Chukka Annam Naidu (Died) And Others v. Kolachala Apparao And Others., Madras High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

S.A No. 850 of 1947.

Advocates

Mr. C.V Dikshatulu for Appts.
Mr. S. Ramamurthi for Respt.

Judges

Rajamannar, C.J
Balakrishna Ayyar, J.

Acts

Ss. 6, Sub-S. (1), Explanations (1) and (2) and S. 8 Sub-S. (5) of the Madras Estates Land Act, I of 1908, as amended by Act XVIII of 1936, i.e, the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936. S. 6(1)
Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, which amended Clause (d) of S. 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, I of 1908.
provisions of this Act and the provisions of S. 8(5)
Madras Estates Land (Third Amemdment) Act, 1936
Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936,
provisions of the Madras Act XVIII of 1936
Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act
Madras Act XVIII of 1936. S. 8(5)
1934. Madras Act XVIII of 1936
Madras Act VIII of 1934.
Madras Act I of 1908.
S. 127(2) of that Act

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal arising from a suit for eviction of certain tenants occupying lands in an agraharam which, by statute, became an estate under the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936. The appeal was originally heard by Panchapagesa Sastri, J., who referred it to a Division Bench because of a conflict of decisions between Demudu v. Pappayaraju and Korada Atchanna v. Jayanti Seetaramaswami.

The material facts stated in the opinion are: the first respondent's father (an Inamdar) obtained a decree for eviction on 7 April 1933 and took delivery of the lands on 23 May 1937. He leased the lands to the defendants by a lease dated 22 June 1933 for a term of one year ending 15 March 1934, but the defendants remained in possession after that period. In 1937 the Inamdar gave notice to quit and ultimately filed the suit for eviction on 24 April 1944. The tenants' principal defence was that they had acquired occupancy rights under the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, and therefore the eviction suit was not maintainable. Both lower courts decreed the suit; defendants 1 and 2 are the appellants in this second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a tenant who was in possession on or after 30 June 1934 (but before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936) can be treated as having acquired an occupancy right "before the commencement" of that Act for the purposes of S. 8(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act as amended.
How Explanation (2) to S. 6(1) of the Madras Estates Land Act, as inserted by the 1936 amendment, is to be construed — specifically, whether Explanation (2) operates retrospectively to confer occupancy rights as of the earlier date (30 June 1934) or only identifies the class of tenants who would obtain rights upon the Act's commencement.
Whether the rights of an Inamdar which had ripened into a final decree or order before 1 November 1933 are preserved by S. 8(5) of the Act as amended, notwithstanding the statutory conferment of occupancy rights on tenants in villages which became estates by the 1936 amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents (Tenants)

The tenants' main defence, as stated in the opinion, was that they had acquired occupancy rights under the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, and therefore the suit for eviction was not maintainable.

Appellant (Inamdar) / Appellant's Counsel

The opinion records the position embodied by S. 8(5): where a landholder had obtained a final decree or order of a competent civil court before 1 November 1933 declaring that the tenant had no occupancy right, the landholder would have specified rights for a period of 12 years from the commencement of Act XVIII of 1936, subject to the condition that no tenant had acquired an occupancy right before the commencement of the 1936 Amendment Act. The Inamdar relied on this provision (as described in the judgment) to sustain the eviction.
The opinion also records that Mr. Dhikshatulu, learned counsel for the appellant, conceded that the Amending Act did not commence to operate before 31 October 1936 (i.e., he accepted that the Act's commencement date could not be earlier than 31 October 1936).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Demudu v. Pappayaraju	Construction that tenants cannot be treated as having acquired occupancy rights before the commencement of the Amending Act by virtue of provisions contained in that Act; the Legislature intended S. 8(5) to except cases where landholder had obtained a decree prior to 1 Nov 1933, unless the tenant acquired occupancy rights independently of the Act.	The court followed the view expressed in Demudu v. Pappayaraju and adopted the construction that occupancy rights under the 1936 Act accrue only from the Act's commencement (31 October 1936), and that S. 8(5) preserves the rights of inamdars who had final decrees before 1 November 1933.
Korada Atchanna v. Jayanti Seetaramaswami	The construction (adopted by Viswanatha Sastri, J.) that Explanation (2) to S. 6 operated retrospectively so as to vest occupancy rights in tenants as from their admission dates (for example, a tenant admitted on 26 June 1936 would be treated as acquiring occupancy rights before the commencement of the Amending Act).	The court rejected this construction. It held that the phrase "before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936" can only mean before 31 October 1936 and that a tenant cannot be held to have acquired rights under a provision that did not come into force until that date. Explanation (2) identifies classes of tenants entitled under the Act but does not create an earlier accrual date for occupancy rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by close examination of the relevant statutory provisions and the temporal language used in those provisions:

