Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Cl. (1) of S. 3 of the Wakf Act, 1954 (Central Act 29 of 1954) (hereinafter referred
  • ORISSA HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT
  • Madras Wakf (Supplementary) Act, 1961, Madras Act 19 of 1961,
  • S. 64 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act
  • Central Act was amended. S. 2 of the Madras Act
  • Wakf Act, Central Act 29 of 1954,
  • Ss. 4 and 5 of the Wakf Act
  • S. 66-C of the Central Act.
  • S. (3)(1) of the Central Act,
  • S, 66-C of the Wakf Act.
  • S. 3(1) of the Wakf Act
  • Madras Act 19 of 1961
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Cl. (1) of S. 3 of the Wakf Act, 1954 (Central Act 29 of 1954) (hereinafter referred
  • ORISSA HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT
  • Madras Wakf (Supplementary) Act, 1961, Madras Act 19 of 1961,
  • S. 64 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act
  • Central Act was amended. S. 2 of the Madras Act
  • Wakf Act, Central Act 29 of 1954,
  • Ss. 4 and 5 of the Wakf Act
  • S. 66-C of the Central Act.
  • S. (3)(1) of the Central Act,
  • S, 66-C of the Wakf Act.
  • S. 3(1) of the Wakf Act
  • Madras Act 19 of 1961
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Letters Patent Appeal challenges the judgment of Alagiriswami J., who allowed the second appeal in a suit concerning the title to a disputed property. The appellant, Madras State Wakf Board, had published a notification under Section 5 of the Wakf Act, declaring the property as a wakf. The plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration of his title and a permanent injunction to restrain the Board from acting on the notification. The core dispute was whether the property constituted a wakf. The plaintiff contended that the property was granted by a non-Muslim for the support of Kazi service and thus did not qualify as wakf under the Wakf Act. The defendant-appellant claimed the property was a wakf, relying on the grant being made by a Muslim or alternatively falling under Section 66-C of the Wakf Act. The trial court and the second appeal court found no evidence as to the grantor's religion and held that the property was granted for Kazi service, which does not fall within the categories of Section 66-C. Consequently, the property was held not to be a wakf, and the plaintiff was entitled to the decree sought.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disputed property qualifies as a wakf under Section 3(1) of the Wakf Act, given the uncertainty about whether the grantor was a Muslim or a non-Muslim.
  2. Whether a grant made by a non-Muslim for Kazi service constitutes a wakf under the Wakf Act or under Section 66-C of the Act.
  3. The allocation of the burden of proof regarding the character of the property after publication of the Wakf Board's notification under Section 5 of the Wakf Act.
  4. Whether the Wakf Board's notification constitutes a quasi-judicial determination shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The property is a wakf because the grant was made by a Muslim.
  • Even if the grant was by a non-Muslim, the property falls within the inclusive definition under Section 66-C of the Wakf Act, which applies to properties donated by non-Muslims for support of certain wakfs.
  • The Wakf Board's publication of the notification under Section 5 of the Wakf Act is a quasi-judicial finding, shifting the initial burden of proof to the plaintiff to show the property is not a wakf.
  • Reference to the precedent Mahant Sri Srinivasa Ramanuja das v. Suryanarayandas to support the contention that the Board's notification has quasi-judicial effect, analogous to provisions under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
  • Some entries in the Inam Fair Register suggest the grant was for a mosque, which would support the property being a wakf under Section 66-C.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The grant was made by a non-Muslim (a Hindu ruler) for Kazi service, which is not a purpose recognized as wakf under the Wakf Act.
  • The burden of proof lies on the defendant Wakf Board to establish that the property is a wakf.
  • The Board's notification is an administrative act of survey and publication, not a quasi-judicial determination, and therefore does not shift the burden of proof.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahant Sri Srinivasa Ramanuja das v. Suryanarayandas Determination of religious institution character under a quasi-judicial process and burden of proof allocation under Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, Section 64. The court distinguished this precedent, holding that unlike the Orissa Act, the Wakf Act does not empower the Wakf Board to make quasi-judicial decisions on property character; thus, the Board's notification is an administrative act and does not shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff.
Syed Anwar Batcha v. Jamia Masjd Mosque Interpretation of the definition of 'wakf' under Section 3(1) of the Wakf Act, especially regarding grants by non-Muslims for Kazi service. The court noted that this precedent did not consider Section 66-C and thus was not authoritative for the present case; the current court reaffirmed that a grant by a non-Muslim can be wakf only if it falls within Section 66-C.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the factual background, emphasizing that the property was granted exclusively for Kazi service, as evidenced by the Inam Fair Register, the inam title deed, and the Board's own notification. The court rejected the argument that the grant was to a mosque, clarifying that Kazi service, even if attached to a mosque, is distinct from a grant to the mosque itself.

