Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 166 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • s. 114 (e) of the Evidence Act
  • s. 114 of the Evidence Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 166 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • s. 114 (e) of the Evidence Act
  • s. 114 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion is a reference by the learned Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram in Sessions Case No. 79 of 1959. The accused, Thangam alias Thangasami Thevar, had been convicted at trial of murder under Section 302 I.P.C. and robbery under Section 392 I.P.C., and sentenced to death on the murder charge and rigorous imprisonment for ten years on the robbery charge (the imprisonment sentence being directed to merge with the sentence of death).

The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. The victim, an old woman named Nacharammal (about 60 years old), was found dead at a lonely spot with her ear-rings and gold chain (jewels she habitually wore) missing. Evidence established that the accused knew the deceased and, some months earlier, had misappropriated bags of paddy belonging to a villager (a fact showing acquaintance but not an adequate motive). On the morning of 15-4-1959 the deceased left home with a basket and spade and was not seen alive thereafter. Her body, with cut ears and a fatal neck wound and another incised wound on the shoulder, was discovered about 7 a.m.

About nine to ten hours after the crime the accused attempted to sell an earring (produced to a purchaser, P.W.12), was handed over to police and from him three other earrings and, later, a gold chain and an umbrella were recovered. The jewellery was identified by relatives as belonging to the deceased. Chemical analysis showed some minute blood-stains on the earrings but their origin was indeterminate; no blood was detected on the umbrella. The accused denied knowledge, denied attempting sale, alleged police torture and gave no explanation for his possession of the jewels.

After reviewing the facts and relevant law, the court considered whether the circumstantial evidence sufficed to support a conviction for murder, and ultimately acquitted the accused of murder but convicted him of theft under Section 379 I.P.C., sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for three years.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts of this case, unexplained possession by the accused of the deceased's jewels (recovered shortly after the murder) is sufficient, as circumstantial evidence, to convict him of murder under Section 302 I.P.C.
  2. Whether the umbrella (produced by the accused) could properly be regarded as the weapon of offence in light of medical evidence and the absence of blood on the umbrella.
  3. Whether Section 166 of the Indian Evidence Act has any application to shift the onus of proof in these circumstances.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The accused consistently denied any knowledge of the relevant pieces of testimony and denied attempting to sell the earring to Lakshmanan (P.W.12).
  • He denied that M.O.2 series (the other earrings) were recovered from him, and did not admit to producing the gold chain (M.O.3) or the umbrella (M.O.6).
  • He alleged that the police tortured him and thereby obtained some statement.

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The prosecution relied on the fact that the accused attempted to sell an earring of the deceased about nine to ten hours after the murder and that other jewels and a chain were produced by him to the police shortly thereafter.
  • The learned Public Prosecutor argued that minute blood-stains found on the ear-rings were significant and pressed the applicability of Section 166 of the Indian Evidence Act in support of drawing an adverse inference (as argued by prosecution).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Singaram v. State Holds that mere possession of articles of a murdered person, without explanation, cannot by itself lead to an inference that the possessor committed or was privy to the murder; something more is required than mere possession (illustration to s.114 Evidence Act cannot be stretched to that extent). The court associated itself with this exposition and adopted it as an approved statement of law: possession alone is insufficient to convict for murder.
Narayana v. King Emperor Discussed in Singaram (earlier authority considered in that leading case). Mentioned as part of the legal background reviewed in Singaram; used indirectly in support of the principle that more than mere possession is required.
Wasim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh Illustrates that possession of a deceased's articles some days after murder, together with failure to trace or report the missing person and other conduct, may justify conviction for murder and robbery. Used to show that possession combined with conduct (e.g., failure to trace the deceased) can sustain conviction where facts compellingly point to guilt; distinguished from the present case where such connecting conduct was absent.
Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan States that mere production shortly after murder of ornaments is not enough to infer the accused committed the murder; further material connecting the accused with the murder is required; suspicion cannot take place of proof. The court treated this exposition as authoritative and binding, and applied the principle that further connecting evidence is required beyond production/possession of stolen goods.
Hira Gobar…Accused v. Emperor (A.I.R. Bom. 1943 458-B) Authority cited in Sanwat Khan for the proposition that mere production of ornaments shortly after murder is not sufficient to conclude the accused was the murderer. Quoted within the Sanwat Khan exposition relied on by the court to reinforce that mere production is inadequate without further connecting material.
Chinnappan Udayar v. State Bench decision where possession of jewels soon after murder, attempted fabrication of alibi and evidence placing accused near the scene at the relevant time supported conviction for murder. Used as an example of circumstances where possession plus other linking facts (movement towards scene, attempt to create alibi) permitted conviction; court distinguished those facts from the present case.
Tulsiram v. State Referenced to show that when ornaments are found with accused a considerable time later, no presumption of guilt for murder is to be drawn. Relied on as part of the body of authorities establishing that timing and surrounding facts affect whether possession supports an inference of murder.
Sundarlal v. State of M.P. Shows that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient where accused was found in possession of ornaments very soon after the murder. Noted as a case where, on its facts, an inference of guilt was drawn; court observed that no hard and fast rule exists and outcomes depend on facts.
Komaraswami alias Kasimuthan v. State (R.T. No. 26 of 1957) — (unreported) Statement of the same principle (possession insufficient without connecting evidence). Mentioned as additional authority reflecting the same legal principle; factual detail not given in the opinion.
Velu alias Velusami Naicker & another v. State (R.T. No. 143 of 1956) — (unreported) Statement of the same principle (possession insufficient without connecting evidence). Mentioned as additional authority reflecting the same legal principle; factual detail not given in the opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded step-by-step from the facts to the legal conclusion:

  1. The court accepted the primary facts: the deceased was murdered for her jewels; the accused knew the deceased; the accused attempted to sell one earring to P.W.12 about nine to ten hours after the murder; other earrings and a gold chain were produced by him to the police and identified by relatives as belonging to the deceased.
  2. The court examined the medical evidence: the autopsy disclosed (a) lower pendulous portions of both ears irregularly cut, (b) a circular punctured wound in the front of the neck (injury No. 2), which the doctor stated was the cause of death, and (c) a horizontal incised injury over the left shoulder (injury No. 3). The medical witness was not asked about whether the fatal wound was merely likely to cause death or sufficient in the ordinary course of nature; the court assumed, based on nature and location, that it was ordinarily sufficient to cause death.
  3. The court scrutinised the umbrella (M.O.6) produced by the accused as a possible weapon. The doctor stated the ferrule of the umbrella could have caused the fatal injury and that the incised shoulder wound could have been caused by the umbrella or a sharp-edged instrument. The court found this unlikely: injury No.3 was incised (suggestive of a blade such as an aruval) and there was no evidence the victim struck a sharp surface in falling. Crucially, the umbrella bore no detectable blood-stains, and the court regarded it improbable that a weapon used to inflict such wounds could have been so thoroughly cleaned that not even minute specks remained, particularly given expert observations that blood generally adheres to most surfaces.
  4. The court analysed the probative value of possession of the jewels. It emphasised established authorities (Singaram, Sanwat Khan, Wasim Khan, Chinnappan Udayar and others) that mere possession or production of a murdered person's articles shortly after the crime is not by itself sufficient to infer guilt of murder. Additional material connecting the accused with the victim's movements or the scene at relevant times, or other facts establishing a nexus, is required so that the chain of circumstantial evidence points unerringly to only one conclusion.
  5. Applying those principles to the present facts, the court found important lacunae: there was "absolutely nothing" connecting the movements of the accused with those of the victim on that morning or after the crime; evidence suggested the accused had companions that morning at Gopalapatnam; the umbrella was probably not the weapon; and blood-stains on the earrings were too disintegrated to determine origin. Thus, although possession of the jewels was unexplained, the absence of connecting evidence meant other reasonable hypotheses (e.g., that the murderer passed the jewels to the accused, or that the accused obtained them later from the spot) remained viable.
  6. The court addressed the prosecution's reliance on Section 166 Evidence Act and related arguments, concluding that Section 166 did not apply to shift the burden of proof in the present prosecution. The court explained (with reference to an earlier case C.A No. 367 of 1959 as precedent in its reasoning) that Section 166 could only be relevant where circumstantial evidence otherwise fully establishes guilt and there is some explanation within the accused's exclusive knowledge which the accused fails to offer.
  7. Given the incompleteness of the circumstantial chain (possession without connecting movement or conduct), the court held that the evidence did not exclude all other reasonable hypotheses and therefore did not establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt on the murder charge.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The accused is acquitted of the charge of murder (Section 302 I.P.C.) but convicted of theft under Section 379 I.P.C.

