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Acts
  • Section 43 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Act and Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, and Section 302 of the Indian Succession Act
  • Acts:(a) Act 1 of 1879; (b) Act 9 of 1881; (c) Act 2 of 1890; (d) Act 7 of 1901 and (e) Act 5 of 1902.26.
  • Section 41-A to Act 2 of 1874 and Section 26-A of the Succession Act).59.
  • etc.(f) Amendment of Section 256 of the Indian Succession Act,
  • Acts 10 of 1914; 21 of 1922; 32 of 1926; 10 of 1927; 32 of 1940.
  • Sections 10 and 11 of the Administrator-General's Act, 1913,
  • SECTION 28 ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL S ACT 1913
  • Ss. 2, 3 and 4).15. By Section 5 of the same Act provision
  • Provident Funds Act, 1897, is excluded.38. Section 31
  • Act passed in 1850 (Act 2, 1850) the Act of 1849
  • Section 302 of the Indian Succession Act.
  • Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act
  • Acts 5 of 1917 and 12 of 1927.54.
  • Act 19 of 1869 and Act 5 of 1870
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 43 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Act and Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, and Section 302 of the Indian Succession Act
  • Acts:(a) Act 1 of 1879; (b) Act 9 of 1881; (c) Act 2 of 1890; (d) Act 7 of 1901 and (e) Act 5 of 1902.26.
  • Section 41-A to Act 2 of 1874 and Section 26-A of the Succession Act).59.
  • etc.(f) Amendment of Section 256 of the Indian Succession Act,
  • Acts 10 of 1914; 21 of 1922; 32 of 1926; 10 of 1927; 32 of 1940.
  • Sections 10 and 11 of the Administrator-General's Act, 1913,
  • SECTION 28 ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL S ACT 1913
  • Ss. 2, 3 and 4).15. By Section 5 of the same Act provision
  • Provident Funds Act, 1897, is excluded.38. Section 31
  • Act passed in 1850 (Act 2, 1850) the Act of 1849
  • Section 302 of the Indian Succession Act.
  • Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act
  • Acts 5 of 1917 and 12 of 1927.54.
  • Act 19 of 1869 and Act 5 of 1870
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition was filed under Section 28 of the Administrator-General's Act, 1913. The testator, Sri T. Rangaswami Chettiar, died on 29-6-1933 leaving a will dated 1-5-1933 disposing of six immovable properties in Madras (valued at Rs. 24,800) and appointing no executor. The sole surviving immediate relatives were his daughter, Gyanambal (the petitioner), and a granddaughter, Swamambal. The will created life estates for Gyanambal and Swamambal, with the remainder to Swamambal's children; contingencies provided for charities if Swamambal died without issue. After the testator's death, Gyanambal and her husband took possession and managed the estate without probate. Disputes later arose, and on the applicant Gyanambal's earlier application (O.P. 242 of 1939) the Court, by order dated 17-8-1939, directed the Administrator-General under Sections 10 and 11 to take possession and apply for Letters of Administration when funds were available. Gyanambal handed over title deeds for three properties (a house at Conjeevaram, three shops in Poonamallee, and premises No. 3, Thandavamurthi Chetti Street, Park Town).

The Administrator-General initially could not take possession of properties outside the City of Madras. The estate taken into administration produced a gross annual income of Rs. 2,052; after taxes and charges the income was payable to Gyanambal under the will. The Administrator-General paid Gyanambal Rs. 60 per month and the estate had an accumulated income of about Rs. 500 at the time. The Administrator-General applied for and obtained Letters of Administration with a copy of the will annexed on 29-4-1954 (O.P. 51 of 1954), having advanced succession duty of Rs. 1,770 from the Administrator-General's Reserve Fund and seeking recoupment by selling one house. The Administrator-General also initiated proceedings to take possession of the Conjeevaram and Poonamallee properties and served notice on Gyanambal concerning sale of the Conjeevaram house. It was in these circumstances that Gyanambal filed the present petition under Section 28.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petition under Section 28 of the Administrator-General's Act is competent in the circumstances (i.e., whether the Court can direct the Administrator-General to wind up administration and hand over the estate to the petitioner where the Administrator-General has obtained Letters of Administration and the administration has not been completed).
  2. What is the scope of the Administrator-General's powers under the Act and, specifically, the scope and limits of Section 28 of the Act (whether Section 28 permits directions to wind up administration and to hand over estate after Letters have been taken out).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Gyanambal) Arguments

  • The Administrator-General should be directed to transfer the testator's properties to her, hand over title deeds and assets, and treat certain properties (including the Conjeevaram house, shops in Poonamallee, and premises No. 3 Thandavamurthi Chetti Street) as her own.
  • The Administrator-General has not managed the properties prudently and the administration has been unduly costly.
  • The Administrator-General has set up an adverse claim to three properties which she had handed over only for safe custody.
  • She asserted that the beneficiaries under the will were prepared to support her claim that she should manage the estate.

