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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 23 (2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act
  • provisions of the Estates Abolition Act
  • S. 66-A of the Indian Income Tax Act
  • S. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act
  • S. 66 of the Indian Incometax Act
  • INDIAN INCOME TAX ACT
  • Bihar Sales Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 23 (2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act
  • provisions of the Estates Abolition Act
  • S. 66-A of the Indian Income Tax Act
  • S. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act
  • S. 66 of the Indian Incometax Act
  • INDIAN INCOME TAX ACT
  • Bihar Sales Tax Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by Srinivasan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are applications by the First Additional Income-tax Officer, Karaikudi, seeking a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution so that appeals may be filed in the Supreme Court from a judgment of the High Court. The High Court's judgment arose from a series of writ applications under Article 226.

Broadly, two landholders were dispossessed of their estates under the Estates Abolition Act and were paid compensation; in addition, they received further sums described as "interim payments." The Income-tax Department proceeded under Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act to bring these interim payments to assessment. In one case an assessment had been made; in the other matters notices under Section 34 had been issued but assessment had not yet been completed. The affected persons filed writ petitions under Article 226 seeking to quash the assessment or the proceedings under Section 34. The High Court held that the interim payments were not income but capital receipts relating to loss of income-producing assets. The Income-tax Officer now seeks a certificate under Article 133 to enable appeals to the Supreme Court against that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the objection raised by the respondents — that the writ proceedings challenging assessments under the Income-tax Act are revenue proceedings and not "civil proceedings" within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution — is sustainable.
  2. Whether this Court can issue a certificate under Article 133 in the circumstances of the present cases (i.e., whether the High Court's judgment in the writ proceedings qualifies as a "judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding" for purposes of Article 133).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Position (Income-tax Officer)

  • The petitioner prays for the issue of a certificate under Article 133, claiming that the requirements of Article 133 are satisfied (i.e., that the judgment is one in a civil proceeding from which an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 lies).

Respondents' Objection

  • The respondents object that the applications do not fall within Article 133 because the writ petitions were filed to quash tax assessments or to prohibit levy of assessments; such proceedings arise out of revenue proceedings and do not relate to any "civil proceedings" within the meaning of Article 133.
  • They pointed to the differing language of Articles 132, 133, 134 and 136 to emphasize that not every proceeding is a "civil proceeding" and that Article 133 is confined to civil proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sriram Gulab Das v. Board of Revenue (Nagpur High Court, Full Bench) Proceedings relating to liability and assessment to tax are revenue proceedings and cannot properly be regarded as civil proceedings within the meaning of Article 133. The Court referred to this decision for the reasoning that proceedings relating to assessment and liability to tax are not civil proceedings and thus not within Article 133.
Jawadas Prabhadas v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Bombay High Court) The advisory jurisdiction under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act would not come within Article 133(1) as the decision would not be a judgment, decree or final order; the appropriate route for leave in such income-tax references might be under Section 66-A rather than Article 133. The Court cited the decision to show that not every matter connected with income-tax references falls within Article 133 and to note the distinction drawn in that case about the nature of particular income-tax references.
Tobacco Manufacturers v. State (Patna High Court, Full Bench) Proceedings in sales tax cases (i.e., sales tax references) are not civil proceedings within the meaning of Article 133. The Court relied on this decision as part of a line of authority holding that revenue/tax proceedings are not civil proceedings for Article 133 purposes.
Allenburry and Co. v. Income-tax Officer (Patna High Court) A writ application under Article 226 is not necessarily a civil proceeding; whether it is civil depends on the nature of the proceeding and the rights questioned — where writs challenged assessment orders, those are revenue proceedings and not civil proceedings. The Court quoted and adopted the reasoning that the nature of the proceeding (challenge to assessment orders) determines that it is not a civil proceeding under Article 133.
Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. Income-tax Officer (this Court) Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is a revenue proceeding depends on the nature of relief sought; where the petitioner asserted a proprietary right and could maintain a suit, the writ was not a revenue proceeding. The Court relied on and approved this decision to illustrate that the nature of the right adjudicated determines classification, and to distinguish cases where writs are not revenue proceedings.
Income-tax Officer v. Joti Prasad (Allahabad High Court) Proceedings for assessment of income tax are not proceedings relating to a civil right; liability to tax is not a civil right enforceable in ordinary civil courts, and such proceedings are revenue proceedings. The Court cited this reasoning to support the conclusion that proceedings for assessment of tax partake of the nature of revenue proceedings and thus are not civil proceedings within Article 133.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the question whether judgments of the High Court rendered in writ petitions under Article 226 challenging tax assessments fall within the expression "judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding" used in Article 133. The Court examined the language of the Constitution — contrasting Articles 132, 133, 134 and 136 — to show that the framers used different expressions ("civil proceeding", "criminal proceeding", "other proceedings", and "any cause or matter") and that therefore not every proceeding must be classified as a civil proceeding.

