AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Art. 144 & Section 6 of the Limitation Act, that Art. 44
  • Contract Act. Amirthalinga v. Arumuga, 28 MLW 634
  • Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Sections 19 & 21 of the Limitation Act,
  • Sections 86, 94 & 96 of the Trusts Act).
  • guardian.4. Art. 44, Limitation Act,
  • SECTION 21 LIMITATION ACT
  • SECTION 28 LIMITATION ACT
  • Art. 126 or 144, Limitation Act.
  • 3 of Art. 44, Limitation Act.
  • 313), Art. 44, Limitation Act,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 60(e) of the CPC,
  • Art. 144, Limitation Act.
  • Art. 44, Limitation Act,
  • Art. 91, Limitation Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Art. 144 & Section 6 of the Limitation Act, that Art. 44
  • Contract Act. Amirthalinga v. Arumuga, 28 MLW 634
  • Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Sections 19 & 21 of the Limitation Act,
  • Sections 86, 94 & 96 of the Trusts Act).
  • guardian.4. Art. 44, Limitation Act,
  • SECTION 21 LIMITATION ACT
  • SECTION 28 LIMITATION ACT
  • Art. 126 or 144, Limitation Act.
  • 3 of Art. 44, Limitation Act.
  • 313), Art. 44, Limitation Act,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 60(e) of the CPC,
  • Art. 144, Limitation Act.
  • Art. 44, Limitation Act,
  • Art. 91, Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal was preferred by defendant 1 against a decree for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage (Ex. P.1) dated 8-2-1922. The mortgage had been executed in 1922 by the mother and guardian of defendant 2, who was then a minor, in favour of Vyapuri (the paternal divided uncle of the minor). Vyapuri later assigned that interest and, professing to act as guardian of his minor nephew (defendant 2), executed a mortgage (Ex. D.5 dated 22-8-1927) and subsequently sold the property to defendant 1 under Ex. D.6 dated 7-6-1939 in discharge of prior mortgages and for a small cash payment. The minor (defendant 2) attained majority in 1939 and then sold the same property to the plaintiff (Vyapuri's son) under Ex. P.5 dated 10-5-1943, notwithstanding the earlier alienation by Vyapuri (Ex. D.6). The plaintiff filed the present suit for redemption of the mortgage (Ex. P.1) on 7-2-1944; the courts below decreed the suit. Defendant 1, the purchaser from Vyapuri, brought this second appeal challenging that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Article 44 of the Limitation Act applies to transfers of a Hindu minor's property effected by a person described as a "de facto" guardian (i.e., whether the word "guardian" in Article 44 includes a "de facto" guardian/manager).
  2. Whether a sale or mortgage by a "de facto" guardian is to be treated as void or merely voidable at the instance of the minor, and which limitation periods (Article 44 v. Articles 126/144/142) govern suits to set aside or recover property.
  3. Whether a sale by an ex-minor (after attaining majority) of property previously alienated by his "de facto" guardian transfers only a mere right to sue (which Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act would prohibit) or transfers the property/interest itself so as to enable the transferee to sue for recovery of possession.
  4. Whether a transferee from the ex-minor can maintain a suit to recover possession or redemption where the prior alienation by the "de facto" guardian is challenged.
  5. Whether, on the facts, plaintiff should be awarded costs given the family connections and suspicion of concerted action among ward, the "de facto" guardian and the plaintiff.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant 1) Arguments

  • Appellant's counsel (Mr. Venkatadri) contended that Ex. D.6 (the sale by Vyapuri as "de facto" guardian) was not void but merely voidable; therefore Article 44 of the Limitation Act applies to transfers by a "de facto" guardian.
  • Relying on Article 44, appellant argued the minor (defendant 2) had a three-year period after attaining majority within which to set aside the sale; as that period expired without effective action, the sale to the plaintiff should be treated as valid and the mortgage (Ex. P.1) extinguished by the sale.
  • Appellant further argued that a subsequent sale by the ex-minor to the plaintiff should be assessed like transfers by a de jure guardian and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot now sue for recovery or redemption.

