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Case Number

C.R.P No. 932 of 1947.

Attorney(S)

Mr. T. Krishna Rao for Petr.
Messrs. K. Veerasami and G. Ramaanujam for Respt.

Judges

Rajamannar, C.J
Viswanatha Sastri
Panchapakesa Ayyar, JJ.

Acts

SECTION 70 PROVINCIAL INSOLVENCY ACT
Sections 69 & 70, Provincial Insolvency Act,
Section 75(1), Provincial Insolvency Act
Section 75(1). 5. Section 476 Cri. P. C.
Section 16 of the Debtors Act 1869,'
Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Official Receiver of Ramnad (the petitioner) applied under Section 70 of the Provincial Insolvency Act to the Insolvency Court of Devakottah for a complaint to be made against an insolvent debtor (the respondent) for alleged offences under Section 69. The Insolvency Court held an enquiry after notice to the respondent but declined to make a complaint. The Receiver appealed to the District Court of Ramnad, but the appeal was rejected on the ground that the Receiver had no right of appeal. The civil revision petition before this Court raises the question whether the Receiver had a right of appeal under Section 75(1) of the Act. Earlier, a reference had been made to a Division Bench on whether the qualification "aggrieved by a decision" in Section 75(1) necessarily applied to the debtor, creditor and Receiver named in that sub-section; that question had been authoritatively decided by a Full Bench in Narasimha v. C. Ramayya (C.M.A. No. 470 of 1946), but the specific question whether the Official Receiver who unsuccessfully sought prosecution under sections 69 & 70 is a "person aggrieved" required full-bench consideration.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Official Receiver who applied under Section 70 for prosecution of an insolvent under Section 69 is a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and therefore entitled to prefer an appeal from the Insolvency Court's refusal to make a complaint.
(Contextual/previously addressed) Whether the qualification "aggrieved by a decision" in Section 75(1) necessarily applies to the debtor, creditor and Receiver named in that sub-section — a point earlier authoritatively considered by a Full Bench in Narasimha v. C. Ramayya.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The petitioner's counsel conceded (correctly, in the Court's view) that a debtor, creditor or Receiver does not have an unqualified right of appeal from any decision or order of an Insolvency Court but only a right of appeal if he is "aggrieved" by that decision or order under Section 75(1).
The petitioner relied on English decisions (notably Ex parte Official Receiver; In re Reed Bowen & Co. (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 174 and In re Lamb; Ex parte Board of Trade (1894) 2 Q.B. D. 805) and on Karuthan Chettiar v. Ramachettiar, 45 M.L.J. 804, to support the contention that the Receiver should be regarded as a "person aggrieved" and entitled to appeal where the Receiver's application for prosecution is refused.
The petitioner also cited In re Dunn; Ex parte Senior Official Receiver (1902) 1 K.B. 107 to support submissions about the duty of the Court to consider the Receiver's report or representations concerning prosecution.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Narasimha v. C. Ramayya (C.M.A. No. 470 of 1946)	Authoritative decision on the construction of the phrase "aggrieved by a decision" in Section 75(1) (that debtor/creditor/Receiver have only a right of appeal if aggrieved).	The Court treated this Full Bench decision as settling that a debtor, creditor or Receiver do not have an unqualified right of appeal but only if "aggrieved". The petitioner's counsel accepted this principle.
Ex parte Official Receiver; In re Reed Bowen & Co. (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 174	English authority interpreting similar language in the English Bankruptcy Act and indicating that a Receiver can be a "person aggrieved" when an application brought by him is decided against him.	The Court acknowledged this English test but contrasted it with Indian precedent and statutory context, concluding the English test did not lead to allowing an appeal by the Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act in the present case.
