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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These are two appeals from the judgment of Rajagopalan J. disposing of two applications in two original-side suits (C. S. Nos. 762 and 763 of 1948). The applications were brought by the common defendant seeking revocation of leave previously granted to the plaintiffs under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

The factual matrix set out in the opinion is as follows: the defendant is a limited company engaged in sugar manufacture at mills at Majhaulia (Champaram District, Bihar) with a registered office at Kanpur. The plaintiffs are sugar dealers carrying on business at Madras. The plaintiffs placed orders for bags of sugar; the orders were booked by Purushotham Pai described in the contracts as the defendant's sugar agent. The contract forms were described as offers made by the plaintiffs, with an acceptance by the defendant; the forms were signed by the buyers, the agent Pai and another representative for the mills/seller. The mills' address on the contracts is given as Majhaulia.

Each plaintiff claimed damages for breach of the respective contract. Before instituting suit each plaintiff obtained an ex parte order granting leave to sue (Applications Nos. 3613 and 3614 of 1948) on the basis that the cause of action arose entirely at Madras (where the contracts were entered into, payment made and delivery to be effected). The defendant entered appearance under protest (Order 5, Rule 12 of the Original Side rules), obtained an extension of time to file written statements, and then filed the two applications (the subject of these appeals) praying inter alia that the leave granted be revoked, that the suits be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and for a stay of the suits under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

The defendant's applications were founded on Clause 8 of the offer forms, which provides:

"All disputes in respect of this contract shall be settled by arbitration failing which shall be settled in the court of the seller's jurisdiction where this contract shall be deemed to have been entered into."

