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  • Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (Act XIV of 1947), referred
  • SECTION 12 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • Section 10(1)(c)
  • Section 2(k)
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citation codes
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  • Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (Act XIV of 1947), referred
  • SECTION 12 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  • Section 10(1)(c)
  • Section 2(k)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the firm Radhakrishna Mills (Pollachi) Ltd. An employee of the mills, the fourth respondent Ponnai Gounder, was charged on 5-10-1953; after an inquiry on 7-10-1953 he was suspended until 15-10-1953 and resumed on 16-10-1953. The fourth respondent initially alleged victimisation against the management, later wrote a letter on 21-10-1953 withdrawing those allegations and expressing regret, but on 23-10-1953 revived his allegations and thereafter abstained from work. The management terminated his services on 26-10-1953 for staying away from work. Workers at the mills supported the fourth respondent and conciliation proceedings under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act ensued.

The conciliation officer reported under Section 12(4) that no settlement could be effected and recommended reference for adjudication under Section 10(1). The Government, by an order dated 27-2-1954 (under Section 12(5)), informed the parties that there was no case for adjudication. A subsequent communication received on 30-3-1954 (a representation said to emanate from the communist legislature party purporting to represent the workers) led the Government to issue Government Ms No. 1086 dated 26-4-1954 directing reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Industrial Tribunal at Coimbatore on whether the dismissal of Ponnai Gounder was justified and, if not, whether he was entitled to relief.

The petitioner challenged the validity of the 26-4-1954 order by filing a writ petition under Article 226 seeking certiorari to set aside the Government order. The petitioner later sought amendment to pray for a writ of prohibition against the Industrial Tribunal, contending that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government had jurisdiction to reverse or revisit its earlier decision of 27-2-1954 (passed under Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act) when it issued the reference dated 26-4-1954 under Section 10(1)(c).
  2. Whether the exercise of the Government's power to make the reference on 26-4-1954 was vitiated by failure to give notice to the employer (the petitioner) before the order was passed.
  3. Whether the dispute between the fourth respondent (an individual worker) and the management constituted an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act such that the Tribunal would have jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Government had no jurisdiction to review its earlier order dated 27-2-1954 passed under Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • Even if the Government had jurisdiction to revisit the matter, the exercise of that jurisdiction in passing the order dated 26-4-1954 was vitiated because no notice was given to the employer before the order was made.
  • The dispute was strictly between an individual worker and the management and therefore did not qualify as an "industrial dispute" under Section 2(k) of the Act; consequently the Tribunal would lack jurisdiction.
  • By amendment (C.M.P No. 2385 of 1955), the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition against the Industrial Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the referred dispute.

Third Respondent (Workers' Union) / Respondent Arguments

  • The petitioner was not entitled to a writ of certiorari to set aside the Government's order; the questions raised could not properly be investigated in these proceedings.
  • The reference under Section 10(1)(c) is an administrative act of the Government; because it is administrative, the court cannot scrutinise the order of reference as if it were a judicial or quasi-judicial determination.
  • The appropriate remedy against the Tribunal's award (if any) would be to challenge jurisdiction in those proceedings; the court should not quash the reference on the basis that it disagrees with the material before the Government.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathi, AIR 1953 SC 53 That making a reference under Section 10(1) is an administrative act; the Government forming an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute is administrative in character and not judicial. The court relied on this authority to hold that the reference dated 26-4-1954 was an administrative act and that the court cannot examine the order of reference as if it were a judicial determination; this supported the conclusion that the Government's decision to refer was within its administrative domain.
United Commercial Bank Ltd., Madurai v. Commissioner of Labour, Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 141 That the dismissal of even one workman can become the subject of an industrial dispute; when that happens the dispute ceases to be purely individual and becomes a collective dispute between workmen and employer. The court invoked this principle to conclude that the dispute concerning the dismissal of Ponnai Gounder was capable of being an industrial dispute under Section 2(k) because the workers had espoused his cause, transforming the matter into a collective dispute.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of discrete legal determinations, strictly grounded on the statutory framework and the materials before it:

  1. Characterisation of the Government's Order: The court accepted and applied the principle from State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathi that a reference under Section 10(1) (and, by extension, the Government's action under Section 12(5) and the later reference under Section 10(1)(c)) is administrative in nature. Because the act was administrative rather than judicial, the court could not scrutinise the order as if the Government had made a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of rights.
  2. Scope of Judicial Review vis-à-vis Tribunal Jurisdiction: The court explained that although the court should not canvass the material before the Government as a court would examine a judicial determination, it is open to the court to examine whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. If the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction (for instance, because no industrial dispute existed within the meaning of Section 2(k)), a writ of prohibition could issue. Thus the validity of the order of reference was examinable only to the extent necessary to determine the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
  3. Existence of an Industrial Dispute: Applying the principle from United Commercial Bank Ltd., the court found that even if the dispute began as an individual's claim, it became an industrial dispute because the workers in the mills espoused the cause of the fourth respondent. The court therefore concluded that the dispute fell within Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  4. Government's Power to Reconsider: The court analysed the interplay between Section 12(5) (where the Government may decide not to refer after failed conciliation) and Section 10(1)(c) (the power to refer). It held that a decision under Section 12(5) is administrative and is not invested with statutory finality by the Act. The Government can re-examine its earlier decision and re-consider the expediency of reference; in this case a fresh representation (dated 30-3-1954) on behalf of the workers prompted the Government to reconsider and refer the dispute on 26-4-1954.
  5. Effect of Lack of Notice to Employer: The court treated the order of reference as administrative and not a judicial or quasi-judicial adjudication of rights. Consequently, the failure to give notice to the management before the Government issued the 26-4-1954 order did not vitiate the exercise of the statutory power under Section 10(1)(c).
  6. Narrowing the Permissible Inquiry: The court rejected the petitioner's argument to the extent it sought to treat the Government's action as immune from any inquiry; but it emphasised that the permissible inquiry by the court is limited to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction. It was unnecessary to decide more generally whether the court can examine the validity of administrative acts beyond jurisdictional questions for the purposes of this case.
  7. Conclusion on Jurisdiction and Remedies: Because an industrial dispute existed and because the Government properly exercised its administrative power to refer the dispute (including reconsideration), the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate. Therefore, neither a writ of certiorari to quash the order nor a writ of prohibition to restrain the Tribunal was warranted in the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was dismissed. The court held that the Government's order dated 26-4-1954 referring the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal was valid and that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the referenced industrial dispute.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Industrial Tribunal at Coimbatore may proceed to adjudicate the dispute concerning the dismissal of Ponnai Gounder; the petitioner's challenge seeking certiorari (and its amended prayer for prohibition) failed, and no writ was issued to restrain the Tribunal.
  • On notice and procedure: The court held that the absence of prior notice to the employer before the administrative reference did not invalidate the Government's action under Section 10(1)(c).
  • On reviewability and finality: The decision recognises that an administrative decision under Section 12(5) is not a final, unreviewable determination; the Government may re-examine and refer a dispute if circumstances (such as fresh representations) justify reconsideration.
  • Precedential scope: The opinion applies established principles about the administrative character of references and the definition of "industrial dispute" in the statutory context. The court did not purport to lay down novel or expansive new legal doctrine beyond these applications; the result was limited to the direct effect on jurisdiction in this case.

Final disposition: Petition dismissed. No order as to costs.

G.M.J

    Radhakrishna Mills (Pollachi) Ltd. v. State Of Madras

    1. The petitioner applied under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside the order of the Government Ms No. 1086 dated 26-4-1954. The petitioner is a firm, Radhakrishna Mills (Pollachi) Ltd., at Pollachi. The fourth respondent, Ponnai Gounder, was one of the employees of the mills. On 5-10-1953 the management framed some charges against the fourth respondent. After an enquiry on 7-10-1953, the fourth respondent was suspended from his office till 15-10-1953 as a punishment. He resumed office on 16-10-1953.

    2. The fourth respondent alleged that it was a case of victimisation and that he had been unjustly punished. But on 21-10-1953 he withdrew those allegations and expressed his regret to the management by a letter. On 23-10-1953 the fourth respondent revived the allegations of victimisation that he had made and resiled from the position he had taken up in the letter said to have been sent by him on 21-10-1953. Thereafter he abstained from work.

