Madurai City Co-Oper... v. Food Inspector, Madu..., Madras High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Cr. R.C No. 932 of 1960 and (Cr. R.P No. 901 of 1960), 22-8-1961, (Saravana 31, 1883)

Attorney(S)

S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, G. Ramanujam & V. Ramaswami, for Petr.
Public Prosecutor, for State.

Judges

Veeraswami, J.

Acts

SECTION 20 A PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT 1954
SECTION 18 PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT 1954
PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
Sub-section (1)(a)(iii) of Section 18,
Sub-section (1) of Section 20.
Sub-section (3) of Section 13

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision challenges the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Madurai dismissing an appeal against the conviction of the petitioners under Section 7 read with Section 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

The first petitioner is Madurai City Co-operative Milk Supply Union (convicted for a third offence of this kind) and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000 (the minimum prescribed by the proviso to Sub-section (1)(a)(iii) of Section 18). The second petitioner, who was the secretary of the first petitioner, was fined Rs. 30.

Both courts below found that a sample of cow's milk (boiled and cooled) purchased from the first petitioner through its salesman Uthaman on the morning of 2-2-1959, taken from a sealed can and intended for the municipal Maternity Home, was adulterated by the addition of water to the extent of 11 per cent. The Public Analyst for Madurai Municipality certified adulteration at 14 per cent, while the Director, Central Food Laboratory at Calcutta reported 11 per cent. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 provides that the Director's certificate supersedes the Public Analyst's report, and Sub-section (5) makes the Director's certificate final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Food Inspector who laid the complaint had the valid authority or written consent required by Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, to institute the prosecution.
Whether a general, omnibus authorisation of Food Inspectors (by a State Government notification) suffices under Section 20, or whether the authorisation must be specific to a particular prosecution (i.e., whether the phrase "in this behalf" requires case‑by‑case authorisation).
Whether the trial procedure that "clubbed" the main charge of selling adulterated milk with the charge for enhanced punishment under Section 16(1)(a)(iii) was irregular and, if so, whether that irregularity prejudiced the accused.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

The primary attack is that the Food Inspector who instituted the prosecution lacked the valid authority or necessary written consent required by Section 20.
Although the Food Inspector was duly appointed under Section 9, the impugned State Government notification (C.O.M.S. No. 1861 Health dated 6.6.1958 published in the Fort St. George Gazette on 20.8.1958) merely authorised Food Inspectors in general to institute prosecutions; it did not grant authorisation specific to this particular prosecution.
Counsel (Sri Mohan Kumaramangalam) contended that the words "in this behalf" in Section 20(1) require the State Government or local authority to apply its mind to each particular prosecution and to authorise prosecutions on a case‑by‑case basis; thus, an omnibus delegation is inadequate.
Counsel relied on City Corporation of Trivandrum v. Arunachalam as supporting the proposition that sanction must refer to specified individuals and specific offences and cannot be vague and general.

