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  • S. 96 of the Motor Vehicle Act. That Section
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  • S. 96 of the Motor Vehicle Act. That Section
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — (Maharajan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 3 September 1967 at about 5:30 p.m., between mile-stones 274/4 and 274/5 on the Madurai–Dindigul Road there was a collision between bus MDU 6991 (Kodaikanal Motor Union (P.) Ltd.) and lorry MDA 1440 (Srinivasa Roadways Ltd.). Ten passengers in the bus were injured and one passenger, Prof. Sundaramoorthy, died in hospital about two weeks later. The road at the scene was a national highway with a tarred portion 22 ft. 4 in. wide and mud shoulders about 4 ft. wide on each side (total about 30 ft. 4 in.), wide enough for a lorry and a bus to pass in opposite directions with a clearance if each had kept to the right.

The Sub-Inspector of Police (R.W.2) prepared a rough sketch (Ex. B.7) and the Motor Vehicles Inspector (R.W.4) prepared a report (Ex. B.19), but neither could determine responsibility from road marks or vehicle positions. The Tribunal (Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madurai) made a common order in M.A.C.O.P. 75 and 143 to 145 of 1968. These appeals and Civil Revision Petitions challenge that common order. The appellate court examined eyewitness testimony (including P.Ws 2, 5 and 7 — passengers who were injured, R.W.1 — the bus driver, and R.W.5 — the lorry driver) and evidence to determine responsibility and quantum of compensation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Which vehicle/driver was responsible for the collision (i.e., causation and negligence)?
  2. Whether the insurer (Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd.) is liable to indemnify when the driver did not hold an effective licence on the date of the accident, in light of S. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the terms of the insurance policy (Ex. B8).
  3. Whether the compensation amounts fixed by the Tribunal for the deceased and injured claimants are reasonable and require adjustment.

Arguments of the Parties

Insurer's Arguments

  • The insurer contended that it was not liable because the bus driver (R.W.1) did not have a valid (effective) driving licence at the time of the accident; the licence had expired and had not been renewed for the period 16 October 1966 to 29 September 1967.
  • Learned counsel for the insurer relied on S. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, arguing that the insurer could incorporate a condition excluding liability where the driver was not duly licensed, and that the proviso in the policy should be construed so as to exclude coverage where the driver did not hold an effective licence at the time of the accident.
  • The insurer's counsel relied on a judicial decision (Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Muniswami) for the proposition that the currency of the driving licence is a condition precedent to attracting the insurer's liability under the policy.

Claimants and Other Contentions

  • Eyewitnesses (P.Ws 2, 5 and 7) — passengers who were injured — gave evidence implicating the bus driver. The appellate court found their evidence acceptable and acted upon it.
  • The Tribunal's awards of compensation to the dependants and injured passengers were challenged on appeal as to reasonableness (one appeal for enhancement by dependants of the deceased was specifically noted and dismissed).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Muniswami (reported decision by Natarajan, J.) Interpreted S. 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act to mean the driver must be "duly licensed" on the date of the accident; the currency of the driving licence was treated as a condition precedent to insurer's liability under the policy. The court explicitly recorded respectful disagreement with Natarajan, J.'s interpretation. It held that where the policy itself contains a clause covering a driver who "has held and is not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence" the insurer cannot escape liability merely because the driver's licence was not current on the accident date. The court emphasized the need to look to the precise terms of the policy.
Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Daniel (ruling by Raghavan, J.) Interpreted a policy that incorporated all the conditions laid down in S. 96(2)(b)(ii), supporting an insurer's right to exclude liability where such conditions were present in the policy. The court distinguished this decision on the factual ground that the policy in V. Daniel incorporated all statutory conditions. The present court emphasized that if a policy omits some of the statutory conditions and positively undertakes to cover the risk, the insurer cannot fall back on the statute to avoid liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in these primary steps, each grounded on evidence and the contract terms of insurance:

  1. Causation/negligence: Investigative officers (R.W.2 and R.W.4) could not attribute responsibility from marks or positions of vehicles. The court therefore relied upon oral eyewitness evidence. It found the Tribunal's reasons for rejecting the testimony of P.Ws 2, 5 and 7 unsound, accepted their evidence as credible, and concluded that the bus driver (MDU 6991) was responsible for the accident by his rash and negligent driving.
  2. Vicarious liability: Given the court's finding of negligence by the bus driver, the owner (Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd.) is vicariously liable to pay compensation to the victims. The insurer of that bus (Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd., Belgaum) contested liability on the ground of the driver's licence status.
  3. Statute vs. policy wording (S. 96 analysis): The court analyzed S. 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, noting that the statute enumerates conditions that an insurer may incorporate to defend a claim (including exclusion for driving by a person "who is not duly licensed"). The court emphasized that such defenses are available only if the insurer actually incorporates those conditions into the policy. The statutory clause is permissive: it permits insurers to include certain exclusions, but does not automatically import them into any given contract of insurance.
  4. Construction of the policy (Ex. B8): The policy's schedule permitted the vehicle to be driven by "the insured or any other person provided he is in the insured's employ ... provided that the person driving holds a licence to drive the motor vehicle or has held and is not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence." The court read this proviso as expressly covering a driver who had held a licence previously and was not disqualified, even if the licence was not then current. The court rejected the insurer's contention that this proviso should be read so as to exclude coverage where the licence was not effective on the accident date.
  5. Effect on insurer's liability: Because the insurer, with full knowledge, had contracted to cover a driver who had previously held a licence and was not disqualified, the insurer could not rely on S. 96 to avoid liability. The terms of the insurance contract (Ex. B8) govern. Accordingly the Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. was held liable under its policy for the accident, subject to the policy limits (Rs. 2,000 per passenger; cumulative company liability capped at Rs. 20,000 at the time).
  6. Quantum of compensation: The court reviewed each award:
    • Deceased Prof. Sundaramoorthy: Tribunal awarded Rs. 55,000. The court found the amount not unreasonably high given his age (41), employment (Professor of English, basic pay Rs. 420 + dearness allowance Rs. 120 per month), prospects of promotion, dependency evidence (monthly support Rs. 250; yearly dependency about Rs. 4,000), receipt of provident fund by the widow, and appropriate discounting for lump-sum payment. The court did note the Tribunal erred in awarding compensation for "mental agony of the survivors" rather than compensation for the physical and mental agony of the deceased; yet it confirmed the Rs. 55,000 award.
    • O.P. 143 (Jayachandran): Award of Rs. 250 was confirmed as reasonable. No appeal preferred by that claimant.
    • O.P. 144 (Saroja): Award of Rs. 10,000 confirmed. Medical evidence showed compound fracture of both bones of left leg, permanent 20% disability, ongoing need for caliper and taxi travel; compensation deemed reasonable for permanent disability, medical expenses and mental agony.
    • O.P. 145 (Swaminathan): Award of Rs. 1,000 for minor injuries confirmed.
  7. Distribution and payment: Of the Rs. 55,000 for the deceased, Rs. 7,000 to Sangammal (4th petitioner) and the balance Rs. 48,000 to be divided equally among petitioners 1 to 3; minors' shares to remain invested in a nationalised bank while they remain minors; the widow (Thylambal) may withdraw her share of Rs. 16,000 and draw interest on minors' investments for maintenance.
  8. Appeals and revisions: The appeals and Civil Revision Petitions filed by the owner of Srinivasa Roadways and by the insurer of the lorry were allowed "as indicated above." The appeal for enhancement by dependants (C.M.A 282 of 1971) was dismissed. There was no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the bus driver (MDU 6991) was responsible for the accident due to rash and negligent driving; the Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd. is vicariously liable; and Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd., Belgaum, is liable under the terms of its policy (Ex. B8) to indemnify within the policy limits (Rs. 2,000 per passenger; cumulative company liability Rs. 20,000). The quantum awards by the Tribunal (Rs. 55,000 for the deceased; Rs. 250, Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 1,000 for the other claimants) were largely confirmed, with the specified apportionments between insurer and owner as recorded by the court.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The owner of the bus is liable to pay the portion of compensation not covered by the insurer. The insurer is bound by the express terms of the policy and must indemnify up to its contractual limits even where the driver’s licence was not current, provided the policy expressly covers a driver who "has held and is not disqualified" for a licence.
  • Interpretive point: The court emphasized that S. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act enumerates conditions that an insurer may incorporate, but those conditions operate only if they are actually incorporated in the policy. Where the insurer has chosen to insure a risk (by contractually covering drivers who had previously held licences and are not disqualified), the insurer cannot avoid liability by invoking the statute.
  • Precedential note: The court recorded respectful disagreement with the interpretation in Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Muniswami and distinguished Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Daniel on the basis of the specific policy terms in the earlier case. The decision therefore places emphasis on the primacy of the policy terms in determining insurer liability under S. 96.

