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Smart Summary

Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns a retail textile partnership firm carried on under the name Messrs. S.R.P Ponnuswamy Chettiar. The partners and their respective shares in profits and losses were recorded as:

  • S.R.P Ponnuswamy Chettiar — 30%
  • P. Jagatheesan (son of No. 1) — 16¼%
  • P. Murugesando — 5%
  • P. Venkatesando — 16¼%
  • P. Sivanandando — 16¼%
  • P. Krishnamoorthydo — 16¼%

Four partners (the assessees in these references) retired from the partnership effective 17 April 1964. At retirement, according to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, they took the amounts to which they were entitled under the partnership deed — namely, their capital invested and their shares of profits to date. The firm was reconstituted by a deed dated 1 July 1964, made effective from 17 April 1964.

The Gift-tax Officer concluded that the retiring partners had relinquished their interests in the partnership (a right to share in future profits), and that such relinquishment amounted to gifts. The Officer valued partners' rights to share profits at 2 to 2½ times the average profits of the preceding three years and took the total value of these rights at Rs. 2,00,000; each assessee's share was calculated according to the percentage above and subjected to gift-tax.

The assessees appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who set aside the Gift-tax Officer's assessments, holding that the assessees had received what they were entitled to and had not relinquished their shares with intent to diminish their property and increase that of continuing partners. The department appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal). The department argued that retirement resulted in surrendering future profit rights to continuing partners and thus constituted a gift; the assessees argued retirement was pursuant to the partnership deed and did not constitute relinquishment in favour of any person.

The Tribunal held that retirement did not involve any transfer of property within the scope of section 2(xxiv) of the Gift-tax Act and upheld the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order, dismissing the department's appeals. The department then obtained a reference to this court, framing an identical question in each of the four references.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not liable to pay gift-tax under the Gift-tax Act, 1958, on the ground that he did not relinquish his right to share in the profits of the partnership on his retirement in favour of the continuing and newly admitted partners?

Arguments of the Parties

Department / Revenue's Arguments

  • On retirement, the continuing partners acquired full rights over the entire profits of the firm; the retiring partners thus surrendered their right to receive future profits without consideration, constituting a gift of property.
  • The Gift-tax Officer's valuation (2 to 2½ times average profits; aggregate value taken as Rs. 2,00,000) and consequent assessments were therefore proper.
  • Learned counsel for the revenue relied strongly on the decision in Commissioner of Gift-Tax, Madras v. V.A.M. Ayya Nadar ([1969] 73 ITR 761 (Mad)) to support the proposition that a partner's right to share in profits is property capable of transfer and that reallocation can amount to a gift.

Assessees' Arguments

  • The retirements were effected according to the partnership deed; on retirement the assessees received their capital and share of profits up to date, and there was no relinquishment of rights in favour of any person.
  • Therefore, there was no transfer of property attracting gift-tax under the Gift-tax Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner Of Gift-Tax, Madras v. V.A.M. Ayya Nadar, [1969] 73 ITR 761 (Mad) The decision treated a redistribution (realignment) of an existing partner's share of profits among partners (while the partner continued in the firm and his capital remained unchanged) as a transfer of a valuable right to share in profits, amounting to a gift. The court considered this decision relied on by the revenue but distinguished it: in V.A.M. Ayya Nadar the partner continued in the firm and had his profit share reduced (without corresponding capital reduction), creating a transferable right that diminished the assessee's interest and increased others'. In the present case the assessees retired, ending any right to future profits; therefore V.A.M. Ayya Nadar was held not to assist the revenue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court affirmed the Tribunal's conclusion. It framed the department's contention as asserting that the subject-matter of the alleged gift was the right to share in the profits of the partnership, and that by retirement the partners relinquished their rights to future profits which thus amounted to a gift.

The court rejected that contention for the following reasons, stated in the opinion:

  1. Even if the right of a partner to share profits is considered "property", a retiring partner does not have a right to share future profits once he has retired. A non-existent right (a right to future profits after retirement) cannot be treated as property for the purposes of the Gift-tax Act.
  2. Accepting the revenue's argument would lead to the untenable consequence that every retirement from a partnership would constitute a gift of rights to future profits.
  3. Practical questions would arise (which the revenue's counsel could not answer), such as the effect of the retiring partner's continuing liability (if any) for future losses — would such liability offset the alleged gift of future profit rights? The court noted no satisfactory answer was provided.
  4. The court examined the decision in V.A.M. Ayya Nadar (relied on by the revenue) and explained why it was distinguishable: in that case a partner who continued in the firm had his profit share reduced from one-third to one-ninth without reduction of capital, so a definite transferable interest in future profits was reallocated and treated as a gift. In contrast, in the present cases the partners retired; their rights to future profits terminated by retirement, so there was no giving up of an existing right to future profits.