Rajagopalan J. granted the first relief sought by the defendant and revoked the leave previously granted to the plaintiffs; he did not decide the other prayers. The judgment under appeal upheld that revocation. The court on appeal agreed with Rajagopalan J.'s interpretation of Clause 8 and the revocation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Clause 8 of the contract (the arbitration clause with a residual forum-selection clause) is void as falling within the mischief of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act (i.e., whether it absolutely restricts a party from enforcing rights in the ordinary tribunals).
  2. Whether Clause 8 is contrary to public policy because it restricts the jurisdiction of courts.
  3. Whether Clause 8 is void for uncertainty under Section 29 of the Indian Contract Act (in particular because the defendant's registered office is at Kanpur while the mills are at Majhaulia and the clause refers to the "seller's jurisdiction").
  4. Whether the defendant waived any objection to the jurisdiction of the Madras courts by entering appearance, filing a vakalat and seeking an extension of time to file written statements.
  5. Whether the part of Clause 8 making the forum the "court of the seller's jurisdiction" comes into operation only after an attempt at arbitration (i.e., whether arbitration must first be attempted before a suit can be instituted under that clause).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • Clause 8 was illegal, void and unenforceable because it fell within the scope of Section 28 of the Contract Act (i.e., it purported to restrict the plaintiffs absolutely from enforcing their contractual rights by the usual legal proceedings in ordinary tribunals).
  • The clause was against public policy as it restricted the jurisdiction of courts.
  • The clause was void for uncertainty under Section 29 of the Contract Act because of the difference between the defendant's registered office (Kanpur) and the mills' location (Majhaulia), making the meaning of "seller's jurisdiction" unclear.
  • The defendant had waived any jurisdictional objection by filing a vakalat and applying for extension of time to file written statements.
  • Part of Clause 8 (the forum-selection provision) only arises on failure of arbitration, and since there had been no attempt at arbitration its forum-selection part could not be relied upon.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant sought revocation of the leave previously granted to the plaintiffs and dismissal of the suits for want of jurisdiction, relying on Clause 8 which provides for arbitration and, failing arbitration, for suits to be instituted in the court of the seller's jurisdiction (Majhaulia).
  • Alternatively, the defendant sought a stay of the suits under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shah Ramanlal v. Abdulla, 3 Dom. L. R. (Mys) 27 Illustration of the principle that parties may choose one of two competent courts to adjudicate disputes. Cited as supporting authority that parties can agree between two competent courts to have disputes heard in one of them.
Achratlal Keshavlal Mehta & Co. v. Vijayam & Co., AIR 1925 Mad 1145 Where two courts would normally have jurisdiction, parties may agree that a suit be brought in one and not the other. Followed and relied upon as a principal authority establishing that such forum-selection clauses are valid.
Raghavayya v. Vasudev-ayya Chetty, AIR 1944 Mad 47 Reaffirmation of the Madras principle that parties may select one of two competent courts. Noted as a decision of this court that followed the Madras ruling and was accepted by other High Courts; relied upon to support Clause 8's validity.
Haji Abdulla v. G. R. Stamp, AIR 1924 Bom 381 Construction of a clause providing disputes to be litigated in England; held to amount to a submission to arbitration and the suit was stayed. Quoted for the proposition that a clause selecting one court (including a foreign court) may not fall within Section 28; used in discussion of forum-selection clauses.
Khandesh Lakshmivilas Mills Co. v. Vinayak Atmaram, AIR 1935 Bom 198 Clause selecting Bombay courts for disputes; held not contrary to Section 28 because parties merely selected one of two competent tribunals. Followed the Madras ruling and relied upon to show such clauses are valid.
Gopaldas v. Harikishan Das, AIR 1936 All 514 Allahabad High Court decision endorsing the same principle—parties may choose among competent courts. Presented as additional High Court authority supporting validity of forum-selection clauses.
National Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Meghraj, AIR 1937 Nag 334 Nagpur High Court decision following Madras, Bombay and Allahabad rulings on selection of competent tribunals. Cited as another decision that adopted the principle that parties may select one of two competent courts.
Milton & Co. v. Ojha Automobile Engineering Co., AIR 1931 Cal 279 Calcutta High Court following AIR 1925 Mad 1145. Noted as having followed the Madras decision, showing consistent acceptance in Calcutta.
Dhanmal Marwari v. Jankidas Baijnath, 49 Cal W. N. 123 Distinguished situation where a clause purported to oust jurisdiction of the only competent court and vest it in one without jurisdiction. Distinguished from the present case because there the clause attempted to confer jurisdiction on a court which had no jurisdiction; the present clause selected among competent courts.
Ramnickial v. Vivekanand Mills Co., Ltd., 49 Cal W. N. 58 Held clause could amount to submission to arbitration where the chosen tribunal was a particular court; addressed interaction with Arbitration Act. Discussed at length; the court respectfully disagreed with the reasoning to the extent it equated domestic forum-selection with submission to arbitration in the same manner as choices of foreign courts.
Austrian Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Gresham Life Assurance Society Ltd, (1903) 1 K. B. 249 English decision treating choice of a foreign court as implying the law of that foreign country governs the contract; treated as submission to arbitration in English authorities. Used to explain why English authorities treat clauses nominating foreign courts differently from domestic forum-selection clauses; court distinguished those decisions from the present facts.
Musarji Lukmanji v. Durgadas, AIR 1946 Lah 57 (Full Bench) Full Bench held an agreement selecting one of two competent courts is valid and not void under Section 28; earlier contrary decisions were overruled. Adopted as authoritative and quoted; relied upon as a comprehensive review supporting the validity of Clause 8.
National Petroleum Co. v. Rebello, AIR 1935 Nag 48 A Nagpur decision cited as taking a contrary view (described as construing a clause as ousting jurisdiction of one court). Considered and rejected by the court as based on an interpretation that the present court could not accept.
Chittaranjan v. Panil Rani, AIR 1946 Cal 112 A single-judge Calcutta decision holding such agreements prevent absolutely filing suit in one of the courts and hence fall within Section 28. Noted but explicitly criticized by the court as a wrong interpretation of Section 28; the court preferred the weight of contrary authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning follows a structured analysis grounded in statutory interpretation and examination of relevant authorities:

  1. Interpretation of Clause 8: The court agreed with Rajagopalan J. that Clause 8 serves two functions — it provides for arbitration and, failing arbitration, designates that disputes "shall be settled in the court of the seller's jurisdiction where this contract shall be deemed to have been entered into." The clause therefore both determines the place of contract and prescribes a particular forum for suits.
  2. Effect on jurisdictional competence: The court acknowledged that under the general law the Madras Court would also have jurisdiction to entertain the suits (i.e., more than one competent court existed). The parties therefore had a genuine choice of courts when the contracts were made, and they voluntarily agreed that any suit relating to the contract should be instituted only in the seller's court.
  3. Section 28 analysis: The plaintiffs' contention that Clause 8 was void under Section 28 (which voids agreements that absolutely restrict enforcement of rights by ordinary tribunals) was examined in light of the statutory text and multiple authorities. The court emphasized that Section 28 voids agreements that "restrict absolutely" a party from enforcing rights; an agreement that merely selects one of two competent courts is only a partial restriction of litigation rights and does not amount to an absolute restriction under Section 28.
  4. Precedential support: The court conducted a thorough survey of precedents from Madras, Bombay, Allahabad, Nagpur, Calcutta, Lahore (Full Bench) and English authorities. A substantial body of High Court decisions (including the leading AIR 1925 Mad 1145 decision and AIR 1944 Mad 47) were held to support the proposition that parties may validly agree to elect one of two competent courts. The Full Bench of the Lahore High Court (Musarji Lukmanji v. Durgadas) was treated as a comprehensive review endorsing this view.
  5. Distinguishing contrary authorities: The court considered decisions that took a contrary approach (for example, where a clause purported to vest jurisdiction in a court that had no jurisdiction at all, or decisions construing the clause as totally ousting jurisdiction). Those decisions were distinguished on their facts or expressly rejected where based on what the court considered an erroneous interpretation of Section 28.
  6. Foreign vs domestic forum-selection: The court explained why English authorities that treat clauses nominating foreign courts as submissions to arbitration were distinguishable — nomination of a foreign court often implies choice of the foreign law and requires recognition of a foreign judgment, which differs from choosing between domestic courts.
  7. Public policy point: The court rejected the submission that the clause was against public policy, adopting the view (expressed by Mahajan J. in the Lahore Full Bench) that there is nothing against public policy in parties agreeing to limit their choice to one competent court.
  8. Uncertainty under Section 29: The court rejected the argument that Clause 8 was void for uncertainty because the seller's registered office was at Kanpur while the mills were at Majhaulia. The court held the contract plainly identified the seller's address as Majhaulia and that the phrase "court of the seller's jurisdiction" should be understood as the court which would have jurisdiction over disputes arising at Majhaulia.
  9. Waiver and procedural posture: The court found no waiver of jurisdictional objection by the defendant. The defendant had entered appearance under protest (Order 5, Rule 12) and filed applications to revoke leave and contest jurisdiction before filing any written statement on the merits; therefore the procedural acts relied upon by plaintiffs did not constitute waiver.
  10. Arbitration-first argument: The court rejected the appellants' contention that the forum-selection provision came into force only after an attempted arbitration. The court observed that if the appellants argued that a suit could not be instituted unless arbitration was first attempted, then the plaintiffs' suits would fail on that basis entirely — an outcome the appellants did not in fact assert. The court concluded there was nothing in that contention.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeals are dismissed with costs. The court expressly upheld Rajagopalan J.'s conclusion revoking the leave previously granted to the plaintiffs and held Clause 8 of the contract valid.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The revocation of leave granted to the plaintiffs stands and the appeals against that revocation are dismissed; Clause 8 (the arbitration and residual forum-selection clause) is held not to be void under Section 28 of the Contract Act, not contrary to public policy, and not void for uncertainty under Section 29.
  • No broader novel precedent claimed: The court based its decision on an established line of High Court and Full Bench authorities and did not purport to create a new principle beyond those authorities. The opinion aligns with a widely-accepted principle in the courts surveyed that parties may agree, where two competent courts exist, to have disputes tried in one of them.

This summary has been prepared strictly on the basis of the information contained in the provided opinion. No facts or legal conclusions beyond those explicitly stated in the opinion have been added.

    Hoosen Kasam Dada (India) Ltd., By Agent Sakoor Dawood v. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co., Ltd.