Respondent / Position Adopted by Courts Below

  • The courts below held that the mortgage Ex. D.5 (22-8-1927) and the sale Ex. D.6 (7-6-1939) executed by Vyapuri as the "de facto" guardian were neither supported by necessity nor beneficial to the minor and therefore were not binding on him.
  • The plaintiff (who purchased from the ex-minor) successfully sued for redemption of Ex. P.1; the lower courts decreed the suit, and the appellant's attack on that finding failed on second appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hanooman Prasad v. Mt. Babooee Munraj (6 MIA 393 : 1 Sar 552 P.C.) Identified as the usual starting point for discussions on de facto guardianship in Hindu-law contexts. Referred to as historical starting authority; court declined further inquiry into textual origin but acknowledged its place in the literature.
Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya (1949 FLJ 288 : AIR (36) 1949 FC 218) Reviewed entire case-law and treated dealings by a de facto guardian as voidable (not void) at the instance of the minor, with same tests as for a de jure guardian. Cited as a leading Federal Court decision recognizing limited validity (voidable) of de facto guardian transfers; court noted it but distinguished statutory interpretation of Art.44.
Bapayya v. Pundarikakshayya (1949 FLJ 318 : AIR (36) 1949 FC 218) Part of the Federal Court's review on de facto guardians; supports view of de facto dealings being voidable under certain tests. Used with Sriramulu to show the judicial development that treats de facto guardian transfers as voidable, though court examined applicability of Article 44 separately.
Ramiah v. Brahmaiah (59 MLJ 196 : AIR (17) 1930 Mad 821) Viewed (in a prior judgment) that Art.44 might be illustrative of combined effect of Art.144 & Section 6; some judges held Art.44 controlled by S.6. Court disagreed with that view and preferred other authorities; cited as part of the debate on interpretation of Art.44.
Doraisami v. Nondisami (38 Mad 118 : AIR (2) 1915 Mad 1201) Earlier decisions considered whether Art.44 was controlled by broader principles or was a distinct specific article; divergent judicial opinions noted. Quoted to show conflicting views; court preferred Sundara Ayyar J.'s view from Doraisami that Art.44 is specific and not to be replaced by Art.144 or S.6 analysis.
Ankamma v. Kameswaramma (68 MLJ 87 : AIR (22) 1935 Mad 1) Supported Sundara Ayyar J.'s view on the distinctness of Art.44. Cited as supporting authority for confining Art.44 to guardians properly so called.
Latchiah v. Mukkalinga (30 Mad 393 : 17 MLJ 220) Decision supporting the proposition that Art.44 governs suits to set aside guardian's improper alienation (short period). Included among several Madras decisions adopting the view that Art.44 applies to guardian alienations and prescribes a short period.
Sivavadivelu v. Ponnammal (22 MLJ 404) Another Madras decision addressing limitation and guardian alienations. Listed among authorities upholding that Art.44 limits actions to three years against guardian alienations.
Satyalakshmi v. Jagannadham (34 MLJ 229 : AIR (5) 1918 Mad 487) Madras decision on limitation and guardian alienation principles. Referred to as part of the body of decisions that treat guardian alienations as requiring suit within Art.44.
Arumugam Pillai v. Panayadian Ambalam (40 MLJ 475 : AIR (8) 1921 Mad 425) Decision dealing with recovery and limitation where there is an apparent title under an instrument. Cited among decisions that apply Art.44 to guardian alienations where displacement of apparent title is necessary.
Ramaswami v. Govindammal (56 MLJ 332 : AIR (16) 1929 Mad 313) Decision applying Art.44 to suits by transferees from ex-minors in certain circumstances. Noted by the court as one authority which applied Art.44 to a transferee's suit; the present court said it would be bound by that view if necessary when sitting singly, but found decision unnecessary here.
Muthukumara Chetty v. Anthony Udayar (38 Mad 867 : AIR (2) 1915 Mad 296) Discussed whether unilateral repudiation by minor suffices or judicial rescission is required for voidable transactions. Cited for the passage on repudiation; the court distinguished facts and emphasized that right to avoid may be annexed to ownership, not a mere personal privilege.
Kandaswami v. Jrusappa (41 Mad 102 : AIR (5) 1918 Mad 724) Another Madras decision on guardian alienations and limitation. Mentioned among several decisions supporting short limitation for guardian alienations.
Doraiswami v. Thangavelu (AIR (16) 1929 Mad 668 : 119 IC 38) Decision on guardian alienations and limitation principles. Included in the list of supporting decisions for the Art.44 approach to guardian alienations.
Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna (44 Bom 742 : AIR (7) 1920 Bom 1 FB) Bombay decision concerning limitation and guardian/manager alienations. Listed among supporting authorities for limiting time to set aside guardian alienations.
Chennappa v. Onkarappa (ILR (1940) Mad 358 : AIR (27) 1940 Mad 33 FB) Discusses natural guardians under various laws and whether de facto guardian is recognized for certain statutory purposes (Limitation Act Sections). Cited to show that a de facto guardian is not a lawful guardian for purposes of Sections 19 & 21 of the Limitation Act; used to support narrower reading of "guardian" in Art.44.
Matadin v. Ahmad Ali (34 All 213 : 39 IA 49 PC) Judicial Committee observation that describing an unauthorised manager as a "de facto guardian" does not improve his legal position. Quoted to support the proposition that a de facto guardian is not a guardian in law and to caution against treating the term as importing legal status for statutory interpretation.
Tulsidas v. Vaghela Rai Singji (57 Bom 40 : AIR (20) 1933 Bom 15 FB) Held that a "de facto" guardian was no guardian at all but a mere intermeddler. Used to illustrate judicial reluctance to treat de facto managers as lawful guardians for statutory purposes.
Seetharamanna v. Appiah (49 Mad 768 : AIR (13) 1926 Mad 457) Recognised the de facto guardian's power in cases of necessity or benefit to charge, mortgage or sell the minor's property under Hindu law. Cited as part of the line of Hindu-law decisions that gave limited recognition to de facto guardians' powers in necessity/benefit cases.
Sankaranarayanan Aiyar v. Poovananthaswami Temple (1949-2 MLJ 171 : AIR (36) 1949 Mad 721 FB) Discusses acts constituting management of a minor's estate and status as de facto guardian. Referenced to underline the difficulty of precise definition of de facto guardianship and the variety of acts that may be relevant.
Chinna Alagaperumal v. Vinayakathammal (55 MLJ 861 : AIR (16) 1929 Mad 110) Discussed uncertainty in defining de facto guardianship; treated an alienation by a de facto guardian not justified by necessity or benefit as void in parts of the judgment. Cited to show inconsistent past treatment; court noted parts where de facto guardian alienation was treated as void and other parts calling it voidable.
Thayammal v. Kuppanna (38 Mad 1125 : AIR (2) 1915 Mad 659) Held that Art.44 did not govern suits by a quondam minor for recovery of possession of property alienated by a de facto guardian. Included among earlier decisions adopting the view that Art.44 did not apply to de facto guardian alienations.
Ramaswami v. Kasinatha (AIR (15) 1928 Mad 226 : 108 IC 529) One of the decisions holding Art.44 not to govern suits by ex-minors in respect of de facto guardian alienations. Listed among precedents supporting the non-application of Art.44 to de facto guardian alienations.
Purushothama v. Brundavaha (33 MLW 664 : AIR (18) 1931 Mad 597) Decision of the court taking the view Art.44 did not govern de facto guardian alienations. Counted with other decisions which the present court considered in evaluating the scope of Art.44.
Sundara Nadan v. Annammal (60 MLJ 695 : AIR (18) 1931 Mad 529) Held an alienation by a de facto guardian of a Christian minor not governed by Art.44. Cited for the proposition that Art.44's reach may not extend to de facto guardian acts in other communities.
Kaveripakkam Bangarammal v. Lydia Kent (57 Mad 1062 : AIR (21) 1934 Mad 605) Case cited by appellant's counsel in support of applying the same tests to de facto and de jure guardians. Referred to as part of appellant's supporting authorities; court considered but did not accept appellant's broad application of Art.44 to de facto guardians.
Adeyya v. Govindu (58 MLJ 417 : AIR (18) 1931 Mad 274) Authority relied on by appellant to support parity between de facto and de jure guardian transfers. Noted as cited by appellant; the bench expressed respectful inability to accept the reasoning of that particular judge in support of appellant's view.
Laxmana v. Rachappa (42 Bom 626 : AIR (5) 1918 Bom 180) Authority cited for view that transferee from ex-minor may be in same position as transferor regarding remedies. Cited among decisions that (without full discussion) recognised a transferee's right to sue against prior guardian alienation.
Mon Mohan v. Bidhu Bushan (AIR (26) 1939 Cal 460 : 185 IC 6) Decision holding the sale of minor's property by his natural guardian involved only a mere right to sue which could not be validly transferred (argument relied on by parties). Examined critically; the present court dissentingly rejected the conclusion that a transferee receives only a mere right to sue and held instead that the transfer by the ex-minor conveyed the property/interest.
Jhavar Bhai Hathi Bhai v. Kabhai Becher (34 Bom LR 151 : AIR (20) 1933 Bom 42) Authority relied on in support of view that right to avoid guardian's act is a mere personal privilege. Considered but not accepted as a correct statement of law for the present court's purposes.
Narasinga Charya v. Tulsa Bai (27 Bom LR 483 : AIR (12) 1925 Bom 320) Earlier Bombay decision that until an unauthorised sale by guardian was set aside by the minor, he had no transferable interest in the property. Distinguished and disagreed with by the present court which held the transfer by ex-minor conveyed property, not merely a right to sue.
Hanumanthappa v. Dundappa (AIR (21) 1934 Bom 234 : 151 IC 1043) Bombay case holding a minor's transferee could have a right to avoid manager's alienation and recover the transferee's transferor's interest. Relied upon as showing the transferee can sue to avoid prior manager's alienation; the present court treated this view as consistent with its own conclusion.
Iburamsa Rowthen v. Thiruvenkatasami Naick (34 Mad 269 : 7 IC 559) Implicit recognition that transferee may have recourse to avoid prior unauthorized alienation. Referred to as implicit support for transferee's right to sue.
Janaki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh (15 Cal 58 : 14 IA 148 PC) Discussed need for judicial rescission in suits under Art.91 for avoidance of deeds. Used to illustrate situations where judicial rescission has been held necessary; compared with requisites for avoiding guardian alienations.
Someswar Dutt v. Tribhavan Dutt (67 MLJ 7 : AIR (21) 1934 PC 130) Principles on judicial rescission for avoidance of deeds discussed in connection with Art.91. Referred to in argument about whether judicial rescission is necessary to restore title.
Satgurprasad v. Harnarain Das (62 MLJ 451 : AIR (19) 1932 PC 89) Judicial Committee on setting aside conveyances obtained by fraud/undue influence: conveyance is not merely voidable but must be formally set aside. Quoted to show that, in some contexts, a deed is a conveyance that must be formally set aside to restore title; used in considering effect of rescission.
Ramcoomar v. Chunder Canto (4 IA 23 : 2 Cal 233 PC) Early JC decision that English doctrines of champerty & maintenance were not imported as specific laws into India. Used in discussion of assignment of rights of action and how Indian law treats transferability of certain actionable claims.
Achalram v. Kazim Hussain (27 All 271 : 32 IA 113 PC) Early authority on transferability/assignment and related equitable doctrines. Cited in discussion on assignability of actionable claims under Indian law.
Bhagwat Dayal v. Debi Dayal (35 Cal 420 : 35 IA 48 PC) Another precedent indicating English rules on champerty/maintenance were not strictly adopted in India. Used to support the proposition that Indian law recognises assignment of certain actionable claims.
Glegg v. Bromley ((1912) 3 KB 474 : 81 LJKB 1081) English Court of Appeal exposition on assignment of choses in action and exceptions (bare right to action) on public policy grounds. Quoted at length to explain the equity view on assignability and to justify the court's view that the ward's right to recover property is not a mere bare right of action.
Venkatasubhadrayyamma v. Venkatapati (52 IA 1 : AIR (11) 1924 PC 162) Judicial Committee acceptance of relaxation in English approach to assignability of choses in action. Referenced in support of Indian courts' approach permitting transfer of certain actionable claims or interests tied to property.
Hanumant v. Ramappa (49 Bom 309 : AIR (12) 1925 Bom 292) Dealings with applicability of Art.44 to suits by transferees from the ward; raised difficulty of fitting transferee suits into Art.44 language. Cited as a case pointing to difficulty; the present court noted it but said no decision on Section 6(e) was made there.
Muthukumarachetty v. Anthony Udayar (38 Mad 867 : AIR (2) 1915 Mad 296) Discusses the nature of repudiation and whether avoidance requires suit; passage cited on unilateral repudiation vs. judicial rescission. Used to show the judicial ambivalence and earlier position that repudiation might be sufficient in some contexts; court clarified its position relative to ownership and transferees.
Bijoy Gopal v. Krishna Mahishi (34 Cal 329 : 34 IA 87 PC) Case regarding improper alienation by a Hindu widow and the rights of the reversioner to treat the transfer as void and sue for possession. Cited to illustrate the nuanced sense in which "voidable" may operate as "void" for certain persons (reversioner/minor) and to distinguish those situations from guardian transfers under Art.44.
Amba v. Shrinivas Kamati (26 CWN 369 : AIR (9) 1922 PC 135) For registration-act purposes a de facto guardian is not on same footing as natural/certificated guardian. Referred to in support of the proposition that de facto guardian is not equivalent to lawful guardian under statutory schemes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured analysis focused on statutory interpretation of Article 44 of the Limitation Act and the legal status of a "de facto" guardian. The reasoning can be summarized in the following steps:

  1. Distinction between legal guardian and "de facto" manager: The court emphasised that the expression "de facto guardian" is a loose phrase meaning a person who manages the minor's estate in fact but without legal authority. The term denotes factual position, not legal status. Kania C.J.'s observation in Sri Ramulu v. Pundarikakshayya and other authorities were relied on to show that "de facto" persons are not guardians in law.
  2. Purpose and scope of Article 44: Article 44 prescribes a short three-year period after majority for challenging improper alienations made by a guardian. The court held Art.44 is drastic and must be strictly construed; it should be confined to transfers by guardians properly so called — natural, testamentary or certificated (court-appointed) guardians — because it presupposes a legal relationship between guardian and ward.
  3. Inapplicability of Article 44 to "de facto" managers: Given the lack of jural relationship inherent in "de facto" management, the court concluded that the word "guardian" in Art.44 should not be stretched to include de facto managers. For statutory purposes, a "de facto" manager is not a guardian and therefore transfers by such a manager are not governed by Art.44.
  4. Consequent applicable limitation periods: If a transfer is by a de facto manager and not a lawful guardian, suits to recover possession are governed by the longer limitation periods (e.g., 12 years under Articles 142 or 144), or other residuary articles, rather than the short three-year period of Art.44 that applies to lawful guardians' transfers.
  5. Nature of de facto guardian transfers under Hindu law distinguished from statutory treatment: The court acknowledged that under Hindu law courts have recognised, on principle of necessity or benefit, limited validity (voidable) of de facto guardian dealings. But statutory interpretation of Art.44 (which applies across communities) requires a narrower meaning of "guardian" for purposes of limitation law.
  6. Transfer by ex-minor and Section 6(e) Transfer of Property Act issue: The court analysed whether a sale by the ex-minor (after majority) of property previously alienated by a de facto guardian was merely a transfer of a right to sue (prohibited by Section 6(e) TPA) or conveyed the property/interest itself. The court held that the sale by the ex-minor conveyed the property/interest — not merely a bare right to sue — and that the transferee could sue to recover the property. The court criticised decisions to the contrary (e.g., Mon Mohan v. Bidhu Bushan) and concluded that the right to obtain reconveyance or recovery is a valuable proprietary right capable of transfer.
  7. Interpretation of prior authorities and reconciling conflicting decisions: The court carefully reviewed a large body of Madras, Bombay and Privy Council precedents, noting inconsistencies. It preferred the view that (i) lawful guardians' improper alienations are subject to Art.44, (ii) de facto manager alienations are not within Art.44, and (iii) a transferee from an ex-minor may acquire an interest enabling suit to recover property (rather than merely a right to sue incapable of transfer).
  8. Application to the facts: On the facts, the courts below had found Vyapuri's mortgage (Ex. D.5) and sale (Ex. D.6) as de facto guardian were neither by necessity nor for the benefit of the minor and so were not binding. The present court found no successful challenge to those findings on second appeal and agreed with the outcome reached below.
  9. Disposition on costs: Noting that the plaintiff was the son of the de facto guardian and that there was "more than a suspicion" of concerted action to deprive defendant 1 of the fruits of his purchase, the court disallowed the plaintiff his costs throughout despite dismissing the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The court held that the word "guardian" in Article 44 of the Limitation Act refers to lawful or "de jure" guardians (natural, testamentary or certificated) and does not include a "de facto" manager of a Hindu minor's property for purposes of Article 44. Consequently, Article 44's short three-year limitation period does not apply to transfers made by a de facto manager/guardian.
  • Transfers or sales by a de facto manager that are not justified by necessity or benefit are not binding on the minor and are subject to the longer limitation rules (e.g., Articles 142/144) applicable to suits for recovery of possession; they need not be set aside within Article 44's three-year period.
  • The court held that a sale by an ex-minor (after attaining majority) of property previously alienated by his de facto guardian conveys the property/interest (not merely a bare right to sue) and that a transferee from the ex-minor can sue to recover possession or to set aside the prior improper alienation.
  • On the facts, the decree for redemption in favour of the plaintiff (son of the de facto guardian) was sustained; however, the plaintiff's costs were disallowed because of suspicion of collusion between the ward, the de facto guardian and the plaintiff.
  • The judgment clarifies a statutory-interpretation point (narrow reading of "guardian" in Art.44) and reconciles it with the separate line of Hindu-law decisions recognising limited de facto guardian powers; the court confined Article 44 to lawful guardians even while acknowledging the judicially-evolved Hindu-law position on de facto guardians.

