Srinivasan, J.:— The question that stands referred to us is.
“Whether the legal expenses of Rs. 3900 and Rs. ??? were allowable under the provisions of Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Indian-tax Act?”
2. The facts leading to this question are these. One Selvarajulu Chetti was carrying on a stevedering business in Madras. He died in 1933 leaving ??? as his only surviving daughter. Thereafter certain relations of this Selvarajulu Chetti ??? on the business purporting to claim it, the business, to be a joint family business. Matters went on thus. In 1948, a deed of partnership came into existence and Padmini, the daughter of Selvarajulu Chetti, was taken as a partner. Subsequently, however, Padmini instituted a suit in the High Court claiming that the business ??? solely to Selvarjulu Chetti as his self-acquired property and that the other so-called partners were net entitled to any interest in that business and sought a declaration that she was solely entitled to the business. There were other reliefs sought in that suit, such as to recover a sum of Rs. 1,32,000 received on life insurance policies of Selvarajulu Chetti, and jewels belonging to him, his wife and Padmini. The trial Judge upheld the claim of Padmini in so far as the moveables are concerned. The business asset was however held to belong to the Hindu undivided family. We may mention at this stage that on appeal from that decision, a Bench of this court held in favour of Padmini even with regard to the business assets. It was the expenses of the defendants in that suit that is the subject matter of the present reference.
3. The Income-tax Officer allowed these expenses in the assessment year 1958–1959. But the Commissioner of Income-tax after notice to the parties, held that the legal expenses were incurred in a dispute regarding the title to the business itself and was not for the protection of the business. He also held that the dispute was between the partners and that it covered not only the business asset but other non-business assets as well. According to him the expenditure could not be said to have been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. This order of the Commissioner was with retard to the assessment year 1959–1960. For he assessment year 1959–1960, the Income-tax Officer declined to grant the allowance. The further appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal also failed.
4. On the application of the assesses, the question set out above stands referred to this court.
5. Shortly stated, the dispute in the suit was to declare the title of the business in its entirety, whether it vested in A or in B would the expenditure incurred in relation to such ??? suit by ewe that could be described as having been ??? wholly and exclusively for the purpose el the business? Sri S. Narayanaswami, learned ??? for the petitioner, argues that if the business has to establish its title to an asset or litigate in order to secure its maintenance, it would be properly allowable under S. 10(2)(xv). Equally, ???, when the title to the entire business is ??? issue, it is the same as saving that the title to the each and every on of the at the business is question. Therefore, be claims that the ??? must be one which would come within the scape of the relevant clause of S. 10(2). In seems to as that there it a fundamental ???. What we conceive to be the real ??? of the allowance contemplated by the relevant prevision is that the busmen regarded as an ??? has to take steps and incur ??? for the purpose of promoting ??? against any ??? upon its productive ???, ownership of assets or the like. Where two disputing claimants claim title to the business as a whole it does not appear to us that any such dispute would involve expenditure which can be regarded as having been emended for the purpose of the business. The expenditure is really incurred for and on behalf of the contending parties, each seeking to establish title to the entirety of the business in himself it is not a case where the business protects itself against any claims to its prejudice or which would jeopardise its profit making ability. This paint of distinction seems to us to be substantial and that is virtually overlooked by the learned counsel in putting forward this argument.
6. In support of his argument, learned counsel has referred to certain decisions none of which to our minds lends any real support to the proposition which he advances. The case Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd., (1941) 23 Tax Cas 597 is hardly in point. That was a case where a company had acquired land in America for the purpose of its business. The title of the company to the land was disputed in American courts and in defending the action the company incurred expenses. This expenditure was held to be wholly and exclusively laid out by the company for the purpose it its trade. We are really unable to see what parallel there is between the facts of that decision and he present one. That was a case where the company as an entity sought to maintain its right to certain assets, and the legal expenses incurred did not create any new asset, at all if a sum of money is expended for the acquisition or the improvement of a fixed capital asset, it is undoubtedly attributable to capital. But if there is no change in the fitted capital asset, then the attributable is properly attributable to revenue. The argument of the leaned counsel in the present case that what the ??? was doing was to its title to each and every one of the assets, and therefore, the expenditure is deductible under S. 10(10)(xv) cannot possibly be accepted.