    1. These are two appeals against the judgment of Rajagopalan J. disposing of two applications in two suits, C. S. Nos. 762 and 763 of 1948 on the original side of this court. The two applications Were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment. The applications were made by the common defendant in the two suits to revoke the leave granted to the plaintiff in each of the two suits under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

    The defendant is a limited company engaged in the business of manufacture of sugar at its mills at Majhaulia in the Champaram District in Bihar State. The registered office of the company happens to be at Kanpur. The plaintiffs are dealers in sugar carrying on business at Madras. They placed orders with the defendant for certain bags of sugar. These orders were booked by one Purushotham Pai who is described in the concerned contracts as the sugar agent of the defendant. The contract forms relating to the suit contracts purport to be offers made by the plaintiffs for the purchase of sugar, and it is recited therein that the plaintiff would agree to sign formal contracts on receipt of the acceptance of the offers.

    It is common ground that the offers were accepted by the defendant. The forms which were signed by the buyers wore also signed by the agent Pai and another for the mills and seller. The address of the mills is given as Majhaulia. In each of the two suits the plaintiff claimed damages for breach of the respective contract in his favour. Before instituting the suit, each of the plaintiffs obtained an ex parte order granting leave to sue the defendant (Appins. Nos. 3613 and 3614 of 19-18). The orders were obtained on the following allegations, viz., that the cause of action for the suite entirely arose at Madras where the contracts were entered into and concluded, where the payment under the contracts was made and where delivery was to be effected.

    The defendant entered appearance in each of the two suits under Order 5, Rule 12 of the Original Side rules, i.e., it entered appearance under protest. The defendants also applied and obtained extension of time to file the written statement but before filing the written statement took out two applications out of which these appeals arise, praying 'inter alia' that the leave granted to the plaintiff in each of the two suite be revoked and the suits dismissed for want of jurisdiction and also for a stay of the suits under Section 34, Arbitration Act.

    2. The applications were entirely founded on the terms of Clause 8 in each of the two offer forms which runs thus:

    "All disputes in respect of this contract shall be settled by arbitration failing which shall be settled in the court of the seller's jurisdiction where this contract shall be deemed to have been entered into."

    The learned Judge granted the first prayer and revoked the leave granted to the two plaintiffs. He did not therefore deal with the next prayer.

    3. Wo entirely agree with the learned Judge that Clause 8 not only provided for a determination of the place of the contract, but it also provided that a suit relating to the contract should be instituted in a particular court, viz., the Court of the seller's jurisdiction. It is obvious that under the general law the Madras Court would also have jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The parties must be deemed therefore to have had a choice of courts at the time when they entered into the contracts but they voluntarily agreed with each other that any suit relating to the contract shall be instituted only in the court of the seller's jurisdiction.

    4. The main contention urged on behalf of the plaintiffs before Rajagopalan J. and before us was that Clause 8 was, illegal void and unenforceable because it fell within the scope of Section 28, Contract Act, which runs as follows :

    "Every agreement, by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunal, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent."

    5. There are two exceptions to the section which relate to agreements to refer disputes to arbitration. The contention is that Clause 8 in effect prevents the plaintiffs from instituting legal proceedings in a court which would have jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on the well known rule of law that parties cannot by agreement, oust the jurisdiction of any court; nor vest jurisdiction in a court otherwise not competent. There is an overwhelming preponderance of judicial opinion in this country on this point against the plaintiff's contention, though there are a few decisions sounding the other way.

    Clauses similar to Clause 8 in the suit contracts have been held to be perfectly valid and not to come within the mischief of Section 28 of the Contract Act. The principle that has now been practically accepted by most of the High Courts is that, where there are two competent courts which can deal with the subject matter of the litigation, it is open to the parties to a contract to agree that disputes in respect thereof should be adjudicated upon by one of the two competent courts and such an agreement is perfectly legal and not contrary to Section 28 of the Contract Act. Vide -- 'Shah Ramanlal v. Abdulla', 3 Dom. L. R. (Mys) 27. In -- 'Achratlal Keshavlal Mehta and Co. v. Vijayam and Co.', AIR 1925 Mad 1145 (A), Madhavan Nair J. observed thus:

    "Where there are two courts both of which would normally have jurisdiction to try the suit, I do not see why the parties should not be allowed to agree among themselves that a suit be brought in one of those courts and not in the other."