Order: Appeal dismissed. Plaintiff's costs disallowed. No leave to appeal further recorded in the body of the opinion.

C.R.K/D.H

    Palaniappa Goundan Applt. v. Nallappa Goundan And Others Resps

    1. This second appeal has been preferred by deft. 1 against a decree for redemption of a usufructuary mtge., Ex. P. 1, dated 8-2-1922, executed by the mother & guardian of deft. 2 then a minor, in favour of Vyapuri, the divided paternal uncle of the minor & assigned by Vyapuri to deft. 1 under Ex. D.3, dated 22-8-1927. The property mortgaged belonged to the minor deft. 2 as sole owner & was managed on his behalf by his mother who died shortly after the execution of the mtge. Ex. P. 1, in 1922. Thereafter, “Vyapuri, the divided uncle, professing to act as guardian of his minor nephew, deft. 2 mortgaged the property under Ex. D.5, dated 22-8-1927, & subsequently sold it to deft. 1 under Ex. D.6 dated 7-6-1939 in discharge of the prior mtges. & in consideration of a small cash payment. Deft. 2 attained majority some time later in 1939 & he sold the same property to the pltf. the son of Vyapuri, under Ex. P. 5, dated 10-5-1943, ignoring the previous alienation by Vyapuri under Ex. D.6 On 7-2-1944, the pltf. filed the present suit for redemption of the mtge. Ex. P. 1, & the suit has been decreed by the Cts below. Hence this second appeal by deft. 1 the disappointed purchaser from Vyapuri.

    2. The Cts. below held that the mtge. Ex. D.5, dated 22-8-1927 & the sale, Ex. D.6, dated 7-6-1939, executed by Vyapuri as the ‘de facto’ guardian of the minor deft. 2 were neither supported by necessity nor beneficial to the minor deft. 2 & therefore not binding on him. Mr. Venkatadri, the learned advocate for the applt., could not successfully challenge this finding on second appeal. His legal contention is that Ex. D.6, the sale by Vyapuri as ‘de facto’ guardian of the minor, was not void but merely voidable & as it had not been set aside by deft. 2 within three years of his attainment of majority, it was not open to his purchaser, the pltf. to sue for recovery of possession of the property, or for redemption of the mtge., Ex. P. 1, which had become extinguished as a result of the sale, Ex. D.6, dated 7-6-1939. In other words, he argues that Art. 44, Limitation Act, applies to transfers of the property of a Hindu minor effected by his ‘de facto’ guardian. The expression ‘de facto’ guardian, however unscientific & inappropriate from the point of view of an orthodox jurist, has become part of the vocabulary of lawyers & judges. It is now a settled rule of Hindu law that a sale or a mtge. of a Hindu minor's property on his ‘de facto’ guardian is effective to convey a valid title to the transferee if the latter establishes the transfer was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the minor or that he took the sale or mtge. after proper enquiries & with a ‘bona fide’ belief in the existence of pressing necessity. It is needless at this time of the day to enquire into the textual origin of this rule or to investigate whether it has any real foundation in ‘Hanooman Prasad v. Mt. Babooee Munraj’, 6 MIA 393 : (1 Sar 552 P.C), which is the usual starting point of discussions on this topic. The whole subject has been exhaustively & authoritatively dealt with & the entire case-law has been reviewed in the judgments of the P.C (now the S.C) reported in ‘Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya’, (1949) FLJ 288 : (AIR (36) 1949 FC 218) & ‘Bapayya v. Pundarikakshayya’, (1949) FLJ 318 : (AIR (36) 1949 FC 218). Suffice it to say that, in the opinion of the learned Judges of the F.C, the dealing of a ‘de facto’ guardian with the estate of a Hindu minor by way of sale or mtge. would be regarded not as void altogether but voidable at the instance of the minor, & the same tests would have to be applied to determine the validity of such sale or mtge. as are applied in the case of a ‘de jure’ guardian's sale or mtge. We are, however, concerned in this case with the interpretation of Art. 44, Limitation Act, though the rules of Hindu Law may also have a bearing on the point.

    3. If there is a trespass on a minor's property, he has 12 years from the date of dispossession or three years after attaining majoriy, whichever is the longer period, to sue for recovery of possession under Art. 142. If the father in a joint Hindu family alienates the interest of his minor son in the family property or the manager alienates the interest of a minor coparcener, the coparcener aggrieved by the alienation can sue to set it aside within 12 years from the date when the alienee takes possession of the property or three years after attaining majority, whichever period is longer, under Art. 126 or 144, Limitation Act. If, however, a guardian transfers his ward's property for purposes not binding on the minor or on a gross undervalue, the minor has only three years after attaining majority for setting aside the alienation under Art. 44, Limitation Act. If an improper alienation of the ward's property is made by a guardian, say, a year before the ward attains majority, the ward will not have 12 years from the date of the alienation but only four years therefrom, within which time he must sue to set aside the alienation. The alienation is only voidable & requires to be set aside by the ward before he could recover possession of the property. He cannot disaffirm it by a mere notice of his intention to repudiate but must sue and obtain a judicial rescission of the sale, by his guardian within the time prescribed by Art. 44. His right to recover possession of the property improperly alienated by his guardian will be lost & his title thereto will be extinguished under Section 28 of the Limitation Act, on the expiry of the three years' period prescribed by Art. 44, if he does not sue to set aside the alienation within that period. The view of Venkatasubba Rao J. in ‘Ramiah v. Brahmaiah’, 59 MLJ 196 at p. 198: (AIR (17) 1930 Mad 821); & of Abdur Rahim & Sadasiva Ayyar JJ. in ‘Doraisami v. Nondisami’, 38 Mad 118 : (AIR (2) 1915 Mad 1201) that Art. 44 is merely an illustration of the combined effect of Art. 144 & Section 6 of the Limitation Act, that Art. 44 is controlled by the principle of S. 6 & that even if Art. 44 had not been there, the result would be the same, seems to me, with all respect, unsustainable, & I would prefer the view of Sundara Ayyar J. in ‘Doraisami v. Nondisami’, 38 Mad 118 : (AIR (2) 1915 Mad 1201) & Varadachariar J. in ‘Ankamma v. Kameswaramma’, 68 MLJ 87 : (AIR (22) 1935 Mad 1). Art. 144 is a residuary article & cannot be resorted to, if a specific article like Art. 44 is applicable to a suit. The Limitation Act itself recognises the distinction between void & voidable transactions & provides a shorter period of limitation for remedies in respect of the latter (see, for example, Arts. 12 & 91). These articles would be applicable, even if the suit is one for possession of immoveable property, if the pltf. cannot succeed without displacing an apparent title under a Court-sale or an instrument by virtue of which the deft, is in possession. Art. 44 cannot be evaded by omitting to sue for setting aside a transfer by the guardian & by professing to sue for possession or redemption. Numerous decisions of this & the other H. Cs have taken this view (see ‘Latchiah v. Mukkalinga’, 30 Mad 393 : (17 MLJ 220); ‘Sivavadivelu v. Ponnammal’, 22 MLJ 404; ‘Satyalakshmi v. Jagannadham’, 34 MLJ 229 : (AIR (5) 1918 Mad 487); ‘Arumugam Pillai v. Panayadian Ambalam’, 40 MLJ 475 : (AIR (8) 1921 Mad 425); ‘Ramaswami v. Govindammal’, 56 MLJ 332 : (AIR (16) 1929 Mad 313); ‘Muthukumara Chetty v. Anthony Udayar’, 38 Mad 867 : (AIR (2) 1915 Mad 296); ‘Kandaswami v. Jrusappa’, 41 Mad 102 : (AIR (5) 1918 Mad 724); ‘Doraiswami v. Thangavelu’, AIR (16) 1929 Mad 668 : (119 IC 38); ‘Ankamma v. Kameswaramma’ 68 MLJ 87 : (AIR (22) 1935 Mad 1) & ‘Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna’, 44 Bom 742 : (AIR (7) 1920 Bom 1 FB). The law regards a dealing, with the minor's estate by his legal guardian as, in effect, an act of the minor himself through his guardian & prescribes a short period of three years after attainment of majority for setting aside an improper alienation by the guardian. As Art. 44 is drastic in its operation it should be strictly construed & confined in its application to cases properly falling within its scope, i.e, to transfers of a minor's property by his legal guardian.