The court sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under Section 379 I.P.C. (the court convicted him under s.379 rather than alternatively under s.379 or s.411, noting the relatively short interval between the murder and the production of the jewels).

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The accused's death sentence for murder was set aside (acquittal on murder); he was punished for theft with three years' rigorous imprisonment.
  • Legal/practical implication emphasized by the court: where a prosecution depends entirely on circumstantial evidence, an alert and exhaustive investigation is crucial to produce connecting material (movements of victim and accused, witnesses placing the accused in the locality at relevant times, clearer forensic linkage to weapon, etc.). The court expressed moral conviction that the accused might have participated in the murder but stressed that defective and imperfect investigation deprived the prosecution of necessary evidence for conviction on the murder charge.
  • On precedent: The court applied and followed established principles from prior cases (as cited) rather than laying down a novel rule; the decision turns on application of existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is limited to and based exclusively upon the information contained in the provided opinion. Where the opinion did not supply certain types of detail (for example, fuller particulars of some cited unreported cases), that additional information has not been added.

    Thangam Alias Thangaswami Thevar v. State

    JUDGMENT

    (Anantanarayanan, J.)— This is a reference by the learned Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram in Sessions Case No. 79 of 1959 upon his file. The accused, Thangam alias Thangasami Thevar, has been convicted of murder under S. 302 I.P.C and robbery under S. 392 I.P.C, and sentenced to death upon the first charge, and to rigorous imprisonment for ten years upon the second, the sentence of imprisonment to merge with the sentence of death. Since the case rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence, and the facts involve the application of a legal principle, which is of some interest and significance, we shall first set forth the facts in detail.

    Briefly, the offence relates to the murder of an old woman named Nacharammal, and there can be no doubt that this woman was murdered at a lonely spot for the sake of her jewels, and that the jewels she habitually wore were missing from her person when the body was discovered. Nacharammal (deceased) belonged to Keelakavanoor village and was aged about 60 at the time she met with her death. It appears that the accused was acquainted with her. Raman Chetty (P.W 6) is a man of this village who used, to send bags of paddy to one Ponnuswami Chettiar (P.W 7), a merchant at Paramakudi and a commission agent for paddy and other grains. Three months before this murder, P.W 6 sent six bags of paddy through the accused, who carted the bags for the witness, to P.W 7. But the accused delivered only three bags and apparently misappropriated the rest. There was a panchayat on this matter, and the accused was compelled to give P.W 6 Rs. 30 for the paddy taken away. P.W 6, P.W 7 and the village Munsif (P.W 8) all speak to these facts. It appears that Nacharammal (deceased) used to taunt the accused often with the misappropriation. But this is really of no significance in the case, except as showing that the accused was acquainted with the old woman, and presumably aware of the jewels that she ordinarily wore. There can be no doubt at all that the victim was murdered for the sake of gain, and the evidence relating to the misappropriation of the bags by the accused merely amounts to proof of knowledge of the old woman as the wearer of certain jewels, and not any proof of an adequate motive.

    It may be further stated here itself that the accused belongs to a different village (Radhapuli) and not to the village of Keelakavanoor, where Nacharammal was living. This is also made clear by the evidence of P.W 6 and the Village Munsif (P.W 8) that P.W 6 had to proceed to Radhapuli for the panchayat at which he was given redress.

    We now come to the actual facts of the murder. Poochendu Ammal (P.W 3) is the daughter-in-law of the deceased. She states that early that morning (15-4-1959), the old woman left the house to get grass for her kid that she was rearing. She took with her, her basket and weed-cutting spade (M.Os 4 and 5). She was then wearing four ear-rings, and a gold chain with a particular kind of link (M. Os. 1 to 3 series). She was not seen alive after this.