    6. The learned Judge pointed out that such an agreement could not be contrary to the provisions of Section 28, Contract Act, because the party is not thereby 'restricted absolutely' from enforc-ing his rights under, or in respect of, the contract by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary Tribunals, as the restriction is only partial. The only other reported decision of this court is that of King J. in -- 'Raghavayya v. Vasudev-ayya Chetty', AIR 1944 Mad 47 (B), where the learned Judge followed the decision of Madhavan Nair J. The learned Judge adverted to the fact that that ruling had been followed by other High Courts, for example, Calcutta, Bombay and Allahabad, and observed that he was not aware that it had ever been dissented from.

    7. In -- 'Haji Abdulla v. G. R. Stamp', AIR 1924 Bom 381 (C), there was a clause in a policy of marine insurance which provided that all disputes must be referred to in England for settlement and no legal proceedings should be taken to enforce any claim except in England where the underwriters were alone domiciled and carried on business. The defendant in a suit on the policy took out an application under Arbitration Act of 1899 praying that all proceedings should be stayed.

    It was held that there was a submission to arbitration and the suit was stayed. Macleod C. J., made the following observations in construing the clause,

    "The Question may arise whether the agreement in suit was an agreement whereby any party thereto was restricted absolutely from enforcing his right under or in respect of the agreement by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals. But I doubt very much whether an agreement of this nature which merely contracts that one of the two courts, which would have jurisdiction to try any dispute arising under the agreement, should try such dispute, would come within the meaning of Section 28, Contract Act."

    The relevant clause in -- 'Khandesh Lakshmivilas Mills Co., v. Vinayak Atmaram', AIR 1935 Bom 198 CD), was,

    "If any dispute arises in respect of the aforesaid business between us under this agreement, the same shall be referred to the Bombay High Court or in such courts in the Town and Island of Bombay as shall have jurisdiction in the matter."

    8. It was held by Eroomfield J. that the clause was not contrary to Section 28, Contract Act, because all that the parties had done was to select one of two competent Tribunals for the disposal of their disputes. The learned Judge followed the ruling in -- 'AIR 1925 Mad 1145 (A)'.

    9. In the Allahabad High Court, Bajpai J., in -- 'Gopaldas v. Harikishan Das', AIR 1936 All 514 (E), followed the same principle. The Nagpur High Court has taken the same view. Pollock J. in the -- 'National Petroleum Co., Ltd., Bombay v. Meghraj', AIR 1937 Nag 334 (F), followed the two Madras rulings, the two Bombay rulings and the Allahabad ruling above mentioned.

    10. In Calcutta, too there has never been any rejection of this principle. On the other hand, the learned Judge accepted it as established beyond doubt. In -- 'Milton and Co., v. Ojha Automobile Engineering Co.,', AIR 1931 Cal 279 (G), without any discussion, Lort Williams J., was content to follow the decision in -- 'AIR 1925 Mad 1145 (A)'. In -- 'Dhanmal Marwari v. Jankidas Baijnath', 49 Cal W. N, 123(H), the question did not arise in the same form as it does here and as it did in the cases cited above. There the effect of one of the terms of the contract was to oust the jurisdiction of the only competent court and confer it on another which had no jurisdiction and it was held by a Division Bench (Eiswas and Latifur Rahman JJ.) that such a term could not be enforced.

    Biswas J., though he thought it was unnecessary to express an opinion on the question, was clearly inclined to the view that where jurisdiction is vested in either of two courts, parties may be allowed, by agreement, to provide that all suits should be brought in one of such courts and not in the other. In his opinion such an agreement being only a partial restriction of the rights of the parties under the ordinary law may not foe hit by Section 28, Contract Act. The other learned Judge expressed his definite agreement with the view taken in -- 'AIR 1925 Mad 1145 (A)'.