Regarding the identity of the grantor, the court found no conclusive evidence that the grant was made by a Muslim. The plaintiff's statement that the grantor was a Hindu ruler was uncorroborated and admitted to be uncertain. Therefore, the burden of proof was critical. The court rejected the appellant's contention that the Board's notification constituted a quasi-judicial finding shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff. It distinguished the Wakf Act from the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, noting that the Wakf Board's publication is an administrative act of survey, not a determination of property character. Hence, the initial burden remained on the Board to prove the property is a wakf.

Legally, the court analyzed Section 3(1) of the Wakf Act, which defines wakf as a permanent dedication by a Muslim for purposes recognized by Muslim law. The court held that a grant by a non-Muslim does not satisfy this definition. The inclusive clauses in Section 3(1) cannot override the primary requirement that the dedication be by a Muslim.

The court then turned to Section 66-C of the Wakf Act, introduced by the Madras Wakf (Supplementary) Act, 1961 and incorporated into the Central Act. Section 66-C extends the Act's application to certain properties donated by non-Muslims for the support of specific wakfs (such as mosques, Muslim graveyards, and choultries). The court held that a non-Muslim grant can be a wakf only if it falls within these categories. Since the grant here was for Kazi service, which is not included in Section 66-C, the property does not qualify as a wakf under that provision either.

The court also addressed the appellant's reliance on the Syed Anwar Batcha case, clarifying that that decision did not consider Section 66-C and thus does not control the present case.

Summarizing, the court concluded that the property is not a wakf because (i) there is no proof the grantor was Muslim, and (ii) the grant for Kazi service does not fall within the definition of wakf under Section 3(1) or Section 66-C.

Holding and Implications

The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff's title to the property is recognized, and the property is not deemed a wakf under the Wakf Act. The Wakf Board's notification declaring the property as a wakf is set aside in effect, and no quasi-judicial status is accorded to such notifications. No costs are ordered as the plaintiff-respondent was not represented. This decision does not establish new precedent beyond the interpretation of the Wakf Act provisions and burden of proof allocation in such cases.