Administrator-General's Arguments

  • The Administrator-General contended that he had prudently managed the properties: putting dilapidated houses in order, preventing reckless mortgaging and raising of loans by the petitioner contrary to the will, and securing fair rents.
  • The three properties in question were purchased out of the deceased's funds and the correspondence filed demonstrated this.
  • Letters of Administration could not be obtained earlier because of the petitioner's non-cooperation and the want of funds; the Administrator-General advanced the succession duty and seeks recoupment.
  • The present petition was characterized as a counterblast to the Administrator-General's steps to liquidate the succession duty and take possession of the properties outside Madras.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Kali v. Administrator-General, U.P., AIR 1943 All 356 Administrator-General may step in to obtain Letters of Administration where a universal legatee has taken no steps; letters can be issued to Administrator-General even in respect of estates of exempted persons. Cited under the discussion of Section 7 and Section 8 to show circumstances in which Administrator-General can apply for Letters and his preference in some courts.
Nritya Gopal v. Administrator-General of Bengal, 10 Cal WN 241 Administrator-General should not take possession without previous order of Court (principle relevant to Section 10). Used to illustrate the limitation in Section 10 concerning taking possession.
Lalchand Ramdayal v. Gumtibai, 8 Bom HC (O.C) 140 When title of Administrator-General accrues and the circumstances in which title relates back to date of death of the deceased. Referred to for general principles on accrual and relating-back of title.
In the Goods of Girdar Das Vallaba Das, 1 Mad HCR 234 When the Administrator-General can be directed to apply for administration. Cited as authority for circumstances in which a court may direct the Administrator-General to apply for Letters of Administration.
In the Goods of Pasupati Mukerjee, AIR 1920 Cal 376 "Succession" in Section 11 is not limited to intestate succession; Administrator-General appointed executor can obtain order to take possession under S.11 before applying for probate. Used to show the breadth of S.11 and the Administrator-General's powers to take possession pending probate.
In the Goods of Hari Das Dutt, 11 Cal WN 193 Pending grant of Letters of Administration, Administrator-General cannot make payments to the prejudice of the estate. Cited to indicate limits on Administrator-General's disbursements before formal grant.
Amir Jan v. L.W.J. Rivett Carnic, 10 Bom 350 Administrator-General's right to reimburse himself for costs incurred in administration. Referred to for the principle that Administrator-General may recoup costs related to administration.
Alwar Chetty v. Chidambara Mudaly, AIR 1915 Mad 110 On grant, the estate vests in Administrator-General; administration is not closed until every necessary act is done; Administrator-General can dispose of immovable property without Court consent once Letters are granted. Applied to support discussion of Section 24 and the Administrator-General's powers after grant of Letters.
Navajee v. Administrator-General of Madras, AIR 1914 Mad 281 Administrator-General cannot administer an insolvent's estate under insolvency law and has no higher rights than the deceased. Used to delineate limits on Administrator-General's rights compared to insolvency trustees or official assignees.
Corporation of Calcutta v. Administrator-General of Bengal, 30 Cal 927 Sanction of the Government under Section 197 CPC is not necessary for institution of a prosecution against the Administrator-General. Cited as a procedural point concerning actions against the Administrator-General.
Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal, 22 Ind App 107 (PC) Executors of a Hindu testator can validly transfer by deed the whole estate vested in them to the Administrator-General. Quoted in relation to the power under Section 25 permitting private executors or administrators to transfer estates to the Administrator-General.
In the Goods of Samuel Marie Brereton, 7 Bom 381 Scope of Section 28 — court refused to give ex parte advice on questions affecting rights inter se; not all questions of disposition fall within the short advisory power. Cited as authority limiting Section 28, showing that difficult disputed questions affecting rights between parties are not to be decided on ex parte applications under analogous provisions.
Guran Das v. Administrator-General, Punjab, AIR 1928 Lah 514 High Court under S.28 cannot advise on disputed points of law and fact; S.28 limited to questions of management of the estate. Applied to confirm that Section 28 addresses management questions and not disputed legal/factual controversies.
Vanama Akkayya v. Vanama Lakshmamma, AIR 1928 Mad 356 Scope of Section 302 (Indian Succession Act) examined, with reference to English and Indian decisions on analogous provisions. Used by the Court to draw analogies between Section 28 and other statutory provisions (Section 302) limiting the court's advisory/winding-up powers.
In re Lorenz's Settlement, (1861) 62 ER 433 English authority considered in construing the scope of statutory provisions analogous to S.302/S.28. Referred to as part of the comparative jurisprudence considered in determining limits of court advisory powers.
Conway v. Fenton, (1829) 40 Ch D 512 English authority relevant to scope of court powers in trusteeship/administration contexts. Referred to in the context of analogies drawn with Section 302 and trusteeship jurisprudence.
Ramamurthy… Applicant v. President, Attur Co-Operative Society, AIR 1955 Mad 417 Examination of the scope of Section 302 of the Indian Succession Act. Cited by the court as its own later consideration of Section 302, aiding comparison with Section 28.
In re Muhammad Hashim Gazdar, AIR 1945 Sind 81 Decision delimiting the scope of Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act. Used to support analogy that advisory/winding-up powers are limited to management questions and not disputed or important contested matters.
In the matter of Moosaji Amiji Valiji, AIR 1938 Sind 182 Decision treating the scope of Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act. Referred to as part of the body of authority limiting trustee-advisory jurisdiction to management matters.
Narendra Nath De v. Promilabala Dassi, AIR 1926 Cal 1225 Authority on the limits of trustee/advisory powers (Section 34 analogies). Cited among decisions showing the restricted nature of court directions in trust/administration contexts.
Desouza v. Daphtary, AIR 1924 Bom 252 Decision delimiting scope of trustee advisory powers. Referred to as supporting authority for narrow construction of advisory/winding-up powers.
Nagarathnammal v. Veeraraghawan, AIR 1954 Mad 1008 Scope of an Originating Summons under O.45 of the Rules of the Madras High Court (original jurisdiction). Referred to in considering procedural modes and limits of originating summons jurisdiction analogous to advisory jurisdiction under Section 28.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in several analytic steps:

  1. The Court first framed the precise point for determination: whether the present petition under Section 28 of the Administrator-General's Act was competent, which required examination of the scope of the Administrator-General's statutory powers and the scope of Section 28 itself.
  2. To interpret the legislative scheme and the Administrator-General's powers, the Court traced the historical development of the office and summarized the statutory framework of the Act of 1913 and its predecessors. The Court extracted the general principles and powers applicable to the Administrator-General (executor, administrator with will annexed, administrator in intestacy, taking charge under Court orders, limited administrator, administrator pendente lite, etc.), and noted procedural and protective features such as audit, accounts to beneficiaries, the State-aid character of estates administered by the Administrator-General, and fee/audit provisions.
  3. The Court carefully surveyed the case law construing the Administrator-General's powers and related statutory provisions (Sections 7, 8, 10, 11, 24, 25 and others), drawing propositions from authorities on when Administrator-General may apply for Letters, the limits on taking possession, the effect of grant of Letters, reimbursement of costs, and limitations vis-à-vis insolvency procedures.
  4. The Court then analyzed the scope of Section 28 specifically by reference to analogous provisions (Section 43 Trustees and Mortgagees Act, Section 34 Indian Trusts Act, Section 302 Indian Succession Act) and the authorities construing those provisions. The Court summarized the consistent theme across authorities: courts will advise on strictly undisputed matters of management (advancement, maintenance, investment changes, sale of property, compromise and procedural acts) but will not decide disputed questions of law or fact or matters involving detailed difficulty or importance on an ex parte or summary advisory basis.
  5. Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court noted that the Administrator-General had correctly taken over administration on the applicant's own earlier application and under Court orders, had been managing and protecting the estate (including preventing mal-administration by the applicant and her husband), had obtained Letters of Administration, and that the administration is not yet complete. The Administrator-General had advanced succession duty from reserve funds and sought recoupment by selling a less valuable property in Kancheepuram.
  6. The Court concluded that Section 28 does not empower the Court to direct the Administrator-General to wind up the administration and hand over the estate once Letters of Administration have been obtained and administration remains unfinished. The Court emphasized that an applicant seeking to avoid such a grant must proceed by other appropriate remedies (an application under Section 263 of the Act showing just cause as defined by the explanation to Section 263, a regular civil suit, review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, or an application under Section 151 CPC).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court found that the petition under Section 28 was not competent in the circumstances and therefore the application is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Administrator-General's administration continues; the Court will not, under Section 28, direct winding up of the administration and transfer of the estate to the petitioner where Letters of Administration have been obtained and administration remains incomplete.
  • The judgment identifies the appropriate alternative remedies for a person seeking to challenge a grant or to avoid administration by the Administrator-General (application under Section 263, civil suit, review under O.47 R.1 CPC, or Section 151 CPC) rather than an application under Section 28.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish a broader novel precedent beyond applying established limits on advisory/winding-up powers; it rests the dismissal on the statutory interpretation and authorities surveyed and applies them to the facts before the Court.
V.S.B

    Gyanambal v. Administrator-General Of Madras .

    JUDGMENT

    1. This is a petition purporting to be filed under Section 28 of the Administrator-General's Act of 1913.

    2. The facts are: Sri. T. Rangaswami Chettiar died at Madras on 29-6-1933. He left a will dated 1-5-1933 disposing of six immovable properties in Madras valued at Rs. 24,800/-. Under this will no executor was appointed. The testator left surviving himself his daughter Gyanambal, the petitioner herein, and a grand-daughter Swamambal, and no other kith or kin. By the said will this Rangaswami Chettiar bequeathed a life estate in the income from the said properties to his daughter Gyanambal and a similar life estate to his granddaughter Swamambal and the remainder for the children born to that Swamambal. In case Swarnambal died without issue, male or female, the properties were to go in equal shares to certain charities. This contingency is extremely unlikely to happen as this Swamambal had already four minor children, and their father Thirunavukarasy Chettiar, the guardian of the person and properties of the said minors, having been appointed as such by this Court in O.P 268 of 1945. After the death of the testator, Gyanambal and her husband Nataraja Chettiar took possession of the estate and both were managing the estate without probating the will, notwithstanding it not being an exempted will. Later, however, disputes, arose between them and on application No. 1694.of 1939 by Gyanambal in O.P 242 of 1939 this Court by its order dated 17-8-1939 directed the Administrator-General under Sections 10 and 11 of the Administrator-General's Act, 1913, to take possession of the estate of the deceased and apply for Letters of Administration upon funds being available. It may be noticed here that this Gyanambal handed over to the Administrator-General the title deeds of three properties, viz., a house in Conjeevaram and three shops in Poonamallee and premises No. 3, Thandavamurthi Chetti Street, Park Town, Madras.