The court identified the key provisions: S. 6(1) (with Explanations (1) and (2)) and S. 8(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act, as amended by the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 (Act XVIII of 1936).
It explained the content of S. 6(1): subject to the Act, every ryot in possession or admitted thereafter shall have a permanent right of occupancy. Explanation (1) defines "every ryot now in possession" to include those who had held land as a ryot and continued in possession at the commencement of "this Act."
Explanation (2) was examined: it was introduced because Act XVIII of 1936 converted certain inam villages into estates, and it provides that the expressions "now" and "commencement of this Act" (in sub-s. (2) and Explanation (1)) shall be construed as meaning 30 June 1934, and "hereafter" shall mean the period after 30 June 1934. The court noted the Legislature deliberately chose a date (30 June 1934) earlier than the actual coming into force (31 October 1936) to identify the class of tenants who would be entitled to benefits under the 1936 amendment.
The court rejected the construction that Explanation (2) operates retrospectively to confer occupancy rights as from 30 June 1934 (or any earlier admission date). The court reasoned that the phrase "before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936" can only mean before 31 October 1936 — the date on which the Act commenced to operate — and it is impossible to say that a tenant obtained a right prior to the Act's commencement by relying on a provision that had not yet come into force.
The court observed that while Explanation (2) identifies which tenants are to be treated as falling within the class entitled to permanent rights of occupancy under the 1936 amendment, it does not state that those tenants are to be deemed to have acquired occupancy rights from 30 June 1934. Instead, the right of occupancy arises only from the date the Amending Act came into force (31 October 1936).
To elucidate statutory intent, the court referred back to prior legislation (Madras Act VIII of 1934), noting that the dates used in Explanation (2) and S. 8(5) have meaning in relation to that prior Act (S. 127(2) of Madras Act VIII of 1934 and its proviso). The proviso to S. 127(2) preceded and is the forerunner to S. 8(5) in the 1936 amendment, and it preserved the position of inamdars in whom kudiwaram interest had been declared or recognised by a final decree or order before 1 November 1933.
Accordingly, the court concluded that S. 8(5) was intended to allow inamdars who had obtained final decrees prior to 1 November 1933 to retain the rights thereby recognised, and that tenants could not be deemed to have acquired occupancy rights prior to the Amending Act's commencement by virtue of provisions contained in the Amending Act itself.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

The court's final disposition was that the second appeal is dismissed with costs payable to the first respondent (as stated in the opinion: "This second appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs of the first respondent.").

Direct consequences for the parties (as expressed in the opinion):

The tenants' defence that they had acquired occupancy rights prior to the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, was rejected insofar as it depended on a retrospective operation of Explanation (2) to S. 6(1) to vest rights earlier than the Act's commencement date.
The rights of the Inamdar which had ripened into a final decree or order before 1 November 1933 were held to be preserved by S. 8(5), and therefore the Inamdar's position as vindicated by the decree prevailed in this litigation.

The opinion expressly contrasts and resolves the conflict between two earlier judicial constructions (Demudu v. Pappayaraju and Korada Atchanna v. Jayanti Seetaramaswami), adopting the reasoning aligned with Demudu v. Pappayaraju and rejecting the retrospective-effect construction applied in Korada Atchanna v. Jayanti Seetaramaswami.

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Chukka Annam Naidu (Died) And Others v. Kolachala Apparao And Others.

(Delivered by the Chief Justice)

This second appeal originally came on before Panchapagesa Sastri, J., who referred it to a Division Bench in view of the conflict of decisions between Demudu v. Pappayaraju(1) and Korada Atchanna v. Jayanti Seetaramaswami(2).

