1. All these three revision petitions arise out of a common Order passed in three different rent control applications, both by the Rent Controller and also by the appellate authority. The petitioner in these revision petitions is the same. He filed the eviction petitions in respect of three different shops occupied by the different respondents therein under Sections 10(2) (7) and 14(1) (b) of the Act.
2. The trial Court found that the requirement of the building for demolition and reconstruction under Section 14(1) (b) is bona fide but holding that there is no valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, dismissed the eviction petitions. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the landlord preferred three rent control appeals. The lower appellate court confirmed the finding as regards the bona fide requirement of the landlord is concerned for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction. On the ground of defective notice, the lower appellate court observed that the vague allegation of the petitioners herein to the effect that the landlord is not the absolute owner of the property will amount to denial of the landlord's title and as such, no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary. The lower appellate court also held that Exs. P-9 and P-12 notices issued are valid and sufficient in law for filing the eviction petitions. With these observations, the lower appellate court ordered eviction. Aggrieved by the order passed by the lower appellate court, the petitioners in each of these revision petitions have filed independent civil revision petitions which are numbered as C.R Ps. 455 to 457 of 1975.
3. At the outset, I am convinced that the finding as regards the bona fides made by the courts below are correct.
4. Mr. Kuppuswami, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in each of these revision petitions, submitted that the eviction petitioners must fail for want of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. For this purpose, he read the notices given by the landlord and also the reply Ex. P-14. According to the learned counsel, there is absolutely no denial of title by the tenants; nor there is evidence as regards the denial of title alleged by the respondent herein. Except pleading that the tenants have denied the title, the respondent has not proved whether there was such a denial. Hence, Mr. Kuppuswami, the learned counsel submits that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary before filing any petition for eviction and since the respondent in each of the revision petitions failed to give such a notice, the eviction petitions ought to have been dismissed on this short alone, Mr. B.T Seshadri, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-landlord, read to me the petitions and counter statements filed in H.R.C 3062 of 1972 and also the petitions filed in the present rent control applications for the purpose of establishing that the tenants have denied the title at least partially. According to the learned counsel, such a denial of title will disentitle the tenants to ask for notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is submitted that the notice issued must be construed as one under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, inasmuch as the tenants have denied the title of the respondents herein.
5. To substantiate his contentions, Mr. B.T Seshadri cited Hashmat Husain v. Saghir Ahmad, AIR 1958 All 847, Thangavelu v. Bahadur Sheriff, (1970) 83 LW 124 and Venkaji Krishna v. Lakshman Devji, ILR 20 Bom 354 (FB). As far as the Allahabad decision is concerned, the case is filed under the Rent Control Act but that is a suit in ejectment wherein the Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that partial denial of title will disentitle the tenant to ask for notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The other two decisions cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case.
6. The present application was filed under Sections 10(2) (7) and 14(1) (b) of the Madras Act 18 of 1960. Section 14(1) (b) is for demolition and reconstruction. Section 10(2) (7) states that eviction can be ordered if the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide. If such denial is not bona fide the Controller shall make an order directing the tenants to put the landlord in possession of the building and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he can make an order rejecting the application. It has been held by the Supreme Court that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary for terminating the tenancy of a tenant before filing any eviction petition. Except pleading that the tenants have denied the title of the respondent herein, the respondent has not proved the said allegation.
7. The reply notice and also the counter statements filed by the tenants, both in H.R.C 3062 of 1972 and in the present applications, cannot be read as denial of title made by the tenants in this case. As far as the present applications for eviction are concerned, the tenants have specifically admitted that the respondent is the landlord but they have questioned the bona fides of the claim for demolition and reconstruction on various grounds, such as, that the property is a trust property, that the petitioner in the eviction petition is one of the trustees and not the full owner of the trust property. As far as the rent control applications are concerned, it is not the ownership of the property that entitles a person to file an eviction petition but when a person comes under the definition of ‘landlord’ mentioned in Section 2(6) of the Act, he is entitled to maintain a petition for eviction. The denial of title contemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, when it is made applicable for any eviction prayed for under Madras Act 18 of 1960, must be read to denote the denial of the right of the landlord to maintain the petition for eviction. As far as the present case is concerned, the tenants never denied that the respondent herein is the landlord. On the other hand, they questioned only the bona fides of the claim of the respondent for demolition and reconstruction.
8. Even apart from this aspect of the case, if a landlord invokes the provisions of Madras Act 18 of 1960, it is incumbent upon him to terminate the tenancy as per Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, since he approaches the court on the specific plea that the respondent in the eviction petition is his tenant.
9. Taking all these aspects into consideration, I am of the view that the respondent in all these revision petitions has failed to give the statutory notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such, the eviction petitions have to be dismissed for want of notice.
10. In these circumstances, the revision petitions are allowed with the result that the order of the Rent Controller is restored. There will be no order as to costs in all these revision petitions.
11. Petitions allowed.