7. In the Commissioner of Income-tax Madras v. Raman and Raman Ltd., 1951-19 ITR 553 : (AIR 1951 Mad 905) the ??? company entered into a agreement to purchase certain buses along with to permits connected with them. A third party filed a suit claiming title to the buses and seeking to recover possession of them. The parties went from court to court with varying success. Finally, the company failed in the civil courts to establish its title. On the question whether the expenditure ??? relation to these proceedings was deductible under S. 10(2(xv), this court held that the expenditure was ??? for the purpose of retaining a capital asset of the company, and there was in improvement to its capital asset by reason of the litigation. Here again, it will be noticed that it was the company fighting for its own rights. In G. Veerappa Pillai Periyar…Applicant; v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras…., 1955-28 ITR 28 (AIR 1956 Mad 29) a similar question arose with regard to the litigation ??? incurred by the ??? in seeking to establish his title to certain bases and to recover possession from the person who had agreed to sell them to the ???. Here again, the right to deduction was upheld and it was ??? cut that far the purpose of S. 10(2)(xv), it did not matter whether the ??? figured as a plaintiff or defendant and equally whether ??? succeeded or failed is the litigation.
8. In Transport Company Limited v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras, 1957-31 ITR 259 (Mad) this court pointed out the ??? between expenses of a litigation to maintain a existing title and where the purpose was to acquire or cure a defect to the ??? title. In the former, the expenditure would be of a revenue nature and in the latter it would be of a capital nature. None of there decisions cited by the learned counsel for the assessee deals with a case like the present where the dispute is not between the company, on the one hand, and another person claiming title adversely to it, on the other, but between the members of a company or members of the partnership, each one claiming exclusive title to the entirety of the business and of the assets it comprises of. That is a position which will not come within the ratio of any of these decisions, and a dispute of that nature, which is in the individual interest of one of the partners of the firm, cannot be equated to one in which the interests of the business are affected.
9. Mr. Ranganathan, learned counsel for be department, has referred to Morgan v. Tate and Lyle Ltd., 1954-26 ITR 195 (Foreign). The actual question for decision in that case was whether an expenditure incurred by the company in conducting a propaganda to oppose the threatened nationalisation of the industry was an admissible deduction. It was held that the object of the expenditure was to preserve the assets of the company Iron seizure an to enable it to carry on and earn profits, and that being so, the expenditure was an admissible deduction. There are certain observations in this judgment which bring out the distinction between a case where the interests of the company or the business are affected and none where the ownership of the business is in question and the nature of the expenditure incurred in litigation relevant to these two aspects. Lord Keith observed at page 224.
“It is necessary, in my opinion, to distinguish between a threat to the assets of a business and a threat to the right of the owner of the business and assets to carry on the business. The assets of the business may be threatened in a variety of ways. They may be said to be under a constant threat of loss by fire or burglary or peril of the sea or other risk, varying, with the nature of the business or asset; or they may come under a more direct threat by challenge of the right to use or employ them in the business. Such threats leave the question of ownership of the business unaffected. The owners of the assets may be able to continue in business and preserve the goodwill, even if the threat is realised. On the other hand, it may be that the loss of the assets will so cripple him as to put him out of the business….. Where the threat is to the ownership of the business, the position is different…… There is a plain difference between these two cases. Where loss of or damage to an asset results, there is loss or damage to the trade as such. Where loss of ownership, results, there is no necessary loss or damage to the trade at all. The trade may go on as before in the hands of the successful challenger with the old assets or may, for a variety of possible reasons, come to an end. Income-tax legislation has at different times made different provisions for cases of discontinuance of trade or succession to a trade. These are no doubt provisions relating to the manner or measure of assessment, but as they are a clear recognition of the common commercial experience of a business, continuing through several hands, they indicate that ‘the trade’, when used in the statutes, has to be construed as an entity in itself……”
10. These observations make it clear that whether the ownership of the business is in the hands of A or B, it makes no difference to the business, and it is not a case where the business itself or any of its assets is jeopardised, so that an expenditure incurred in maintaining that asset can be said to be a revenue expenditure. It accordingly seems abundantly clear to us that in the present case, the expenditure was not one which was incurred wholly or exclusively for the purpose of the business. The question is answered in the negative and against the assessee, which will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee Rs. 250.
HH/CWM/R.G.D
11. Question answered in negative.