In re Lamb; Ex parte Board of Trade (1894) 2 Q.B.D. 805	Another English decision treated as applying the same test as Ex parte Official Receiver regarding who is a "person aggrieved".	Noted by the Court as part of the English authorities that, if applied, would support the Receiver being aggrieved; nevertheless, the Court declined to adopt that approach for the present statute and facts.
Ex parte Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458	Statement that a "person aggrieved" is one who has suffered a legal grievance—wrongfully deprived or refused something or whose title is affected.	The Court cited James L. J.'s description as a landmark exposition of the test that a legal grievance is required; used as the starting point for examining whether the Receiver suffered such legal grievance.
Iyappa Nayanar v. Manicka Asari, 40 Mad. 630	Decision under the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907 taking the view that the Official Receiver would not be entitled to appeal in analogous circumstances.	The Court followed this decision as supporting the conclusion that the Receiver is not a "person aggrieved" where the Court refuses to make a complaint under the insolvency offence provision.
Palaniappa Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti, 38 M.L.J. 338	Decision under the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907 adopting the view that the Receiver is not entitled to appeal in such matters.	The Court regarded this decision as sound and applicable; it found Palaniappa Chetti not open to the criticisms applicable to Iyappa Nayanar and relied on it as consistent authority.
Laduram v. Mahabir Prasad, 39 ALL. 171	High Court decision aligned with the view that neither creditor nor Official Receiver is a "person aggrieved" by refusal to make complaint under the insolvency provisions.	The Court cited this as one of several High Court decisions in agreement with the view it adopts.
Digendra Chandra v. Ramani Mohan, 22 C.W.N. 958 (also referenced as Bisendra/Bisendra Chandra Basak v. Ramani Mohan)	High Court authority cited among those taking the same view regarding "person aggrieved" under the insolvency enactment.	Referenced by the Court as part of the body of decisions supporting the conclusion that a Receiver is not "aggrieved" by the insolvency Court's refusal to make a complaint.
Lalchand Hirachand v. Tuljaram Raoji, I.L.R. (1942) Bom. 67	Bombay High Court decision holding that neither creditor nor Official Receiver is a "person aggrieved" by a refusal to make a complaint under Section 70.	The Court respectfully agreed with this decision and treated it as consistent with the present conclusion.
Achruram v. Padan Pershad, I.L.R. (1941) Lah. 779	Lahore High Court decision aligning with the view that the Receiver is not a "person aggrieved" in such cases.	Adopted as consistent authority supporting the Court's conclusion.
Gujarsaha v. Barkat Ali, 1 Lah. 213	Another High Court decision cited as aligned with the view under the Act of 1907.	Included among the High Court authorities that the Court cited as in agreement with its conclusion.
Karuthan Chettiar v. Ramachettiar, 45 M.L.J. 804	Case where the insolvency Court refused to entertain an application in limine; on appeal it was held the Court erred in declining to go into the matter — the case contains an observation that if there had been a full enquiry and a decision not to make a complaint, the creditor would not have been entitled to appeal.	The Court held that Karuthan Chettiar must be confined to its facts (refusal to entertain in limine) and cannot be relied upon to support a general right of appeal by a creditor or Receiver where an enquiry was held and the Court thereafter declined to make a complaint.
In re Dunn; Ex parte Senior Official Receiver (1902) 1 K.B. 107	Authority discussing that the Court must consider the Receiver's report and that the duty to determine prosecution rests with the Court.	The Court observed that In re Dunn is not authority for the proposition that, after the Court considers the Receiver's report and declines to prosecute, the Receiver is a "person aggrieved" entitled to appeal; rather, it supports that the Receiver's duty is discharged by filing the report and the decision then rests with the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of steps, applying legal principles to the facts as follows:

Preliminary position accepted: The Court accepted the concession (and the Full Bench precedent in Narasimha v. C. Ramayya) that under Section 75(1) only a "person aggrieved" by a decision or order of an Insolvency Court can appeal; there is no unqualified right to appeal by a named class (debtor, creditor, Receiver) unless that person is in fact aggrieved.
Legal standard for "person aggrieved": The Court adopted the established exposition (Ex parte Sidebotham) that a "person aggrieved" must have suffered a legal grievance — e.g., being wrongfully deprived of something or wrongfully refused something to which he had a right — and that disappointment of expectations without a legal grievance is insufficient.
Functional roles of Receiver and creditors contrasted with prosecution interest: The Court enumerated the Receiver's statutory functions (realise assets, recover fraudulent transfers, admit proofs of debts, distribute dividends) and the creditors' powers in estate administration. In matters of administration of the estate the Receiver or a creditor would have a direct interest and could be aggrieved by adverse orders affecting those rights.
Distinction for prosecution under Sections 69 & 70: The Court observed that neither the Receiver nor a creditor has a statutory right to demand prosecution of the debtor for offences under Section 69; Section 70 does not provide expressly for an application by the Receiver or creditor or for a right of appeal against refusal to make a complaint. The decision whether to make a complaint is left to the Court's discretion.
Comparison with criminal procedure provisions: The Court contrasted Sections 70 & 75 of the Act with Sections 476 and 476B of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provide for an application and an appeal in respect of offences against public justice. That difference in statutory design indicated that the Legislature did not intend to create an analogous right of appeal for insolvency offences under Section 70.
Application of the legal standard: Applying the "legal grievance" test, the Court concluded that a refusal by the Insolvency Court to make a complaint under Section 70 does not directly affect the legal rights or property of the Receiver or creditors. At most it may disappoint a desire for retributive justice; this is not a legal grievance making them "persons aggrieved" for purposes of Section 75(1).
Consideration of precedents relied on by petitioner: The Court treated Karuthan Chettiar as confined to its facts (where the insolvency Court refused even to entertain an application) and not authority for permitting an appeal after a full enquiry and a refusal to make a complaint. In re Dunn was read as holding the Court must consider the Receiver's report, but not as establishing that after such consideration and a decision not to prosecute the Receiver becomes a "person aggrieved" entitled to appeal.
Reliance on consistent judicial authority: The Court noted and relied on decisions (Iyappa Nayanar; Palaniappa Chetti; Laduram; Lalchand Hirachand; Achruram; Bisendra Chandra Basak/Bisendra Chandra Basak v. Ramani Mohan; Gujarsaha v. Barkat Ali) taking the view that neither a creditor nor the Official Receiver is a "person aggrieved" by a refusal to make a complaint under the insolvency provisions, and adopted the same conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Receiver had no right of appeal to the District Court under Section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act in respect of the Insolvency Court's refusal to make a complaint under Section 70, and the appeal was rightly dismissed on that ground.