    11. A peculiar view of a clause like that in question was taken by Gentle J. as he then was in -- 'Ramnickial v. Vivekanand Mills Co., Ltd.,', 49 cal W. N. 58 (I). A clause in that contract provided that any dispute arising under the contract could only be decided in the court of Ahniedabad. By the said contract A agreed to sell, and B to buy, certain textiles. On 11-5-1943, B instituted a suit in the High Court at Calcutta claiming damages for non-delivery. A in his written statement pleaded that the court had no jurisdiction because of the said clause. On 16-12-1943. A instituted in his turn a suit in the court of the First Class subordinate Judge of Ahmedabad, claiming damages from B. On 11-3-1944, B filed an application in the Calcutta Court seeking an injunction restraining A from prosecuting the Ahmedabad suit until a final determination of the Calcutta suit. A, the defendant in the suit, raised an objection that the Calcutta court had no jurisdiction, but the learned Judge held that the Calcutta Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in spite of the clause in the contract.

    At the same time he came to the conclusion that B's application to prevent A from prosecuting his suit in the Ahniedabad court must fail. The learned Judge threw out a suggestion that B could apply under Section 10. Civil P. C., to the Ahmedabad Court for a stay of A's suit. The learned Judge had no hesitation in overruling the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff before him that the clause in the contract was contrary to Section 28, Contract Act. He said,

    "There is nothing contrary to law in an agreement that the disputes between the parties should be tried by one court rather than by the other and such agreement does not offend the section. In my opinion Clause 5 of the Contract is not void."

    But the learned judge was of opinion that the effect of the Clause was a submission to arbitration under the Arbitration Act, the chosen Tribunal being the Ahmedabad Court and therefore when one of the two courts each having jurisdiction is the chosen tribunal, the jurisdiction of the other court is not ousted but it is subject to the exercise of the powers in Section 34, Arbitration Act.

    In the case before him as there was no application tor stay of proceedings under that section, it was dismissed. The learned Judge's opinion was based almost entirely on certain decisions of the courts in England and one decision of the High Court at Bombay to which reference has already been made, viz, -- ' AIR 1924 Bom 381 (C)'. All these decisions related to contracts in which the parties have agreed upon foreign courts to decide disputes arising out of their contracts. Gentle J., assumed that there was no difference in principle, whether the chosen court is a foreign court or both courts are of the same country. With great respect to him we do not agree. When the chosen forum is a foreign court, there is also the consequent implication that the rights under the contract would be determined by the rules of law prevailing in the foreign country.

    In one of the cases referred to by Gentle J., viz., -- 'Austrian Llyod Steamship Co. v. Gre-sham Life Assurance Society Ltd', (1903) 1 K. B. 249 (J), the contention of Haldane K. C. in respect of a clause which provided that for all disputes which may arise out of the contract of insurance all the parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court of Budapest having jurisdiction in such matters, was that the object of that clause was that the lav; of Hungary should govern the contract as presumably the Hungarian courts would only administer that law. This contention was accepted.

    12. In Chitty on Contracts, 20th Edn. page 161 this decision is cited as an instance where parties provided in the contract itself for the law which is to govern it. The learned Judge overlooked the fact that the judgment of a foreign court does not stand on the same footing as the judgment of one of the courts in India. A decree will have to be again obtained in a court in India on the foreign judgment. If this is borne in mind, it becomes easy to understand why the English decisions treat the term in a contract providing for reference of disputes to a foreign court as a submission to arbitration. We therefore respectfully, dissent from the decision of Gentle J. in this respect.

    13. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court reviewed all the relevant decisions on this point in -- 'Musarji Lukmanji v. Durgadas', AIR 1946 Lah 57 (FB) (K), and held that an agreement between the parties to a contract to the effect that a suit concerning disputes arising between them in respect of the contract would be instituted in one of two competent courts is a valid and enforceable agreement and is not void under the provisions of Section 28, Contract Act.

    Mahajan J. who delivered the leading judgment pointed out that there was a considerable body of judicial opinion in support of the said view. Earlier decisions of that court to the contrary were overruled. The following observations of Abdur Rahaman J. bring out clearly the 'ratio decidendi' of the decision.