    3. The history of the management by the Administrator-General can be briefly summarised: on account of the fact that the will has not been probated and that Letters of Administration have not been obtained, the Administrator-General could not take possession of the properties situated outside the City of Madras, viz., the properties at Conjeevaram and Poonamalle. The gross annual income of the estate taken possession, of by the Administrator-General came to Rs. 2,052/-. After the payment of taxes and other administrative charges, the income is payable to Gyanambal according to the will. The Administrator-General has been paying her Rs. 60/- per month and Gyanambal has been keeping the family house, premises No. 6, Vengu Chetti Lane, Park Town, Madras, free of rent and taxes and has been letting out portions in the family house given to her for residence and enjoying the rents derived therefrom. The present accumulated income of the estate is about Rs. 500/-. In these circumstances, the Administrator-General applied for Letters of Administration in O.P 51 of 1954 and obtained Letters of Administration with the copy of the will annexed on 29-4-1954. The succession duty of Rs. 1,770/- required therefor was advanced out of the Administrator-General's Reserve Fund and this amount has to be recouped now by selling one of the houses. The Administrator-General has also started proceedings for taking possession of the Conjeevaram and Poonamalle properties. In fact, the Administrator-General has given notice to Gyanambal to state her objections, if any, for selling the house at Conjeevaram for that purpose. It is in these circumstances that Gyanambal has filed this petition.

    4. This petitioner prays that the Administrator-General be directed to transfer the properties of the testator to her and hand over the title deeds and assets with an account and claims house bearing door No. 1 Kotharampalayam, Conjeevaram, and bazars bearing Nos. 746, 879 and 880, Poonamallee and premises No. 3, Thandavamurthi Chetti Street, as her own properties and not those of the testator and rests the reliefs asked for by her on the ground that the Administrator-General has not been prudently managing the properties and that the administration was unduly costly, and that the Administrator-General has set up an adverse claim in regard to the three properties concerning which she had handed over the title deeds only for the purpose of safe custody. She adds that the beneficiaries under the will are prepared to support her claim for her managing the estate.

    5. The reply of the Administrator-General is that far from imprudently managing the properties, the Administrator-General, after taking possession of the estate, has put into good order the dilapidated houses and saved the properties from the reckless mortgaging and raising of loans by this Gyanambal contrary to the provisions of the will, coupled with various acts of devastation, that the houses are fetching fair and maximum possible rents, that the three properties were purchased out of the funds of the deceased, that the earlier correspondence between the Administrator-General & the petitioner Gyanambal and her husband Nataraja Chettiar, extracts of which have been filed, would clearly demonstrate it and that Letters of Administration could not be taken out earlier owing to the non-co-operative attitude of Gyanambal and want of funds and that this application is nothing more than a counterblast to the steps being taken by the Administrator-General to liquidate the succession duty advanced out of the Administrator-General's Reserve Fund and take possession of the Conjeevaram and Poonamallee properties.

    6. The point for determination is whether this petition under Section 28 of the Administrator-General's Act is competent, and, in order to do so we must examine the scope of the Administrator-General's powers, and, also the scope of Section 28 of the Act.

    7. At this stage it is interesting to trace the history of the office of the Administrator-General to comprehend the scope of his powers, for which I am indebted to the only known publication on the subject namely Kinney, Administrator-General of Bengal's Law Relating to Administrators-General and Official Trustees in India (Thacker Spink and Co., Calcutta, 1915) of which an up-to-date edition is long overdue.

    8. This office so to speak grew out of the Mercantile and Trading Communities formed in the days of the East India Company, whose interests were safeguarded by the Charter establishing the Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal dated 26-3-1774. Its functions have been developed and regulated on lines which experience has shown to he necessary; and its history is an illustration of the adaptation and modification to suit local circumstances, of those principles which underlie the law of trusts, and also the law affecting the administration of the estates of deceased persons.

    9. Under the aforesaid Charter, the Supreme Court was empowered to exercise such ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, over British subjects as was exercised in the diocese of London, and the said Court was authorised to—

    1. Grant probate of last will of British subjects;

    2. Commit letters of administration in cases of intestacy, or in cases where no executor had been named, or where, when named, he did not appear after having been cited;

    3. To sequester the estates of deceased persons;

    4. To allow and reject accounts;

    5. To reserve power on the appearance of an Executor and to grant probate on his appearing;

    6. To grant administration to lawful next-of-kin, and if no such person was residing within the jurisdiction, or being cited, did not appear, then to grant administration to a creditor, and if no creditor appeared, then to the person who should be thought proper.

