Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
  • Mr. Justice Rajagopala Iyengar
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
  • Mr. Justice Rajagopala Iyengar
Acts
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee, a tanning expert, filed a return on 21 February 1951 for the previous year ended 31 March 1947 (assessment year 1947-48) estimating profits at Rs. 550. The return was filed voluntarily in response to the public notice under Section 22(1) and not in response to an individual notice under Section 22(2). The Income Tax Officer rejected the return and estimated the assessee's income at Rs. 30,000. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, contending the assessment was illegal because the return showed income below the taxable limit and therefore was not a "return" within the Income Tax Act; the assessee argued that proceedings could only be taken by invoking Section 22(2) read with Section 34. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected this contention and held that a voluntary return removed the necessity to invoke Section 34; that view was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal referred the following question of law to this Court: "Whether the aforesaid assessment (i.e., of Rs. 30,000) for the assessment year 1947-48 is valid?"

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statement filed by the assessee in response to the public notice under Section 22(1) amounted to a "return" within the meaning of the Income Tax Act (i.e., whether a return that discloses income below the taxable limit can nevertheless be a "return").
  2. Whether the assessment of Rs. 30,000 for the assessment year 1947-48 was valid in light of the manner in which the initial statement/return was filed (voluntarily under Section 22(1) and without any individual notice under Section 22(2)).

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The return filed declared income below the taxable limit and therefore was not a "return" within the meaning of the Income Tax Act.
  • Proceedings to assess the assessee could be taken only by issuing a notice under Section 22(2) read with Section 34; because no such notice was issued, the assessment was illegal.
  • It was contended (by learned Counsel for the assessee) that a statement could be a "return" when filed in response to Section 22(2) even if it did not disclose taxable income, but that returns under Section 22(1) should be treated differently from those under Section 22(2).

Revenue / Appellate Authority's Position

  • The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that where an assessee voluntarily files a return in response to the public notice under Section 22(1), there is no necessity for the Income Tax Officer to invoke Section 34 or to serve an individual notice under Section 22(2); a voluntary return is a valid "return" on which assessment proceedings may be based.
  • The Department relied upon earlier decisions (discussed by the Court) to support the proposition that a voluntary return under the public notice starts assessment proceedings and that income cannot escape assessment merely because the return discloses income below the taxable threshold.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harakchand Makanji & Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City, A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 401 : 16 I.T.R. 119 Where a public notice is issued under Section 22(1) and a voluntary return is furnished in response, assessment proceedings commence and there is no requirement for individual notice under Section 22(2); no question of notice under Section 34 arises in such circumstances. The Court cited this decision to support the proposition that an assessment can validly proceed from a voluntary return under Section 22(1) and that the Income Tax Officer is not obliged to serve Section 22(2) notice before assessing.
C.V. Govindarajulu Iyer v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1946) 16 I.T.R. 391 at 397 Approval of the principles expressed in Harakchand Makanji (i.e., voluntary returns in response to public notice lead to valid assessment without individual Section 22(2) notice). The Court noted that the observations in Harakchand had been quoted with approval in this Madras decision, reinforcing the position that voluntary returns under public notice suffice for assessment.
Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Sultan Ali (Calcutta High Court) (1951) 20 I.T.R. 432 The Calcutta High Court considered whether a return filed that disclosed income below the taxable limit could be treated as a return called for under the public notice provision (corresponding to Section 24(1)/our Section 22(1)). The Court discussed distinctions between voluntary returns and returns in compliance with requisitions, and expressed certain reservations about treating a return showing no assessable income as a return under the public-notice provision. The present Court examined and interpreted the Calcutta decision: while Sultan Ali addressed related points (including timing and whether a return was voluntary), the present Court concluded that its passage ultimately supported the proposition that a voluntary return under Section 22(1) is nonetheless "a return" even if it shows income below the taxable limit (as later clarified by the same judge in R.K. Das & Co.).
Ranchhoddas Karsondas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City (Bombay High Court) The Bombay High Court (Chagla, C.J.) held that a voluntary return showing income below the assessable limit cannot be held not to be a return under Section 22(1); such a construction would be contrary to the scheme of the Income-tax Act. The Court relied on this authority to reinforce the conclusion that a voluntary return under the public-notice provision is a "return" even if it discloses income below the taxable limit.
R.K. Das and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal Contains an explanation by Chakravarthi, C.J., of his earlier observations in Sultan Ali's case and clarifies the position regarding returns under the public-notice provision and returns filed in compliance with requisitions. The present Court relied on the explanation in R.K. Das to show that the Calcutta judge's later clarification supports treating voluntary returns under Section 22(1) as returns even if they disclose income below the taxable limit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting the undisputed factual premise that no individual notice under Section 22(2) had been served and that the return was filed voluntarily under the public notice provision of Section 22(1). Thus the core legal question for determination was whether the statement filed by the assessee constituted a "return" within the meaning of the Income Tax Act.