    Shanmugham (P.W 2), is a boy aged about ten, belonging to this village. Sometime at about 7 a.m he saw Nacharammal lying in Koothappa Udayar's punja. Her ears had been cut, and her neck wounded, and she was dead. The basket and spade (Mos. 4 and 5) lay near the body. P.W 2 went and informed Raman Chetty (P.W 1), a nephew of the victim. P.W 1 came and saw the body, and found the jewels of the old woman, namely, the ear-rings and neck chain missing from the body. He went and made a report to the Village Munsif (P.W 14), within whose jurisdiction the locality of offence lay, at about 10 a.m (Ex. P-1). It is here sufficient to observe that in Ex. P. 1 itself the definite allegation is that Nacharammal was apparently murdered for the sake of robbery of the jewels, and no suspects are mentioned in this report. The Village Munsif thereupon sent his yadasts (Exs. P. 10 to 13), The station writer (P.W 15) came to the scene at about 3 p.m and blood-stained earth was recovered from the spot of offence, and the inquest was held.

    The manner in which the accused came into the picture of the crime was this. Lakshmanan (P.W 12) is a resident of Paramakudi, who is previously acquainted with the accused. At about 3-30 p.m that day, i.e, about nine or ten hours after the crime, the accused called upon the witness, and took him to a park. The accused then produced an ear-ring for sale (M.O 1), because he (accused) had to go to Tanjore. As the manner of the accused was somehow nervous and hesitant, and the accused could not properly explain the occasion for sale of this jewel, P.W 12 handed over the accused to the Head Constable (P.W 16), whom he met near the bridge. The Head Constable arrested the accused on suspicion, and recovered from the accused three other earrings (M.O 2 series) in addition to the ear-ring (M.O 1), which the accused had attempted to sell to Lakshmanan (P.W 12), and which P.W 12 had produced. In pursuance of a statement made by him, the accused and the police party proceeded by jeep to a spot about 4½ miles away, and from here the accused produced a gold chain (M.O 3) as well as an umbrella (M.O 6). We might here immediately state that the earring (M. Os. 1 and 2 series) and the gold chain (M.O 3) have been identified as the jewels of the deceased, by her immediate relatives like her nephew (P.W 1) and her daughter-in-law (P.W 3).

    The autopsy was held in this case (report P-2) by Dr. Rangarajan (P.W 9), the Medical Officer attached to the Government Dispensary, Paramakudi. He noticed the following injuries on the body. Firstly, the lower pendulous portion of both the ears were found irregularly cut. Secondly, there was a circular punctured wound 1/5th inch in diameter, on the centre of the front of the neck, 1½ inches above the jugular notch of the sternum. The cut section showed congestion of the underlying tissues, with a big clot of blood. Thirdly, there was an horizontal incised injury 3 inches in length ¼ inch in breadth and bone deep over the left shoulder joint. Injury No. 2 was the cause of death, according to the doctor. But it is highly regrettable that the medical witness (P.W 9) was not asked anything about the character of the injury, and whether it was an injury merely likely to cause death, or sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. We need not emphasise that it is of the greatest importance that, in murder cases, such facts should be carefully elicited by the prosecution from the Medical Officer who has held the autopsy. But, considering the nature and location of the injury, we are assuming that it was ordinarily sufficient to cause death. Injury No. 3 was perhaps caused by contact with a sharp surface, or due to a sharp-edged instrument. We shall later discuss the relation, if any, between the Medical evidence and the umbrella (M O. 6) produced by the appellant.

    At this stage itself, we may state that, both in the commital court and at trial, the accused contended himself with a denial of knowledge of all relevant pieces of testimony. Throughout, he has affirmed that he did not attempt to sell M.O 1 to Lakshmanan (P.W 12), and that M.O 2 series were not recovered from him. He did not produce the gold chain (M.O 3) or the umbrella (M.O 6), and the police tortured him and got some statement out of him. It may be also convenient here to notice that some blood-stains were found upon the earrings, but the chemical analysis showed that they were too disintegrated for their origin to be determined. We cannot hence say whether they were human blood-stains, or not. No blood whatever was detected upon the umbrella (M.O 6); we shall comment later upon the significance of this fact.

    There is the evidence of a woman selling, sweet toddy Arulayee (P.W 4), that she sold sweet toddy at Gopalapatnam that morning to the accused and Subbiah and Thangavelu (P. W 5). The record is not precise as to the exact occasion, but if it was upon the date of offence, all that it proves is that the accused had at least two companions with him that morning.