No costs were ordered. The shares of minors are to remain invested as specified.

    Messrs. Srinivasa Roadways, Madurai v. Saroja And Others

    (Maharajan, J.)

    1. These appeals and Civil Revision Petitions are directed against the common order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madurai, in M.A.C.O.P 75 and 143 to 145 of 1968. On 3rd September 1967, at about 5-30 pm, between mile-stones 274/4 and 274/5, in Madurai—Dindigul Road, there was a collision between the bus MDU 6991 belonging to the Kodaikanal Motor Union (Pie.) Ltd., and lorry MDA 1440 belonging to Srinivasa Roadways Ltd. A number of persons were inside the bus as passengers at the time of the collision, and ten of the passengers received injuries and one of them, Prof. Sundaramoorthy, succumbed to his injuries in the hospital about two weeks after the accident. The scene of the accident is a national highway, the tarred portion of which is 22 ft. 4 inches wide. There is a mud portion about 4 ft. wide on either side of the road. The total width of the road at the scene of accident would therefore be about 30 ft. 4 inches. The road is wide enough, therefor, to allow free passage for a lorry and a bus moving in opposite directions. If each of the vehicles had been driven on its right side of the road, there would have been a clearance of at least 14 ft. in between the crossing vehicles. But unfortunately, at the time of crossing, the right portion of one of the vehicles came into contact with the right portion of its opposite number, and both got badly damaged.

    2. The Sub Inspector of Police, R.W 2, came to the scene and prepared a rough sketch Ex. B.7 The Motor Vehicles Inspector, R.W 4, visited the scene the next day, and prepared a report as per Ex. B.19 Strangely enough, neither of them is able to say, from the marks on the road and the relative positions of the vehicles, which of the drivers was responsible for this tragic collision. We have, therefore, to fall back upon the oral evidence on record in order to understand now she collision could have happened.

    3. As many as five eyes witnesses to the accident were examined by both the parties and they are P.Ws 2, 5 and 7, who were passengers in the bus and who got injured, R.W 1, the driver of the bus and R.W 5, the driver of the lorry.

    [The discussion of the evidence is omitted-Ed.] We, therefore, disagree with the Tribunal and hold that neither of the reasons given by is for rejecting the evidence of P.Ws 2, 5 and 7 is sound. We are satisfied that their evidence is acceptable and shall be acted upon, in which case we have no option but to hold that ir was the driver of the bus MDU 6991 who was responsible for the accident by his rash and negligent driving.