The assessee's primary contention was that a statement could be a "return" only if it disclosed taxable income; because the statement disclosed income below the taxable threshold, it could not be a "return" and therefore the ITO's assessment (without issuance of Section 22(2)/Section 34 notices) was invalid. The Court rejected this interpretation for several reasons explicitly stated in the opinion:

  • The Court emphasized that the word "return" must bear the same meaning across the subsections of Section 22 and that it was unsound to attribute different legal meanings to "return" in Section 22(1) versus Section 22(2).
  • The Court observed that the assessor's argument that a person would not file a return under Section 22(1) unless he thought his income exceeded the non-taxable maximum does not justify treating a voluntary return showing income below the taxable limit as not being a "return."
  • The Court pointed out anomalous and impractical consequences that would follow from the assessee's construction: it would allow Income Tax Officers to invoke penal provisions (e.g., Section 28), make provisions like Sections 82(3) and (4) inapplicable, and permit assessments to be completed purely on estimates, thereby rendering the Act unworkable. The Court used these consequences to demonstrate the untenability of the assessee's interpretation.
  • Relying on precedent (notably Harakchand Makanji & Co. and subsequent approvals and discussions in other High Court decisions), the Court held that when a return is voluntarily submitted in response to the public notice under Section 22(1), assessment proceedings may validly be taken on that basis and there is no requirement of serving a separate personal notice under Section 22(2) or invoking Section 34 in those circumstances.
  • The Court considered and distinguished the Calcutta High Court decision in Sultan Ali, explaining that Sultan Ali's discussion focused on whether a particular return was voluntary or made in compliance with a requisition and on timing issues; the present Court found that, properly read and as subsequently explained in R.K. Das, Sultan Ali did not require the present Court to adopt the assessee's restrictive interpretation.

On the basis of these legal principles and the authorities cited, the Court concluded that the return filed by the assessee was a "return" within Section 22(1) and that assessment proceedings could validly be taken thereon, including the estimation of income.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative and against the assessee: the return submitted by the assessee was a valid "return" under Section 22(1) and the assessment of Rs. 30,000 for the assessment year 1947-48 was valid.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The assessee's challenge to the assessment fails; the assessment stands and the assessee was ordered to pay the costs of the reference amounting to Rs. 250.
  • Legal consequence summarized by the Court: A voluntary return filed in response to the public notice under Section 22(1) is a "return" within the meaning of the Income Tax Act even if it discloses income below the taxable limit; the Income Tax Officer is entitled to proceed with assessment on that basis without first serving an individual notice under Section 22(2) and invoking Section 34.
  • The Court's decision rests on and applies existing precedents and explanations thereof; it addresses the practical and textual consequences of the alternative interpretation urged by the assessee and rejects that interpretation as inconsistent with the scheme and working of the statute.

Costs awarded to the department: Rs. 250.

Show full summary ...

    P.S. Rama Iyer v. Commissioner Of Income Tax

    1. This reference under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act has clearly to be answered against the assessee and in favour of the department.

    2. The assessee was a tanning expert. For the previous year ended 31st March, 1947 (the assessment year 1947-48) he filed a return on 21st February, 1951 estimating his profits from business at Rs. 550. This return was filed admittedly without a notice under Section 22(2) having been issued to the assessee. The income as set out in the return was scrutinsed after enquiry and the Income Tax Officer rejected the return and estimated the assessee's income at Rs. 30,000. We are not now concerned with the correctness of the quantum of the assessment but only with its legality. From the order of assessment the assessee filed an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and there urged that the assessment was illegal and invalid. The ground for this contention was that as the return that he had filed declared an income below the taxable limit it was not a "return" within the meaning of the Income Tax Act, and that proceedings could have been taken against him only by invoking the provisions of Section 22(2) read with Section 34 and that as this was not done the assessment was illegal. This contention was rejected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who held that when an assessee had filed voluntarily a return there was no necessity for the Income-Tax Officer to call in aid Section 34 and that the assessment was therefore valid. This view was upheld and the appeal of the assessee was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal on further appeal by the assessee. They however referred to this Court the following question of law for its decision:

    Whether the aforesaid assessment (i.e., of Rs. 30,000) for the assessment year 1947-48 is valid ?