    4. Art. 44, Limitation Act, does not differentiate between guardians & wards belonging to different, communities. It does not lay down any special, rule with reference to Hindu minors. At the same time, the personal law of the parties determines who the natural guardians of a minor are. The question is whether it is permissible to read, the word ‘guardian’ in Art. 44 so as to include a person who is loosely styled a de factor guardian & who is not known to the law applicable to Mohamadans & Christians, but who has gained a limited recognition amongst Hindus as a result, of judge-made law. In my opinion, the word ‘guardian’ in Art. 44 should be interpreted as referring, only to guardians properly so called or legal guardians, that is to say, natural & testamentary guardians & guardians appointed by Ct. The expression ‘de facto’ means the position in fact, & not in law. Therefore, a ‘de facto’ guardian is not a guardian in law. Kania C.J in ‘Sri Ramulu v. Pundarikakshayya’, (1949) FLJ 288 at p. 292: (AIR (36) 1949 FC 218), observed:

    “In law, there is nothing like a ‘de facto guardian’. There can only be a ‘de facto’ manager, although the expression ‘de facto’ guardian has been) used in text-books & some judgments of courts. If that description is adopted (& I consider it to) be a correct description of a person generally managing the estate of a minor without having any legal title to do so) the powers of a natural guardian are not brought into consideration in defining the position of such a manager.”

    Mahajan, J. also remarked that the expression de facto guardian’ was a loose phrase & the words ‘de facto manager’ used in ‘Hanuman Prasad's case’, 6 MIA 393 : (1 Sar 552 P.C), would be more appropriate to denote the position of a person who assumes the management of a minor's estate without legal warrant.

    5. Most systems of law recognise a guardianship; by nature or nurture. Under the Mohammadan law, the father, & under the Hindu law, the father, &, in his absence, the mother, but no others, are the natural guardians of a minor (see ‘Chennappa v. Onkarappa’, ILR (1940) Mad 358 : (AIR (27) 1940 Mad 33 FB). The Guardians & Wards Act makes provision for the appointment of a guardian for a minor, to whichever community he may belong. In these cases, the status of a guardian & the consequential right to Seal with the property of a minor arise from the legal relationship between the parties, or the order of Ct. Ties of natural affection or the vigilance of the Ct. as the case may be, would be a sufficient safeguard against an improper alienation of the Restate of a minor by his natural or certificated guardian; &, on this basis, a shorter period of limitation for questioning their alienations as provided in Art. 44, Limitation Act, is intelligible, but a ‘de facto’ guardian is a creature improvised by judicial decisions out of the necessities of the situation & in the interests of the minor's estate. His powers of alienation may be analogous to those of a natural, guardian but he is not a guardian properly so called. In ‘Matadin v. Ahmad Ali’, 34 All 213: 39 IA 49 P.C), the Judicial Committee observed:

    “It is difficult to see how the situation of an unauthorised guardian is bettered by describing him as a ‘de facto’ guardian.”

    The case related to a Mahomedan minor. With respect to Hindus, Beaumont C.J, in ‘Tulsidas v. Vaghela Rai Singji’, 57 Bom 40 : (AIR (20) 1933 Bom 15 FB) held that a so called ‘de facto’ guardian was no guardian at all but was a mere inter-meddler. Kumaraswami Sastri, J. in ‘Ramaswami v. Kasinatha’, AIR (15) 1928 Mad 226 : (108 IC 529) was inclined to accept the description of the position of a ‘de facto guardian’ in ‘Matadin v. Ahmad Ali’, 34 All 213 : (39 IA 49 PC) as equally applicable to Hindus. It is only as the result of a long course of decisions & on the principle of ‘stare decisis' that a ‘de facto’ guardian's power in case of in necessity or benefit to the minor, to charge, mtgee. or sell the minor's property has been recognised under the Hindu Law (see ‘Seetharamanna v. Appiah’, 49 Mad 768 : (AIR (13) 1926 Mad 457) & ‘Sri Ramulu v. Pundarikakshayya’, (1949) FLJ 288 : (AIR (36) 1949 FC 218). But this is not to say that a ‘de facto guardian’ is a ‘guardian’ for all purposes or a guardian within the contemplation of a statute-law which applies to all communities.

    6. The expression ‘de facto guardian’ is further not capable of a precise definition. It is not possible to say precisely what conditions & circumstances must exist before a person can be described as a ‘de facto guardian’ (see ‘Chinna Alagaperumal v. Vinayakathammal’, 55 MLJ 861 : (AIR (16) 1929 Mad 110). It was observed by Mahajan J. in ‘Bapayya v. Pundarikakshayya’, 1949 FLJ 318 at p. 337: (AIR (36) 1949 FC 218) that

    “a person who is not attached to the minor by ties of affection or other reasons of affinity & remains in charge of his estate is, in truth, a mere intermeddler with his estate.”

    as distinguished from a relation of a minor who assumes management of his estate in his interests, who alone could, according to the learned Judge, be properly described as a ‘de facto’ guardian. In the case of natural guardians, the law ascribes the guardianship to a definite & intimate natural & legal relationship existing between the guardian & ward. Is it to be said that precisely the same status can be acquired on the basis of any remote relationship? The existence of any particular degree or kind of relationship between the ‘de facto’ guardian & the minor is not required as an indispensable legal requisite of ‘de facto’ guardianship. Nor is it practicable to embark upon an enquiry into the motives actuating the ‘de facto’ guardian in assuming the management of the minor's estate, whether it was the protection of the minor's estate or a less laudable purpose. In many cases it would be difficult to say as to whether a person who posed as a guardian in respect of a particular transaction affecting the minor's estate was a guardian ad hoc, or a guardian ‘de facto’. It is not possible to fix any period of time during which a person must have managed a minor's estate before he can be recognised as ‘de facto’ guardian or manager. Nor is it possible to formulate any precise course of conduct in reference to the management of the minor's estate as being necessary to create a ‘de facto’ guardianship. The leasing out of the properties of the minor, the collection of rents & profits the payment of Govt. revenue, the maintenance of the minor, the discharge of debts binding on the estate & similar acts spread over a substantial period of time might constitute the manager of the minor's estate a ‘de facto’ guardian. (Compare ‘Sankaranarayanan Aiyar v. Poovananthaswami Temple’, (1949)-2 MLJ 171 at p. 187: (AIR (36) 1949 Mad 721 FB). But no definite rule can be laid down as to what acts constitute or are insufficient to constitute ‘de facto’ guardianship. I am referring to the difficulties that may arise in applying Art. 44, Limitation Act, to transfers by ‘de facto’ guardians, whose status as such depends on so many uncertain & debatable factors & is incapable of verification or ascertainment of reference either to natural relationship or an order of appointment by Ct.