The Court then reviewed a line of authorities from various High Courts and from this Court. The common thread in those authorities is the proposition that the nature of the proceeding — specifically, the nature of the right to be adjudicated — determines whether the proceedings are civil, criminal or "other" (revenue) proceedings. Decisions cited include cases holding that proceedings relating to liability and assessment to tax, or sales tax references, are revenue proceedings and not civil proceedings. The Court also noted decisions that distinguish situations in which a petitioner asserts a proprietary or other civil right (in which case the writ may be civil) from cases where the challenge is to an assessment order (which is a revenue matter).

Applying this principle, the Court concluded that writ applications which seek to quash assessment orders or to prohibit the Income-tax authorities from invoking the machinery of the Income-tax Act are revenue proceedings and cannot be termed judgments in civil proceedings for the purposes of Article 133. Because the present writ proceedings were directed at tax assessments and proceedings under Section 34, they fall within that category of revenue proceedings.

Consequently, the petitioner (the Income-tax Officer) is not entitled to a certificate under Article 133 to appeal to the Supreme Court from the High Court's judgment in these writ proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The applications for a certificate under Article 133 are refused; the petitions fail and are dismissed. The Court explicitly held that the petitioner is not entitled to the grant of a certificate under Article 133 because the High Court's judgments in these writ proceedings do not constitute judgments in "civil proceedings" within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Income-tax Officer will not obtain from this Court the certificate under Article 133 required to appeal to the Supreme Court under that Article. The petitions are dismissed with costs in S.C.P. No. 117 of 1962; counsel's fee of Rs. 150 was awarded.
  • Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles from prior authorities about the classification of proceedings (civil vs. revenue) and reaffirms that challenges to tax assessment proceedings are revenue proceedings and not civil proceedings for Article 133 purposes. The Court did not state that it was laying down a new precedent beyond applying and approving the existing line of authority.

Order: The petitions are dismissed with costs in one—S.C.P No. 117 of 1962. Counsel's fee, Rs. 150.

    The First Additional Income-Tax Officer, Karaikudi, Ramanathapuram Dt. v. R. Shanmugha Rajeswara Sethupathi

    (Delivered by Srinivasan, J.)

    These are applications by the First Additional Income-tax Officer, Karaikudi, for grant of certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution. The judgment of this Court from which appeals are sought to be filed in the Supreme Court was rendered in a series of applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Broadly stated, two persons who were landholders were under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act dispossessed of their estates and compensation was paid to them in lieu of such dispossession. In terms of the Act, certain further payments referred to as interim payments were also made to them. The Department took proceedings under S. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act and sought to bring these interim payments to assessment. One of the writ applications related to a case where such an assessment had in fact been made. In the others, the matter stood at the stage of notices under S. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act to these persons. It was in these circumstances that applications were filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution seeking to have the order of assessment in the one case and the proceedings under S. 34 in the remaining cases quashed. The judgment of this Court was that these interim payments were not income, representing as they did capital receipts for the loss of the assets which was the income-producing asset belonging to the petitioners. It is this decision of this Court that is sought to be taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court.

    The petitioner, the Income-tax Officer, prays for the issue of a certificate claiming that the requirements of Art. 133 are satisfied.