    4. It would then follow that the Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd., Ammayanaickanur, will be vicariously liable to pay compensation for the victims of the accident. The insurer of Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd. is the Motor Owners Insurance Co., Ltd., Belgaum. Though the insurer did not take the objection before the Tribunal that it was not liable to cover the risks involved in the case, because the driver of the bus had no valid licence at the time of the accident, this objection has been taken before us on foot of an admission made by the driver of the bus himself, R.W 1, to the effect that though he had been holding a licence previously, he had failed to renew the licence for the period from 16th October 1966 upto 29th September 1967 and that he actually renewed the licence only with effect from 30th September 1967. Let us assume that R.W 1, the bus driver, did not have an effective licence on the date of the accident. The question arises whether this circumstance would exonerate the insurer of the liability to pay compensation. Reference has been made by learned counsel for the Insurance Company to S. 96 of the Motor Vehicle Act. That Section provides that an insurer shall be entitled to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely;

    ‘96 (2)(a)…or (f) that there has bee a breach of a specified condition of the policy being one of the following conditions, namely, (i) s condition excluding the use of the vehicles—(a)…(b)…(c)…(d)

    (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification.”

    While the above provision makes it clear that the right of the Insurance Company to defend is restricted to the various conditions set out in this sub-section, it is also clear from the sub-section that none of those defences will be available to the Insurance Company unless it incorporates these conditions in the policy. The expression in Cl. (b) of S. 96(2) that there has been breach of a specified condition of the policy being one of the following conditions, reinforces this conclusion. All that the Section does is to enumerate the condition, which the Insurance Company is at liberty to incorporate in the policy. What the Act in effect tells the Insurance Company is:

    “There are cestain risks which under the statute, you are bound to cover. There are certain other risks which by negotiating with the owner of the vehicle you may choose to cover at your option though under the statute you are not bound to cover the same”.

    S. 96 enables the Insurance Company to defend an action against it on the ground that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy and enables the company to incorporate in the policy any of the conditions mentioned in sub-Cl. (ii) of Cl. (b) of S. 96(2) namely,

    “a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licenced or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification.”

    This clause, it may be noted contains three sub-clauses which are disjunctive, namely: (1) excluding driving by a named person or persons or (2) excluding driving by any person who is not duly licensed, or (3) excluding driving by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification. The first clause permits an Insurance Company to rid itself of the liability by providing that if an accident occurs while a named person drives the vehicle, the company shall not be liable to indemnify the owner. The second clause enables the Insurance Company to disclaim liability in cases where at the time of accident the driver is a person who does not hold a licence duly granted to him. The third clause enables the Insurance Company to disclaim liability in cases where during the accident the vehicle was driven by a person who might not hold a valid licence at the time of the accident, but who had held a licence previously, but who had not been disqualified for holding or obtaining it. In other words, the three sub-clauses in S. 96(2)(b)(ii) indicate the amptitude of permissible exclusion. As the sub-clauses are disjunctive, an option is given to the Insurance Company to exclude at its discretion driving either by a named person or by a person who is not duly licenced or by a person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence or to exclude driving by all these clauses of persons. In other words it is open to the Insurance Company to refuse to cover a risk brought about by a person like R. 1. in this case who at the time of the accident, had held a liceace, but bad no effective licence covering the period of the accident. But, unfortunately the Insurance Company has in this case exercised its option even to include a person who had held a licence prior to the date of the accident (that is to say, a licence that bad expired prior to the date of the accident) and yet was not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence at the time of that accident. The Insurance policy issued by the Motor Owners Insurance Co., Ltd., in this case has been marked as Ex. B8. In the schedule to this policy, the limitations as to use of the bus have been defined and it is stipulated that 44 the vehicle may be driven either by the insured or any other person provided he is in the insured's employ and is driving on his order or with his permission; provided that the person driving holds a licence to drive the motor vehicle or has held and is not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence”. What is the construction to be placed on the words ‘the person driving holds a licence to drive the motor vehicle or has held and is not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence?’ This clause clearly contemplates a person who did not hold a valid licence on the date of the accident, but who had held a licence previously and who had rot, at the time of accident, been disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence. The Insurance Company, with its great business experience, must have thought it right to cover an accident caused by a person who has had considerable driving experience, and yet due to inadvertence or absent mindedness, has not chosen to renew that licence during the period allowed by law and has been involved in an accident while he had not yet obtained a renewal of the licence. Evidently, the Insurance Company trusts experienced drivers not to drive the vehicle rashly and negligently, this expectation, resting upon their past performance rather than upon the technical, but unimportant question whether they have been careful and alert enough to renew the licence within the period allowed by law. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company says that the proviso should be construed in such a way as to exclude the intention of the Insurance Company to cover driving by a person who did not hold an effective licence at the time of the accident. We are entirely at a lost to accept such a construction. The Insurance Company is given the option to impose conditions which it is permitted by the statute to impose, and to exclude liability when the vehicle is driven by a person who is not duly licensed at the time of the accident. If the Company does not take advantage of the permissible conditions and with its eyes open enters into a contract, whereby it undertakes to cover risks which it need not cover under S. 96 of the Act, then it cannot escape liability. In this case, it is the terms of the policy that ought to guide us and those terms make it clear that the Company would be liable even in a case where a driver has held a licence previously but did not hold an effective licence at the time of the accident and has not been disqualified at the time of the accident for holding or obtaining such a licence. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company relies upon the decision of Natarajan, J. in The Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Muniswami(1), where the learned Judge, while interpreting S. 96(2) of the Act, has made the following observation:

    “The word ‘duly licensed’ in S. 96(2) of the Act clearly goes to show that in order to attract the term of the policy, the driver of the vehicle, on the date of the accident, must be a person who is duly licensed or who is not disqualified for holding or detaining a driving licence. The currency of the driving licence is a condition precedent to the attraction of the liability of the Insurance Company under the terms of the policy of insurance. The disqualification referred to in the sub-clause will have reference only to a current licence held by the driver on the date of the accident or a licence obtained by the driver during the period of such disqualification. It certainly cannot have any reference to a date expired licence.”

    5. After making these observations, with which we respectfully disagree, the learned Judge relied upon the ruling of Raghavan, J. in Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Daniel(2). We do not think that the ruling of Raghavan, J. affords any support to the proposition laid down by Natarajan, J. It can be distinguished on the ground that the policy which Raghavan, J. was called upon to interpret incorporated all the conditions laid down in S. 96(2)(b)(ii). The thing to look into is the policy and the question to ask is, “Does the Policy incorporate any or all of the conditions which the statute permits an Insurance Company to incorporate?” If it incorporates all the conditions mentioned in the Section, including the one which excludes driving by a person who is not duly licenced at the time of the accident, the Insurer will be exonerated of liability. If, on the other hand the policy incorporates only some of the conditions and omits the others mentioned in the statute, the Insurer cannot resist liability on the ground that though the policy has omitted the conditions, the conditions are there in the statute. If, as in this case, all the conditions laid down in the Section are not reproduced in the policy, and the policy positively undertakes to cover liability in respect of an accident caused by a person, who though not having an effective licence at the time of the accident, has not been disqualified to hold a licence, the Company cannot, in disregard of its policy, fall back upon the Section and say that despite the contract it has entered into to the contrary, it must be exonerated of liability. We, therefore, hold that the Motor Owners Insurance Co., Ltd., Belgaum, is liable, by and under the terms of the policy issued by it, to cover the risk that has occurred in this case. Needless to add that its liability will be limited to Rs. 2,000 per passenger and the cumulative liability of the company for the entire accident would be limited to Rs. 20,000 At the time of the accident the relevant Section had not been amended to enlarge the total liability to Rs. 50,000.