    7. Whatever be the degree of recognition accorded to ‘de facto’ guardians of Hindu minors by the decisions, the Limitation Act has not placed the ‘de facto’ guardian on the same footing as a natural or certificated guardian. A ‘de facto’ guardian has no authority to acknowledge a debt on behalf of a minor under Sections 19 & 21 of the Limitation Act, & the minor's estate is not affected by such acknowledgment of liability. The ‘de facto’ guardian is not a lawful guardian within the meaning of Section 21 of the Limitation Act (see ‘Chennappa v. Onkarappa’, ILR (1940) Mad 358 : (AIR (27) 1940 Mad 33 FB). For purposes of the Registration Act, a ‘de facto’ guardian is not in the same position as a natural or certified guardian (see ‘Amba v. Shrinivas Kamati’, 26 CWN 369 : (AIR (9) 1922 PC 135). There is no reason why the word ‘guardian’ in Art. 44 should receive a different interpretation. The very notion of a ‘de facto’ guardian involves & implies that there is no jural relationship of guardian & ward; but, that is exactly what Art. 44, Limitation Act, requires. Holding as I do, in deference to authority, that the expression ‘ward’ in Art. 44 is not limited to a minor for whom a guardian has been appointed by Ct. & that the word ‘guardian’ includes natural & testamentary guardians also, I cannot stretch the word ‘guardian’ so as to include a ‘de facto’ manager of the minor's properties. In my opinion, a person who is not equipped with the requisite legal authority as a natural, testamentary or certificated guardian but who is in management of a minor's estate, is only a ‘de facto’ “manager & not a ‘guardian’ within the meaning of Art. 44.

    8. In ‘Thayammal v. Kuppanna’, 38 Mad 1125 : (AIR (2) 1915 Mad 659); ‘Ramaswami v. Kasinatha’, AIR (15) 1928 Mad 226 : (108 IC 529) & ‘Purushothama v. Brundavaha’, 33 MLW 664 : (AIR (18) 1931 Mad 597) this Ct. held that Art. 44 did not govern suits by a quondam minor for recovery of possession of property alienated by a ‘de facto’ guardian, though there is not much discussion of the reasons for this conclusion. In ‘Chinna Alagamperumal v. Vinayakathamma’, 55 MLJ 861 : (AIR (16) 1929 Mad 110), an alienation by a ‘de facto’ guardian not justified by necessity or benefit was treated as void & as a transfer not requiring to be set aside within the period limited by Art. 44, though in another portion of the judgment the alienation is stated to be merely voidable. An alienation by the ‘de facto’ guardian of a Christian minor was held not to be governed by Art. 44 (see ‘Sundara Nadan v. Annammal’, 60 MLJ 695 : (AIR (18) 1931 Mad 529). Mr. Venkatadri, the learned advocate for the applt., contends that these decisions are no longer law in view of the recognition of the validity of a transfer by the ‘de facto’ guardian of a Hindu minor by the F.C in ‘Sri Ramalu v. Pundarikakshayya,’, (1949) FLJ 288 : (AIR (36) 1949 FC 218). He also placed reliance on the decisions in ‘Kaveripakkam Bangarammal v. Lydia Kent’, 57 Mad 1062 : (AIR (21) 1934 Mad 605) & ‘Adeyya v. Govindu’, 58 MLJ 417 : (AIR (18) 1931 Mad 274) & the comments on Art. 44 by the learned editors of Mitra's Limitation Act (Edn. 7, Vol. 1, at pp. 434 & 435). The argument runs as follows: Under the Hindu Law, the powers of a ‘de facto’ & a ‘de jure’ guardian to alienate the minor's property are the same. An alienation in excess of such powers is only voidable at the instance of the minor & not void. A voidable transfer must be set aside before possession of the property can be recovered. Art. 44 provides only a period of three years for a suit to set aside the transfer & the residuary provision in Art. 144 does not apply to the case. If the ex-minor does not bring a suit for possession within three years of attaining his majority, his title to the properties is lost & extinguished & the transferee's title becomes absclute & unimpeachable. A subsequent transferee of the property from the ex-minor is in the same position as his transferor. This last proposition rests on the principle that a person who claims under another, whether as his legal representative or transferee, should in such character be governed by the same rule as would apply to the person from whom he derives his title, the only limitation being that he is not entitled to any privileges or exemptions from limitation which the latter had. There is some authority for this view (see ‘Laxmana v. Rachappa’, 42 Bom 626 : (AIR (5) 1918 Bom 180) & ‘Raja Rama swami v. Govindammal’, 56 MLJ 332. But the rest of the argument is open to question though it is supported by the decision of Curgenven, J. In ‘Adeyya v. Govindu’, 58 MLJ 417 : (AIR (18) 1931 Mad 274). I am unable, with all respect, to accept the reasoning of the learned Judge.

    9. The expressions ‘void’ & ‘voidable’ are loosely & indiscriminately used in discussions on this topic. An alienation by a Hindu widow without legal necessity is not void, but voidable, in the sense that the transfer has a qualified operation even after the death of the widow & it is only the reversioner & nobody else, that has a right to disaffirm or impugn the transfer. In this sense, the transfer is voidable. The reversioner, however, need not sue to set aside the alienation, but can disaffirm it or treat it as a nullity & sue for possession of the property within 12 years of widow's death. In this sense, it is void as against the reversioner ‘Bijoy Gopal v. Krishna Mahishi’ 34 Cal 329 : (34 IA 87 PC). ‘In re Appavu Naicken’, AIR (18) 1931 Mad 377 : (128 IC 695). Similarly, an alienation by a father or manager of a joint Hindu family in excess of his powers is voidable in this sense that only the junior members of the family can disaffirm it & no others, but it is void so far as the junior members are concerned, for, they need not sue to set aside the alienation, but can straightway sue for recovery of possession within the period limited by Art. 126 or 144, Limitation Act. In this context, the expression ‘voidable’ is not used in the sense in which it is used in the Contract Act. ‘Amirthalinga v. Arumuga’, 28 MLW 634 : (AIR (15) 1928 Mad 986). I am aware that in ‘Muthukumarachetti v. Anthony Udayar’, 38 Mad 867 at p. 877: (AIR (2) 1915 Mad 296), the learned Judges in dealing with an improper alienation of a minor's property by a duly appointed guardian, observed as follows:

    “We cannot uphold Mr. Rangachariar's contention that whenever a transaction is voidable, it can be avoided only by getting a decree of Ct. setting it ‘aside. The party who is entitled to avoid may do so by an unequivocal act repudiating the transaction (see ‘Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali’, 34 All 213 : (39 IA 49 PC) & ‘Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi’, 34 Cal 329 : (34 IA 87 PC). If Rajagopalan (the minor) after attaining majority should wish to repudiate the lease there can be no doubt he can do so without a suit. But can anyone else do so? The right to avoid appears to be a personal privilege.”

