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  • 306, Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act
  • Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act
  • Article 182(5) in the previous Limitation Act,
  • Article 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act.
  • provisions of Order 21, Rules 11
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • 306, Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act
  • Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act
  • Article 182(5) in the previous Limitation Act,
  • Article 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act.
  • provisions of Order 21, Rules 11
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These civil miscellaneous second appeals arise from execution proceedings under two decrees where the decree-holders are different but the judgment-debtors are the same. Because the facts and the progression of execution in both matters are essentially identical, the Court set out the facts of one case (C.M.S.A. No. 15 of 1947) for disposal of both appeals.

The relevant events in summary:

  • A decree in O.S. No. 12 of 1933 led to a series of execution petitions: E.P. No. 67 of 1934 (dismissed 24 July 1934); E.P. No. 127 of 1934 (filed 8 Sept 1934, dismissed 16 July 1935).
  • On 30 October 1937 another (unnumbered) execution petition was filed but returned several times for compliance with requisitions and was never finally re-presented.
  • On 29 April 1940 a further execution petition was filed (for attachment and sale of moveables); it was not pressed and was rejected on 6 January 1941 with a note that limitation would be considered when the next petition was filed.
  • On 26 April 1943 E.P. No. 95 of 1943 (for attachment and sale of moveables) was filed. An application (E.A. No. 195 of 1944) sought to treat E.P. No. 95 of 1943 as a continuation of E.P. No. 127 of 1934.
  • The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed E.P. No. 95 of 1943 and E.A. No. 195 of 1944 on 18 November 1944, holding E.P. No. 95 barred by limitation.
  • The decree-holder appealed the dismissal of E.P. No. 95 to the District Court of Kistna at Masulipatam in A.S. No. 26 of 1945; the District Judge allowed the appeal and held the 1943 execution petitions were not barred by limitation.
  • The present proceedings are second appeals reviewing the District Judge's decision and the underlying law on limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an execution petition that was returned by the court for compliance with requisitions but never re-presented (the unnumbered 1937 petition) can operate to save or extend the period of limitation for subsequent execution petitions under Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act (i.e., whether the relevant starting point is the date of filing of the earlier application or the date of the final order on it).
  2. Whether the execution petitions filed in 1940 and 1943 are barred by limitation.
  3. Whether E.P. No. 95 of 1943 could be treated as a continuation of the earlier E.P. No. 127 of 1934 (i.e., whether the 1943 petition can rely on the pendency or continuation of the 1934 petition).
  4. Whether the operation of Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act (by reason of the insolvency of the father of the judgment-debtors) or alleged acknowledgments by the father operated to save or extend limitation in respect of the execution petitions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (judgment-debtors) — representative arguments in the opinion

  • Mr. Venkatarama Sastri argued that the learned District Judge was incorrect in treating the date of filing of the 1937 execution petition (if regarded as a step-in-aid) as the starting point for limitation; he maintained the Article requires the starting point to be the date of the final order on such an application.
  • The appellants (by implication through counsel) challenged belated assertions by the decree-holder about the alleged manner in which the execution petition of 1934 was disposed of and did not accept those late factual allegations.