Implications and consequences:

The direct effect on the parties is that the Official Receiver (petitioner) was not entitled to appeal the Insolvency Court's refusal to make a complaint against the debtor under Section 70; accordingly the civil revision petition was dismissed with costs.
The Court noted that the case of a debtor against whom a complaint is actually made under Section 70 might be on a different footing (i.e., different procedural posture), but did not decide that question in this opinion.
The decision follows and aligns with earlier authorities under the Act of 1907 and subsequent High Court decisions; the Court framed its conclusion as an application of existing precedent and statutory interpretation rather than the establishment of an expansive new rule beyond the present context.

End of summary. This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal propositions beyond those contained in the opinion itself.

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The Official Receiver Of Ramanathapuram At Madura, Representing The Estate Of The Insolvent, P.L.S.L.P Palaniappa Chettiar And P.L.M.L Chellappa Chettiar v. P.L.S.L Chellappa Chettiar

1. This case was referred to a Division Bench by my Lord the Chief Justice for an authoritative decision on the question whether the qualification "aggrieved by a decision" in Section 75(1), Provincial Insolvency Act necessarily applies to the debtor, creditor & the Receiver expressly named in that sub-section. That question has since been authoritatively decided by a Full Bench of five Judges in Narasimha v. C. Ramayya. C. M. A. No. 470 of 1946; but there is another question which, in our opinion, requires consideration by a Full Bench, viz. whether the Official Receiver, who unsuccessfully applied for prosecuting the insolvent under sections 69 & 70, provincial insolvency act, is a person aggrieved by the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. If the test laid down in Ex parte Official Receiver; In re Reed Bowen & Co., (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 174 & In re Lamb; Ex parte Board of Trade, (1894) 2 Q. B. D. 805, were to be applied which considered similar language under the English Bankruptcy Act, the Receiver would be a person aggrieved by the order & would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. But Iyappa Nayanar v. Manicka Asari, 40 Mad. 630 & Palaniappa Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti, 38 M. L J. 338, which were decisions under the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907 took a different view & if the principles of those decisions were to be applied the Official Receiver would not be entitled to prefer an appeal. A similar view was taken by the other High Courts, vide Laduram v. Mahabir Prasad, 39 ALL. 171, Digendra Chandra v. Ramani Mohan, 22 C.W.N. 958 ; Lalchand Hirachand v. Tuljaram Raoji, I.L.R. (1942) Bom. 67 and Achruram v. Padan Pershad, I. L. R. (1941) Lah. 779. There are no doubt observations in the judgment of the Full Bench in G. M. A. No. 470 of 1946 which clearly indicate that this Court was inclined to adopt the test laid down in Ex parte Official Receiver; In re Reed Bowen &Co., (1987) 19 Q. B.D. 174. We think that this is a matter which requires an authoritative decision on the point & we, therefore, direct the papers to be placed before my Lord the Honourable the Chief Justice for constituting a Pull Bench.

Judgment.

2.The Official Receiver of Ramnad, here petitioner, moved the Insolvency Court of Devakottah to make a complaint under Section 70, Provincial Insolvency Act, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") against the insolvent debtor, here respondent, of offences under Section 69 of the Act alleged to have been committed by the latter. The insolvency Court held an enquiry after notice to the respondent but declined to make a complaint. An appeal against the decision of the Insolvency Court preferred by the Receiver to the District Court of Ramnad was rejected on the ground that the Receiver had no right of appeal. The only question in the civil revision petition is whether the decision of the insolvency Court was appealable at the instance of the receiver, & the answer depends upon a proper interpretation of Section 75, Sub-section (1) of the Act which runs thus :

"the debtor, any creditor, the Receiver, or any other person aggrieved by a decision oome to or an order made in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction by a Court subordinate to a District Court may appeal to the District Court."

In view of the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Narasimha v. Ramayya, 1950-1 M. L. J. 484, it was conceded, & we think rightly, by the learned advocate for the petitioner that a debtor, creditor or Receiver had not an unqualified right of appeal from any decision or order of an insolvency Court, but a right of appeal only if he was aggrieved by that decision or order. Under Section 75(1) of the Act the only person entitled to appeal is "a person aggrieved" by the decision or order and there is no difference in this respect between the provisions of Section 46 of the Act of 1907 & Section 75(1) of the Act of 1920. Can the Receiver be said to be "a person aggrieved" by the decision of the insolvency Court not to make a complaint against the debtor of offences under Section 69 of the Act. The English decisions expounding the meaning of the phrase "aggrieved person" occurring in the corresponding provisions of the English Bankruptcy Acts had been considered in Narasimha v. Ramayya, 1950 l M. L. J. 484 & it is unnecessary to go over the same ground. Suffice it to refer to a few landmarks.

3. In Ex parte Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458 James L. J. said,

"A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongly deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something."

This however, was not a definition of the expression "person aggrieved" or even an exhaustive statement of its meaning. The grievance may not be personal or pecuniary & may yet be a legal grievance. A person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully refused him something which he had a right to demand, would be an "aggrieved person." A creditor or receiver who is under the provisions of the Act empowered to make & who makes an application to the insolvency Court for a relief or who is brought before the Court to submit to its decision is, if the decision goes against him, thereby an 'aggrieved person.' This is the effect of the decisions of the Court of appeal in Ex Parte Official Receiver: In re Reed Bowen and Co. (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 174 & In re Lamb; Ex Parte the Board of Trade, (1894) 2 Q. B. d. 805. Not every person who has suffered some disappointment or whose expectations have not been realised as a result of the decision or order of an insolvency Court can claim to be an aggrieved person.