    Madras State Wakf Board v. Khazi Mohideen Sheriff

    JUDGMENT

    N.S Ramaswami J:—

    This Letters Patent Appeal is against the judgment of Alagiriswami J. who allowed the second appeal. The appellant before us is the Madras State Wakf Board, who was the defendant in the suit. The Board Published under S 5 of the Wakf Act, Central Act 29 of 1954, a Notification in the Fort St. George Gazette, stating that the property in dispute is a wakf. The plaintiff filed the suit out of which this appeal has arisen for a declaration of his title to the suit property and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking any action in pursuance of the publication of the abovesaid notification. The question was whether the property was a wakf. According to the plaintiff, the property had been granted by a non-Muslim for the support of Kazi service and his case is that it would not be a wakf as defined in the Wakf Act. On the contrary, the case of the defendant-appellant has been that the property is a wakf. The learned counsel for the appellant seeks to support such a conclusion on two grounds, namely, that firstly the grant had been made by a Muslim and secondly even if it is not a grant made by a Muslim, it came under the definition contained in S, 66-C of the Wakf Act. Alagiriswami, J. who heard the second appeal, came to the conclusion that as thee had been no evidence as to who made the grant, it was possible that the grant might have been made by a non-Muslim and therefore the property would not come under the definition of the word ‘wakf’ contained in S. 3(1) of the Act. He further came to the conclusion that the grant was made for Kazi service and that is not one coming under any one of the clauses in S. 66-C of the Act. The view of the learned Judge is that for a wakf, as defined in S. 3(A), the grant ought to have been made by a Muslim, and if the grant is made by a non-Muslim, it would be wakf only if it comes under any one of the clauses of S 66-C of the Act. ‘Kazi service’ is not one contemplated by S. 66-C of the Act. Therefore, the learned Judge held that property is not wakf and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree is prayed for.

    2. There can be no serious dispute that the property had been granted, whether it be by a Muslim or a non-Muslim, only for Kazi service. Extracts from Inam fair register as well as a copy of the inam title deed have been filed, In the extracts from the inam fair register, it is specifically mentioned that the grant was for Kazi service. In the copy of the inam title deed, the genuinenees of which is not in dispute, it is specifically mentioned that the grant was for Kazi service. In the very notification made by the Board, the grant is described as one for Kazi service. The notification is as follows:

    “Kazi service inam Paramathi pious, religious and charitable and mushrut-alkhidamat. For rendering Kazi service in the Mosque 300,008.31”

    The learned counsel for the appellant however contends that in the extracts from the Inam Fair register, there is some reference that the inam was for Masjid and therefore it must be held that the grant was to the mosque. No doubt in Ex. A.2, in one of the columns, namely column 15, it is stated:

    “In Fasli 1230 Mahajid Inam J. Mohammad Amir.”

    As Alagiriswami, J. has rightly pointed out, this description in column 15-is rather confusing. The entries in the other columns in the extracts of inam fair register made it quite olear that the grant was for kazi service. It has been described as kazi service inam. As stated earlier, even the inam title deed, a copy of which is available, describes the inam as kazi service inam. It may be that kazi service is attached to a particular mosque. But that does not mean that the grant itself is to the Mosque. We have no nesitation in accepting the conclusion of Alagiriswami, J. that the grant was for kazi service.