    On behalf of the respondents, objection has been taken that the applications do not come within the scope of Art. 133. It is claimed that the writ petitions were filed either to quash the assessment made by the Department or for the writs of prohibition against the levy of assessments which they were about to levy, on the ground that such assessments were illegal and that therefore the writ proceedings arose out of revenue proceedings and do not relate to any “civil proceedings” within the meaning of Art. 133 of the Constitution.

    The question we have to consider is whether this objection raised by the respondents is sustainable and whether this Court can issue the certificate prayed for.

    On behalf of the respondents, the difference in the language employed in the relevant Articles of the Constitution has been pointed out. While Art. 132 provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court whether in a civil or criminal or other proceeding, Art. 133 is confined to a judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding, and Art. 134 in a like manner is restricted to a judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding. Turning to Art. 136 which provides for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, it refers to any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter. The Constitution has accordingly employed, besides the well-known expression “civil proceeding” and “criminal proceeding”, three other terms “other proceeding” in Art. 132 and “any case or matter” in Art. 136. It is certainly patent from these provisions of the Constitution that there can be proceedings other than civil or criminal and that it is impossible to say that any proceeding other than a criminal proceeding must necessarily be a civil proceeding. The question then arises whether a judgment rendered by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction-under Art. 226 must in all cases be termed a judgment in a civil proceeding.

    In a Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Sriram Gulab Das v. Board of Revenue(1), the question arose whether the decision of the High Court rendered in a reference by the Board of Revenue under S. 23 (2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act does not arise out of a civil proceeding within the meaning of Art. 133. It was held that the proceedings under S. 23 dealt with matters pertaining to liability and assessment to tax and can properly be regarded as revenue proceedings, and that they are not civil proceedings. Two of the learned Judges observed that the words “other proceedings” in Art. 132 are words of wide amplitude and include all proceedings other than civil and criminal proceedings. It is unnecessary to refer to any other aspect of that decision except to refer to the reasoning that where proceedings relate to liability and assessment to tax, they cannot be regarded as civil proceedings.

    That a decision rendered by a High Court in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction under S. 66 of the Indian Incometax Act would not come within the scope of Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution, as the decision would not be a judgment, decree, or final order, was decided by the Bombay High Court in Jawadas Prabhadas v. Commissioner of Income tax(2). The High Court however did not decide the question whether proceedings in the High Court on a reference under S. 66 are civil proceedings within the meaning of Art. 133 (1). But nevertheless the learned Judges took the view that the question whether leave should be granted or not in a matter arising out of a reference under the Indian Income Tax Act should be considered only under S. 66-A of the Indian Income Tax Act and not under Art. 133.

    A Full Bench of the Patna High Court In Tobacco Manufacturers v. State(3), again dealt with the question whether the judgment of the High Court rendered on a reference made to it by the Revenue Authorities is or is not a judgment. The question there arose under the Bihar Sales Tax Act and the view was taken that proceedings in Sales Tax cases are not civil proceedings within the meaning of Art. 133. This decision was considered by the Patna High Court in Alenburry and Co. v. Income Tax Officer. This decision is of considerable importance, for it deals with a position that is almost parallel to the facts now before us. In that case, the assessees were taxed under the Indian Income Tax Act, and against the order of assessment they applied under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. These applications were dismissed and they moved the Court for a certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution. The learned Chief Justice referred to the Full Bench decision in Tobacco Manufacturers v. The State, and after quoting extracts therefrom observed:

    “It seems clear to me that every writ application is not necessarily a civil proceeding; it may be a civil proceeding, or a criminal proceeding, or other proceeding, according to the nature of the application and the questions raised and decided in the proceeding it is well settled that a suit would cot have been maintainable by the petitioners in respect of the two assessment orders; and if the petitioners had proceeded under the machinery of the Indian Income Tax Act, the proceeding would not have been anything but a revenue proceeding.

    The mere fact that the petitioners filed two applications for writs in the High Court against the assessment orders, does not, in my opinion, change the nature of the proceeding I agree with the view expressed by their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court, which states that the question whether a proceeding under Art. 226 is a civil proceeding or not depends upon the nature of the proceeding.

    In the Case before us, the nature of the proceeding was that it called into question certain assessment orders made by the Income tax authorities. The proceeding was not a civil proceeding, as there was no right of suit and I do not think it can be said to be a civil proceeding within the meaning of Art. 133 of the Constitution.”