    3. Before we deal with the legal contentions urged on behalf of the assessee, it is necessary to mention one fact about which there is no dispute, that there was no notice issued to the assessee under Section 22(2) and that the return was filed in pursuance of the public notice under Section 22(1). In that sense the action of the assessee in filing the return was voluntary and not in compliance with any requisition by the Income Tax Officer. The only question therefore for our consideration is whether the statement, which he filed before the Income Tax Officer setting out the details of the income which he said he had received during the account year ended 31st March, 1947, does or does not amount to a "return " within the meaning of the Income Tax Act. It was urged by learned Counsel for the assessee that in order that the statement of his income filed by the assessee might be a "return" it ought to disclose the receipt of taxable income. We are wholly unable to accept this interpretation of Section 22. To a question by us during arguments as to whether a return filed by a person on whom a notice had been issued under Section 22(2) was a return where such a return did not disclose taxable income, learned Counsel answered in the affirmative but sought to distinguish returns under Section 22(1) from those filed under Section 22(2). We are unable to follow this argument which seeks to attribute different meanings to the same word "return" used in the several Sub-sections of Section 22. This differentiation was however sought to be sustained by the difference in the language employed in Section 22(1) and (2) giving rise to the obligation to file a return. It was pointed out that whereas under Sub-section (1) the public notification called for a return only when the income "exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax" the decision whether this is so or not being at that stage left to the person filing the return, whereas under Sub-section (2) it is the opinion of the Income Tax Officer regarding the person being in receipt of income above the taxable minimum that determined the calling for the return. It was, therefore, urged that unless the assessee thought that his income was above the taxable limit he would not send a "return" and that consequently what he sent in would not be a "return" where the income disclosed was less. In our opinion this argument is unsound and has to be rejected. It is one thing to say that where there is a doubt or dispute as to whether a return filed, was a voluntary one under Section 22(1) or not, the fact that the income disclosed is less than the minimum might be an important or even a crucial factor for proving that it was really one under Section 22(2). We might add that this was precisely the scope of the decisions of the Calcutta High Court on which learned Counsel for the assessee relied and to which we shall advert a little later. But this is far from saying that a return which admittedly was not preceded by any action on the part of the Income Tax Officer under Section 22(2) and which was a voluntary return ceased to be "a return" because of the quantum of the income it disclosed. If this argument were right it would follow that where an assessee filed such a return under Section 22(1) even within the assessment year the Income Tax Officer would be obliged to proceed as if no return has been filed and be enabled to levy penalties under Section 28 for failure to furnish "a return" on the ground that what was filed was not "a return ". There would be other anomalous consequences like the inapplicability of Section 82(3) and (4) in the case of such persons but as the point is clear we consider it unnecessary to detail the necessary consequences of such a construction. It is sufficient to say that the acceptance of such a construction would make the entire Act unworkable, lay upon asses-sees the burden of penal provisions and enable the Income Tax Officers to complete assessments on basis of estimates, all because the statement filed by the assessee is not a ''return" within the meaning of the Act.

    4. For the position that on the submission of such a return the Income Tax Officer was entitled to proceed with the assessment applying the other provisions of the enactment including that for ignoring the return and estimating the income it is sufficient to refer to Harakchand Makanji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 401 : 16 I.T.R. 119 where Chagala, C.J., held that once a public notice was given under Section 22(1) assessment proceedings commenced and there was no obligation upon the Income Tax Officer to serve notice on an assessee individually under Section 22(2) and that if a return were voluntarily made in response to this public notice, there was no question of any income escaping assessment, to attract the provisions of section 34. The learned Chief Justice said:

    Notice under Section 34 is only necessary if at the end of the assessment year no return has been made by the assessee and the Income-tax authorities wish to proceed under Section 22(2) by serving a notice individually. It may then be stated that as the assessment year had come to an end and as no return had been furnished and as the authorities wished to proceed under Section 22(2) they should not do so without a notice under Section 34. But as in this case the assessees themselves chose voluntarily to make a return no question of notice either under Section 22(2) or Section 34 arises .

