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  • S. III(c) of the Transfer of Property Act
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  • S. III(c) of the Transfer of Property Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from O.S. No. 40 of 1945 (District Munsif's Court, Kumbakonam), a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage executed in favour of the first defendant. The second defendant in that suit (referred to in the judgment as the appellant) was a co-mortgagor. A preliminary decree was passed on 30th April 1947 and confirmed on appeal by the Sub Court of Kumbakonam on 16th April 1948.

The plaintiff and the second defendant deposited the mortgage amount of Rs. 1,000 in equal moieties on 30th July 1947; the first defendant drew the amount from court on 22nd September 1948. The present application, I.A. No. 781 of 1950, was filed by the second defendant seeking a final decree for redemption under Order 34, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, an order directing the first defendant to deliver possession of the mortgaged properties, and accounts for future profits from 2nd September 1948 until delivery of possession.

Complications arose because, after the usufructuary mortgage in favour of the first defendant, the first defendant had let the third defendant into possession as his tenant. The third defendant's occupation and the obstruction caused by him gave rise to eviction proceedings and subsequent litigation that form the basis of the present civil revision petition and the alternative civil miscellaneous second appeal.

After the first defendant drew the mortgage money from court, he issued notices (Ex. R.5 to the third defendant and Ex. R.1 to the appellant and the plaintiff) directing the third defendant to pay rent to the plaintiff and the second defendant. The third defendant replied disputing arrears but not his status as tenant.

The appellant filed R.C.A. No. 132 of 1930 before the Rent Controller seeking eviction of the third defendant; the Rent Controller upheld a preliminary objection that the application was not maintainable (the objection being that without symbolic delivery against the first defendant no ejectment claim could be maintained), and the appellate authority (Subordinate Judge) dismissed the appeal, upholding that preliminary objection.

Separately, the appellant prosecuted I.A. No. 781 (for a final decree for possession and mesne profits). Delay in hearing that application was caused by the third defendant's adjudication as an insolvent and the need to implead the Official Receiver. When eventually heard, the District Munsif dismissed the application in full on the ground that, by initiating eviction proceedings against the third defendant, the second defendant had accepted the third defendant as his tenant and therefore could not claim mesne profits against the first defendant. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge allowed the prayer for a final decree for redemption but dismissed the claim for mesne profits on the ground that the appellant was estopped from claiming mesne profits. The present revision petition and alternative civil miscellaneous second appeal challenge that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a usufructuary mortgagee (or mortgagee who has let a tenant into possession after the execution of the mortgage in his favour) is obliged to put the mortgagor in actual possession on redemption (i.e., whether issuing a notice to the tenant to attorn to the mortgagor suffices, or whether the mortgagee must secure actual delivery of possession).
  2. Whether the mortgagor's initiation of eviction proceedings against the tenant (i.e., the appellant's proceedings before the Rent Controller) constitutes an election or creates an estoppel that precludes the mortgagor from subsequently claiming mesne profits from the mortgagee.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (Mr. Venugopalachari, learned Counsel) contended that the mortgagor's right to proceed against the mortgagee for mesne profits is not extinguished merely because the mortgagee issued notices to the tenant asking him to attorn; in other words, where there has been no attornment by the tenant and no acceptance by the mortgagor of that tenancy, the mortgagor's right to claim mesne profits against the mortgagee remains.
  • The appellant argued that the first defendant had suffered no prejudice by the appellant's proceedings against the third defendant and therefore could not rely on an estoppel. In support he relied on paragraph 239 of Spencer Bower on Estoppel to assert that there could be no final election unless the other party had suffered prejudice.