This second appeal arises out of a suit for evicting certain tenants in occupation of lands in an agraharam which became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, which amended Clause (d) of S. 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, I of 1908. The only facts necessary for understanding the point which falls for decision are as follows: The first respondent's father an Inamdar obtained a decree for eviction in respect of the suit lands on 7th April 1933 and obtained delivery of them on 23rd May 1937. He let the lands to the defendants by a lease dated 22nd June 1933. The period of lease was one year ending 15th March 1934. The defendants, however, continued to remain in possession thereafter. In 1937 the Inamdar gave notice to quit and eventually filed the suit for eviction on 24th April 1944. The main defence of the tenants was that they had acquired occupancy rights under the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, and therefore the suit for eviction was not maintainable. Both the Courts decreed the suit and defendants 1 and 2 are the appellants.

The relevant statutory provisions which have a material bearing on the question to be decided are Ss. 6, Sub-S. (1), Explanations (1) and (2) and S. 8 Sub-S. (5) of the Madras Estates Land Act, I of 1908, as amended by Act XVIII of 1936, i.e, the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936. S. 6(1) declares that

“Subject to the provisions of this Act, every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding.”

Explanation (1) runs thus:

‘For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression ‘every ryot now in possession’ shall include every person who, having held land as a ryot, continues in possession of such land at the commencement of this Act.”

Ordinarily the word “now” in Sub-S. (1) and the words “at the commencement of this Act” must be taken to refer to the date of the passing of Madras Act I of 1908. Explanation (2) became necessary because by the provisions of the Madras Act XVIII of 1936 certain Inam villages, which did not fall within the definition of an estate originally contained in Madras Act I of 1908, became estates by virtue of the new provisions. It was necessary to provide for a different construction of the words “now” and “at the commencement of this Act” in relation to such inam villages. Explanation 2, therefore, declares that the expressions “now” and “commencement of this Act” in Sub-S. (2) and Explanation (1) shall be construed as meaning the 30th day of June 1934 and the expression “hereafter” in the sub-section shall be construed as meaning the period after the 30th day of June 1934. Madras Act XVIII of 1936 came into force on 31st October 1936. But for reasons which need not detain us now, the Legislature took a date prior to the date of the coming into force of that Act as the material date to denote the tenants in occupation of the lands in such villages, who would be entitled to permanent rights of occupancy.

It will be noticed that Sub-S. (1) of S. 6 commences with the words “subject to the provisions of this Act” and the provisions of S. 8(5) are to take effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Act. That sub-section provides that,

“If before the 1st day of November 1933, the landholder has obtained in respect of any land in a village which became an estate by virtue of Act XVIII of 1936, a final decree or order, of competent civil Court”

declaring that the tenant has no occupancy right in such land, the landholder shall, if the land is not private land, have the right for a period of 12 years from the commencement of Madras Act XVIII of 1936, i.e, from 31st October 1936, of admitting any person to the possession of such land on such terms as may be agreed upon between them, provided also that “no tenant has acquired any occupancy right in such land before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act 1936.”

It is this last condition that has given rise to a difference of opinion between Horwill, J., and Viswanatha Sastri, J. The construction which found favour with Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Korada Atchanna v. Jayanti Seetaramaswami, was that the landholder would not have the rights declared under that sub-section against tenants who were in possession or who might have been admitted in possession on or after the 30th day of June 1934 and before the 31st October 1936, i.e, the commencement of Madras Act XVIII of 1936. The reasoning of the learned Judge is that though the Amending Act came into force on 31st October 1936 and its operation commenced on that date, still, S. 6, Explanation (2) of that Act (sic) gives it retrospective operation from 30th June 1934, in respect of one important matter, namely, the accrual of occupancy rights. In the case before him, the tenant had been let into possession of the land on 26th June 1936. Speaking of such a tenant the learned Judge says,

“In the present case, it could not be said that the tenant had not acquired occupancy rights in the land before the commencement of the Amending Act XVIII of 1936, i.e, 31st October 1936, because Explanation (2) to S. 6 which, by express declaration, operates retrospectively from 30th June 1934, clothed him with a right of occupancy as from 26th June 1936, the date when he was admitted to possession by the landholder. The tenant, therefore, had acquired occupancy rights before the commencement of the Amending Act XVIII of 1936, as a result of the provision in that very enactment embodied as Explanation (2) to S. 6”.