Respondents (decree-holders) — representative arguments in the opinion

  • Mr. Kameswara Rao relied on the District Judge's reasoning that the 1937 petition, although not re-presented, could be treated as a step-in-aid of execution and that the date of filing of that application (20 October 1937) gave a fresh three-year period under Article 182(5), thereby validating the 1940 and 1943 petitions as timely.
  • He also relied on the decision in Satyanarayana v. Kajireddi to support the District Judge's approach and advanced alternative arguments: (a) that an affidavit (sworn 21 March 1944) established that E.P. No. 127 of 1934 was dismissed without notice and therefore remained pending/continuable; and (b) that limitation was saved by operation of Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act due to the insolvency of the father and/or certain acknowledgments by the father of liability.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ayi v. Solai (1945) 1 M.L.J. 47 : I.L.R. 1945 Mad. 468 (Full Bench) Discussion of Article 182(5) (amendment of 1927) and observation that the starting point is the final order, with a sentence that "Nothing really turns on this..." The Court held the District Judge misread this observation; Ayi supports that the starting point under Article 182(5) is the date of the final order on the application and does not permit the distinction the District Judge attempted.
Satyanarayana v. Kajireddi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 427 Noted that the Full Bench in Ayi left open whether time began from date of application or date of order. The Court treated this as indicating the question must be decided from Article 182(5)'s wording and concluded the starting point is the date of the final order.
Chidambara v. Murugesam (1939) 2 M.L.J. 671 : I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 60 Held that an application for execution returned by the Court but never re-presented should be treated as if it had never been presented. Relied upon as authority for treating the 1937 returned-but-not-represented petition as if never presented, so it could not save limitation.
Official Receiver, Ramnad v. Marayanasami Thevar (1941) 2 M.L.J. 1018 Same principle: returned applications not re-presented do not save limitation. Used to support the conclusion that the 1937 application did not operate to extend limitation.
Khadir Sahib v. Viswanatha Aiyar (1942) 2 M.L.J. 768 : I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 357 Attempted distinction between returns for defects under Order 21, Rules 11–14 and returns for other requisitions; held that an order of return by a competent court is not a nullity. The Court observed that even if the 1937 petition were in accordance with law, since it was not re-presented it must be treated as never presented; Khadir Sahib did not alter that result for present purposes.
Venkatappa v. Venkatappa I.L.R. (1944) Mad. 266 Supports the principle that returned execution petitions not re-presented are to be treated as never presented. Relied upon as part of the series of authorities confirming the treatment of returned-but-not-represented petitions.
Seshagirirao v. Subbarami Reddi (1945) 1 M.L.J. 270 : I.L.R. 1945 Mad. 684 (Full Bench) Again supports the rule about returned applications not re-presented. Counted among the authorities confirming that a returned-and-not-represented petition does not save limitation.
Muthuvenkatasubba Reddiar v. Thangavelu Chetti (1948) 1 M.L.J. 327 In that case a petition re-presented after a period was described as "not pressed and hence dismissed" and was treated as involving an order excusing delay followed by dismissal (thereby creating a final order for limitation purposes). The Court distinguished that case on its peculiar facts and held it did not affect the general doctrine about returned but unrepresented petitions.
Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. A.H. Forbes (1929) 57 M.L.J. 184 (P.C.) Where intervening applications are essentially different in character from the original application, the Court may infer abandonment; combined effect of previous applications may mark a substantial departure making continuation impossible. Applied to support the view that the 1943 petition (for moveables) could not be treated as a continuation of the 1934 petition (which sought relief against immoveables).
Chalavadi Kotiah v. Pooloori Alimelammah (1908) 18 M.L.J. 46 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 71 Cited in connection with doctrines of continuation of applications. The Court noted the case involved no intervening application and therefore was not helpful to support continuation in the present factual matrix.
Subbachariar v. Muthuveeran Pillai (1912) 24 M.L.J. 545 : I.L.R. 36 Mad. 553 Cited on the subject of continuation of proceedings; the effect of intervening applications was not considered in that decision. Noted as not directly determinative for the present facts involving intervening petitions of a different character.
Nandlal v. Ramdatta I.L.R. (1942) Nag. 306 Held that Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act cannot apply where the order of adjudication is not annulled but the insolvent obtains an order of absolute discharge. Applied to reject the respondents' reliance on Section 78(2) to extend limitation in respect of the sons' execution petitions, since the father had obtained an absolute discharge.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise manner, strictly on the basis of the language of Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act and the facts of the various execution petitions:

  1. Interpretation of Article 182(5): The Court reproduced Article 182(5) and concluded that the Article makes the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law the starting point of the three-year period. The Court rejected the District Judge's attempt to treat the date of filing of a prior application (even when that application was an application to take a step-in-aid of execution) as the starting point. The Article does not permit the differentiation adopted by the District Judge.
  2. Precedent analysis: The Court examined the District Judge's reliance on the Full Bench in Ayi v. Solai and found that the District Judge misread an obiter sentence in that decision. The Full Bench in Ayi, properly read with reference to the text, supported the conclusion that a fresh period of limitation starts from the date of the final order in an application to take a step-in-aid of execution as well as in an application for execution.
  3. Treatment of returned but unrepresented petitions: The Court relied on a series of decisions (Chidambara; Official Receiver, Ramnad; Khadir Sahib; Venkatappa; Seshagirirao) establishing that an application for execution that is returned by the Court and never re-presented should be treated as if it had never been presented. The Court observed that attempts to distinguish returns made for defects under Order 21, Rules 11–14 from returns for other requisitions do not, for present purposes, change the result: a returned petition not re-presented does not save limitation.
  4. Application to the facts: Because the 1937 application was admittedly not re-presented, it could not be relied upon to extend limitation. Consequently, the District Judge's principal basis for holding the 1940 and 1943 execution petitions to be in time (i.e., treating the 1937 petition's filing date as creating a fresh three-year period) was rejected.
  5. Consideration of alternate arguments advanced by respondents: The Court addressed the respondents' alternative contentions and found them unsatisfactory:
    • The late affidavit (1944) alleging the 1934 petition was dismissed without notice was unpersuasive: the statement was belated and the Court declined to accept it as establishing pendency of the 1934 petition.
    • Even assuming such an allegation were true, the 1943 petition sought relief against moveables whereas the 1934 petition sought relief against immoveables; the Court held it was not plausible to treat the 1943 petition as a continuation of the 1934 petition. The Court invoked Maharaj Bahadur Singh to support the proposition that intervening applications of a different character may warrant an inference of abandonment of the original application.
    • The respondents' reliance on Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and on alleged acknowledgments by the father was also rejected: the relevant acknowledgment material (Exs. P-6, P-7) did not demonstrate an unequivocal admission that the decree debt subsisted at the time; and Section 78(2) could not be invoked where the father had obtained an absolute discharge (per Nandlal v. Ramdatta). The Court further observed there was no indication those points were pressed before the Subordinate Judge and inferred they had been abandoned.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: In light of the statutory text, the authorities, and the factual record (including the admitted failure to re-present the 1937 petition), the Court concluded the 1940 and 1943 execution petitions are barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the execution petitions filed in 1940 and 1943 are barred by limitation; the judgment of the District Judge of Kistna (which had allowed the appeals holding the 1943 petitions not barred) is set aside; the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Bezwada (dismissing the execution petitions as barred) is restored; both execution petitions are dismissed with costs.

Implications (direct consequences as stated in the opinion):

  • The immediate legal effect is that both execution petitions (the 1940 and 1943 petitions) are dismissed and the Subordinate Judge's orders are restored.
  • The Court clarified its reading of Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act: the starting point for the three-year period is the date of the final order passed on an application for execution or on an application to take a step-in-aid of execution, not the date of filing of such an application when no final order has been passed.
  • The Court reaffirmed the principle, as established in earlier authorities, that an execution petition returned by the Court and never re-presented must be treated as if it had never been presented and thus does not save limitation.
  • Leave to appeal was refused.

    Chaturvedula Venkata Lakshminarasimham And Another. v. Sha Ven Vaktaji Gomaji & Co. Sait Vummaji Manrupchand Firm.

    1. These civil miscellaneous second appeals arise out of proceedings in execution of two decrees. The decree-holders are different but the material judgment-debtors are the same. The facts in the two cases are so identical and the execution of the two decrees proceeded on lines so closely parallel that it is sufficient for the disposal of both the appeals to state the facts in one of them.