Respondent / Court's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

The Food Inspector had been duly appointed under Section 9, and the State Government notification expressly authorised Food Inspectors to institute prosecutions under Section 20.
The court rejected the petitioners' narrow construction of "in this behalf", holding that it contemplates delegation of the power to institute prosecutions and that a general authorisation enabling Food Inspectors to institute prosecutions is within the scope of the provision.
Once a person is authorised to institute a prosecution by the State Government or a local authority, that authority is of the same quality as the power of the State Government or local authority itself to institute prosecutions.
The court noted and considered the City Corporation of Trivandrum decision but interpreted its observations as relating to the absence of proof that the Commissioner had authority from the State Government or local authority, rather than laying down a rule that all delegations must be limited to a single specified prosecution.
The court relied on the Supreme Court's construction in State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal that the authority filing the complaint must itself consider the reasonableness and propriety of the prosecution and be satisfied that it is not frivolous.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
City Corporation of Trivandrum v. Arunachalam	Observed that a purported general authority (sanction) may be invalid where it is not proved that the authorising official had authority from the State Government or the local authority; held that a sanction must show that the authority applied its mind to the alleged commission of an offence and referred to specified individuals and specific offences (criticised vague/general authorisations).	The court acknowledged this decision and the petitioners' reliance on it but interpreted the decision as addressing a lack of proof that the Commissioner himself had authority to authorise prosecutions. The present court did not accept that the case establishes a rule barring all general delegations by State Government/local authority.
State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal	Held that when prosecution is instituted by one of the four categories (State Government, local authority, a person authorised thereby, or a person with written consent), the authority or person filing the complaint must consider the reasonableness and propriety of the prosecution and be satisfied that it is not frivolous.	The court cited this Supreme Court construction as supporting the view that Section 20 contemplates delegation and that a delegated authority must in practice be satisfied as to the reasonableness of prosecutions—thus supporting the court's acceptance of general delegation to Food Inspectors in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory framework: Section 9 authorises the State Government to appoint Food Inspectors; Section 20(1) provides that no prosecution under the Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the State Government, a local authority, a person authorised by the State Government, or a person authorised by a local authority.

The petitioners' central contention was that Section 20 requires a specific, case‑by‑case authorisation (or written consent) because of the phrase "in this behalf", and that the impugned State Government notification constituted only a vague, omnibus delegation not meeting that requirement.

The court rejected this construction. It held that "in this behalf" in context means that the authority vested in the State Government or local authority is for the purpose of enabling delegation to persons to institute prosecutions. The provision contemplates delegation; therefore, a general authorisation enabling Food Inspectors to institute prosecutions is consistent with the statute's purpose of permitting delegated authorities to act. Once authorised, such a person holds authority of the same quality as the State Government or local authority for instituting prosecutions.

The court addressed City Corporation of Trivandrum v. Arunachalam (relied upon by petitioners) and explained that the observations in that case were concerned with the absence of satisfactory proof that the Commissioner had authority from the State Government/local authority to give sanction. The court did not read that decision as establishing that any delegation by a local authority must be limited to a particular prosecution and specific individuals.

The court found support in the Supreme Court's construction in State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal, which emphasises that the authority or person filing a complaint must consider the reasonableness and propriety of the prosecution and be satisfied it is not frivolous. The court considered that observation consistent with its view that Section 20 permits delegation while imposing on the delegated authority the responsibility to apply judgment as to whether prosecution is proper.

Finally, the court observed a procedural irregularity at trial: the magistrate had "clubbed together" the main charge of selling adulterated milk and the charge applying enhanced punishment under Section 16(1)(a)(iii). The court noted the proper procedure would be to try the main offence first and, only after conviction, proceed to the question of enhanced punishment as an old offender. Nevertheless, the court was not satisfied that this defect had prejudiced the accused in the particular case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: CRIMINAL REVISION DISMISSED. The court confirmed the convictions and sentences imposed by the courts below (the first petitioner fined Rs. 3,000 and the second petitioner fined Rs. 30).

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The convictions and fines as imposed below are upheld; the first petitioner remains liable as an old offender to the minimum fine prescribed, and the second petitioner remains liable for the fine of Rs. 30.
On Section 20 interpretation: The court accepted that a State Government notification generally authorising Food Inspectors to institute prosecutions falls within the scope of Section 20 and that such delegation does not, on its face, require case‑by‑case authorisation; however, the delegated authority must still apply its own judgment as to the propriety of prosecution (per the Supreme Court’s guidance).
No new broad precedent was proclaimed by the opinion beyond this interpretation; the court treated earlier authorities (including City Corporation of Trivandrum and State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal) as instructive and compatible with its construction rather than announcing a novel rule.

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Madurai City Co-Operative Milk Supply Union Through Its Present Secretary, Ramayya Pillai And Another v. Food Inspector, Madurai Municipality

ORDER Veeraswami, J.

