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  • Clause (2) of Column 3 of Article 182 of Lim. Act
  • 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 179 of the Limitation Act
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  • Clause (2) of Column 3 of Article 182 of Lim. Act
  • 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 179 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A decree in O. S. No. 1 of 1935 (Subordinate Judge, Devakotta) was passed in favour of the plaintiffs for Rs. 30,263-3-0 with interest and proportionate costs. The decree included a provision that the plaintiffs execute a registered release deed in accordance with an agreement marked Ex. A, and that the decree be executed only after execution of that release deed. Because of that provision the plaintiffs could not execute the decree until they complied with the release-deed requirement.

The present appellants are the legal representatives of the first plaintiff. Their application to execute the decree was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of bar of limitation.

Relevant procedural timeline (as stated in the opinion):

  • Decree passed: 24-8-1937.
  • Decree confirmed on appeal: 17-4-1941.
  • E. P. No. 318 of 1941 filed for attachment of movable property; judgment-debtors objected that release deed condition not complied with.
  • Subordinate Judge overruled the objection and directed attachment: 10-7-1942.
  • The warrant could not be executed (no attachable movables) and the petition was dismissed on 31-7-1942.
  • Judgment-debtors filed C. M. A. No. 329 of 1942 against the 10-7-1942 order; stay obtained then dissolved; C.M.A. dismissed on 13-7-1943 leaving the question of the validity of the release deed open.
  • E. P. No. 120 of 1946 was filed by decree-holders on 5-7-1946 and later dismissed on 17-8-1946 because the first defendant had died.
  • E. P. No. 8 of 1947 (the execution petition that is the subject of this appeal) was filed on 7-11-1946 (recorded as E.P. No. 8 of 1947 in the opinion).

The learned Subordinate Judge held that E. P. No. 8 of 1947 was barred by limitation because, in his view, more than three years had elapsed from 10-7-1942 (the date of the Subordinate Judge's order overruling the objection). The Subordinate Judge also found that the release deed that had been put into court with E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was a proper registered release deed and that the decree-holders had fulfilled the decree's conditions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. For the purpose of limitation under Article 182 (clause 5) of the Limitation Act, from which date should the period of limitation for executing the decree be computed: (a) the date of the Subordinate Judge's order overruling objections to executability (10-7-1942), or (b) the date of the final appellate order disposing of the dispute between decree-holders and judgment-debtors (13-7-1943)?
  2. Whether the confirmation by the High Court (made after an appeal filed by the judgment-debtors) can be treated as the "final order passed on an application made" as contemplated in clause 5 of the third column of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  3. Whether the appeal to a superior court by the judgment-debtor affects the characterization of the appellate disposal as the "final order" relevant to the computation of limitation for a decree-holder's step-in-aid application.

Arguments of the Parties

Decree-holders' (Appellants') Arguments

  • They contended that E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was an application made according to law by a decree-holder to the proper court either for execution of the decree or to take some step-in-aid of execution, and that the material date for limitation is the date of the final order disposing of that application. The final order, where there was an appeal, must be the ultimate decision of the appellate court.
  • They relied on the Privy Council decision in Annamalai Chettiar v. Valli-ammai Achi, AIR 1945 PC 176 (cited in the opinion) for the proposition that an appeal to a superior court to set aside an order raising an attachment is an application to take a step-in-aid of execution and that the appellate disposal is the final order for limitation purposes.