    2. C.M.S.A. No. 15 of 1947 arises out of proceedings in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 12 of 1933 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bezwada. The first of the petitions to execute this decree was E.P. No. 67 of 1934 which was dismissed on 24th July, 1934. On 8th September, 1934, the decree-holder applied in E.P. No. 127 of 1934 for rateable distribution of the proceeds of a sale to be held in E.P. No. 29 of 1933 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bezwada and in case no such sale was held for attachment and sale of the immoveable property mentioned in the schedule attached. E.P. No. 127 of 1934 was dismissed on 16th July, 1935, with the endorsement, As E.P. No. 29 of 1933 was dismissed for want of bidders this petition does not lie. No sale. Dismissed.

    On the 30th of October, 1937, the decree-holder filed an execution petition. It was returned several times for compliance with certain requisitions made by the office, and both the courts below have found that this execution petition was not finally re-presented. The correctness of this finding cannot now be questioned. It would appear that the execution petition was being returned firstly for producing the power of attorney which enabled the decree-holder's clerk to sign the execution petition and secondly, for the purpose of making a correct calculation of the interest due on the decree. I may observe in passing that the lower appellate Court has held that neither of these defects is such as to make the execution petition one not in accordance with law. The correctness of this conclusion has not been seriously challenged by Mr. Venkatarama Sastri, the learned advocate for the appellants-judgment-debtors.

    3. On the 29th of April, 1940, still another execution petition was filed. The prayer was that certain moveables of the judgment-debtors should be attached and sold. The execution petition was not pressed and was rejected on the 6th of January, 1941, with an observation that, the question of limitation would be considered when the next execution petition is filed.

    On the 26th of April, 1943, the decree-holder filed E.P. No. 95 of 1943 out of which C.M.S.A. No. 15 of 1947 arises. The prayer here also was that certain moveables should be attached and sold. During the pendency of this execution petition the decree-holder filed E.A. No. 195 of 1944 for treating the main petition E.P. No. 95 of 1943 as a continuation of E.P. No. 127 of 1934 and for permitting him to proceed with the latter. E.P. No. 95 of 1943 and E.A. No. 195 of 1944 were dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge of Bezwada on the 18th of November, 1944, on the ground that E.P. No. 95 of 1943 was barred by limitation and that the prayer in E.A. No. 195 of 1944 could not be granted. There was no appeal against the order in E.A. No. 195 of 1944 but the order in E.P. No. 95 of 1943 was appealed against to the District Court of Kistna at Masulipatam in A.S. No. 26 of 1945. The learned District Judge of Kistna allowed this appeal as also the appeal in the connected case and held that the Execution Petitions of 1943 are not barred by limitation. His reasoning can be briefly summarised. Agreeing with the learned Subordinate Judge he held that the unnumbered execution petition of 1937 was never re-presented. He further held that that execution petition could not be regarded as an execution petition in which no final order was passed and which must therefore be treated as pending. He held however that it could be regarded as a step-in-aid of execution and so treating it, he thought that what is material is the date of the application itself and not the date of any order passed on it. Since the E.P. of 1937 was filed on 20th October, 1937, it gave according to the learned District Judge a further period of three years within which the decree-holder could file a fresh execution petition. As the execution petition of 1940 was admittedly filed on the 29th of April, 1940, it followed that that execution petition was in time as also the later execution petition of 1943 which was filed within three years of the dismissal of the execution petition of 1940. Mr. Venkatarama Sastri argued that the learned District Judge was not right in treating the date of the filing of the execution petition of 1937 as the starting point even if that execution petition is to be viewed as an application to take a step-in-aid of execution. Article 182, Clause (5) provides a period of three years, the time from which the period begins to run being defined in the following words:

    5. Where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution, or to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree or order.

    From the language of the Article it is clear that whether the execution petition of 1937 is regarded as an application for execution or as an application to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree, the starting point of limitation is the final order passed on such application. The Article does not permit any differentiation like what the learned District Judge has attempted.

