contended that the respondents were estopped from raising the res judicata objection because they had not raised it in earlier stages (before the District Court originally, in the second appeal previously filed to this Court, or when the matter was remanded and heard again).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lonankutty v. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1645 (89 L.W. 94 S.N.) The principle that when an issue is directly and substantially in question in a suit and the decision in that suit becomes final (not appealed), that decision is a "former suit" for the purposes of Section 11, Explanation I, C.P.C., and the issue cannot be reopened in subsequent proceedings between the same parties (res judicata). The Court held that the ratio of Lonankutty is directly applicable: the trusteeship issue was directly in issue in O.S. 170 of 1967 and that decree, not having been appealed against, is final and bars the present appeal. The Court treated the Supreme Court decision as binding and dispositive.
Faramananda Velan v. Vaithinatha Sastrial The appellant relied on this authority to contend that the same question being agitated in appeals could keep the question alive and obviate a separate appeal against the related decree. The opinion records reliance on the decision but does not elaborate its rule; the Court considered it among authorities argued for the appellant but concluded it was bound by the Supreme Court decision in Lonankutty.
Panchanadavelan v. Vythinatha Sastrigal (Full Bench) The Full Bench held that where identical questions are decided in separate suits tried together, an appellate court was not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from dealing with an appeal in one suit even when no appeal had been filed in the other suit, because a successful appeal in one suit could supersede adjudication in the other. The Court acknowledged the Full Bench ratio supports the appellant's view and noted factual differences might exist, but held itself bound by the Supreme Court decision in Lonankutty which took a contrary position.
Angappa Gounder v. Roja-velu Gounder and others Followed the Lonankutty principle regarding finality of adjudication and res judicata (as applied by a learned Judge of this Court). The Court noted that one learned Judge of this Court has followed the Lonankutty approach and expressed agreement with that view.
Khaja Mohideen v. Mohideen Batcha Another decision of this Court following the Lonankutty principle. The Court recorded that the decision was followed by another learned Judge and agreed with that approach in reaching its conclusion that the appellant's appeal is barred by res judicata.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds principally from the binding authority of the Supreme Court in Lonankutty v. Thomas and the factual parallels between that case and the present dispute.

Step-by-step:

  1. Identification of the common issue: The Court observed that the decisive issue in the grouped suits was the identity of the lawfully constituted trustee of the temple (the trusteeship question), and that this question was directly and substantially in issue in both the appellant's suit (O.S. 175 of 1968) and the first respondent's suit (O.S. 170 of 1967).
  2. Application of Lonankutty: Drawing on the Supreme Court's holding in Lonankutty that when an issue has been finally decided in a former suit (and the decision in that suit is not appealed), that decision operates as res judicata and prevents re-examination of the same issue in a later suit between the same parties, the Court held that the decree in O.S. 170 of 1967 is final and conclusive for the purpose of barring relitigation of the trusteeship question in the present appeal.
  3. Consideration of contrary High Court Full Bench authority: The Court acknowledged the Full Bench decision in Panchanadavelan v. Vythinatha Sastrigal, which supported the appellant's position that an appellate court might still entertain an appeal in a related suit. The Court observed that although that Full Bench ratio favours the appellant, it cannot prevail over the Supreme Court authority and thus cannot be applied to displace Lonankutty.
  4. Reliance by other judges: The Court noted subsequent decisions by judges of this Court (Angappa Gounder and Khaja Mohideen) that followed the Lonankutty approach, and the present Court agreed with those views.
  5. On the estoppel point: The appellant argued the respondents were estopped from raising res judicata because they did not raise it earlier. The Court examined the procedural history and stages at which the matter had been heard and held that there were plausible reasons why the point had not been raised earlier (the appeal originally was by the appellant, not the respondents; after a prior second appeal that was allowed on merits, there was no occasion to raise res judicata until this stage). The Court therefore rejected the estoppel contention and held the respondents were not precluded from raising the res judicata objection in this second appeal.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Because the finding in O.S. 170 of 1967 in favour of Murugesa Chettiar was not appealed and thus became final, the appeal against O.S. 175 of 1968 was barred by res judicata and must be dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: DISMISSED. The Court held that the second appeal fails and is dismissed.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The decree in O.S. 170 of 1967 in favour of the first respondent (Murugesa Chettiar) stands as final and binding on the parties for the trusteeship question, because it was not appealed.
  • The appellant's attempt to challenge the trusteeship by an appeal limited to O.S. 175 of 1968 is barred by res judicata given the prior unappealed decree.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Broader precedent: The Court expressly followed the Supreme Court's decision in Lonankutty v. Thomas and treated that authority as binding. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new or novel principle of law beyond applying established res judicata doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court.

End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.