Judgment-debtors' Arguments

  • They argued that the "final order passed on an application made" must be the Subordinate Judge's order of 10-7-1942 which overruled their objection and directed attachment; once that order was made there was no impediment to execution by the decree-holders and the period of limitation should be computed from that date.
  • They pointed out that the appeal (C. M. A. No. 329 of 1942) was taken by them (the judgment-debtors), not by the decree-holders, and contended that since the appellate proceeding was initiated by the judgment-debtors it could not be invoked as an appeal "by the decree-holder" to bring the matter within clause 5 of Article 182.
  • The judgment-debtors cited Kristo Coomar Nag v. Mahabat Khan, 5 Cal 595, to support the proposition that the date of dismissal by the trial court should be taken as the starting point (in that older statutory context), rather than the date when the appeal was dismissed by the appellate court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Annamalai Chettiar v. Valli-ammai Achi, AIR 1945 PC 176 (Privy Council) That an appeal to a superior court to set aside an order raising an attachment is an application according to law to take a step-in-aid of the execution of a decree; the final order for limitation purposes is the appellate disposal. The court relied on this decision to hold that the final order in E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was the High Court's disposal (13-7-1943), not the intermediate Subordinate Judge's order of 10-7-1942, regardless of which party preferred the appeal.
Annamalai Chettiar v. Valli-ammai Achi, AIR 1943 Mad 398 (decision of this court reversed by the Judicial Committee) Earlier provincial decision on same dispute; noted as reversed by the Judicial Committee. The opinion records that the Provincial decision was reversed by the Judicial Committee and that the Privy Council's observations support treating the appellate disposal as the final order.
Golum Mustafa v. Arifunnessa, 51 Cal WN 316 (Calcutta High Court) Support for the proposition that the final order on the application for execution is the day when the court finally disposes of the dispute between decree-holder and judgment-debtors as to the amount recoverable under the decree. The court cited this decision (through Mitra's textbook reference) as supporting the view that the appellate disposal is the final order for Article 182(5) purposes.
Abheram v. Bhola, 157 Ind Cas 604 (Lahore) Authority cited in support of the textbook observation that the final order for Article 182(5) is the final appellate disposal. The court referenced it as part of the judicial support for treating the appellate decision as the final order.
Kristo Coomar Nag v. Mahabat Khan, 5 Cal 595 Held, in the context of Article 179 of the Limitation Act of 1877, that where judgment-debtor appealed and appeal dismissed, the date of dismissal by the trial court should be taken as the starting point; the appeal by judgment-debtor not construed as an application to the proper court for execution (older statutory regime). The court observed this authority was cited by judgment-debtors but distinguished it because the 1877 Act's provisions differed and did not include the phrase "final order passed on an application" introduced by the 1927 amendment.
Sivaramachari v. Anjaneya Chetty (Full Bench) Held that the word "appeal" in Clause (2) of Column 3 of Article 182 must be confined to an appeal against the decree and not extended to interlocutory appeals; thus not helpful for Clause (5) analysis. The court said this Full Bench decision was not relevant to the interpretation of "final order" in Clause (5) of Article 182 and therefore did not assist the present case.
Rameshwar Singh v. Homswar Singh, AIR 1921 PC 31 (Privy Council) Cited in the opinion to note that it could have no application to Clause (5) in the present context. The court stated this Privy Council decision had no application to the Clause (5) issue before it.
Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore, AIR 1936 Mad 613 Observation that where an execution petition is returned for amendment there is no judicial dealing and therefore such a return is not a final order within Clause (5) of Article 182; illustrates the concept of finality as ending the action or leaving nothing further for the court to determine other than administrative execution. The court cited this observation to support the proposition that a decision is final when it ends the action in the court that makes it, and that appellate intervention sets at large any finality previously attached to a subordinate court's decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in clear steps, addressing the proper date from which limitation should be computed under Clause (5) of Column 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act:

  1. The court observed that the phrase "the final order passed on an application made" was introduced by the 1927 amendment and required interpretation as to what constitutes a "final order."
  2. It was conceded that E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was an application made according to law by a decree-holder for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution. The narrow issue was whether the "final order" was the intermediate Subordinate Judge's order of 10-7-1942 or the ultimate appellate disposal on 13-7-1943.
  3. The judgment-debtors argued that because their C.M.A. was the appeal before the High Court, the appellate disposal could not be treated as a "final order passed on an application made" by the decree-holder. The court rejected this distinction.
  4. The court explained the legal principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the original court; when an appeal is lodged and entertained by a superior court, finality attached to the Subordinate Judge's decision is "set at large." Consequently, the decision in the proceedings is the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the appellate court.
  5. The court relied on the Privy Council decision in Annamalai Chettiar v. Valli-ammai Achi (AIR 1945 PC 176) and supporting text and cases (including Mitra's Law of Limitation, Golum Mustafa v. Arifunnessa, Abheram v. Bhola) to conclude that the "final order" for the purposes of Article 182(5) is the final appellate disposal where an appeal has been entertained.
  6. The opinion noted that it did not matter which party invoked the superior forum; what matters is the final result reached by the superior court. Thus the Subordinate Judge's order of 10-7-1942 was an intermediary order and not the final order for limitation computation purposes.
  7. The court also considered and distinguished earlier authority cited by the judgment-debtors (Kristo Coomar Nag) on the basis that the statutory language under the 1877 Act was different and did not use the phrase "final order passed on an application," which was introduced by the 1927 amendment.
  8. On the question whether the release deed was properly filed and complied with the decree's condition, the court agreed with the lower court's finding that the release deed filed with E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was a registered release deed in accordance with agreement Ex. A and that the decree-holders had satisfied the decree's conditions.
  9. Applying the conclusion that the final order was the High Court's disposal on 13-7-1943, the court found that E. P. No. 120 of 1946 (filed 5-7-1946) was within three years of that final order and that E. P. No. 8 of 1947 (filed subsequently) was therefore in time.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct consequences and remedies ordered by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The order of the lower court (which held E. P. No. 8 of 1947 barred by limitation) is set aside.
  • E. P. No. 8 of 1947 is remanded to the lower court for disposal according to law.
  • The court confirmed that the release deed filed with E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was a duly registered release deed in accordance with the agreement Ex. A and that the decree-holders had complied with the conditions of the decree.
  • The appellants (decree-holders) were awarded their costs in this court.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion interprets "final order" in Clause (5) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act to mean the ultimate appellate disposal where an appeal has been entertained, regardless of which party preferred the appeal. The opinion does not expressly state whether it intends to establish a novel precedent beyond its application to the facts; accordingly, the direct effect stated above is the immediate legal consequence recorded in the opinion.