    3. Another question of fact raised is as to whether the grant has been made by a Muslim or non-Muslim. Really, there is no evidence on record either way. The plaintiff as P.W 1 stated in the witness box that the grant had been made by a Hindu ruler. But that statement cannot be accepted as evidence and that is a statement of only his case and nothing more. The plaintiff himself had to concede in cross-examination that he did not know who was the grantor, whether the grantor was a Muslim or a non-Muslim. No documentary evidence had been placed either by the plaintiff or by the defendant in order to find out who the grantor was. Due to complete lack of evidence regarding this aspect, the burden of proof becomes important. Alagiriswami, J. has held that the defendant, namely, the Board has to prove that the grant was made by a muslim, if it wants to support its case that the property is wakf on the ground that it has been granted by a Muslim. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that the Board having made an enquiry and held that the property is wakf in consequence of which a notification to that effect was published in the Fort St. George Gazette when the plaintiff questioned that notification, the initial burden to prove that the property is not wakf is on him. The contention is that if the plaintiff wants to support his case that the property is not wakf on the ground that the grant had been made by a non-Muslim, the initial burden is on him to prove such a case. In this connection, the learned counsel for the defendant invited our attention to Mahant Sri Srinivasa Ramanuja das v. Suryanarayandas(1). That was a case under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act. Under S. 64 of that Act, if any dispute arises as to whether an institution is a math or temple or whether a temple is an excepted temple or not, such a dispute has to be decided by the Commissioner under that Act. The said section further provided that any person affected by a decision of the Commissioner may within one year, institute a suit in a civil court to modify or set aside such decision and subject to the result of such suit, the order of the Commissioner shall be final. The learned counsel contends that Ss. 4 and 5 of the Wakf Act are on par with S. 64 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act and once the Wakf Board causes a notification to be published, it must be held that there has been a quasi judicial finding regarding the character of the property The learned counsel contends that under such circumstances, the initial burden is on the plaintiff, who institutes the suit in a civil court to show that the property is not wakf. However, we are unable to agree with this contention. The decision contemplated under S. 64 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act is certainly a quasi-judicial decision. That section contemplates an enquiry to be made by the Commissioner and it further says that subject to the result of a suit which might be instituted in a civil court, the order of the Commissioner shall be final. But as far as the Wakf Act is concerned, there is no provision for the Wakf Board to make any enquiry regarding the character of the property. The very heading of Chapter II of the Act and the caption to Sec. 4 make it clear that the Commissioner or the Board is not making any enquiry to determine the character of the property. The Commissioner makes only a preliminary survey regarding wakfs and a publication of the list of wakfs is made under S. 5. Sec. 6 which refers to filing of civil suits makes it clear that the decision of the civil court shall be final. It is nowhere stated that any decision of either the Commissioner or the Wakf Board shall be final subject to the decision by a civil court for the simple reason that neither the Commissioner nor the Wakf Board makes any decision after an enquiry regarding the character of the property. As already stated, only survey is made and a list of wakfs is published. This is only an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial act. Therefore, it is the defendant-Board which wants to establish that the property is wakf that should shoulder the burden of proof initially. As there is no evidence on either side, the conclusion of the learned Judge that it has not been proved that the grant had been made by a Muslim has to be accepted as correct. Therefore, we have to proceed on the footing that the grant might have been by a non-Muslim and it was for Kazi service.

    4. Now, we have to examine, on the above finding, whether the property would be wakf. S. 3(1) of the Wakf Act defines the word ‘wakf’ as follows:

    “‘Wakf’ means the permanent dedication by a person by a person professing Islam of any moveable or Immoveable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes—i) a wakf by user; (ii) grants (including mashrut-ul-khimdat) for any purpose recogniged by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and Hi) a wakf-alal-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable.”

    The question is whether a grant made by a Non-Muslim, whatever be the purpose for which the grant is made, would come under the above definition. We are quite clear that it would cot. The main part of the defining section makes it clear that the dedication should be by a Muslim. Only then it could be a wakf. The contention on behalf of the defendant-appellant is that in the latter part of the section which contains the inclusive definition, there is no reference to the grant being made either by a Muslim or by a non-Muslim and therefore the grant mutt for any of the purposes mentioned in Cls. (i), (ii) or (iii) in the latter part of the section does not necessarily be one made by a Muslim to make a wakf. We are unable to agree with this contention. The inclusive definition contained in the latter part of the section cannot go beyond the terms of the first part, which is the main part of the section. In the first part, it is clearly stated that the dedication should be by a person professing Islam. That is one of the qualifications for making a dedication a wakf. The second qualification, in order to make a dedication, a wakf, is that it should be for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. This second qualification, is in general terms. Then comes the inclusive definition. It specifies certain items. But there can be no doubt that the items mentioned in Cls. (i) to (iii) in the latter part of the section which gives the inclusive definition should come within the general clause in the first part of the section which, as already stated, refers to the purpose of the dedication as one recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. It is not possible to dissociate the three clauses in the inclusive definition in the latter part of the section from the first part of the section Itself.

    5. Under the Madras Wakf (Supplementary) Act, 1961, Madras Act 19 of 1961, the term ‘wakf’ as defined by the Central Act was amended. S. 2 of the Madras Act is as follows:

    “The term ‘wakf’ defined in Cl. (1) of S. 3 of the Wakf Act, 1954 (Central Act 29 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act, shall include all property given or endowed by any person professing any religion other than Islam for the support of—(i) a mosque, idgahs, imambaras, dargahs, khangha or maqbaras; (ii) graveyards of persons professing Islam; and (iii) choultries for, or musafarikhanas for the benefit of persons professing Islam; and the term ‘wakf’ defined in the clause aforesaid shall include any person aforesaid”.