    S. Kandaswami Chettiar As Trustee Of Dharmaraja Koil, Arkonam v. R A. Murugesan Chettiar & Another

    JUDGMENT

    1. The plaintiff in O.S No. 175 of 1968 is the appellant in this second appeal. That was a suit filed by him as trustee of Dharmaraja Koil, Arkonam, for a declaration that he is the trustee of the said temple and for an injunction restraining one Murugesa Chettiar, the first defendant in that suit, from interfering with his management of the temple properties. A little earlier than that, the defendant Murugesa Chettiar himself, had filed O.S 170 of 1967 praying for a declaration that he is the lawfully constituted trustee of the said temple and for an injunction or in the alternative for delivery of possession of the endowed property. The said Murugesan Chettiar also filed O.S 180 of 1968 as a trustee against one Kanda Pandithar for recovery of rent due to the temple. As the common question to be decided in all these suits was whether Murugesa Chettiar was lawfully constituted trustee or Kandaswami Chettiar, the appellant herein was a lawfully constituted trustee of the suit temple, the suits were tried together and by a common judgment, dated 30th April, 1971, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, of Vellore, granted a declaration that Murugesan Chettiar is a lawfully constituted trustee and accordingly decreed O.S 170 of 1967 and 180 of 1968 filed by him, and dismissed O.S 175 of 1968 filed by the appellant herein. Though the judgment was common, three separate decrees were made in the three suits. The appellant preferred A.S No. 277 of 1971 on the tile of the District Court, North Arcot at Vellore against the decree in O.S 175 of 1968 alone. That appeal was allowed on merits by the learned District Judge holding that the appellant herein who was the lawful trustee and not the first respondent, Murugesan Chettiar. The first respondent preferred S.A No. 512 of 1973. On the ground that the Judgment of the learned District Judge was too scrappy and too summary amounting to a non-application of the mind to the controversies raised between the parties, this Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. When the matter again came up on remand, the learned District Judge again went into the merits and he d that the finding of the trial court that Murugesan Chettiar, the first respondent herein, who was the lawful trustee is correct and that finding does not call for any interference and accordingly dismissed the appeal. It is against this judgment, the present second appeal has been filed.

    2. Mr. V. Krishnan, the learned counsel for the first respondent herein, raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that in the first respondent's suit, O.S 170 of 1967 a declaration that the first respondent is the lawfully constituted trustee has been given and the suit itself has been decreed, that since the defendant was a party to that suit and that decree not having been appealed against, that finding had become final and would operate as res judicata in these proceedings taken against the suit filed by the appellant himself though both were tried together. In support of this contention, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Lonankutty v. Thomas . A.I.R 1976 S.C 1645=89 L.W 94 S.N. The learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, contended relying on the decision in Faramananda Velan v. Vaithinatha Sastrial,2 and certain other decisions that since the same question as to whether the appellant or the first respondent is the lawfully constituted trustee is agitated in his appeal before, the District Court and in this Court, the question is kept alive and it could not be said that any finality could be attached to the earlier judgment, and if on merits this Court were to agree and set aside the judgment of the courts below, it will supersede automatically the decree made in O.S 170 of 1967 and there was no need for him to file any separate appeal against O.S 170 of 1967. It may be mentioned at this stage that O.S 170 of 1968 filed by the first respondent for recovery of rent was decreed and that does not have any bearing on the determination of the question now at issue.

    3. In Lonakutty v. Thomas, the facts are these. The appellant before the Supreme Court filed Civil suit No. 666 of 1954 against the respondents in which the question for consideration was whether the respondents had not acquired any right of easement over the appellant's land for the ingress and egress of water for fishing rights as well as for agricultural purposes. The respondents filed civil suit No. 5 or 1957 for a declaration that they have acquired such a right in respect of fishing as also for agricultural purposes. The trial court decreed the appellant's suit partly holding that the respondents had not acquired any right of easement over the appellant's land for ingress and egress of water for fishing purposes but they had established such a light for agricultural purposes during the agricultural season. The trial court issued an injunction restraining the respondents from taking or letting out water from or through the appellant's land for fishing purposes, in the respon ent's suit, the trial court recorded Similar findings and issued an injunction against the appellant restraining him from interfering with the respondent's easementary right limited to agricultural purposes during agricultural season. Each party being partly aggrieved by both the decrees, each of them filed appears in the District Court against the two decrees. The learned District Judge who heard the appeals dismissed all the four appeals, two arising from each suit, and confirmed the decrees of the trial court. The respondents did not file any further appeal against the decree passed by the District Court in the appeal arising out of their suit. They filed a second appeal in the High Court only as against the decree passed by the District Court in A.S N0.60 of 1958 which arose out of the decree passed by the trial court in the appellant's suit. Thus the decision of the District Court in the appeal arising out of the respondents’ suit became final and conclusive. 1 he question for consideration was whether the decision in the respondents’ suit that they had not acquired any right of easement over the appellant's laud for fishing purposes had become res judicata and therefore, the appeal against the decree in O.S 66 of 1958 could not be maintained. The Supreme Court held—