    M.L.R.M Lakshmanan Chettiar Died And Others v. P.L.S.P Alias Sm. P.L Malayandi Chettiar And Others.

    1. In O. S. No. 1 of 1935 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Devakotta a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs. 30263-3-0 with interest and proportionate costs. There was a further provision that the plaintiffs do execute a registered release deed in accordance with an agreement marked in the case as Ex. A and that the decree be executed only after the execution of the release deed. The result of ihis provision was that the plaintiffs did not have the unregistered right of executing the decree before complying with the provision for execution of the release deed. The present appellants are the legal representatives of the first plaintiff whose application for executing the decree has been dismissed on the ground of bar of limitation.

    2. A few dates have to be mentioned in order to correctly understand the relevancy of the legal arguments. The trial court passed the decree on 24-8-1937 and on appeal therefrom the original decree was confirmed on 17-4-1941. Thereafter E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was filed for the attachment of moveable properties. This application was resisted by the judgment-debtors on the ground that the decree-holders had not complied with the provision regarding the execution of the release deed and that therefore the decree could not be executed. The learned Subordinate Judge enquired into the matter and overruled the objection on 10-7-1942, giving it as his reason that the release deed filed in Court was valid and directed the attachment of the moveable properties. But the warrant could not be executed as it was impossible to find any moveable properties which could be attached. The result was that the petition was dismissed on 31-7-1942. But against the order dated 10-7-1942 overruling the contention regarding the execu-tability of the decree, the judgment-debtors filed C. M. A. No. 329 of 1942 and obtained stay of execution which was later on dissolved. C. M. A. No. 329 of 1942 came up for final disposal on 13-7-1943 and was dismissed with a reservation that the question regarding ' the validity or otherwise of the release deed filed by the decree-holders was left open.

    On 5-7-1946, E. P. No. 120 of 1946 was filed by the decree-holders again for execution but as it was found that the first defendant died, it was dismissed on 17-8-1946. Thereafter E. P. No. 8 of 1947 was filed on 7-11-1946 for execution of the decree out of which this appeal has arisen. On the objection raised by the judgment-debtors that the execution of the decree has become barred because more than three years had elapsed from 10-7-1942, when E. P. No. 120 of 1946 was filed on 5-7-1946, the learned Subordinate Judge accepted their contention and held that the execution petition was barred by limitation. He also found that the decree-holders have complied with the provision regarding the execution of the release deed and that therefore the release deed put into court with E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was a proper one.

    3. E. P. No. 120 of 1946 was filed within three years of the date, viz., 13-7-1943 when the High Court confirmed the order of the Subordinate Judge in E. P. No. 318 of 1941 dated 10-7-1942. If the period of limitation is computed from the date of the appellate order then E. P. No. 120 of 1946 is in time. If, on the other hand, the period has to be computed from the date of the order of the Subordinate Judge, viz., 10-7-1942 then E. P. No. 120 of 1946 was clearly out of time and the subsequent E. P, No. 8 of 1947 was also barred by limitation. What is contended on behalf of the judgment-debtors is that the confirmation by the High Court on 13-7-1943 of the order of the Subordinate Judge dated 10-7-1942, cannot be said to be a final order passed on an application by the decree-holder which was a step-in-aid of the execution as contemplated in Clause 5 of the third column of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.