    10. Rules were framed dealing with above matters (vide Rr. 1 and 2 under heading Probate, and Rr. 1 to 12 under heading Administration, Smoult and Ryan on Rules and Orders of the Supreme Court).

    11. The next point to devote attention to is the power of the Ecclesiastical Registrar. The estates which were dealt with by him may be taken to have come under 3 heads:

    1. Estates of intestates to which he was entitled to by right to administer;

    2. Estates of which he had been appointed Executor, or where he had been requested to act under a power of attorney;

    3. Estates of Hindus and Mahomedans to which administration was granted at the request of persons interested.

    12. The first Statute which dealt with the powers of the said Ecclesiastical Registrar was 39 and 40 Geo. III, C. 79.

    13. In order to understand the position of the Registrar under this Statute, one must read S. 21 thereof, which recites that great inconvenience had been felt in regard to the practice of granting Letters of Administration where the next-of-kin or creditors did not apply, to persons calling themselves friends, it was enacted that as from 1-3-1801 whenever any British subject died in the Presidencies of Fort William, Fort St. George and Bombay, or territories subordinate thereto, and if no next-of-kin or creditor, should apply then a grant should go to the Registrar.

    14. It became necessary to further develop this law, and by Stat. 55 Geo. III, C. 84, it was enacted that as the previous Act did not provide for executors, administrators or persons not resident who might appoint attorneys and it was doubtful if the Registrar had not a prior right to a grant, it was provided that an Attorney empowered should have a prior right (see Ss. 2, 3 and 4).

    15. By Section 5 of the same Act provision was also made for the Registrar to keep proper accounts. There was no such restriction imposed upon private Executor or Administrators.

    16. The precautions which were provided were not apparently sufficient to guard against frauds. Very gross irregularities were discovered in respect of estates under the charge of T.E.M Turton, the then Registrar, with the result that an order was passed by the Government in 1848, appointing a Committee to enquire into the working of the office, and the report was presented in January 1849 which clearly showed an abuse of powers.

    17. The Government of India, in view of what had transpired, deemed it advisable to introduce special legislation, and it was resolved that a public official should be appointed who should be given powers to protect the property of persons dying, and where no steps were taken by the next-of-kin or where they were absent from British India. It was also deemed advisable to give such official powers to deal with the estates of persons who had left wills in cases where executors took no steps, or the beneficiaries were out of British India.

    18. A careful consideration of the matter resulted in the passing of Act 7 of 1849, which was the first Administrator-General's Act.

    19. The above Act of 1849 abolished the office of the Ecclesiastical Registrar, and his duties as such Registrar, were made over to the Master of the Supreme Court. The estates which were vested in him passed to the Administrators-General.

    20. The Act provided that the Administrator-General was to be appointed by Government and that such Administrator-General was to give security. Provisions were also made with regard to audit of his accounts.

    21. The Act was confined in its operation to the Presidency of Fort William. Experience however showed that it was necessary to extend the law, with the result that by an Act passed in 1850 (Act 2, 1850) the Act of 1849 was extended to Bombay and Madras. But the Administrators-General of these Presidencies, were not to cease to hold the office of Eccelesiastical Registrars and by S. 4 the Administrators-General were strictly prohibited from trading.

    22. The above Acts of 1849 and 1850 remained in force until the year 1855, when it was deemed necessary to pass a further Act dealing with the office which repealed the Acts aforesaid.

    23. This Act remained in force till the year 1867 when a further Act was passed in relation to the office, being Act 24 of 1867, and which made various changes in the then existing law, the most important of which may be summarised as follows:

    I. The jurisdiction of each Administrator-General was defined.

    II. It prohibited the Administrator-General from holding the appointment of Ecclesiastical Registrar.

    III. It prohibited the officers holding any other post without the sanction of Government.

    IV. It allowed the officers to be also appointed Official Trustee.

    V. It was declared an offence to trade.

    VI. Power was given to appoint a deputy.

    24. This Act was amended by Act 19 of 1869 and Act 5 of 1870 remained in force until the year 1874 when a further Act was introduced and passed being Act 2 of 1874.

    25. This Act since 1874 underwent various amendments and modifications by the following Acts:

    (a) Act 1 of 1879; (b) Act 9 of 1881; (c) Act 2 of 1890; (d) Act 7 of 1901 and (e) Act 5 of 1902.

    26. By the last of the aforesaid Acts the offices were so to speak created Government offices and it would perhaps be advisable to summarise the provisions as follows:

    (a) Provision for payment by fixed salary.

    (b) Appointment of a Deputy.

    (c) Government took over the civil liabilities.

    (d) Commission earned was to be credited to Government.

    (e) Power was given to High Courts to give directions as to management etc.