    6. We shall next examine the reasonableness of the compensation that has been awarded by the tribunal. So far as the deceased Prof. Sundaramurthi is concerned, the claimants in O.P 75 of 1968—appellants in C.M.A 282 of 1971—who are the widow, children and mother of the deceased, have been awarded a compensation of Rs. 55,000. The deceased was a Professor of English employed in G.T.N College, Dindigul, drawing a basic pay of Rs. 420 per mensem and dearness allowance of Rs. 120 per month. He was aged 41 at the time of his death. But for the accident, he could have lived for many more years, and he could have been earning upto his 58th or 60th year. He had also chances of promotion. He sustained very serious injuries as a result of which he died two weeks after the accident. The Tribunal was wrong in awarding any compensation for the mental agony of the survivors. It ought to have awarded compensation for the physical and mental agony undergone by the victim. The evidence shows that he was spending Rs. 250 every month upon his dependent. The value of dependency may be put at about Rs. 4,000 per year. Having regard to his chances of promotion, and having regard to the fact that his wife is only 30 years old and may live for another 30 years, and taking into account other relevant factors such as receipt of the provident fund by the widow and the need for making a discount for lump sum of payment of compensation, the amount of Rs. 55,000 fixed by the Tribunal cannot be said to be unreasonably high. We therefore, confirm that figure. Out of this amount of Rs. 55,000, only a sum of Rs. 2,000 would be payable by the Motor Owners Insurance Co., Ltd., and the balance by the Kodaikanal Motor Union (Pte) Ltd.

    7. Next, we may deal with the compensation awarded to the claimant in O.P 143 of 1968. The Tribunal has fixed a compensation of Rs. 250 for the injuries sustained by Jayachandran, the petitioner in O.P 143 of 1968. He has not preferred any appeal. We think the compensation awarded to him is reasonable, and we confirm it. This amount will be payable by the Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd.

    8. Saroja, the petitioner in O.P 144 of 1968, has been awarded a compensation of Rs 10,000. She is 35 years old. During the accident her left leg below the knee was broken and she was put in plaster. Three months later, when the plaster was removed, it was found that the bones had not joined, whereupon she was treated in the hospital at Madurai. She came to the hospital by taxi every time and she was given special caliper. The medical evidence shows that she sustained a compound fracture of both the bones of the left leg, and has sustained a permanent 20 percent disability. It is the evidence of P.W 4, the Orthopaedic Surgeon attached to the Government Erskine Hospital, that without wearing caliper, she would tumble down and that in the present state of her disability she cannot work like any other normal person. The injury has permanently affected her gait. The mental agony suffered by her must have been considerable and she has to be compensated for the permanent disability which she has suffered, as well as for the expenses of medical treatment and for taxi charges. Taking all these factors into account, the tribunal has fixed a compensation at Rs. 10,000 which we think is quite reasonable. Out of this amount, a sum of Rs. 2,000 will be paid by the Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. and the balance of Rs. 8,000 will be paid by the Kodaikanai Motor Union (P) Ltd.

    9. Swaminathan, the petitioner in O.P 145 of 1968, sustained only minor injuries and he has been awarded a sum of Rs. 1,000 by way of compensation. We see no reason to interfere with the quantum of compensation awarded to him. This amount will be payable by the Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd.

    10. Out of the amount of Rs. 55,000 awarded to the claimants in O.P 75 of 1968, a sum of Rs. 7,000 will be paid to Sangammal, the 4th petitioner, and the balance of Rs. 48,000 will be divided equally among petitioners 1 to 3. The shares of the minors Anusuya and Kannan will remain invested in any nationalised bank so long as they continue to be minors. Thylambal, the 1st petitioner, will be entitled to withdraw her share of Rs. 16,000 and to draw interest from the amounts invested in the names of her minor children for the purpose of meeting the expenses of maintaining them.

    11. The appeals and the Civil Revision Petitions preferred by the owner of Srinivasa Roadways, namely, C.M.A 262 and 263 of 1970 and C.R.P 1397 and 1398 of 1970 are allowed as Indicated above. So also, the two appeals and C.R.Ps, preferred by the insurer Of the lorry, namely, C.M.A 291 and 292 of 1970; and C.R.P 1598 and 1599 of 1970 are allowed as indicated above. C.M.A 282 of 1971 filed by the dependants of Sundaramurthi for enhancement of the compensation is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

    V.C.S

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    Messrs. Srinivasa Roadways, Madurai v. Saroja And Others
    (Apr 3, 1974)