    "But in agreeing not to bring suits in one out of the two courts, both of which were competent to try them, parties cannot be said to have contracted out of the jurisdiction vested in that court or to be depriving it of the jurisdiction which it otherwise possessed (and would continue to possess as long as it could entertain a suit of that kind in accordance with the law in force) but to have deprived themselves of the right of proceeding in that court with a reservation that they would continue to have a right to proceed in others which have in law, jurisdiction to try. The parties did nob thus deprive any court of its inherent or even territorial jurisdiction but themselves of their right of exercising, it partially in one out of the two or three courts. Jurisdiction is one thing, right to exercise it another."

    The only two decisions which learned counsel for the appellant was able to cite in support of a contrary view are (1) a decision of the Judicial Commissioner of Nagpur in -- 'National Petroleum Co. v. Rebello', AIR 1935 Nag 48 (L) and (2) a decision of a single Judge, Henderson J. in --'Chittaranjan v. Panil Rani', AIR 1946 Cal 112 (M). In the former case the decision was based on a construction of a clause similar to that in question as a clause ousting the jurisdiction of one of the courts--a construction which we can-not accept. In the latter case the learned Judge took the view that the effect of such an agreement was to prevent the parties absolutely from filing a suit in one of the courts, and so it falls under Section 28, Contract Act. With respect to the learned Judge, we think that this is a wrong interpretation of the language of Section 28, Contract Act. The observations of Abdur Rahman J. extracted above completely answers this objection.

    14. We have no hesitation in accepting the view taken in the two decisions of this court in

    -- 'AIR, 1925 Mad 1145 (A)' and -- 'AIR 1944 Mad 47 (B)', which has been accepted by almost all the courts in this country. We hold that Clause 8 of the suit contract is not void as one falling within the mischief of Section 28, Contract Act.

    15. Learned counsel for the appellants next contended that the clause was void as being against public policy because it restricts the jurisdiction of courts. No authority was cited by him in support of his contention except an observation in -- 'AIR 1935 Nag 48 (L)', viz.,

    "It appears to me that it would be against public policy if the parties by private agreement can oust the jurisdiction of the courts."
    We can do no better than to quote Mahajan J.

    -in -- 'AIR 1946 Lah 57 (FB) (K)' to overrule the contention. At page 61 the learned Judge said :

    "It may be observed that there is nothing against public policy in an agreement arrived at between the parties that where several courts have territorial jurisdiction to hear a case they may limit their choice to one of those courts. So long as the case is heard by a competent court which has jurisdiction in every way to hear it, there is nothing in public policy which dictates that, because other courts can also hear the same and because they cannot hear it in view of the agreement, that is a matter against public policy."

    16. The next argument on behalf of the appellants was that the clause was void for uncertainty under Section 29, Contract Act. The uncertainty is supposed to arise from the fact that ine registered office of the defendant company is at Kanpur while the mills are in Majhaulia. A glance at the contract will show what was meant by the parties. The seller's address is given as Majhaulia and the court of seller's jurisdiction must be held to be the court which would have jurisdiction to decide dispute which arises at Majhaulia. We hold that Clause 8 of the suit contracts is not void on this ground.

    17. Mr. Azizuddin for the appellants also contended that the defendant must be deemed to have waived the objection to the jurisdiction of this court. His contention is founded on the following facts, viz., that the defendant filed a vakalat and an application for extension of time to file the written statement. There is no substance in this contention because, as already mentioned, the defendant entered appearance under protest and filed the applications for revoking the leave before he filed any written statement pleading on the merits.

    18. There is one other argument of Mr. Aziz-uddin which we are unable to follow, viz., that that part of Clause 8 which provides for institution of a suit in the court of the seller's jurisdiction comes into force only on failure of arbitration and as there had been no attempt at arbitration that provision cannot be relied upon. If the argument is that a suit cannot be instituted unless there has been an attempt at arbitration, then logically the present suits must fail on that ground and we do not think Mr. Aziz-uddin intended to say this. There is nothing in this contention.

    We entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion of Rajagopalan J. and dismiss the appeals with costs.

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    Comments

    Hoosen Kasam Dada (India) Ltd., By Agent Sakoor Dawood v. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co., Ltd.
    (Sep 25, 1953)