    4. In support of his decision, on this matter the learned District Judge relied on an observation of Leach, G.J., in Ayi v. Solai (1945) 1 M.L.J. 47 : I.L.R. 1945 Mad. 468 at 472 (F.B.). The question in that case was whether an application to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of Article 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act should be made in a pending execution petition. This was answered in the negative. While referring to the change that had been made in Article 182(5) in 1927 and to the provision which corresponded to Article 182(5) in the previous Limitation Act, the learned Chief Justice pointed out that under Article 182(5) as amended in 1927 the starting point is the final order, while previously it was the date of the application itself. Then occurs the following sentence:

    Nothing really turns on this, because for the purpose of answering the question referred it is immaterial whether the starting point is the date of the application or the date of the order passed thereon.

    It is obvious that the question before the Full Bench in no way depended on whether the starting point was the one or the other. It is really surprising how the learned District Judge read this observation of the learned Chief Justice as supporting the inference that while the starting point is the date of the final order if the previous application was one for execution, it would be the date of the application itself if the previous application was one to take some step-in-aid of execution. In fact at page 475 after referring to Kunhi v. Seshagiri (1882) I.L.R. 5 Mad. 141, the learned Chief Justice observed that, ...a fresh period of limitation starts from the date of the final order in an application to take a step-in-aid of execution as well as from the date of a final order in an application for execution.

    Mr. Kameswara Rao, the learned advocate for the respondents-decree-holders, relied on the decision in Satyanarayana v. Kajireddi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 427, where it was observed that the Full Bench which decided Ayi v. Solai (1945) 1 M.L.J. 47 : I.L.R. 1945 Mad. 468 at 472 (F.B.) left open the question whether time began to run from the date of the application or the date of the order on it because it was unnecessary to decide it on the facts of that case. That only means that the question has now to be decided on the wording of Article 182 (5). Judging from the language of that Article I have no doubt whatever in holding that whether the previous application was one for execution or to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree, the starting point is the date of the final order on it and not the date on which it was filed.

    5. That an application for execution which is returned by the Court but never re-presented thereafter should be treated as if it had never been presented at all, has been held in a series of cases: Chidambara v. Murugesam (1939) 2 M.L.J. 671 : I.L.R. 1940 Mad.60, Official Receiver, Ramnad v. Marayanasami Thevar (1941) 2 M.L.J. 1018, Khadir Sahib v. Viswanatha Aiyar (1942) 2 M.L.J. 768 : I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 357 and scarcely admits of any doubt. See also Venkatappa v. Venkatappa I.L.R. (1944) Mad. 266 and Seshagirirao v. Subbarami Reddi (1945) 1 M.L.J. 270 : I.L.R. 1945 Mad.684 at 692 (F.B.).

    6. A distinction was attempted in Khadir Sahib v. Viswanatha Aiyar (1942) 2 M.L.J. 768 : I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 357 between a case where an application for execution is returned for rectifying a defect by way of non-compliance with the provisions of Order 21, Rules 11 to 14, and a case where the return is for complying with requisitions in respect of matters which cannot be described as defects falling under Order 21, rules n to 14. In the former class of cases the application for execution is not one in accordance with law while in the latter it is one in accordance with law. It was however held in Khadir Sahib v. Viswanatha Aiyar (1942) 2 M.L.J. 768 : I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 357, that for the purpose of the present discussion there is no distinction between the two classes of cases. It was pointed out in that decision that the petition which was returned in Official Receiver, Ramnad v. Narayanaswami Thevar (1941) 2 M.L.J. 1018, was in conformity with the law, but that it still made no difference in the decision arrived at. The learned Judges in Khadir Sahib v. Viswanatha Aiyar (1942) 2 M.L.J. 768 : I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 357, noticed that Somayya, J., expressed a contrary opinion in Sundarabalakadiresa Thevar v. Avudai Ammal (1942) 1 M.L.J. 542, but they disagreed with that judgment and followed the decision of the Bench in Official Receiver, Ramnad v. Narayanasami Thevar (1941) 2 M.L.J. 1018, and observed that an order of return, right or wrong, if made by a competent Court is not a mere nullity and cannot be ignored by the party affected. As already stated it may be assumed that in this case the application of 1937 was one in accordance with law. But that, in my opinion, makes no difference and since the application was admittedly not re-presented, the question of limitation must be decided as if there was no application made at all in 1937.