4. Judged by this test, can it be said that the Receiver was a person aggrieved by the decision of the insolvency Court in this case ? The Official Receiver has the right & duty to get in & realise all the assets of the debtor & distribute them among his creditors. He has the right to apply to the Court for an order to set aside the fraudulent dealings of the debtor with his property & recover the same for the benefit of the creditors. He has to scrutinise the claims of creditors, admit proof of debts & distribute the assets of the insolvent as dividend among the creditors. A creditor too has rights given to him under the Act. He can apply to the Court under Section 21 for interim security to be furnished by the debtor & for attachment of his property. He can also apply to the Court under s. 54A for avoiding fraudulent transfers of his property by the debtor. He can apply to the Court to expunge the name of a creditor from the list of creditors on proof that the debt is unreal. He has a right to oppose the discharge of the insolvent. In matters relating to the administration of the estate of the debtor, the realisation & the distribution of his assets, the Receiver & the creditors are directly interested. A decision or order adverse to the receiver or the creditor in connection with matters of the kind above specified on an application presented by or as against the Receiver or the creditor would be appealable at his instance, for, he thereby suffers a legal grievance. But neither a creditor nor the Receiver has a direct interest in sending a debtor to jail for offences under Section 69 of the Act. He may be indirectly interested like the rest of the public in the purity & efficiency of insolvency administration. But he has no further or other interest in the matter. The act does not specifically provide for an application under Section 70 either fey a Receiver or a creditor praying for action to be taken against the debtor. Neither fee Receiver nor a creditor has any right to demand the prosecution of the debtor for an offence under Section 69 & they cannot be said to be "aggrieved" by a refusal of the insolvency Court to make a complaint under Section 70 of the Act. The matter is left to the Court's discretion. This is not to say that the Receiver or creditor cannot file an application in the insolvency Court for action being taken against a debtor under Section 70 of the Act or that he cannot place before the Court materials in support of the application. Such assistance to the Court is legitimate & is rightly given. But then there is no dispute to which the applicant is a party or by the decision of which the applicant suffers a legal grievance. Whether the application succeeds or fails, he has no further concern in the matter. He has done his duty & the responsibility for the decision rest? with the insolvency Court which hears his application. The decision or order of the Court does not in any way affect directly or indirectly the rights of the creditors or the Receiver. The creditors or the Receiver is no more "aggrieved" than any other member of the public by the Court's decision not to make a complaint against a debtor, & there is no reason why he should have a right of appeal against the decision of the insolvency Court under Section 75(1).

5. Section 476 Cri. P. C. providing for an application to the Court to make a complaint in respect of offences against public justice, & Section 476B providing for a right of appeal against an order refusing to make a complaint may be usefully contrasted with the provisions of Sections 70 & 75 of the Act, which neither contemplate a formal application to the Court nor expressly provide a right of appeal from a decision of the Court refusing to make a complaint. The marked difference between these two sets of provisions shows that the Legislature in enacting Section 70 of the Act merely allowed the receiver or creditor to bring to the notice of the Court the fraudulent dealings of the insolvent with his property & affairs in order that the Court might take disciplinary action against the erring debtor. If the Court declines to make a complaint it cannot be, said that it has refused the applicant, the receiver or creditor, something which he had a right to demand. Nor has it deprived him of anything or affected his right or title to any property. He is not therefore '"aggrieved" in the relevant sense of that expression. It may be that the decision of the Court not to make a complaint has failed to satisfy the thirst for "retributive justice" on the part of the applicant; but this is not a legal grievance. The Receiver or the creditor is no more aggrieved than any other member of the public by a judicial decision of which he does not approve. The offence created by Section 69 of the Act is a special one relating to & arising out of the insolvency of a debtor & is not part of the general criminal law, & the Legislature has not thought fit to enact provisions on the lines of Sections 476 & 476B, Cri. P. C. with reference to offences under Section 69 of the Act. For these reasons it must be held that the Receiver in the present case was not a "person aggrieved" by the decision of the Insolvency Court declining to make a complaint against a debtor under Section 70 of the Act.