    The reference in this context to ‘Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali’, 34 All 213 : (39 IA 49 PC), which was a case of an alienation of the property of a Mahomedan minor by a ‘de facto’ guardian & to ‘Bijoy Gopal v. Krishna Mahishi’, 34 Cal 329 : (34 IA 87 PC), which was a case of an improper alienation by a Hindu widow, is unhappy. In those cases, the Mahomedan minor or the Hindu reversioner was not a party to the transaction directly or in contemplation of law on any theory of representation & a suit for setting aside the alienation was not therefore necessary, a mere repudiation being sufficient. In those two cases, Arts. 144 & 141 would govern a suit for recovery or possession of the property by the minor or the reversioner. The learned Judges themselves in another part of their judgment held that Art. 44 Limitation Act applied to the case of an improper alienation by the guardian of a minor.

    10. If a transfer by a guardian is only voidable, then as decided in ‘Raja Rajeswara Dorai v. Arunachellam Chettiar’, 38 Mad 321 : (AIR (3) 1916 Mad 350); a unilateral repudiation by him or rescission in ‘pais' would not be sufficient. In ‘Satgurprasad v. Harnarain Das’, 62 MLJ 451 : (AIR (19) 1932 PC 89), the Judicial Committee while setting aside a conveyance, of property as having been obtained by fraud & undue influence observed:

    “Their Lordships are unable to regard the deed of 25-11-1924 merely as a contract voidable at the option of the pltf., but good until avoided. It was, in effect, a conveyance, under which the title to the properties passed to the deft., & ‘which had to be formally set aside’.”

    Their Lordships also held that the pltf. exercising his option to rescind the transfer, was entitled to the rents & profits of the property from the date of the transfer & not merely from the date of the suit.

    11. An alienation by a ‘de jure’ or lawful guardian of the property of the ward in excess of his powers as a guardian is treated differently from an improper alienation by a Hindu widow or the manager of a joint Hindu family for purposes of the Limitation Act. The transfer by the guardian is not void as against the minor, but only voidable at his instance & the minor must sue to set aside the unauthorised transfer within the three years limited by Art. 44 or lose his title to the property. As I have already stated, the law regards the minor as being a party to the alienation through his guardian, & Art. 44 allows only a period of three years for setting aside the transfer, the same period being allowed under Art. 91 for a man who seeks to set aside his own deed. But, if a ‘de facto’ manager of a minor's estate improperly alienates his property, the alienation is one to which the minor is not a party through his legally authorised representative & does not require to be set aside within the period limited by Art. 44. The minor can sue for recovery of possession within the period 12 years allowed by Art. 142 or Art. 144. The word ‘guardian’ in Art. 44 must be interpreted as meaning only a lawful or ‘de jure’ guardian & not as including a de facto’ manager of the property of a Hindu minor, whatever be the effect of an alienation by a ‘de facto’ guardian or manager under the Hindu law.

    12. Mr. Venkatadri's further contention is that the sale in favour of the pltf. by deft. 2 after he attained majority, of property which had been previously sold to deft. 1 by his ‘de facto’ guardian, is, in effect, a transfer of a right to sue which is prohibited by Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. ‘Mon Mohan v. Bidhu Bushan’, AIR (26) 1939 Cal 460: (185 IC 6), was the only decision cited by the learned counsel on both sides on this point. In that case, the sale of the minor's property was by his natural guardian & not by a ‘de facto’ guardian. Mr. Venkatadri's contention is that this does not make any difference, for the property of sale by a “de facto” guardian has to be judged by the same tests as are applicable to the case of an alienation by a ‘de jure’ guardian & a sale in excess of the power of the guardian, ‘de facto’ or ‘de jure’, can only be avoided by the minor. In the case of an unauthorised alienation by a ‘de facto’ guardian, the setting aside of the transaction is not a condition precedent to the minor recovering the property from the alienee & the minor can sue for possession of the property within the period limited by Art. 142 or 144. Assuming that a sale by a ‘de facto’ guardian without necessity or benefit to the minor is only voidable, the question is whether the right to question an excessive or improper alienation by a guardian & recover possession of the property from the alienee is only a personal right of the minor & whether it is a mere right to sue which could not be availed of by a transferee of the property from the minor on his attaining majority. Sen, J. held that the right of the minor to avoid the alienation was a mere right to sue & could not be validly transferred in ‘Mon Mohan v. Bidhu Bushan’, AIR (26) 1939 Cal 460 : (185 IC 6) relying on the decision in ‘Jhavar Bhai Hathi Bhai v. Kabhai Becher’, 34 Bom LR 151 : (AIR (20) 1933 Bom 42) in support of his conclusion. I may also point out that there is an earlier decision of the Bombay H.C (Macleod, C.J & Coyajee J.) in ‘Narasinga Charya v. Tulsa Bai’, 27 Bom LR 483 : (AIR (12) 1925 Bom 320), that till an unauthorised sale by his guardian was set aside by the minor, he had no transferable interest in the property. I am unable to accept these decisions as embodying a correct statement of the law. There was here a sale of property by the ex-minor & not an assignment of a mere right to sue. No doubt, the vendee from the minor had to sue the previous purchaser from the guardian for recovery of possession of the property, but, in my opinion, that did not render the sale by the minor a transfer of a mere right to sue. A unilateral dis-affirmance or rescission in ‘pais’ of the guardian's Improper alienation by the minor might not be sufficient to revest title to the property in the minor & enable him to sue for recovery of possession of property within 12 years of such repudiation under Art. 144, Limitation Act. A judicial rescission may be necessary as held in cases decided under Art. 91, Limitation Act, (see ‘Janaki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh’, 15 Cal 58 : (14 IA 148 PC); ‘Raja Rajeswara Dorai v. Arunachalam Chettiar’, 38 Mad 321 : (AIR (3) 1916 Mad 350); & ‘Someswar Dutt v. Tribhavan Dutt’, 67 MLJ 7 : (AIR (21) 1934 PC 130). I have already referred to the decisions of the Ct. taking the same view of the effect of Art. 44, Limitation Act. It does not, however follow that the right to obtain a judicial rescission of an unauthorised & therefore voidable transfer by a guardian, is a mere personal privilege of the minor, as observed in ‘Muthukumar Chetty v. Anthony Udayar’, 38 Mad 867 at p. 877: (AIR (2) 1915 Mad 296) in the passage already cited. It is a right annexed to the ownership of property or an Interest in property & is available to the legal representatives of a minor who dies without avoiding the transfer. Where an ex-minor transfers property unauthorisedly sold by his guardian during his minority he transfers not a mere right to sue but his interest in the property, though a suit may be necessary to avoid the transfer by the guardian & recover possession of the property from his alienee. Conversely, the liability of the transferee from the guardian is not a liability to pay damages for the unauthorised act of the guardian, but is a liability to restore the property to the rightful owner or his transferee (compare Sections 86, 94 & 96 of the Trusts Act). If, as held by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. in ‘Muthukumara Chetti v. Anthony Udayar’, 38 Mad 867 : (AIR (2) 1915 Mad 296), a mere repudiation by the minor on attaining majority is sufficient to avoid the transfer, then the transfer by the ex-minor of the property previously alienated by the guardian is a sufficient repudiation of the guardian's act.