Based on this analysis, the court concluded there was no transfer of property within section 2(xxiv) of the Gift-tax Act on retirement, and therefore no liability to gift-tax arose from the retirements in question.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Tribunal was right; the assessees are not liable to pay gift-tax on the ground that they did not relinquish any right to share in future profits of the partnership upon retirement.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Gift-tax Officer's assessments (based on valuing partners' profit-sharing rights at Rs. 2,00,000 and taxing the respective shares) were set aside; the Tribunal's confirmation of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order is upheld.
  • The court answered the referred question in the affirmative (i.e., the Tribunal was right) and in favour of the assessees in each of the four references.
  • The court awarded costs to the assessees (each assessee being entitled to costs) and fixed counsel's fee at Rs. 500 each.
  • The opinion does not discuss any broader implications beyond these cases; the court distinguished but did not overrule the precedent it considered, and it confined its decision to the factual and legal distinctions identified above.

    Addl. Commissioner Of Gift-Tax, Madras-Ii. v. P. Krishnamoorthy And Others.

    Ismail, J.:— There was a partnership firm under the name and style of Messrs. S.R.P Ponnuswamy Chettiar, carrying on business in retail in textiles. The partners and their respective shares in the profits and losses were as under:

    1. S.R.P Ponnuswamy Chettiar 30% 2. P. Jagatheesan, Son of No. 1 16¼% 3. P. Murugesando. 5% 4. P. Venkatesando. 16¼% 5. P. Sivanandando. 16¼% 6. P. Krishnamoorthydo. 16¼%

    2. Four partners, who are the assessees in these references, retried from the partnership with effect from April 17, 1964. At the time of retirement, as stated by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in his order, they took whatever they were entitled to from the partnership firm, namely, the amounts of capital invested along with profits and shares to their credit.

    3. The firm was reconstituted with the continuing two partners and certain others by a deed dated July 1, 1964, and that partnership became effective from April 17, 1964, namely, the date on which the four assessees herein retired. The Gift-tax Officer came to the conclusion that as a result of the retirement from the partnership firm, the assessees herein had relinquished their respective interests as shown above in the partnership firm and since the right of a partner to share in the profits of the firm is property capable of transfer and since the retirement of the assessees from the partnership firm had resulted in relinquishment of the interest in the partnership firm, there was diminution of the assessee's interest and corresponding increase in the value of shares in the hands of the continuing partners and, in the circumstances, the assessees relinquishing their rights in the partnership firm constituted gifts. The Gift-tax Officer valued the rights of all the partners to share the profits of the firm at 2 to 2½ times of the average profits during the preceding three years and the value of the rights of all the partners to share the profits of the partnership firm was taken by him at Rs. 2 lakhs and the respective assessee's shares were worked out on the percentage shown already and the amounts so arrived at were subjected to gift-tax.

    4. Appeals were preferred to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that when the assessees retired from the partnership firm, they were given whatever they were entitled to as per the partnership deed, namely, the amounts of capital invested along with profits and shares and there was no question of the assessees relinquishing their shares of interest with intent thereby to diminish the value of their own property and increase the value of the property of the continuing partners on retirement; consequently, there was no question of liability to gift-tax, with the result the Appellate Assistant Commissioner set aside the assessments made by the Gift-tax Officer. Against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the department preferred appeals to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the contentions of the department were that on account of the retirement of the assessees from the partnership, the continuing partners had full rights over the entire profits of the firm and to that extent the assessees surrendered the right of their shares in the profits without consideration which involved gift of property and that the gift-tax assessments made by the Gift-tax Officer were, therefore, proper. As against this, the assessees contended that since the retirement of the assessees from the partnership firm was as per the provisions of the partnership deed, there was no relinquishment of the assessees' rights in the partnership firm in favour of any one and, therefore, there was no liability to gift-tax. The Tribunal held that as a result of the assessees retiring from the partnership firm, there was no scope for transfer of any property falling under one or other provisions of section 2(xxiv) of the Gift-tax Act. The Tribunal further held that after retiring from the partnership firm, what is received by the assessees as their respective shares in the net partnership assets, after deducting liabilities and prior charges on settlement of accounts, does not result in transfer of any interest in property from the retiring partners to the continuing partners in the assets of the partnership and there was no transfer of property falling under one or other provisions of section 2(xxiv) of the Gift-tax Act. In this view, the Tribunal upheld the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and dismissed the appeals preferred by the department.