    We accept the evidence for prosecution that the accused was attempting the sale of one of the jewels of the murdered woman, about ten hours after the crime. We also accept the evidence that he produced the other jewels (M.O 2 series) and the chain (M.O 3) to the police. We are at pains to emphasise here that, this is all the evidence which does connect the accused with the crime of murder. For the evidence makes it abundantly clear that the production of the umbrella (M.O 6) by the accused is of no significance. Indeed, upon a careful assessment of the facts and probabilities here, we are definitely inclined to the view that this umbrella (M.O 6) was probably not the weapon of offence at all. The Doctor (P.W 9) no doubt states that the iron end or ferrule of the umbrella could have caused the fatal injury. He even thinks that the incised wound, injury No. 3, could have been caused by the umbrella, or equally by contact with a sharp surface, or by some sharp-edged instrument. It appears to us, judged from the description, that injury No. 3 is far more likely to have been caused by a sharp instrument like an aruval. There is no evidence that the woman struck any sharp surface in falling, at the spot of offence. Injury No. 3 is an incised and not a punctured wound, and is far more suggestive of a blade. As regards the umbrella (M.O 6), it is indisputable that this is a common household object, which anyone might possess. The accused is supposed to have dug it out from a spot of concealment, but, while we are clear that the accused certainly produced this object, we are very doubtful about the truth of this allegation. For, it is very clear that the object contained no trace of any blood-stains, anywhere upon it. Since the accused was not even aware that there were some blood-stains upon the earrings (M. Os. 1 and 2 series), for, in that case, he would certainly have removed them, whether he was the murderer, or a person who had been commissioned by the murderer to dispose of the jewels, it is difficult to believe that the accused used the umbrella as the weapon of offence, and then cleaned it in such a thorough manner as to leave no room for the detection of even minute specks of blood. It may be a different question with regard to the cleaning of the blood on a weapon like aruval, where mere washing will remove the blood-stains. In this connection we extract the following observations by the Chemical Examiner of Madras on the interpretation of reports of blood-stain cases. (Appx. VII The Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1958 Paragraph 6):

    Blood or the red colouring matter of it, can obviously be removed by scraping or rubbing, or washing etc., and may even if on a very shining or greasy object fall off in handling. To most surfaces, however, blood sticks very tightly, and it is exceedingly improbable that even the roughest handling would entirely remove a stain from any object, so that not even a small speck sufficient to give the tests remains. Sufficient of the red colouring matter to give the tests sometimes remains on a cloth, even after it has been washed.”

    We are, therefore, of the opinion that the analysis of the evidence in this case amounts to this. As a person who was acquainted with the deceased, and who had knowledge that she habitually wore certain jewels, the accused had a possible opportunity and motive to commit the crimes of robbery and murder. But there is absolutely nothing to connect the movements of the accused with those of the victim, either that morning, or after the crime. On the contrary, the only evidence is that the accused was in the company of two other persons at Gopalapatnam, namely one Subbiah Udayar and Thangavelu (P.W 5). The accused definitely attempted the sale of one of the jewels of the victim, at Paramakudi that evening to Lakshmanan (P.W 12). He produced the other jewels also to the police. There is nothing to indicate that the umbrella produced by the accused (M.O 6) was the weapon of offence, and the probabilities are against it. Considering the character of this object, blood-stains would have been detected upon it, had it been used as the weapon of offence, since the removal of even minute blood-stains from such an object would have been difficult. The accused has not given any explanation for the possession of the jewels. The question is whether, upon these bare facts, and these alone, the accused can be convicted upon the main charge of murder.

    With regard to an inference of this kind, which has to be established upon the circumstantial evidence, our attention has been drawn to several cases of this court and of the Supreme Court, which contain an exposition of the law. We might conveniently commence with Singaram v. State(1) for that is a landmark in the case-law, and it discusses the earlier case such Narayana v. King Emperor(2). After a discussion of the cases, Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ. observed:

    It seems to us that mere possession by an accused person of articles which were on the person or custody of a murdered man without any explanation for such possession, cannot lead to an inference that he took part in the murder or that he was privy to it. The presumptions mentioned in the illustration to s. 114 of the Evidence Act cannot be stretched to that extent. One can very well imagine a case where a jewel on the person of a murdered individual came to be in the possession of another, without any kind of reasonable explanation being offered by that individual. The fact that no rational explanation is possible, or that the explanation offered is unacceptable, should not militate against the innocence of the individual with regard to the offence of murder. Something more is necessary than mere possession of articles.”