    This view of the matter found approval in the decision of this Court in Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. Income-tax Officer. That was a case where the question arose in relation to a judgment in a writ petition under Art. 226. The facts were that the Collector took proceedings for attachment of certain properties in pursuance of a certificate issued under the Indian Income-tax Act for recovery of arrears of tax. The properties stood in the name of the wife of the assessee. The wife contended that the properties were hers, while the Department took the stand that the wife was only a benamidar for the assesses. The wife moved the High Court by way of Art. 226. But that application was dismissed on the ground that the Collector exercised powers of a civil Court and that it was open to the petitioner to prefer a claim and resort to a suit under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Against the dismissal of the writ, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was sought. The question accordingly arose whether Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution applied. The learned Judges referred with approval to the observations of S.K Das, J. in Allenburry and Co. v. Income-tax Officer. They proceeded to observe:

    “If the application filed by the petitioner before us under Art. 226 of the Constitution had been to quash the assessment order, it may well be said that it is not a civil proceeding on the above reasoning. But such is not the relief sought by the petitioner. There is no quarrel as such with the orders of assessment passed on her husband. All that she complains of is that her own property is being attached and sold to realise the amount of tax due by her husband. She is only, asserting her right to the property standing in her name and seeking relief against any interference with her right. We do not think that it is proper to describe her application as a revenue proceeding. She could not have obviously proceeded under the machinery of the Indian Income Tax Act as the petitioners in the Patna Case could have. Further, a suit would have, been maintainable by the petitioner to restrain the Income tax Authorities from taking proceedings against her property to satisfy the arrears of tax due from her husband, whereas in the Patna Case and other similar cases a suit would not have been maintainable, to challenge the validity of the assessment orders. We, therefore hold that the writ petition filed by the petitioner was not a revenue proceeding.”

    It is seen from the above observations that it is the nature of the proceeding in which the judgment is rendered that can govern the classification of the proceeding as criminal, civil or other proceeding. It would be Incorrect to say that any matter that is brought before the High Court invoking the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution must be regarded as a civil proceeding.

    In Income-tax Officer v. Joti Prasad a Bench of the Allahabad High Court referred to the earlier cases and their observations seem to us, if we may say so with respect, very pertinent:

    “The more liberal view in favour of the applicant is that a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution is a civil proceeding, if it relates to civil rights, but it seems to us that, even on this view the petitioner would not be entitled to the certificate sought, because it cannot be held that this particular order related to any civil right. The order which was passed by this Court related to proceedings for assessment of tax and some assessment orders were quashed by this Court Proceedings for assessment of income tax, in our opinion, are not proceedings relating to a civil right. The liability to income tax is not a civil right enforceable as such in Courts of law.

    Liability to tax is created by the Income tax Act and is for the purpose of gathering revenue for carrying on the Government of the country, No one can claim it as a civil right that he is not liable to pay tax. Nor can the State claim that any person is liable to income tax under the common law relating to civil rights. A proceeding relating to liability to income tax partakes of the nature of a proceeding which has been usually described as a revenue proceeding.”

    The line of cases we have referred to has consistently taken the view that the order of the High Court made in the writ application seeking to quash assessment orders or to prohibit an Income tax Officer from proceeding under the machinery of the Income tax Act in any of its aspects cannot be termed to be judgments in civil proceedings. There is a well marked distinction between civil and criminal proceedings and when the Constitution itself refers to other proceedings in juxtaposition with civil and criminal proceedings, those words must be given a proper meaning. The principle that the nature of the right adjudicated upon in a proceeding is one that determines the nature of the proceedings is what has been stressed in the several cases to which we have made reference and if we apply that test, it follows that a judgment in a writ application seeking to quash an assessment order or to issue a writ of prohibition against the taxing authorities cannot come within the scope of the expression civil proceedings as used in Art. 133 of the Constitution. It follows that the petitioner is not entitled to the grant of the certificate under Art. 133.

    The petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in one—S.C.P No. 117 of 1962. Counsel's fee, Rs. 150.

    V.C.S

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