With great respect to the learned Judge we are not in agreement with this construction of S. 8(5) or of Explanation (2) to S. 6(1). “Before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amemdment) Act, 1936” can mean only before 31st October 1936. It is impossible to give an earlier date, because that Act did not commence to have operation before that date. This much was also conceded by Mr. Dhikshatulu, the learned Counsel who appeared for the appellant before us. Now, the only question is whether before the date, i.e, before 31st October 1936, it could be said that a tenant has acquired any occupancy right, because he was in possession on and after 30th June 1936. The only provision under which it is contended that the tenant has acquired such right is a provision contained in that very Act which did not come into force till 31st October 1936. Therefore it follows that the tenant did not acquire any right prior to the commencement of that Act under a provision of that Act which did not exist at the time. In other words it cannot be held that on any date before the coming into force of Madras Act XVIII of 1936 he had acquired any occupany right by virtue of a provision in that Act which was to come into force. With due deference to the learned Judge Viswanatha Sastri, J., we think that it is wrong to assume that the effect of S. 6(1) Explanation (2) is to confer permanent occupancy rights on tenants as and from 30th June 1934 or such other later date when the tenant was admitted into possessession. There is nothing in Explanation (2) which says anything of the sort. It only lays down who are the tenants who would be entitled to the benefits of Madras Act XVIII of 1936. It helps us to ascertain the class of such tenants. They are ryots who were in possession on 30th June 1934 and ryots who had been admitted subsequently and continued in possession. This does not mean that they are deemed to have obtained rights of occupancy from 30th June 1934. They obtained such rights only from 31st October 1936. It follows therefore that such tenants cannot be deemed to be tenants who have acquired occupancy rights before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, within the meaning of S. 8(5) of the Act. Horwill, J., took practically the same view which we are taking in Demudu v. Pappayaraju, though the way in which he put his view is slightly different. The learned Judge observed:

“There seems to me no doubt when the Legislature spoke of the tenant acquiring occupancy right during the period between the passing of the final decree and the commencement of the Act they were referring to an acquisition of occupancy right otherwise than under the Act…………………The Legislature must have intended by this sub rule to except from the general operation of S. 6 all cases where the landholder had obtained a decree prior to the 1st November, 1933 unless the tenant subsequent to the passing of the final decree had acquired occupancy right independently of the Act.”

The dates which occur in S. 6(1) Explanation (2) and S. 8(5) have a meaning and significance in relation to a prior Act, namely, Madras Act VIII of 1934. 30th June 1934 happens to be the date on which that Act became law. S. 127(2) of that Act was as follows:

“No tenant in possession on the 1st day of November 1933, of any land in an inam village, not being an estate within the meaning of sub-clause [d] of clause [2] of S. 3 of the said Act as amended by this Act or admitted by the inamdar to possession of any such land subsequent to the said date, shall be liable to be ejected until the 1st day of November 1936 and all proceedings in ejectment of any such tenant and all proceedings involving a decision whether or not the inamdar has the kudivaram right in such land, shall be stayed until the 1st day of November 1936.”

The proviso to this sub-section is the forerunner to S. 8(5) which was inserted by Act XVIII of 1936. It runs thus,

“Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall apply to any land the kudiwaram interest in which has been declared or recognised before the 1st day of November 1933 to vest in the Inamdar by a decree or order of a competent Court which has become final.”

It is therefore clear that the rights of an Inamdar which had ripened into a final decree or order of a competent Court were intended to prevail, over the rights which the legislature was conferring for the first time on tenants of Inam villages which became estates by virtue of Madras Act XVIII of 1936. S. 8(5) declared definitely what the rights of such inamdars were.

This second appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs of the first respondent.

N.R.R

Chukka Annam Naidu (Died) And Others v. Kolachala Apparao And Others.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents (Tenants)

Appellant (Inamdar) / Appellant's Counsel

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Chukka Annam Naidu (Died) And Others v. Kolachala Apparao And Others.

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