    With respect, we would associate ourselves with this exposition of the law, as fully approving it. It may be stated, in this context itself, that the decision has been followed and approved by the Andhra High Court in Jani Shahm, In re(3) by Chandra Reddy, J.

    Of the decisions of the Supreme Court, we particularly desire to make reference to Wasim Khan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh(4) and Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan(5). In Wasim Khan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh the facts were that the deceased travelled with his goods, with the accused, in the bullock cart of the accused at night, and should have reached a particular destination (Jarwal), which he never reached. He was not seen alive later, but was found murdered. The appellant in the case was found in possession of the articles of the victim three days later. The appellant made no effort to trace the whereabouts of the deceased, or to lodge information of his disappearance. Under those circumstances, Their Lordships held that the appellant was rightly convicted of the offences of both murder and robbery. In Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan the murders were of two individuals living in a temple, and several days later jewels were recovered from the two appellants who had buried them. The following exposition of the law by Their Lordships is of great significance, in our view.

    In our judgment, Beaument, C.J and Sen J. in Hira Gobar…Accused v. Emperor…Opposite Party. (1943) A.I.R Bom. 458-B rightly held that the mere fact that an accused produced shortly after the murder ornaments which were on the murdered person, is not enough to justify the inference that the accused must have committed the murder. There must be some further material to connect the accused with the murder in order to hold him guilty of that offence . . . In our judgment, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from a certain circumstance. Where however, the only evidence against an accused person is the recovery of stolen property, and although the circumstances may indicate that the theft and the murder must have been committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw the inference that the person in possession of the stolen property was the murderer. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof.”

    In the Bench decision of this Court in Chinnappan Udayar v. State(6), the facts were that the accused was found in possession of the jewels of the victim, soon after the murder. Next, the accused had attempted to create evidence of alibi at about the time of occurrence. Not merely this, the accused was seen going towards the scene of occurrence, at about the time of murder. On those facts, the offence of murder was held established, as well as an offence under s. 404 I.P.C This case reviews the prior case law, and refers to the Supreme Court decision in Tulsiram v. State(7) and Sundarlal v. State of M.P(8). In the first case, no presumption of guilty upon a charge of murder was drawn, when the ornaments of the victim were found with the accused a considerable time later. In the second case, Sundarlal v. State of M.P the circumstantial evidence was held sufficient, when the accused was found to be in possession of the ornaments of the victim very soon after the murder. But we take it that no hard and fast rule can be laid down, upon the circumstances which would justify the inference or presumption under s. 114 (e) of the Evidence Act that the accused was guilty of murder. We take it that the exposition of the law by the Supreme Court in Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan, already extracted by us, is authoritative and binding upon us, and not in conflict with the exposition of the law in any other case including Sundarlal v. State of M.P, where the inference of guilt was drawn, upon the particular facts of that case. This exposition is also confirmatory of the exposition of the law in Singaram v. State and the other decisions of this Court, including (with reference especially to its facts) the Bench decision in Chinnappan Udayar v. State. Our attention has also been drawn to the unreported judgments in Komaraswami alias Kasimuthan v. State (R.T No. 26 of 1957) and Velu alias Velusami Naicker & another v. State (R.T No. 143 of 1956) in which statements of the same principle will be found. In brief, the inference or presumption of guilt upon the main charge of murder can be safely drawn, where the accused is in unexplained possession of jewels or articles of the victim after the crime, and where in addition, there is some evidence at least connecting the movements of the accused with those of the victim, either before or after the crime, or in some manner or another, establishing a nexus between the accused and the offence. The mere unexplained possession or production of the jewels of the victim by the accused may not constitute a safe basis for a conviction upon a charge of murder, when that is the only bare circumstance proved in evidence. The reason for that is fairly obvious. The test of circumstantial evidence must be satisfied; the chain of links in that evidence must lead to only one reasonable inference, namely, that the accused was the murderer, and all other probable hypotheses must be excluded. But how can that be done where the sole evidence is that the accused was in unexplained possession of the jewels of the murdered woman? Since the murder was for the sake of robbery of the jewels, that motive would apply to every person, known or unknown, who could have come across the woman at that particular spot. As we have already stated, the murderer might have delivered the jewels to the appellant for disposal, shortly after the crime. Again, it is even conceivable that the murderer might have fled when someone approached, and that the jewels might later have been taken away by the accused from the body, or from the spot of crime. The Bench decision in Chinnappan Udayar v. State contains a hint or suggestion, in its discussion of the case law, that something might depend upon the time interval between the crime, and the recovery of the jewels from the accused. But it is quite probable that, even during the lapse of a few hours, the jewels might have changed hands. The facts that the accused was in the company of others that morning, and that the umbrella (M.O 6) was probably not the weapon of offence, only strengthen the argument that it would be unsafe to draw the inference of murder, upon these probabilities alone.