6. This view is in accord with the conclusion reached by this Court in Iyappa Nainar v. Manicka Assari, 40 Mad. 630 and Palaniappa Chetti v. Subramania Chetti, 88 M. L. J. 338 under the corresponding provisions of Sections 43 & 46 of the Act of 1907. It is true, as pointed out by the petitioner, that all the reasons given in the former case have not been accepted in the latter. It is also true that the procedure for the trial of an offence under the insolvency law was different under Section 43 of the Act of 1907 from what is now under Section 70 of the Act of 1920, as amended & that much of the reasoning in Iyappa Nayanar v. Manicka Asari, 40 Mad. 630 may not hold good in the present state of the law. The decision in Palaniappa Chetti v. Subramania Chetti, 38 M. L. J. 338 however is not open to such criticism. The other High Courts have taken the same view as this Court in cases decided under the Act of 1907. Laduram v. Mahabir Prasad, 39 ALL. 171, Gujarsaha v. Barkat Ali, 1 Lah. 213 and Bisendra Chandra Basak v. Ramani Mohan, 22 C. W. n. 958. As already observed, there is no difference between the Act of 1907 & the present Act with reference to the right of appeal & under both the enactments, only a "person aggrieved" by a decision or order of an insolvency Court could appeal therefrom. In cases decided after the enactment of Sections 70 & 75 of the Act V [5] of 1920, in their present form the Bombay & Lahore High Courts have held that neither a creditor nor the Official Receiver is a "person aggrieved" by a decision of the insolvency Court refusing to make a complaint under Section 70. Lalchand Hirachand v. Tuljaram, I. L. R. (1942) Bom. 67 and Lachruram v. Padam Pershad, I. L. R. (1941) Lah. 779. We respectfully agree with these decisions.

7. The petitioner relied on Karuthan Chettiar v. Ramachettiar, 45 M. L. J. 804. There the insolvency Court refused even to entertain or consider an application by a creditor to take action against the debtor under Section 43 of the Act of 1907 in respect of offences under the insolvency law. On an appeal by the creditor it was held that the insolvency Court erred in dismissing his application in limine & in declining to go into the matter. It was, however, observed that if the Court had made an enquiry & then decided not to make a complaint, the creditor would not have been entitled to prefer an appeal as an aggrieved person" on the authority of Iyappa Nainar v. Manicka Assari, 40 Mad. 630. There was a full enquiry in the present case, & it was only after such enquiry that the insolvency Court declined to make a complaint against the debtor.

The decision in Karuthan Chettiar v. Raman Chetti, 45 M. l. j. 804 must be confined to its own facts & cannot be relied upon as an authority for the proposition that a creditor or Receiver is a person aggrieved by the decision of the insolvency Court not to make a complaint against a debtor under Section 70 of the Act. Reference was also made to the decision in In re Dunn; Ex parte Senior Official Receiver, (1902) 1-K. B. 107 but there the Court in bankruptcy refused to consider the report of the Receiver & decided one way or the other whether an order should be made for the prosecution of the bankrupt. Romer L. J. observed as follows:

"The duty ultimately determining whether a prosecution shall be instituted rests with the Court & not with the Official Receiver. It appears to me, therefore that the Court cannot refuse to consider the report merely because the Official Receiver has not made up his mind whether there ought or ought not to be a prosecution, or will not make a substantive application for an order to prosecute. The report having been made, it must at some time or other be considered by the Court, & the Court itself must, under Section 16 of the Debtors Act 1869,' make up its mind whether the bankrupt is to be prosecuted."

This decision is not an authority for the position that if the Bankruptcy Court after considering the report, representation or application of the Receiver & after making such enquiry as it thinks fit, decides not to prosecute the bankrupt, the Receiver is a "person aggrieved" by that decision. The observations above quoted tend to show that the Receiver discharges his duty or responsibility by filing his report, that thereafter it is a matter between the debtor & the Court & that it is for the insolvency Judge to decide whether he will make an order for the prosecution of the bankrupt or not.

7. For the reasons above stated we hold that the Receiver had no right of appeal to the District Court under Section 75(1) of the Act & that the appeal was rightly dismissed by the Court on this ground The case of a debtor against whom a complaint is made under Section 70 of the Act might stand on a different footing. The civil revision petition is dismissed with costs.

The Official Receive... v. P.L.S.L Chellappa Ch...