Respondent / Other Parties' Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the respondent (as described in the judgment) argued that the mortgagee's obligation to deliver possession to the mortgagor on redemption is fulfilled by the mortgagee issuing a notice to the tenant directing the tenant to attorn to the mortgagor; the mortgagee was not required to ensure that the tenant actually attorned.
  • The third defendant (tenant) resisted the eviction petition before the Rent Controller on the preliminary ground that, without symbolic delivery against the first defendant, no ejectment claim could be maintained; this preliminary objection was upheld by the Rent Controller and by the Subordinate Judge on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Scarf v. Jardine (quoted passage from Lord Blackburn) The doctrine of election: "where a man has an option to choose one or other of two inconsistent things, when once he has made his election it cannot be retracted, it is final and cannot be altered." The court relied on this statement to support the proposition that when a party with knowledge makes an unequivocal choice between inconsistent rights, he cannot later pursue the other right; applied this to hold that the appellant's conduct constituted an election precluding him from claiming mesne profits against the first defendant.
United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (House of Lords; Lord Atkin) Endorsement and explanation of the election principle: a party who with full knowledge does an unequivocal act showing choice of one inconsistent right cannot afterwards pursue the other. The judgment cited Lord Atkin's passage approving Lord Blackburn's statement to reinforce that the rule of finality in election applies and supports the court's conclusion that the appellant's initiation of eviction proceedings constituted an election.
Spencer Bower on Estoppel (paragraph 239) — (treatise relied on by appellant) The authoritatve statement (relied on by appellant) that there could be no final election unless the other party had suffered prejudice. The court noted the appellant relied on this passage but explicitly rejected its applicability to "true cases of election," holding that in such cases detriment to the other party is not a required foundation for applying the rule of election.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a series of legal analyses grounded in both statute and principle:

  1. The court began from the uncontroversial premise that when a mortgagor puts a mortgagee in possession under a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagor is entitled, upon discharging the mortgage debt, to redelivery of possession from the mortgagee.
  2. The court rejected the respondent's submission that the mortgagee's obligation is fulfilled merely by issuing a notice to his tenant to attorn to the mortgagor and that the mortgagee need not ensure actual attornment. The court held that where a tenant attorns to the mortgagor and the mortgagor accepts that attornment, there is an effective delivery of possession; but where there is no attornment (either because the mortgagor refuses to accept the person in occupation as his tenant, or because the tenant refuses to attorn) the mortgagor is entitled to insist on khas (actual) possession and not merely a direction by the mortgagee to the tenant to attorn.
  3. The court observed that if the facts had been confined to the mere issuance of notices by the mortgagee and failure by the tenant to attorn, the second defendant would have been entitled to a decree for mesne profits against the first defendant. The crucial issue, however, was the legal effect of the appellant's initiation of eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller.
  4. The court accepted the Subordinate Judge's ground that the appellant was estopped from proceeding against the first defendant because of the eviction proceedings. The court reasoned that the appellant's action against the tenant prevented the first defendant from taking steps himself to recover rents or possession from the tenant to satisfy the appellant's claims; in those circumstances the initiation of proceedings against the tenant furnished a foundation for raising an estoppel against the appellant, particularly in light of the tenant's subsequent insolvency.
  5. Independently, the court held that the appellant's initiation of eviction proceedings amounted to an election to treat the tenant as his own tenant. The court explained the two inconsistent courses open to the appellant at the time notices were issued: (a) demand khas possession from the first defendant and refuse to recognise the tenant, pursuing remedies against the first defendant; or (b) recognise the tenant in possession as his own tenant. By choosing the latter path (proceeding against the tenant), the appellant could not later pursue the inconsistent remedy of claiming mesne profits against the first defendant if he found it difficult or impossible to recover from the tenant.
  6. The court rejected the argument that the tenant's refusal to attorn made the appellant's position different. Citing (as quoted in the judgment) S. III(c) of the Transfer of Property Act — the judgment reproduces the relevant sentence: “a lease of immoveable property determines where the interests of the lessor in the property terminates on the happening of any event, by the happening of such an event.” On that basis the court reasoned that in a usufructuary mortgage the mortgagee's interest terminates on redemption; a lease granted by him ends at the same time and the lessee then becomes a trespasser. Therefore, the lessee cannot create by his own act a fresh lessor/tenant relationship with the mortgagor. Once the mortgagor treated the tenant as holding under him and sought relief on that footing (the eviction proceedings), he could not thereafter turn around and assert the contrary and claim mesne profits from the first defendant.
  7. Addressing the appellant's reliance on Spencer Bower's statement that final election requires prejudice to the other party, the court distinguished "true cases of election," observing that where a person with full knowledge performs an unequivocal act indicating a choice between two inconsistent rights, detriment to the other party is not necessary for the principle to apply. The court invoked Scarf v. Jardine (Lord Blackburn) and United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (Lord Atkin) to support the conclusion that election, once made, is final and precludes pursuit of the alternative right.