    13. It is significant that Section 60(e) of the CPC, which is in ‘pari materia’ with Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, exempts from attachment & sale “a mere right to sue for damages”. The right to get a reconveyance of property through Ct. or otherwise, is a valuable right in the nature of a right of property & can be validly transferred.

    14. The Transfer of Property Act itself recognises transfers of actionable claims as defined in the Act. The transferee as the representative of the transferor can sue for specific performance of a contract to re-convey land (see ‘Venkateswara Ayyar v. Raman Nambudri’, 3 MLW 435 : (AIR (4) 1917 Mad 358) & ‘Sakalaguna Naidu v. Chinna Munuswami’ 55 IA 243 : (AIR (15) 1928 PC 174). The prohibition of a transfer of a mere right to sue in Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act is an adaptation for India of the English equitable doctrine that a right to complain of a fraud is not a ‘marketable commodity’, (see Turner, L.J in ‘De Hoghton v. Money’, (1867) 2 Ch. A. 164 : (15 LT 403). The English Cts of equity held that the transfer of such a right savoured of champerty & maintenance & refused relief on that ground. But the Judicial Committee held as early as ‘Ramcoomar v. Chunder Canto’; 4 IA 23 : (2 Cal 233 PC) that the English doctrines as to champerty & maintenance were not in force as specific laws in India (see also ‘Achalram v. Kazim Hussain’, 27 All 271 : (32 IA 113 PC) ‘Bhagwat Dayal v. Debi Dayal, 35 Cal 420 : (35 IA 48 PC). Even in England, the rigour of the rule has been considerably relaxed, as might be found from the authoritative exposition of the present state of the law in the judgment of Parker, J. in the Ct. of Appeal in ‘Glegg v. Bromley’, (1912) 3 KB 474 at pp. 439, 490 : (81 LJKB 1081), approved & accepted by the Judicial Committee in ‘Venkatasubhadrayyamma v. Venkatapati’, 52 IA 1 at p. 19: (AIR (11) 1924 PC 162). Parker J. laid down the law in these terms:

    “Ordinary choses in action were not assignable at law, but were generally speaking, assignable in equity whether themselves legal, or equitable choses. In the former case, equity compelled the assignor to allow his name to be used for their recovery in legal proceedings; in the latter case, the assignee could sue in equity in his own name. There was one exception to this rule. Equity on the ground of public policy did not give validity to the assignment of what is in the cases referred to as a bare right of action, & this was so whether the bare right were legal or equitable. I have looked at a good many authorities on this point, & I am satisfied that the real reason why equity did not allow the assignment of a bare right of action, whether legal or equitable, was on the ground that it savoured of or was likely to lead to maintenance. There is no doubt in the cases about the rule, & there is no doubt in the cases with regard to the exception, but difficulties often arose in deciding whether a particular right was within the exception or was within the rule. It is to be observed that an equitable assignee of a chose in action, whether it is legal or equitable, could institute proceedings & maintain proceedings for its recovery. The question was whether the subject matter of the assignment was, in the view of the Ct., property with an incidental remedy for its recovery, or was a bare right to bring an action either at law or in equity. ‘Glegg v. Bromley’, (1912) 3 KB 474 at pp. 489, 490 : (81 LJKB 1081).”

    In my opinion, the right of the ward to recover property improperly alienated by his guardian would have been treated in equity as property & not as a bare right of action & the same rule must prevail here. The conveyance, Ex. P. 5, by the ex-minor in favour of the pltf. in this case is of the property itself & not of a mere right to sue. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of Sen J. in ‘Mon Mohan v. Bidhu Bhushan’ AIR (26) 1939 Cal 460 : (185 IC 6) & the observations of Macleod, C.J in ‘Narasimhachary v. Tulsa Bai’, 27 Bom LR 483 : (AIR (12) 1925 Bom 320) & Parkar & Murphy, JJ. in ‘Jhavar Bhai Hathi Bhai v. Kabhai Becher’, 34 Bom LR 1512 : (AIR (20) 1933 Bom 42). The decision in ‘Hanumant v. Ramappa’, 49 Bom 309 : (AIR (12) 1925 Bom 292) points out the difficulty of applying the language of Art. 44, Limitation Act, to a suit by a transferee from the ward & though there is a passing reference to Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, in the judgment, there is no decision on the point whether a transfer by the ward on attaining majority is hit at by Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. In that case, both the ward & his transferee were pltfs. & the Ct. held that the transferee would get the benefit of an adjudication setting aside the improper alienation of the ward's property by his guardian. In ‘Kamaraju v. Gunnayya’, 45 MLJ 240 : (AIR (11) 1924 Mad 322) & ‘Ramaswami v. Govindam-mal’, 56 MLJ 332 : (AIR (16) 1929 Mad 313), two D. Bs of this Ct. & ‘Laxmana v. Rachappa’,:42 Bom 626 : (AIR (5) 1918 Bom 180) a D.B of the Bombay H.C recognised, though without a discussion of the point, the right of a transferee of property from the ex-minor to sue to set aside an improper alienation of that property by the guardian of the minor. The Bombay H.C itself has, in a later case, held that where the manager of a joint Hindu family, acting in excess of his powers, alienates the joint family property for himself & his minor brother, the latter continues to have an interest in the property alienated, which he can transfer so as to clothe the transferee with a right to avoid the manager's alienation & recover possession of the interest of his transferor (See ‘Hanumanthappa v. Dundappa’ AIR (21) 1934 Bom 234 : (151 IC 1043). The same view is implicit, though not expressly stated, in ‘Iburamsa Rowthen v. Thiruvenkatasami Naick’ 34 Mad 269 : (7 IC 559). In ‘Ramaswami v. Govindammal’, 56 MLJ 332 : (AIR (16) 1929 Mad 313), Art. 44, Limitation Act, was applied to a suit by the transferee from the ward & in ‘Ramiah v. Brahmaiah’, 59 MLJ 196 : (AIR (17) 1930 Mad 821) the same article was applied to a suit by the legal representative of a ward who died a minor. As pointed out in ‘Hanumant v. Ramappa’, 49 Bom 309 : (AIR (12) 1925 Bom 292) it is difficult to bring a suit by the transferee or legal representative of a deceased minor within the language of Cols. 1 & 3 of Art. 44, Limitation Act. In the view I have taken that Art. 44 does not apply to transfers by ‘de facto’ managers or ‘de facto’ guardians of a Hindu minor, a decision on this point is unnecessary. If it were, I would, sitting singly, be bound by the decision in ‘Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal’, 56 MLJ 332 : (AIR (16) 1929 Mad 313) to hold that Art. 44 applies even to suits by transferees from an ex-minor for recovery of possession of property improperly alienated by the minor's guardian. For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss this second appeal. But, having regard to the fact that the transferee, the pltf. is no other than the son of the ‘de facto’ guardian & that there is more than a suspicion that deft. 1 is sought to be deprived of the fruits of his purchase by the concerted action of the ward, the ‘de facto’ guardian & the pltf. I disallow the pltf. his costs throughout. No leave.

    C.R.K/D.H

    15. Appeal dismissed.

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