    (f) Amendment of Section 256 of the Indian Succession Act, as to exempting Attorneys of absent executors from giving security bonds.

    27. Various representations had from time to time been made to the Government on certain provisions of the Act of 1874 which required reconsideration. After due consideration of the matter, the Government of India in the year 1910 placed Mr. Sanders Slater, the Administrator-General and Official Trustee of Bombay, on deputation, to report upon the whole question. After consideration of the report, and also opinions of local Governments, and other officials, the Government of India introduced a new measure, the Act of 1913.

    28. The general principles governing the powers, duties and liabilities of an Administrator-General may be classified under the following heads:

    29. The Administrator-General and his Deputy or Deputies are under the Act wholetime officers of the Government, and are therefore subject to the complete control of the “Government” as defined by the Act.

    30. (Powers): The Administrator-General can act as—

    (a) Executor.

    (b) Administrator with will annexed.

    (c) Administrator as in case of intestacy.

    (d) Take charge under the order of Court.

    (e) Limited Administrator, including Administrator ‘pendente lite’.

    (f) Administrator of Military Estates under Regimental Debts Act.

    31. As to point (a) where a testator appoints an Administrator-General executor of his will, it is always advisable to inform that official of such appointment, and send him a copy of the will, together with a memorandum of assets belonging to the testator at the time.

    32. As to points (b) and (c). This may be subdivided into two heads (a) where the Administrator-General moves at the request of beneficiaries or next-of-kin, (b) where he moves under Ss. 9 and 10 of the Act. As to S. 9 that section does not apply to estates of exempted persons and refers chiefly to those cases where a report is received under S. 54 from District Judges. As to cases under S. 10: This applies to estates of all persons and the provisions thereof can be brought into operation on the application of any person interested.

    33. As to point (d) this refers to those cases where a temporary order is necessary for the proper protection and preservation of an estate (see S. 11).

    34. As to point (e) attention is directed to the definition of the terms, Letters of Administration and S. 8.

    35. As to point (f) attention is directed to the provision of Ss. 15 to 17 of the Act.

    36. (Power to accept transfer): Under the Act any private Executor or Administrator can transfer an estate to the Administrator-General and no order of the Court is necessary (S. 25).

    37. (Certificate): The above is an important power vested in the Administrator-General; and has so to speak been extended by the present Act. So long as the assets in the Presidency do not exceed Rs. 1000/- in value the certificate can issue, and in calculating such assets, money deposited in Government Savings Bank or any Provident Fund subject to the Provident Funds Act, 1897, is excluded.

    38. Section 31 shows to whom certificates can be granted and attention is directed to that section and notes thereunder.

    39. Certificates can also issue to creditors in the circumstances set out in S. 32.

    40. Certificate-holders are vested with the powers of an Administrator in regard to the assets disclosed in such certificate (S. 34).

    41. (Power to take charge): The power is also of importance and enables the Administrator-General to deal with the estate without a grant, but the assets must be under Rs. 1000/- in value.

    42. The Act also now gives power to deal with estates of exempted persons where the assets are situate within the jurisdiction of High Courts or within any area as notified by the Government in this behalf.

    43. (Administration bond): No security is necessary for the Administrator-General, and estates thus administered by him are not called upon to pay any surety-fees.

    44. (Liabilities): The Administrator-General is subject to the same liabilities as an ordinary executor or administrator, but under this Act, the revenues of the Government of India are liable to make good any loss sustained by mal-administration when proved. It follows from this that all estates now vested in the Administrator-General are what one may term “State Aided” which confers, if it were needed, an additional protection to the public.

    45. Attention is also directed to the point when Government is sought to be made liable before an action is brought, notice under Section 80 of the CPC is necessary.

    46. (Fees): The fees are now no longer payable to the offices holding the post but to the Government. Now such fees are the same as were provided by Act 2 of 1874.

    47. The fees have been fixed by rule, as in England, and the fees at present payable are those which are set out in the rules.

    48. Attention is directed to those rules and scale of fees, especially to that rule which allows of a remission being made in certain cases.

    49. These fees can be changed from time to time to meet the circumstances. This is the method which is adopted in England.

    50. (Audit): In addition to the protection afforded to the public by what may be termed “State Aid” the Government have provided for the regular Audit of the accounts of the Administrator-General and for a full report to be forwarded to the Government upon such audit (Ss. 44 and 45).

    51. Very full powers have also been given to the Auditors in regard to the examination of persons, etc., in course of such audit (S. 46).

    52. (Accounts): The Administrators-General are liable to render accounts to beneficiaries and persons interested in the Administration of estates subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed (S. 49).

    53. This Act has been amended by Acts 10 of 1914; 21 of 1922; 32 of 1926; 10 of 1927; 32 of 1940. It has been adapted by A.O It has been repealed in part by Acts 5 of 1917 and 12 of 1927.

    54. The cognate Acts and Provisions are:

    1. Sections 5, 6, 8 and 10 of the Charitable Endowments Act, 6, of 1890.

    2. (Sections 5 and 56 Viet. Clause 6) of the Colonial Probates Act of 1892.