    “Thus, the decision of the District Court rendered in the appeal arising out of respondent's suit became final and conclusive. That decision, not having been appealed against, could not be reopened in the second appeal arising out of the appellant's suit. The issue whether respondents had the easementary right to the flow of water through the appellant s land for fishing purposes was directly and substantially in issue in the respondent's suit. That issue was heard and finally decided by the District Court in a proceeding between the same parties and the decision was rendered before the High Court decided the second appeal. The decision of the District Court was given in an appeal arising out of a suit, which though instituted subsequently, stood finally decided before the High Court disposed of the second appeal. The decision was therefore, one in a ‘former suit’, within the meaning of S 11, Explanation I, C.P Code. Accordingly, the High Court was in error in deciding an issue which was heard and finally decided in a ‘former suit’ and was therefore, barred by res judicata,”

    The ratio of this judgment is clearly applicable to the facts in the present case. As in the decision of the Supreme Court, in the present case also the question of trusteeship has directly and substantially been in issue in both the suits. Though in the case before the Supreme Court, the trial court gave two separate judgments, when the matter came to the District court, the finding was given only in a common judgment. The Supreme Court's judgment that the issue was barred by res judicata was with reference to the appeal preferred in the High Court and not with reference to the appeal preferred in the lower appellate court. With reference to the appeal preferred in the High court it was against the common judgment rendered by the lower appellate court. Therefore, the decision could not be distinguished on the ground that in the trial court the judgment in the two suits were not common but separate.

    4. We need notice only one decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant and that is a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Panchana davelan v. Vythinatha Sastrigal. In that case, a tenant filed a suit against the landlord for the grant of patta for fasli 1310 with certain terms agreed to by him. The landlord filed a separate suit for a direction against the tenant to accept patta for the same fasli on the terms and conditions suggested by him. The question at issue in both the cases was identical, namely, as to the terms of the patta for the year. The suits were tried together and judgment was given on the same day. Though the decree to be passed in each suit was in effect to be the same, the suit filed by the tenant was dismissed while the suit filed by the landlord was decreed in accordance with the judgment. The tenant preferred an appeal against the dismissal of this suit, but he did not prefer any appeal against the decree granted in the landlord's suit. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the decree in the landlord's suit not having been appealed against would preclude the determination of the question again in the appeal preferred by him in nis suit. Against that judgment, second appeal was preferred which was referred to a Full Bench. The Full Bench was of the view that the tenant's appeal in his suit is successful would have the effect of superseding the adjudication in the landlord's suit but, however, it is not necessary to consider what might be the exact legal effect of such a supersession. In that view, the Full Bench held that the appellate court was not precluded from dealing with the appeal by reason of the doctrine of res judicata. Though it is possible to point out certain differences between the facts in this decision and the facts in the present case, it would not be proper to overlook the ratio of the judgment itself and I think the learned counsel for the appellant is right in his submission that the ratio is definitely for the view that it was not necessary for him to have filed an appeal against the decree in the first respondent's suit. But, as I have already pointed out, there is a direct judgment of the Supreme Court though without reference to the Full Bench decision of our High Court which had taken entirely a different view from that of the Full Bench of this Court and I am bound by the decision of the Supreme Court.

    5. It may be pointed out that the judgment of the Supreme Court was followed by two of of the learned Judges of this Court, one by Shanmukham, J. in Angappa Gounder v. Roja-velu Gounder and others, and the other by Balasubramanyan, J. in Khaja Mohideen v. Mohideen Batcha. I am also in agreement with the view expressed by the two learned Judges. The appellaat not having preferred an appeal against the decree in O.S 170 of 1967, the appeal preferred against O.S 175 of 1960 is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the finding in O.S 170 of 1967 is final and binding on the parties.

    6. The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that it is not open to the respondents at this stage to raise the question of bar by res judicata and that he is estopped from raising such a contention. This was on the ground that at the time when A.S 227 of 1971, was originally decided by the District Court of North Arcot at Vellore, before remand, this point was not raised as to the maintainability of the appeal by the respondents. He did not also raise the same when he preferred a second appeal nor did he raise this question after the matter came up for the second time before the District Judge in pursuance of the order of remand made by this Court in second appeal and therefore, he is estopped from raising this question. I think this point will have to be dealt with reference to each of the stages when the matter was dealt with by the courts below and this Court. At the time when the appeal was originally heard, since the appeal was by the appellant herein and not by the respondents, there was no occasion for specifically raising it. It is true that judgment and decree was against the respondents and in fact the first respondent preferred an appeal to this Court and even in the second appeal he did not raise this question. But, that judgment had been set aside on merits and there was no need for him to raise this question of bar by res judicata. When the matter again came up before the District Judge after remand also there was no occasion for the respondent to raise this question as the appeal itself was dismissed on merits and the judgment was not in his favour. Only in this Court for the first time it had become necessary for him to support the decree and he tried to support it on the ground that the appeal itself has to be dismissed on the basis of bar by res judicata. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondents are in any way estopped or precluded from raising this question in this second appeal.

    7. For the foregoing reasons the second appeal fails and it is dismissed. There Will fee no order as to costs.

    VCS.

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    S. Kandaswami Chettiar As Trustee Of Dharmaraja Koil, Arkonam v. R A. Murugesan Chettiar & Another
    (Jan 22, 1982)