1. This revision is directed against the order Of the learned Sessions Judge, Madurai dismissing the appeal against the conviction of the petitioners of an offence under Section 7 read with Section 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

This being a third offence of the kind committed by the first petitioner, Madurai City Co-operative Milk Supply Union, it was sentenced to any a fine of Rs. 3000, the minimum prescribed by the proviso to Sub-section (1)(a)(iii) of Section 18, The second petitioner, who was the secretary of the first petitioner, was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 30. Both the courts below have found that the sample of cow's milk boiled and cooled, purchased from the first petitioner, through its salesman Uthaman, on the morning of 2-2.2.1959 from the quantity in a sealed can, and meant for the Maternity home, maintained by the municipality, was adulterated with added water of 11 per cent.

The Public Analyst for Madurai Municipality certified the adulteration to be 14 per cent; but the Director, Central Food Laboratory at Calcutta reported that the milk was adulterated with 11 per cent of added water. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 provided that the certificate of the Director of Central Food Laboratory shall supersede the report given by the Public Analyst under Sub-section (1) and by Sub-section (5) the certificate is final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.

2. The main attack against the conviction is that the food inspector, who laid the complaint, had no valid authority or consent required by Section 20 as a condition to the institution of the prosecution. The Food Inspector in his evidence stated that he was authorised to institute the complaint by a notification in C.O.M.S. No. 1861 Health dated 6.6.1958 published in the Fort St. George Gazette part 1-A page, 350 dated 20.8.1958. This notification reads:

In exercise of the power conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Central Act 37 of 1954) the Governor of Madras hereby authorises the Food Inspectors appointed under the said Act to institute prosecutions for offences under the Act.

3. Section 9 of the Act authorises the State Government to appoint by notification, persons having the prescribed qualifications to be Food Inspectors for the purposes of the Act, and they shall exercise their powers within such local areas as that Government may assign to them. It is not disputed that the Food Inspector had been duly appointed as such. But the argument is that the Government notification above extracted being a general authorisation of all Food Inspectors without reference a particular prosecution, it is not in consonance with the requirements o£ Section 20 of the Act. It is contended that what the section contemplate if a specific authorisation in respect of a particular prosecution and not an omnibus delegation. Section 20(1) reads, No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written on sent of the State Government, or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the Stale Government or a local authority.

The sub-section has a proviso which need not be set out for the purpose of this case.

The object of Sub-section (1) obviously is to avoid indiscriminate prosecution without scrutiny in each case of particular facts and circumstances justifying penal action under the Act. The section, therefore, requires certain conditions to be complied with before a court can take cognizance of a prosecution under the Act. It states that the prosecution may be instituted (1) by the State Government, (2) local authority, (3) a person authorised by the State Government and (4) a person authorised by the local authority. In addition, the section also provides that a prosecution may be instituted with the written consent of any of the four categories of authorities aforesaid. When the section speaks institution of prosecution with the written consent of any of those authorities, it plainly means that the consent should be specifically related to a particular offence with reference to which it is intended to institute a prosecution. If the authority that institutes a prosecution is the State Government or local authority, in that case no written consent is of course required.

But the argument is that if the person instituting a prosecution is one authorised by the State Government or a local authority, the authorisation should be specific in relation to a particular case and not in general terms applicable to all prosecutions, as and when they may arise. This construction by Sri Mohan Kumaramangalan appearing for the petitioners is based on the words "in this behalf" in Sub-section (1). He contends that the words import an intention that "the State Government or a local authority'' before it authorises a person should apply its mind to the fact of the particular prosecution and not leave it to the person authorised to decide whether a particular prosecution should be laid. According to the learned Counsel. in this "behalf" has reference to "no prosecution...shall be instituted except...that is to say, to the particular institution of a certain prosecution in view. It is further contended that this construction is reinforced by the fact that the written consent contemplated by the sub-section is undoubtedly related to each particular prosecution.