    3. Section 4 of the Domicile Act of 1861 (24 and 25 Viet. Cl. 121).

    4. Section 1 of the Indian Securities Act, 1860 (23 and 24 Viet. Cl. 5).

    5. Legal Representatives' Suits Act, 12 of 1855 (in Torts).

    6. Mortgaged Estates Administration Act, 23 of 1855.

    7. Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 3 of 1909, Part III.

    8. Succession Act, 39 of 1925, Part IX.

    9. Sections 3, 7, 20, 24 to 29, 34, 43, 48, 51 to 53 of the Trustees Act, 27 of 1866 (Power of the High Court).

    10. Sections 25 to 28, 38, 40 to 43 and 45 of the Trustees and Mortgagees' Powers Act, 28 of 1866 (Powers of Executors and Administrators).

    55. The relevant case law can be summarised as follows:

    Section 7: Where a universal legatee under a will has taken no steps to take out Letters of Administration, the Administrator-General may step in and get the letters: — ‘Ram Kali v. Administrator-General, U.P’, AIR 1943 All 356 (A). Letters can be issued to the Administrator-General even in respect of estate of exempted persons (ibid).

    Section 8: Section 8 must be read so as to mean that the Administrator-General will have a right to apply for Letters of Administration in preference to creditors or legatees other than universal legatees or friends of the deceased in any Court other than a High Court. In a High Court he has preference under S. 7 over everybody except the next-of-kin. Where the widow, the universal legatee takes no steps to take out Letters of Administration, it is open to the Administrator-General to step in and apply for Letters of Administration and there is nothing in the Succession Act which can affect the rights of the Administrator-General (ibid).

    Section 10: Possession not to be taken by the Administrator-General without previous order of Court: — ‘Nritya Gopal v. Administrator-General of Bengal’, 10 Cal WN 241 (B). As to when the title of the Administrator-General accrues generally and as to the circumstances in which title of Administrator-General relates back to date of death of deceased, see — ‘Lalchand Ramdayal v. Gumtibai’, 8 Bom HC (O.C) 140 (C). As to when Administrator-General can be directed to apply for administration, see — ‘In the Goods of Girdar Das Vallaba Das’, 1 Mad HCR 234 (D). (Mere possibility of debts being barred by limitation, not always sufficient ground — case under the old Act).

    Section 11. “Succession” in S. 11 should not be read as meaning intestate succession only: — ‘In the Goods of Pasupati Mukerjee’, AIR 1920 Cal 376 (E). When the Administrator-General is appointed executor of a will he can obtain an order to take possession of the assets under S. 11 before applying for probate (ibid). Pending grant of Letters of Administration, the Administrator-General cannot make payment to prejudice of estate: — ‘In the Goods of Hari Das Dutt’, 11 Cal WN 193 (F). As to right of Administrator-General to reimburse himself for costs, see — ‘Amir Jan v. L.W.J Rivett Carnic’, 10 Bom 350 (G).

    Section 24: The estate vests in Administrator-General on grant of Letters of Administration. An Administration cannot be treated as closed until every act necessary for its completion has been done. Thus, where in order to realise his commission the Administrator-General sold an item of immovable property which had been previously sold by the son of the deceased on attaining majority, it was held that the sale by the son was a nullity: — ‘Alwar Chetty v. Chidambara Mudaly’, AIR 1915 Mad 110 at p. Ill (H). Where the Letters of Administration have been granted, he can exercise his ordinary powers as Administrator-General and dispose of immovable property without the consent of the Court (ibid). There is no provision of law by which an insolvent's estate in respect of which Letters of Administration have been granted to the Administrator-General, can be administered under the insolvency law. An Administrator-General in such cases can claim no higher rights than the deceased himself and he has not the rights of either the trustee or Official Assignee in insolvency: — ‘Navajee v. Administrator-General of Madras’, AIR 1914 Mad 281 (I).

    Sanction of the Government under Section 197 of the CPC, is not necessary for the institution of a prosecution against the Administrator-General: — ‘Corporation of Calcutta v. Administrator-General of Bengal’, 30 Cal 927 (J).

    Section 25: Executors of Hindu testator can validly transfer by deed the whole estate vested in them to the Administrator-General: — ‘Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal’, 22 Ind App 107 (117) (PC) (K).

    56. Bearing these sections and decisions in our mind if we examine the facts of this case, we find that the correct procedure has been followed in taking over the administration of the estate and applying for Letters of Administration and seeking to get possession of the properties situated outside the city of Madras and taking steps to reimburse the costs incurred by the Administrator-General and that great advantages have been conferred on the estate by the Administrator-General managing it and that this administration has not been completed. It will be remembered that the administration of this estate was taken over on the very application of this applicant and under orders of Court. The tide deeds for the properties have been handed over by this applicant and the Administrator-General has been putting the properties in good order and been giving a handsome maintenance amount to this applicant. In fact the Administrator-General has had to protect the estate not so much from third parties but from the effects of the mal-administration of the applicant and her husband. This management is being audited every year and the maximum income is being collected. The Administrator-General has finally taken up Letters of Administration which this applicant neglected to do and for the costs incurred by him he is seeking to dispose of one of the properties in Kancheepuram, least valuable to the estate. The administration has not been completed. In fact this is not the ground on which the application is rested.