    3. The management terminated his services on 26-10-1953 for staying away from work. The workers in the mills espoused the cause of the fourth respondent. Conciliation proceedings under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Act 14 of 1947, ensued, and the labour officer who was the conciliation officer reported under Section 12(4) of the Act that he had not been able to effect a settlement; and he recommended that the industrial dispute be referred for adjudication under Section 10(1) of the Act.

    4. The Government did not accept that recommendation. On 27-2-1954, obviously in exercise of the powers vested in the Government under Section 12(5) of the Act, the Government informed the parties that the Government considered that there was no case for adjudication. On 30-3-1954 the Government received a communication emanating from the communist legislature party at Madras, which itself purported to be a representation on behalf of the workers of the petitioner-mills.

    5. On 26-4-1954 the Government directed under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that the industrial disputes specified in the schedule to the order be referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Coimbatore. The industrial disputes specified were, (1) whether the dismissal of Ponnai Gounder, son of Chellapa Gounder was justified, and (2) if not whether he was entitled to reinstatement or compensation or any other relief. It was the validity of this order dated 26-4-1954 that the petitioner challenged.

    6. The validity of the order of reference under S. 10(1)(c) dated 26-4-1954 was challenged by the petitioner on the following grounds: (1) the Government had no jurisdiction to review its earlier order dated 27-2-1954 passed under Section 12(5) of the Act, (2) even if the Government had jurisdiction, the exercise of that jurisdiction was vitiated by failure to give notice to the employer before the order dated 26-4-1954 was passed, and (3) a dispute between an individual worker and the management was not an industrial dispute as defined by Section 2(k) of the Act.

    7. Learned counsel for the third respondent, the Workers' Union, contended that none of the questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner could be investigated in these proceedings, as the petitioner was not entitled to a writ of certiorari to set aside the order complained against.

    8. Learned counsel for the third respondent urged that the reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act constituted an administrative act of the Government to correct which no writ of certiorari could issue. That contention is well founded. In — ‘State of Madras v. C.P Sarathi’, AIR 1953 SC 53 (A), Patanjali Sastri, C.J observed at page 57:

    “It must be remembered that in making a reference under S. 10(1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence: of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less administrative in character.

    9. The Court cannot therefore canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. No doubt it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award.

    10. But, if the dispute was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon, and it will not be competent for the court to hold, the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters.”

    11. The petitioner filed C.M.P No. 2385 of 1955 to amend the prayer in the petition W.P No. 53T of 1954 as originally filed. The petitioner prayed for the issue of a writ of prohibition against the Industrial Tribunal. Such a writ could issue if it, is established that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed with the adjudication of the dispute referred to. In the circumstances of this case no question of excess of jurisdiction arises for consideration.

    12. If the dispute was not an industrial dispute at all as defined by Section 2(k) of the Act, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction despite-the reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act.

    13. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the dispute was one between the fourth respondent, one of the workers, and the management, and that it was not an industrial dispute. That contention must be negatived. It is true that the industrial dispute originated with a claim of the fourth respondent against the management, that he had been victimised and wrongfully dismissed. As pointed out by the learned Chief Justice at page 144 in — ‘United Commercial Bank Ltd., Mathurai v. Commissioner of Labour Madras’, AIR 1951 Mad 141 at p. 144 (B):

    “it may be that the dismissal of even one workman can become the subject of an industrial dispute, but then it is no longer an individual dispute between the dismissed workman and the employer only; it becomes a dispute between the workmen on the one hand and the employer on the other. Such a dispute, it may be called a collective dispute…………….”

    14. The dispute referred for adjudication by the order dated 26-4-1954 was an industrial dispute as defined by Section 2(k) of the Act.

    15. The next question is, was the reference under S. 10(1)(c) valid. The extreme contention, that the validity of what was an administrative act, done no doubt in the exercise of a statutory power conferred by the Government under S. 10(1)(c), could not be questioned even for deciding whether a writ of Prohibition could issue to the Industrial Tribunal, has to be rejected.