    This amendment introduced by the above Madras Act has since been incorporated in the Central Act by the Central Act 34 of 1964 by the introduction of S. 66-C. The said S. 66-C is as follows:

    “Application of the Act to properties given or donated by persons not professing Islam for support of certain wakfs-Not Withstanding anything contained in this Act where any moveable or immoveable property has been given or donated by any person not professing Islam for the support of a wakf being—raj a mosque, idgath, imambaral, dargah khangah or a maqbara; (b) a Muslim graveyard; (c) a choultry or a musafarkhana, then such property shall be deemed to be comprised in that Wakf and be dealt with in the same manner as the wakf in which it is so comprised”.

    The very introduction of this section, namely, S 66-C would go to show that unless a grant made by a non-Muslim comes under any one of the clauses mentioned in that section, it would not be wakf. In other words, a dedication made by a non-Muslim, even if it is for the purposes contemplated under S. (3)(1) of the Central Act, would not be wakf. As already noted, S. 66-C says that the Act is being applied to properties given or donated by persons not professing Islam for support of certain wakfs. But for this section which applies the Act to certain grants made by non-Muslims, no dedication made by a Non-Muslim would be part of wakf property.

    6. The learned counsel for the defendant appellant relies upon Syed Anwar Batcha v. Jamia Masjd Mosque which is a decision rendered by one of us. No doubt the observations contained in that judgment support the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that even if the dedication is made by a non-Muslim for Kazi service, it would be a wakf. But in that case, the definition of the word, ‘wakf’ as contained in S. 3 (1) of the Act, had not been considered along with S. 66-C of the Act. That decision has proceeded on the footing that the definition of the word ‘wakf’ had been amended so as to include all dedications by-non-Muslims as well. But as already stated, the amendment of the definition of the word ‘wakf’ was by the Madras Act 19 of 1961 and that has now been incorporated in S. 66-C of the Central Act. That means, all the dedications by a non-Muslim, even if the purpose of dedication is one cont templated under S. 3 (1) of the Act would no wakf, and a dedication by a non-Muslim can be wakf only if it comes within the four corners of S, 66C. Whether the present dedication comes under S. 66-C is another question which we would consider presently. We want to make it clear that in order to treat the property as wakf as defined in S. 3 (1) of the Act, one of the pre-requisites is that the grant ought to have been made by a person professing Islam.

    7. Now, the question is whether the property can be brought under the provisions of S. 66-C. As already noticed, under S. 66-C, the grant should be for the support of a wakf as described in Cls. (a) to (c) in that section. As plain meaning of S. 66-C indicates that it does not contemplate a non-muslim creating a wakf himself. He can donate property to an already existing wakf, and that too, if the wakf is one coming under any of the three clauses mentioned in that section. As we have already said, the grant in this case is for Kazi service. Kazi service which would be a mushrut-ul-khidmat is not one of the wakfs mentioned in any one of the three clauses in S. 66-C. That is why the learned counsel for the defendant—appellant had been trying to establish that the grant was to a mosque. If really the grant was to a mosque there would be no difficulty in holding that the property is wakf, becauseundtr S 66-C a non-muslim can dedicate property for the support of a mosque and such dedication shall be deemed to be wakf. As we are clear that the dedication in this case is not to a mosque but only to Kazi service to be done in a mosque, we agree with the conclusion of Alagiriswami, J. that this does not come under S. 66-C either.

    8. The Letters Patent Appeal fails and it is dismissed. As the plaintiff-respondent is not represented, there will be no order as to costs.

    V.C.S

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Madras State Wakf Board v. Khazi Mohideen Sheriff
    (Jul 17, 1973)