    5. It is the correctness of this conclusion of the Tribunal that is challenged by the department by applying for and obtaining a reference of the following question for the opinion of this court:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not liable to pay gift-tax under the Gift-tax Act, 1958, on the ground that he did not relinquish his right to share in the profits of the partnership on his retirement in favour of the continuing and newly admitted partners?”

    6. We may point out that the question is identical in all the four references.

    7. We are clearly of the opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal is correct. From the question reproduced above, it is clear that, according to the department, the subject-matter of the gift was a right to share in the profits of the partnership. It is not in dispute that when the assessees retired from the partnership, they received their share in the assets of the partnership including their share of profits up-to-date. Consequently, the only contention of the department, which has been made clear to us, is that, by retirement, the partners have relinquished their rights to receive the profits in future and that constituted a gift. We are unable to accept this argument. In the first place, even when the right of a partner to share the profits of the firm is considered to be “property”, there is no question of a retiring partner having a right to share the future profits. If so, such a non-existent right cannot be “property” as contemplated by the statute. The learned counsel for the revenue repeatedly contended before us that even when a partner retires from a partnership after receiving his share of assets and profits of the partnership, still he gives up his right to receive future profits and that would constitute a gift. The acceptance of this argument of the revenue will lead to the strange proposition that in the case of every retirement of a partner from a partnership a gift of a right to receive future profits of that partner is involved and such a proposition is obviously untenable. Further, if such a proposition is a valid one, a question will naturally arise as to what should happen to the liability of the retiring partner to share the future losses. Is there to be a set-off or adjustment ?, If so, will not the liability to share the future loss neutralise the right to share the future profits? The learned counsel for the revenue has no answer to any of these questions. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention of the revenue, and the moment a partner retires from the partnership, he will have no right to receive any future profits in the said firm and hence there is no question of his giving up any such right. The learned counsel strongly relied on a decision of this court in Commissioner Of Gift-Tax, Madras v. V.A.M Ayya Nadar, [1969] 73 ITR 761 (Mad). In that case, what happened was that the assessee therein was a partner of a firm under the name and style of V.A.M Rathinam Brothers, which carried on business at Virudhunagar. It had nine partners with four minors admitted to the benefits of the partnership. The assessee had a third share in the profits of the firm as well as its liabilities. By a deed dated March 31, 1958, the firm was reconstituted with effect from January 31 of that year. By that time, one of the minors having become a major, he was taken as a full-fledged partner and the remaining minors continued to have the benefits of the partnership. One further change was that the assessee was allotted a one-ninth share out of the one-third share and the balance of two-ninths share was distributed as between two other partners. The Tribunal found that notwithstanding the distribution of two-ninths share, the assessee's share capital remained as it was prior to January 31, 1958, and that the transfer if at all was only of a two-ninths share in the future profits and losses of the business. Under these circumstances, the question that came up for consideration was whether there was a gift by the assessee of the right to receive his 2/9th share of the profits of the firm. This court held that the same constituted a gift. This court observed (page 763):

    “Quite apart from this reasoning, we are inclined to think that a right of a partner to share in the profits is as much property as a right of a partner to share in the assets of the firm. It is the right of a partner which entitles him to a share in the profits of the firm and that, as we think, is a valuable right and capable of transfer at least as between the partners by common consent. When so much is clear, we encounter no difficulty in approving the next step that when there is distribution of a quantum of the share of profit as between its original holder and certain others who are all partners, it involves a transfer of the right which has the effect of diminishing the assessee's interest and correspondingly increasing the value or quantum of the shares earlier held by the other two partners. On that view we think that the distribution by way of realignment of the one-third share of the assessee did involve transfer of property amounting to a gift chargeable to tax.”

    8. We are clearly of the opinion that that case has no bearing whatever on the present case. In that case, a partner, who was entitled to ⅓rd share, by realignment Was allotted only 1/9th Share and the balance of 2/9th share went to other partners. At the same time, that partner's share of the capital was not reduced and he continued to be a partner. Consequently, in view of his continuing as a partner, he had a right to share the profits, so long as he continued. But he got that right reduced from ⅓rd to 1/9th without at the same time reducing his share of the capital proportionately with the result 2/9th share in the profits was treated as gift. In the present case, the assessees have retired from the partnership. The moment they have retired, their right to a share in the future profits of the firm came to an end and, therefore, there is no question of their giving up any right to share the future profits. In view of this, the decision of this court in V.A.M Ayya Nadar's case, [1969] 73 ITR 761 (Mad) referred to above cannot be of any assistance whatever to the case of the revenue in the present references. Under these circumstances, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee in each of these references. The assessees being different individuals, they will be entitled to their costs and the counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 500 each.

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    Addl. Commissioner Of Gift-Tax, Madras-Ii. v. P. Krishnamoorthy And Others.
    (Mar 11, 1977)