Holding and Implications

Final Rulings:

  • The civil miscellaneous second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
  • The civil revision petition is dismissed (in the circumstances, without costs).

Implications:

  • The court's decision means that the appellant (the second defendant) is precluded by election and/or estoppel from claiming mesne profits against the first defendant after having initiated eviction proceedings against the third defendant and thereby treated the third defendant as his tenant.
  • The court reinforced that where a party elects between two inconsistent remedies by unequivocal conduct (even if the tenant refuses to attorn), that party cannot later pursue the alternative remedy; in such "true cases of election" the presence of prejudice to the other party is not a necessary condition for applying the doctrine of election.
  • The judgment does not purport to establish a novel legal principle; it applies established doctrines of election and estoppel (as supported by the cited authorities) to the facts of this case. The direct effect on the parties is the dismissal of the appellant's remedies sought in the appeal and the revision petition as set out above.

Signed: V.C.S (as recorded in the judgment)

    R. Samudra Vijayam Chettiar v. Srinivasa Alwar And Others.

    JUDGMENT

    The civil revision petition and the civil miscellaneous second appeal in the alternative have been filed by the second defendant in O.S No. 40 of 1945 on the file of the District Munsif's Court of Kumbakonam, in the following circumstances. I shall be referring to the second defendant as the appellant in the rest of the judgment.

    O.S No. 40 of 1945 was a suit brought by the plaintiff for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage executed in favour of the first defendant, wherein the second defendant, who is the present appellant, was a co-mortgagor. The redemption suit was decreed, the preliminary decree having been passed on 30th April 1947, and this was confirmed on 16th April 1948 by the Sub Court of Kumbakonam on appeal. The second defendant and the plaintiff deposited the mortgage amount of Rs. 1000 in equal moieties on 30th July 1947 and the first defendant drew the amount from Court on 22nd September 1948. The present application I.A No. 781 of 1950 is for the purpose of passing a final decree for redemption under O. 34, R. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code and for directing the first defendant to deliver possession of the mortgaged properties and render accounts in respect of future profits from 2nd September 1948 until delivery of possession. This application was preferred by the second defendant, who, as stated before, was one of the mortgagors. The complications in the case have arisen out of the fact that Subsequent to the usufructuary mortgage in favour of the first defendant, he let the third defendant into possession as a tenant under him, and it is the obstruction caused by this tenant that has been responsible for the proceedings now before this Court, and the effect of this obstruction on the rights of the parties is the subject matter for adjudication in the Civil Revision Petition and the civil miscellaneous second appeal new before me.

    To continue the narration of the facts immediately after the receipt of the mortgage money from Court on 22nd September, 1948 the first defendant issued a notice, Ex. R. 5, to the third defendant, his tenant directing him to pay the rent subsequent to 20th September 1918 to the plaintiff and the second defendant, the appellant here. He also gave another notice dated 25th September 1948, Ex. R. 1. to the appellant and the plaintiff directing them to receive the rent Subsequent to 20th September 19 8 from the third defendant The third defendant sent a reply. Ex. R. 6, on 4th October 1946 disputing the amount of arrears of rent due by him, but not questioning his stats as a tenant or his liability to pay rent.

    After the despatch and receipt of these notices the appellant filed R.C.A No. 132 of 1930 before the Rent Controller, Kumbakonam, for an order of eviction against the third defendant, the tenant in occupation of the suit property. In this petition he claimed that he was the landlord and the third defendant, the respondent to that petition, was the tenant of the non-residential building which was described in the schedule attached, and that the the tenant had-not paid any rent to him or to the plaintiff in the suit, who were the persons entitled to receive the rent by virtue of the decree in O.S No. 40 of 1945. He also stated that the tenant, had sublet the entire building and had further used the building for purposes other than that for which it was leased. On these grounds he prayed for an order for eviction and for his being put in possession of the property under the orders of the Court. The third defendant resisted that petition on the ground that the application was not maintainable and that without obtaining symbolical delivery against the first defendant no claim for ejectment could be maintained against him. This preliminary objection was upheld by the Rent Controller and the appellant took the matter in appeal to the appellate authority, the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam. This appeal was dismissed, the appellate authority also holding the preliminary objection to be well-founded.