    These observations have been quoted with approval by the learned Chief Justice of this Court delivering the judgment of the Bench in C.V. Govindarajulu Iyer v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1946) 16 I.T.R. 391 at 397. No doubt in the case before the Bombay High Court it does not appear wheher the voluntary return furnished by the assessee disclosed less than the taxable income. But subject to the argument regarding the meaning of the expression "return" learned Counsel for the assessee does not contend that if the statement submitted by the assessee in this case was a return, the assessment was otherwise invalid. Learned Counsel, however, relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Sultan Ali (1951) 20 I.T.R. 432. The question before the Court related to an assessment under the Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act the provisions of which were exactly similar to those contained in the Indian Income Tax Act. After the public notice under the section corresponding to Section 22(1), there had been an individual notice served on the assessee under the provision corresponding to Section 22(2) and subsequently the assessee had submitted a return disclosing an income below the taxable limit. The main question for the Court's consideration was whether this was a voluntary return or not. If it was in pursuance of the requisition of the Income-Tax Officer, it would not be voluntary. It was however contended by the department that as the requisition was issued after the period, when a valid requisition could be made, had expired, it must be treated as non est and that the return filed though actually in compliance thereof should be treated as legally attributable to the public notice requiring returns. This latter contention was rejected. Chakravarthi, J., (as he then was) who delivered the judgment of the Court dissented from the view expressed in Harakchand Makanji & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City (1948) A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 401 : 16 I.T.R. 119 in so far as the Bombay High Court had held that the assessment proceedings started with the issue of a public notice and expressed it as his opinion that it started only with the filing of a return. That is one of the points of difference between the two decisions but it is not necessary for us to canvas this question as that is outside the controversy raised by the present refernce. What is to the point in the present context is a passage which occurs at page 442 of the report:

    In order that the return may be treated as the return called for under Section 24(1) (corresponding to Section 22(1) of the Income-Tax Act) it must be capable of being so treated which clearly it is not. A return under Section 24(1) is a return filed by a person who decides for himself that he had an assessable income in the previous year and by filing the return he offers that income for assessment. A person who had no assessable income in the previous year is placed under no duty by a notice under Section 24(1) to furnish a return and a person who thinks, rightly or wrongly, that he had no assessable income will furnish none. A return under Section 24(1), whether filed within the time allowed under the section or filed subsequently...will therefore show an assessable income. A return which showed no assessable income, could not possibly be ' treated ' as a return filed under Section 24(1) or a return called for under that section but filed under Section 24(3), when in fact it was filed in response to a notice under section 24(2).

    The learned Judge further proceeded:

    It is true that there is nothing to prevent a person from filing a return showing an income below the assessable limit, in response to a notice under Section 24(1) but the question we are considering is whether a particular return not filed in fact under Section 24(1) or...is yet having regard to its contents capable of being treated as a return under the one or the other section.

    Though this passage is somewhat ambiguous, one thing is clear and that is sufficient for the present purpose that the learned Judge did hold that a voluntary return filed under Section 22(1) was not any the less "a return" within the Act because it disclosed an income below the taxable limit. We are reinforced in this conclusion by the explanation of these observations by Chakravarthi, C.J., himself in R.K. Das and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal to which we shall refer presently. That the correct view is as above stated has been held by the Bombay High Court in Ranchhoddas Karsondas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City where Chagla, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court and after referring to the observations of Chakravarthi, J., of the Calcutta High Court said:

    It is difficult to understand if it is open to a person to file a return which shows an income below the assessable limit under what other section would such a return be made except under Section 22(3); and it must also be said that this opinion of the learned Judge is obiter because in that particular case after a notice under Section 24(1) was issued there was also a notice under Section 24(2)(corresponding to our Section 22(2).... But to take the view that a voluntary return made is not a return under Section 22(3) merely because the return is of an income which is not assessable is in our opinion, with great respect, unaccepable and contrary to the scheme of the Income-tax Act.

    Chakravarthi, C.J., had occasion to consider in R.K. Das & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ranchhoddas Karsondas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City and the comment made upon his older decision in Sultan Ali's case (1951) 20 I.T.R. 432 and explained himself thus : After stating the facts of Sultan Ali's Case (1951) 20 I.T.R. 432 he said:

    ....I went on to say that a return under Section 24(1) would only be filed by a person who thought that he had a taxable income and therefore a return showing an income below the taxable limit could not be held, on a construction thereof, to be a return under Section 24(1) and consequently the return in the case we were then considering could not be treated as such a return filed under Section 24(3). To say that, was not to say that even a return filed in compliance with a notice under Section 22(2), if filed belatedly under Section 22(3), -could not be a return showing an income below the taxable limit.

    5. We are therefore clearly of the opinion that the return for the assessment year 1947-48 submitted by the assessee was a return within Section 22(1) on which assessment proceedings could validly be taken. It is for this reason that we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed he will pay the costs of the reference Rs. 250.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    P.S. Rama Iyer v. Commissioner Of Income Tax
    (Feb 5, 1957)