I am unable to agree with the construction contended for. The words "in this behalf" do not bear, in the context, the meaning attributed to them. In my view, they mean no more than the authority vested in the State Government or a local authority is for the purpose of enabling the person to institute a prosecution. The intention appears to be to provide for a delegation by the State Government or a local authority of its power to institute prosecutions under the Act. To construe the section in the way the learned Counsel has asked me to do, would defeat the very purpose of this provision for delegation of the power to institute a prosecution. Once authorised to institute a prosecution, the authority so vested in the person is of the same quality and Virtue as the power of the State Government or a local authority to institute a prosecution. This is contrast with a case o£ a person enabled to institute a prosecution with the written consent of any of the parties enumerated by the sub-section. In any opinion, therefore, the food Inspector in this case was competent to lay the complaint.

4. But: Sri Mohan Kumaramangalam called my attention to City Corporation of Trivandrum v. Arunachalam as placing a contrary construction upon Sub-section (1) of Section 20. There the complainant a food inspector, was given a general authority by the commissioner of the Corporation of Trivandrum to prosecute persons found to have committed offences under the Act. The learned Judges in that case held that it had not been satisfactorily proved that the Commissioner of the Corporation has been authorised by the State Government or the local authority to issue the necessary sanction for prosecuting offences under the Act and that in the absence of such proof the sanction to the food inspector could not be accepted as a proper and valid authority as required by Section 20. That was sufficient to hold the prosecution to be invalid. But the court went further and observed:

Even apart from this defect about the sanction evidenced by Ex. P. 4, there is yet another serious defect, about Ex. P. 4. The authority purported to be conferred by Ex. P. 4 is couched in vague and general terms. Under Ex. P. 4, the commissioner has merely stated that the food inspector P. W. 1 is authorised to prosecute all offenders under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act before the Corporation First Class Magistrate. The sanction required by Section 20 is not an empty formality. The sanction must show that the authority giving the sanction had applied his mind to the alleged commission of an offence by the accused person and was satisfied that the accused has to be prosecuted for the said offence.

Necessarily it follows that the sanction must be for the prosecution of specified individuals and for specific offences. These conditions are not satisfied by Ex. P. 4 which makes no reference to any specified individuals to be prosecuted or to any specific offence for which the prosecution has to be launched. The conferring of an authority or the giving of sanction in such vague and general terms is not what is required under Section 20.

5. I do not understand these observations as having been made with regard to authority of a person authorised by a local authority to prosecute or with reference to a question as to whether such authority delegated by a local authority can really be couched in general terms enabling the institution of not merely a particular prosecution but all prosecutions. The learned judges were only con earned to point out that the commissioner who purported to authorise the food inspector was not himself proved to have authority to authorise the food inspector. Apparently what the Court had in mind was the requirement with reference to the words "with the written consent of. If the court intended to lay down that even in cases of an authority, delegated by a local authority, such delegation can only be in respect of a particular prosecution of specified individuals and for a specific offence. With respect to the learned judges, I am unable to subscribe to such a construction of Sub-section (1) of Section 20. This provision has been construed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State Of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal . and they observed, In the case of these four categories, the authority or person filing the complaint has itself or himself to consider the reasonableness and propriety of the prosecution and be satisfied that the prosecution is not frivolous and is called for.

6. This observation and the general tenor of the construction placed by the Supreme Court on the provision appear, in my opinion, to support the view I have taken of the scope and the intendment of Sub-section (1) of Section 20.

7. There is one other matter which requires notice before leaving this case. The trial magistrate seems to have clubbed together the charge for the commission of the offence of selling adulterated milk and the charge that the first accused was liable for enhanced punishment under Section 16(1)(a)(iii) of the Act. This procedure is quite irregular. In such a case, with respect, I agree with the observations of the learned Judges in that the proper procedure would have bean to frame charges against the first accused for the main offence in the first instance and them charge him as an old offender after he has been found guilty of the offence of the main offence changed against him. I am. however not satisfied that in the instant case the defect has in any way prejudiced the first accused for the trial. The conviction and sentences of fine are confirmed and the criminal revision case is dismissed.

Madurai City Co-Oper... v. Food Inspector, Madu...