    At about the same time as the application for eviction before the Rent Controller, the appellant filed I.A No. 781 of 1930 for a decree for possession and mesne profits, from the order in which the present civil miscellaneous second appeal and the civil revision petition arise. There was delay in the hearing of this application for a final decree by reason of the third defendant being adjudicated an insolvent and the Official Receiver haying to be impleaded as a party to the proceeding. By the time this application came on for, hearing the petition for eviction had been dismissed by the Rent Controller and the appeal against it by the appellant was pending. The learned District Munsif, who heard the application, I.A No. 781 of 1950, held that the second defendant having accepted the third defendant as a tenant under him by reason of the proceedings for eviction taken against the latter could not claim to have a decree for mesne profits as against the first defendant. On this ground he dismissed the petition in full even in regard to the prayer for a final decree for redemption. The appellant took the matter in appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam. He allowed the appeal in so far as it related to the prayer for a final decree for redemption; but in regard to the claim for mesne profits he dismissed it. The ground upon which this dismissal was rested was that the appellant was estopped from claiming any mesne profits from the first defendant by reason of certain conduct which is referred to in the judgment. It is from this order of the learned Subordinate Judge that the present revision petition and the alternative civil miscellaneous second appeal have been filed.

    Two questions arise for consideration. The first is as regards the obligation of a usufructuary mortgagee, who has let a tenant into possession after the execution of the mortgage in his favour to put the mortgagor in actual possession of the property on redemption. It is not disputed that when a mortgagor puts a mortgagee in possession of property under a usufructuary mortgage the former has a right, when he has discharged the mortgage debt, to redelivery of the possession of the property from the mortgagee. The position, however, that is sought to be maintained by learned Counsel for the respondent is that this obligation is fulfilled by the mortgagee issuing a notice to the tenant whom he had inducted into possession to deliver possession to or at torn to the mortgagor, and that he was not concerned to see whether the tenant did so or not. 1 cannot agree that this is the law. In cases where such tenant attorns to the mortgagor and the mortgagor accepts the attornment there would doubtless be an effective delivery of possession, which would terminate all further liability on the part of the mortgage; but where there is no attornment either because the mortgagor refuses to accept the person in occupation as his tenant or because though the mortgagor is willing to accept the person in possession as his tenant, the latter refuses to do so, the mortgager is entitled to insist that khas possession should be delivered to him and not merely such possession as is involved by a mere direction by the mortgagee to his tenant to attorn to the mortgagor. Coming to the facts of the present case if the matter had rested merely with the issue of the notice by the first defendant to the third defendant asking the latter to attorn to and pay the rents to the plaintiff and the second defendant and the notices to the second defendant and plaintiff requiring them to look to the third defendant for the payment of rents due on the property, together with the failure on the part of the tenant to attorn to the mortgagors there could be no doubt that the second defendant would have been entitled to an order for mesne profits as against the first defendant. The contention of Mr. Venugopalachari, learned Counsel for the appellant, was that the position was not different and what I have just now set out and that so long as there had been no attornment by the tenant and acceptance by the mortgagor of that tenancy, his right to proceed against the mortgagee for mesne profits was not extinguished. But what stands in the way of the appellant's contention is the legal effect of the proceedings for eviction before the Rent Controller initiated by him.

    The learned Subordinate Judge decided against the appellant on the ground that he was estopped from proceeding against the first defend ant by reason of the eviction proceedings. Mr. Venugopalachari submitted that this was erroneous in that the first defendant had suffered no prejudice by reason of the appellant proceeding against the third defendant. I am not inclined to agree with this submission. If the appellant had indicated that he did not propose to recognise the third defendant as his tenant but would proceed only against the first defendant the latter might certainly have taken steps to recover rents as also possession from his tenant so that he might satisfy the claims of the appellant. In the face of the action by the appellant against the third defendant, the first defendant could certainly not himself have proceeded against the latter. Meanwhile the third defendant has become insolvent. In these circumstances I am inclined to agree with the Subordinate Judge that there exists a foundation for raising an estoppel against the appellant.