    The learned Public Prosecutor has addressed an argument with reference to the fact that some minute blood-stains were found upon the ear-rings. But, first of all, their origin is indeterminate. We cannot assume that they are human blood-stains. Next, even assuming that they are human blood-stains, we are unable to see how this takes the case further. This is only another circumstance to prove that the jewels must have been removed from the body of the woman at, or about, the time of murder, and not earlier. Obviously, the murder and robbery were parts of the same transaction. The facts that the accused was in possession of the jewels, a possession which he has not explained, some hours later, and that he was apparently unaware of the blood-stains on the jewels, would either support the inference that he must have been the murderer, or must have participated in the murder, or that he must have stolen the jewels from the spot of occurrence, or must have been commissioned to dispose of them. Before it could be held by us that the circumstantial evidence establishes the guilt of the accused upon the charge of murder, some further evidence is necessary, establishing some connection between the accused and the victim, in relation to the time and locality of offence, or to the crime itself. That is not forthcoming in the present case. The learned Public Prosecutor also refers to S. 166 of the Indian Evidence Act, but we think it is clear that, that section has no application to the present case at all. We have recently discussed the true scope and incidence of that provision of law in C.A No. 367 of 1959, where the case-law is also examined. That section cannot apply to shift the onus of proof in a criminal prosecution, at any stage of the prosecution. It is only where the circumstantial evidence fully establishes the guilt of the accused, and where, Nevertheless, some explanation by the accused compatible with his innocence could possibly be put forward by him, relating to facts within his exclusive knowledge, that his failure to put forward any such explanation could be considered by the Court as an additional circumstance against him. Clearly, an accused might fail to put forward a particular explanation, such as theft or dishonest retention of the jewels of the victim, which may be true, owing to fear or ignorance. Where such a probability exists, the mere fact that he does not put forward the explanation, cannot justify the inference of guilt, when the chain of circumstantial evidence is otherwise incomplete.

    We are, therefore, constrained to acquit the accused upon the charge of murder, and to convict him instead, upon the charge of theft (S. 379 I.P.C) alone. In view of the relatively short interval between the murder and the production of jewels by the accused, we convict him only for this offence and not alternatively under S. 379 I.P.C or S. 411 I.P.C, which would be the proper conviction if the interval were to be longer. We sentence the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 (three) years.

    Before taking leave of the case, we are constrained to observe that we do feel the moral conviction that the accused was probably guilty of participating in the murder itself. We are most reluctant that an offender in such a grave crime should escape retributive justice, and we have to observe that this is directly due to the very defective investigation of this case. Investigation in this case was neither alert nor industrious. Considering that the accused lived in a neighbouring village, and that many villagers would have been astir at dawn when the old woman went out, surely industrious investigation could have unearthed pieces of evidence relating to the movements both of the victim and of the accused. If only such evidence had been forthcoming, to show that the accused was seen in that locality at about that time, or even proceeding towards it, the situation would have been far different. If, as we suspect, the umbrella (M.O 6) was not the weapon of offence at all, it is clear that the investigation has been imperfect upon this vital aspect also, We desire that our views to this effect should be forwarded to the proper authorities, so that hereafter at least an alert and thorough investigation might procure all relevant pieces of evidence, where proof of such a grave crime depends upon circumstantial evidence alone, in order to enable the courts to mete out full justice.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Thangam Alias Thangaswami Thevar v. State
    (Oct 23, 1959)