    16. What I have to consider is whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the industrial dispute referred to it. If it had no jurisdiction a writ of prohibition could issue, even as a writ of Certiorari could issue to quash an award of the Tribunal if it had acted without jurisdiction. Absence of an industrial dispute would obviously be sufficient to negative jurisdiction. The validity of the order of reference is open to examination by this court to decide whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction. There was an industrial dispute in this case, as I have already pointed out.

    17. Learned counsel for the third respondent next contended that the examination of the validity of the reference should be limited to verifying whether there was an industrial dispute, and the court had no jurisdiction to go into the validity of an administrative act for any other purpose. It is not necessary for me to pronounce any opinion on the soundness or otherwise of this contention to dispose of the questions at issue in these proceedings.

    18. Even if, on the termination of conciliation proceedings under Section 12 of the Act, the Government have to decide under Section 12(5) of the Act, whether a reference is necessary, that reference has to be only under Section 10(1) of the Act. In this case it was under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act. Before making a reference under S. 10(1)(c) the Government have to be satisfied that an industrial dispute existed or was apprehended.

    19. In this case the industrial dispute did exist. Even if an industrial dispute does exist or is apprehended, it is still left to the discretion of the Government to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 10(1) of the Act. It has therefore to be satisfied that it is expedient to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication. On both factors, the factual existence of the industrial dispute and of the expediency to refer that industrial dispute for adjudication, the Government is the sole judge.

    20. In this case that an industrial dispute has existed all along cannot be doubted on 27-2-1954 the Government decided it was not expedient to refer that dispute for adjudication under Section 10(1) of the Act. The circumstances under which they decided on 28-4-1954, that it was necessary to refer that dispute for adjudication, were set out in paragraph 4 of the counter the Government filed:

    “Subsequently representation was received on behalf of the workers dated 30-3-1954 requesting the Government to refer the matter for adjudication as the Government's conclusion based on an alleged ‘false allegation’ of the worker without going into the question whether the dismissal of the worker was just or not was incorrect, that evidence had to be taken on that question in an enquiry.

    21. The Government considered the matter afresh and by their order Ms. No. 1086 dated 26th April 1954 in exercise of the power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (Act XIV of 1947), referred the question to the second respondent as to whether the dismissal of the worker was justified for adjudication.”

    22. It was a representation on behalf of the workers. Their own Union had apparently not been recognised by the management. That was how the representation was viewed, though it emanated from a party, which had nothing to do either with the management or with the worker or with the workers' Union. A decision under Section 12(5) of the Act is an administrative act and not a judicial or quasi-judicial adjudication. Such a decision has not been invested with any statutory finality by any provision of the Act.

    23. The right of the Government — very often it is a duty—is not exhausted by the exercise of the power vested in it by Section 12(5) of the Act. It could re-examine the question of expediency afresh. The industrial dispute was still there and unresolved. In this case there was the supervening factor. A fresh representation was made on behalf of the workers, that the basis on which the Government issued the order dated 27-2-1954 required further examination, i.e, whether the letter said to have been sent by Ponnai Gounder was a genuine letter and really represented what he meant.

    24. There had been no judicial determination of that question at any time. There was no need to, as all acts culminating with the reference to S. 10(1) were administrative in their scope. It is therefore not a question of a review of a judicial determination. Therefore no question of jurisdiction of the Government as such arises for consideration. That the Government acted bona fide throughout was never questioned.

    25. In my opinion, the fact that the Government in effect reversed their earlier view on the question of expediency of a reference u/s. 10(1)(c) of the Act, did not invalidate the reference. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate on the industrial dispute referred to it by that order of reference therefore remains unaffected. Since the Tribunal had jurisdiction to proceed with the adjudication, no writ of Prohibition can issue.

    26. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that no notice had been given to the management before the order dated 26-4-1954 was passed. I have already pointed out that the issue of that order itself was an administrative act. It did not amount to a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of the rights of any of the parties. Therefore failure to give notice to the management did not vitiate the exercise of the statutory power vested in the Government by Section 10(1)(c) of the Act. The petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.

    G.M.J

    27. Petition dismissed.

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    Radhakrishna Mills (Pollachi) Ltd. v. State Of Madras
    (May 3, 1955)