    7. Mr. Kameswara Rao drew my attention to the decision in Muthuvenkatasubba Reddiar v. Thangavelu Chetti (1948) 1 M.L.J. 327, in which there is an observation that the judgment in Khadir Sahib v. Viswanatha Aiyar (1942) 2 M.L.J. 768 : I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 357, was with respect to the particular facts which arose therein and which, the learned Judges add " are not the same as in the present instance." I do not read this as expressing any disapproval of the judgment in Khadir Sahib v. Viswanatha Aiyar (1942) 2 M.L.J. 768 : I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 357. In Muthuvenkatasubba Reddiar v. Thangavelu Chetti (1948) 1 M.L.J. 327, the facts were somewhat peculiar. An execution petition returned for re-presentation after compliance with certain requisitions was re-presented after the time given for the purpose by the Court. On the decree-holder mentioning to the Court that he was not pressing it the Court passed an order in the following terms: "This is not pressed and hence dismissed". This was held by the learned Judges in Muthuvenkatarasubba Reddiar v. Thangavelu Chetti (1948) 1 M.L.J. 327, as amounting to an order excusing the delay in the re-presentation of the petition followed by an order of dismissal and the order of dismissal was held to be a final order within the meaning of Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act. Having regard to the wording of the order the learned Judges were perhaps quite justified in inferring or implying an order excusing the delay in re-presentation, but that however bears in no way on the question whether the doctrine that has been developed in regard to execution petitions returned but not re-presented would not apply also to a case where the execution petition was one in accordance with law but is still returned for re-presentation after compliance with certain requisitions made by the Court.

    8. The ground therefore on which the learned District Judge held that the application of 1937 saves limitation cannot be accepted.

    9. Mr. Kameswara Rao however attempted to support the judgment of the lower appellate Court in several alternative ways. He first referred to the execution petition of 1934 in which there was, as already stated, a two-fold prayer. In an affidavit sworn to by the decree-holder on the 21st of March, 1944, it was stated that the dismissal order of the execution petition of 1934 was passed without issuing any notice to the parties or their pleaders and without hearing them, and that neither the decree-holder nor his vakil was aware that such an order of dismissal was passed and that as soon as it was known that the said execution petition was dismissed, another execution petition was filed on the 30th of October, 1937. Mr. Kameswara Rao argued that if this allegation is true the execution petition of 1934 has not been validly disposed of and must therefore be held to be pending, and that consequently it would be open to his client to remind the Court of the pendency of such an execution petition and ask for its continuance. In the first place, this allegation as to the circumstances in which the execution petition of 1934 was passed and the way it was dismissed seems to have been made for the first time in 1944. In the earlier execution petition of 1940 all that was said was that the execution petition of 1934 was dismissed meaning presumably that it was dismissed in the usual course. It is not known what allegation was made in the execution petition of 1937 regarding the manner of disposal of the earlier execution petition of 1934, but there is no reason to think that anything different from what was said in 1940 was said in 1937. I am not therefore prepared to accept the truth of the somewhat belated statement of the decree-holder in his affidavit of 1944.