    The phrase "the final order passed on an application made" was introduced for the first time by Act 9 of 1927 and what we have to see is, what is meant by the words "final order". It is conceded that E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was an application in accordance with law to the proper court for the execution of the decree or to take some step-in-aid of the execution of the decree. The point put forward on behalf of the judgment-debtors is that since C. M. A. No. 329 of 1942 was filed by them, the disposal of it on 13-7-1943 cannot be said to be a final order passed on 'an application by the decree-holder' for the execution of the decree or to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree. According to their argument the final order was passed on 10-7-1942 when the executing court overruled the contention of the judgment-debtors and directed attachment of moveable properties. Thereafter, there was no impediment to the execution of the decree at the instance of the decree-holders and the period of limitation should be computed from that date. It is conceded also that if .the decree-holders had preferred an appeal to the High Court as a result of the dismissal of their application by the executing court, then the final order passed on the decree-holders' appeal would be a final order as contemplated in clause 5 in the third column to Article 182 of the Limitation Act. But since the appeal to the High Court was at the instance of the judgment-debtors, it is not possible to invoke that provision at all.

    4. Before the learned Subordinate Judge the decree-holders cited the decision of the Privy Council in -- 'Annamalai Chettiar v. Valli-ammai Achi', AIR 1945 PC 176 (A) but the learned Judge distinguished the same on the ground that the final order in that case was passed on an appeal preferred by the decree-holder therein and not at the instance of the judgment-debtor as is the case before us, and that therefore in that case the requisites of the phrase "final order passed on an application made" have been complied with. Their Lordships held that an appeal to a superior court to set aside an order of a Subordinate Judge raising an attachment ordered earlier is an application according to law to take a step-in-aid of the execution of the decree. It is also an application to the proper court for, when an application for execution is dismissed by the lower court, the appellate court is the proper, and indeed the only, court which can then execute the decree. The decision of this court reported in -- 'Annamalai Chettiar v. Valli-ammai Achi', AIR 1943 Mad 398 (2) (B) was reversed by the Judicial Committee. At page 178 the following pertinent observations occur:

    "E. P. No. 418 of 1934 was an application, made according to law for execution of the decree and it was finally disposed of by the order of the Court of appeal made on the 27th September 1938, which brings the case within the first branch. Further the application to the court of appeal of the 3rd December 1936 to set aside the order of the Subordinate court raising the attachment was an application according to law to take a step in aid of the execution of decree."

    We do not think that the distinction made by the learned Judge in the court below is a proper one. There can be no dispute whatever that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the original court and the moment an appeal has been lodged and entertained by a superior court, the finality attached to the decision of the Subordinate Judge is thereafter set at large and the decision in the pro'ceedings is the ultimate and final conclusion arrived at by the appellate court. It should therefore be taken that the overruling of the objections regarding the executabllity of the decree by the Subordinate Judge on 10-7-1942 was only an intermediary order and not one which finally terminated the proceedings, because the intermediary order against the judgment-debtors was taken in appeal to the High Court and a final order was passed by the High Court only on 13-7-1943. In our opinion, it does not matter as to who figured as the appellant before the superior court because whosoever invoked the superior forum it is only the final result that matters and not the party at whose instance the court's powers were invoked.

    We have no doubt whatever that when once it is granted that E. P. No. 318 of 1941 is an application made by a decree-holder to the proper court for the execution of the decree or for taking some step-in-aid of the execution of the decree, then the final order in that case can only be the ultimate decision passed by the High Court on 13-7-1943 and not the interme-diate stages through which that petition passed and the orders passed during the intervening stages. No direct authority has been cited before us in support of the appellant's contention but in our opinion it does not matter because observations in text books as well as the principle deducible from decided cases support the view that the final order can only be that passed in appeal.

    In Mitra's Law of Limitation and Prescription, 7th Edn. Vol. II, at page 1303 the learned author says as follows:

    "Final Order: After the amendment of 1927, the result of the application for execution, namely, the final order passed on the application is the material point of time that is relevant for purposes of Article 182 (5). The final order of the final court of appeal, where there has been an appeal, would be the final order for the purposes of Article 182 (5)."