    But apart from this I am prepared to hold that the initiation of the proceedings before the Rent Controller by the appellant against the third defendant constitutes an election on his part to treat the tenant in possession as his tenant. When notices were issued by the first defendant to the appellant and the third defendant there were two courses open to the former. The first was to require the first defendant to deliver him khas possession of the property refusing to recognise the third defendant. On this footing he could have pursued his remedies against the first defendant and would have been entitled to a decree for mesne profits as against him. There was another different and a wholly inconsistent position which he might have taken up. That was to recognise the tenant in possession as his own tenant. There can be no doubt that if he chose the latter course he could not at any later date make any claim against the first defendant in the event, say, of his finding it difficult or not possible to recover either arrears of rent or possession from his tenant. In the present case though the appellant was willing to recognise the third defendant as his tenant the latter refused to recognise the appellant as his landlord. The question is whether it is the act or conduct of the appellant that matters or whether the fact that the tenant has refused to attorn makes any difference. In my opinion the conduct or attitude of the tenant is wholly irrelevant. Under S. III(c) of the Transfer of Property Act “a lease of immoveable property deter, mines where the interests of the lessor in the property terminates on the happening of any event, by the happening of such an event.” In the case of a usufructuary mortgage, as the mortgagee's interest in the property terminates of redemption, a lease granted by him comes to an end at the same time. The lessee then in possession, would, on that event happening become a trespasser and therefore cannot by any act of his own create the relationship of lessor and tenant between himself and the mortgagor. In the present case the mortgagor has treated the tenant as holding under him and sought relief on that footing in the eviction proceedings. Could he thereafter turn round and assert that the third defendant was not his tenant and claim to treat the first defendant as continuing in possession and therefore liable to pay him mesne profits by reason of wrongful occupation. I am clearly of the opinion that he cannot and that he is precluded by his election in so doing.

    Mr. Venugopalachari contended that the effect of the eviction proceedings did not unmistakably evince any intention to treat the third defendant as his tenant. I am, however, unable to agree in this submission in view of the terms of the allegations contained in the application for eviction as well as the grounds put forward in the memo of appeal to the appellate authority from the order of the Rent Controller. For instance in ground No. 3 in the appeal grounds the second defendant insisted that the Rent Controller ought to have held

    “that the petitioner is the landlord and the respondent is a tenant under the Act and as such the petition is sustainable.”

    In my opinion, there is here a clear case of election and the second defendant must be taken by reason of his conduct to have accepted the third defendant as his tenant with the necessary result that he could no longer look to the first defendant for the payment to him of any mesne profits which he now finds unable to recover from the person whom he accepted as his tenant.

    A further contention was raised by learned Counsel for the appellant that there could be no final election unless the other party had suffered any prejudice and in support of this position he relied on paragraph 239 of Spencer Bower on Estoppel. I do not however agree with him in regard to what might be termed, true cases of election. Where a man is entitled to one of two inconsistent rights and he has with full knowledge done an unequivocal act indicating his choice of the one he cannot afterwards pursue the other which after the first choice is by reason of the inconsistency no longer open to him. Such cases do not require detriment to the other party as foundation for their application. As Lord Blackburn said in Scarf v. Jardine (1), quoting a passage from Coke on Littleton.

    “where a man has an option to choose one or other of two inconsistent things, when once he has made his election it cannot be retracted, it is final and cannot be altered.”

    This passage as well as the law contained in it received express approval from Lord Atkin in the House of Lords in United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (2), where the learned Lord said:

    “On the other hand, if a man is entitled to one of two inconsistent rights it is fitting that when with full knowledge he has done an unequivocal act showing that he has chosen the one he cannot afterwards pursue the other, which after the first choice is by reason of the inconsistency no longer his to choose. Instances are the right of principal dealing with an agent for an undisclosed principal to choose the liability of the agent or the principal; the right of a landlord where forfeiture of a lease has been committed to exact the forfeiture or to treat the former tenant; as still tenant and the like. To those cases the statement of Lord Blackburn in Scart v. Jardine (1) applies ‘where a man has an option to chaose one or other of two inconsistent things when once he has made his election it cannot be retracted’.”

    The first defendant was undoubtedly prejudiced by the election but even if this feature were absent I would hold that there had been an election by proceeding against the tenant notwithstanding that the appellant was unable to obtain a judgment in it and that he cannot thereafter seek to treat the first defendant as in possession and recover mesne profits as against him.

    The civil miscellaneous second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The civil revision petition also is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.

    V.C.S

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    Comments

    R. Samudra Vijayam Chettiar v. Srinivasa Alwar And Others.
    (Aug 25, 1955)