    10. Assuming for a moment that the allegation referred to above is true, the judgment-debtors have more than one answer. In the first place, the present execution petition No. 95 of 1943 is for attachment and sale of moveables. It is not easy to see how this application could be regarded as a continuation of the execution petition of 1934 which sought relief by way of attachment and sale of immoveable properties. It is also quite possible that having regard to the fact that the immoveable property which was sought to be proceeded against had already been attached at the instance of another creditor in E.P. No. 29 of 1933 and was being brought to sale, the decree-holder did not in his E.P. No. 127 of 1934 press for or take adequate steps in regard to the prayer in his execution petition for attachment and sale of the same immoveable property. Again as held in Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. A.H. Forbes (1929) 57 M.L.J. 184 (P.C.), as the intervening applications are essentially different in character from the application of 1934, it is quite open to the Court to infer an abandonment of that application and " in any event," to borrow the language of the Privy Council in the decision just quoted, " the combined effect of the previous applications marks such substantial departure from the original application (of 1934) so as to make it impossible to hold that the application (of 1943) was a continuation of the application (of 1934)."

    11. Mr. Kameswara Rao cited in this connection Chalavadi Kotiah v. Pooloori Alimelammah (1908) 18 M.L.J. 46 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 71 and Subbachariar v. Muthuveeran Pillai (1912) 24 M.L.J. 545 : I.L.R. 36 Mad. 553. In the former case, there was no intervening application while in the latter there was an intervening application; but its effect was not considered by the learned Judges. Having regard to the fact that the present application itself is for relief by way of process against moveables, that the application of 1940 also was for attachment and sale of moveables and that presumably the application of 1937 also was for the same purpose, it is impossible for the decree-holder to summon to his aid any doctrine of continuation of the application of 1934 in the application of 1943.

    12. It was then said that by an amendment of the present execution petition the decree-holder alleged two other ways in which limitation in respect of the present execution petition was saved. One is by the application of Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act arising by reason of the insolvency of the father of the judgment-debtors-appellants. The other is said to arise by reason of certain acknowledgments of liability made by the father in respect of the decree debt. There is no doubt that these allegations were inserted in the execution petition by an amendment as per an order of Court. It is also true that Exs. P-5 to P-8 relate to the insolvency of the father of the appellants. No reference however is made in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Bezwada to either of these aspects and as already stated the learned Subordinate Judge held that the execution petitions are out of time. In the memorandum of appeal presented to the District Court of Kistna no complaint was made that these aspects ought to have been considered by the learned Subordinate Judge and the judgment of the learned District Judge which is no doubt in favour of the decree-holders does not suggest that there was any discussion before him in regard to either of these points.

    13. It can therefore be safely presumed that the decree-holders were advised to give up and gave up these pleas even in the Court of first instance.

    14. Moreover, there seems to be little substance in either of the pleas put forward. The affidavit in Ex. P-6 and the deposition Ex. P-7 which are both of 1940 are said to contain the relevant acknowledgments but having gone through both of them I find it difficult to say that there is any unequivocal admission that the decree debt was subsisting at the time of the alleged acknowledgment. The point as to Section 78(3) also seems to me to be not maintainable as admittedly the father of the appellants obtained an order of absolute discharge and his adjudication was not annulled. As held in Nandlal v. Ramdatta I.L.R. (1942) Nag. 306, Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act cannot apply where the order of adjudication is not annulled but the insolvent obtains an order of absolute discharge. Further it is difficult to see how there can be any extension of the period during which the insolvency of the appellants' father was subsisting in order to calculate limitation in regard to his sons who were admittedly not insolvents. I am therefore unable to accede to Mr. Kameswara Rao's request that the lower appellate Court should be called upon to submit its findings in regard to these two aspects. It is fairly clear to me that these were abandoned even before the learned Subordinate Judge of Bezwada, evidently because it was realised that there was no substance in them.

    15. The result is that the execution application of 1940 as also the execution application of 1943 must be held to be barred by limitation. I therefore set aside the judgment of the learned District Judge of Kistna and restore that of the learned Subordinate Judge of Bezwada and dismiss both the execution petitions with costs throughout in both the cases.

    16. Leave refused.

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    Chaturvedula Venkata... v. Sha Ven Vaktaji Goma...
    (Jul 20, 1948)