    57. In these circumstances, this application is sought to be rested under Section 28 of the Act and I am asked to give directions to the Administrator-General to wind up the management and hand over the estate to the applicant with an account and surplus fund which he might have on hand. Can this be done under Section 28 of the Act?

    58. The scope of S. 28 has been laid down in — ‘In the Goods of Samuel Marie Brereton’, 7 Bom 381 (L). In this case, the point was whether the Administrator-General of Bombay could pay over the balance in his hands to the Administrator to the estate in England and the Court held that the question being of some difficulty involving questions which might seriously affect the rights of the parties ‘inter se’, it was not a question such as was contemplated by Section 43 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Act, nor one which the Court could give any opinion on an ‘ex parte’ application. (Note; this was before Act 2 of 1890 which brought in Section 41-A to Act 2 of 1874 and Section 26-A of the Succession Act).

    59. In — ‘Guran Das v. Administrator-General, Punjab’, AIR 1928 Lah 514 (M), it was held that the High Court could not advise on disputed points of law and fact under S. 28 but only on questions of management of the estate. In AIR 1943 All 358 (A), the argument was that if an adjournment were given an affidavit would be obtained from, the other persons interested in the will and that therefore there would be no justification for the Administrator-General to administer the estate. The argument in this case was more or less similar to the one here, viz., that this applicant had obtained an affidavit from her daughter, the next life estate holder and on behalf of the grandchildren as their guardian and who are the remaindermen, and that there is no justification, for the Administrator, General to continue to administer the estate. This argument was repelled by the Allahabad High Court pointing out that the original apprehension of the estate being wasted away which brought in the, Administrator-General into the picture had not ceased to exist and that if the applicant were to obtain possession and waste away the estate, the persons who stood ultimately to benefit would have no redress. The learned Judges remarked:

    “‘Prima facie’ it appears that the widow could have no other assets from which the original applicants (descendants and ultimate beneficiaries) could recover any amount which the widow had chosen to spend. In these circumstances, it seems to me that there is justification for the appointment of the Administrator-General to administer the estate. Doubtless this will give rise to some expenditure but the widow can scarcely complain because she took no steps to take out Letters of Administration herself……….”

    60. In addition to these three cases under the Administrator-General's Act, on account of the fact that this S. 28 is analogous to Section 43 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Act and Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, and Section 302 of the Indian Succession Act and an Originating Summons of this Court, the case law thereunder, indicating the scope of these provisions may also be considered. In a leading decision of this Court in — ‘Vanama Akkayya v. Vanama Lakshmamma’, AIR 1928 Mad 356 (N), Devadoss, J. dealing with the scope of S. 302 has examined therein the relevant English and Indian decisions in — ‘In re Lorenz's Settlement’, (1861) 62 ER 433 (O), — ‘Conway v. Fenton’, (1829) 40 Ch D 512 (P), — ‘7 Bom 381 (L)’. I have subsequently examined in — ‘Ramamurthy…Applicant; v. President, Attur Co-Operative Society Attur….’, AIR 1955 Mad 417 (Q), the scope of Section 302 of the Indian Succession Act. I have also examined the scope of Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act and referred to decisions similarly delimiting its scope like in — ‘In re Muhammad Hashim Gazdar’, AIR 1945 Sind 81 (FB) (R): — ‘In the matter of Moosaji Amiji Valiji’, AIR 1938 Sind 182 (S); — ‘Narendra Nath De v. Promilabala Dassi’, AIR 1926 Cal 1225 (T); — ‘Desouza v. Daphtary’, AIR 1924 Bom 252 (U). In — ‘Nagarathnammal v. Veeraraghawan’, AIR 1954 Mad 1008 (V), I have examined the scope of an Originating Summons under O. 45 of the Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Madras on its original jurisdiction.

    61. The analysis of this case-law is that the questions on which the Court has advised the trustees or persons beneficially interested, related strictly to undisputed matters of management such as questions of advancement, maintenance, changes of investments, sale of a house, compromise and taking proceedings. But disputed points of law or fact or questions of detailed difficulty or importance have never been included.

    62. It will be seen, therefore, that the directions contemplated under S. 28 would not include the winding up of administration and handing over of the estate by the Administrator-General who has obtained Letters of Administration and whose administration has not yet been completed.

    63. A person who seeks to avoid such a grant can do so only by an application under S. 263 showing a just cause defined by the explanation to S. 263 and exemplified by the illustrations appended thereto or by a regular civil suit or review under O. 47, R. (I) of the CPC or an application under Section 151 of the CPC.

    64. This application is plainly incompetent and is dismissed with costs.

    V.S.B

    65. Application dismissed.

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    Gyanambal v. Administrator-General Of Madras .
    (Jan 25, 1955)