    As authority for this observation a decision of the Calcutta High Court in -- 'Golum Mustafa v. Arifunnessa', 51 Cal WN 316 (C) and a decision of the Punjab High Court in -- 'Abheram v. Bhola', 157 Ind Cas 604 (Lah) (D) are cited. In the Calcutta case, the learned Judges followed the observations in -- '157 Ind Cas 604 (Lah) (D)'. But there the appeal was at the instance of the decree-holder and not at the instance of the judgment-debtor as in the present case. The Calcutta case decides the same principle as was laid down earlier by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in -- 'AIR 1945 PC 176 (A)' though the Privy Council decision has not been referred to by the learned Judges Nasim Ali A. C. J. and Hindley J. of the Calcutta High Court. The following observations of the learned Judges may be cited as useful:

    "The final order on the application for execution must be taken to have been made on the day when this court finally disposed of the dispute between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtors as regards the amount recoverable under the decree."

    5. Mr. K. Parasurama Aiyar for the judgment-debtors cited -- 'Kristo Coomar Nag v. Mahabat Khan', 5 Cal 595 (E) which according to the learned counsel supports his contention. It was held therein that where a judgment-debtor opposed an application for execution of a decree and that objection was overruled by the trial court which ordered the execution of the decree and the judgment-debtor preferred an appeal which was also dismissed, then in computing the period of limitation under Article 179 of the Limitation Act of 1877, the date of dismissal by the trial Court should be taken to be the starting point and not the date when the appeal was dismissed by the appellate Court. But we have to remark in this connection that the provisions of the article in the act of 1877 were different from what they are now. The expression "final order passed on an application" was not there. Sut what existed at that time was the following:

    "An application to the proper court to take some step in aid of the execution", and the step-in-aid was then considered to be the application by the decree-holder to execute the decree in the trial court.

    The learned Judges also held that the appeal by the judgment-debtor cannot be construed as an application made to the proper court for execution. But in view of the observations of the Judicial Committee in -- 'AIR 1945 PC 176 (A)' these observations have no force. The meaning of the expression "final order" did not fall to be considered in -- '5 Cal 595 (E)'.

    6. Decisions bearing on the meaning of the word "appeal" occurring in Clause (2) of Column 3 of Article 182 of Lim. Act cannot be of help in understanding the meaning of the words "final order" in clause (5) of column 3 of Article 182 and therefore the recent Full Bench decision in --'Sivaramachari v. Anjaneya Chetty,' (FB) (F) where it was held that the appeal referred to in clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act must be confined to an appeal against the decree in the suit and not extended to an appeal from any interlocutory order in the suit or an appeal in any collateral proceeding, cannot be of any assistance. There is no question here with regard to the applicability of Clause (2) at all. It is conceded on all hands that Clause (5) is the proper provision to be invoked in this case. That being the case the Privy Council decision in -- 'Rameshwar Singh v. Homswar Singh', AIR 1921 PC 31 (G) can have no application.

    Venkatasubba Rao J.'s observations, in --'Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore', AIR 1936 Mad 613 (H), that when an execution petition is returned for amendment there is no judicial dealing with the matter of the petition and therefore the order returning cannot be regarded as a final order within the meaning of Clause (5) of Article 182, can also be referred to in this connection, to show that a decision or a judgment is final when it ends the action or proceeding in the court that makes it leaving nothing further to be determined or to be done by the court except the administrative execution of the decision or the judgment as the case may be. Though the learned Judge did not have to deal with the decision of an appellate court, still in our opinion the finality which was attached to a decision of the trial court had there not been any appeal has been set at large by the appeal in the present case. It seems to us therefore that E. P. No. 8 of 1947 which was filed within three years of E. P. No. 120 of 1946 which itself was within three years of the final order in C. M. A. No. 329 of 1942 viz., 13-7-1943 is in time.

    7. We confirm the order of the learned Judge that the release deed that was put into court with E. P. No. 318 of 1941 was a registered release deed in accordance with the agreement Ex. A and therefore the decree-holders have fulfilled the conditions set forth in the decree.

    8. The appeal is therefore allowed and the decision of the lower court is set aside and E. P. No. 8 of 1947 is remanded to the lower court for disposal according to law. The appellants will be entitled to their costs in this court.

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    Comments

    M.L.R.M Lakshmanan Chettiar Died And Others v. P.L.S.P Alias Sm. P.L Malayandi Chettiar And Others.
    (Mar 31, 1953)