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Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 7(2)(1) of Madras Act XV of 1946,
  • Rent Control Act.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 7(2)(1) of Madras Act XV of 1946,
  • Rent Control Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from an application for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, in H.R.A. No. 446 of 1947, which itself arose from an order of the House Rent Controller in H.R.C. No. 7277 of 1946.

The original landlord, Sha Moolchand Jodhajee, owned premises in Madras in which the respondent was a tenant. On 12 December 1946 Jodhajee petitioned the Rent Controller under Section 7(2)(1) of Madras Act XV of 1946 seeking eviction on the ground that rent for October 1946 (monthly rent Rs. 225) was not paid or tendered on or before 30 November 1946. The landlord alleged rent for October and November was sent on 5 December 1946, received 9 December, and was refused and returned. The landlord also said he required the premises bona fide for his own business (a circumstance the opinion notes, by itself, would not justify eviction).

The respondent tenant filed a counter-statement alleging that the landlord had demanded an enhanced rent in mid-October 1946 (to Rs. 337-8-0 effective 1 October), that discussions occurred, and that the tenant had tendered the original rent (Rs. 225) in early November but the landlord refused to accept it. The tenant further stated the bill-collector later refused rent at the old rate in late November, arbitration produced an agreed rent of Rs. 280-8-0, and a cheque sent at that rate on 5 December 1946 was refused and returned.

Before hearing, Jodhajee died on 22 January 1947. His son (the present petitioner) filed an affidavit on 18 February 1947 seeking to be brought on record as legal representative and reiterating the eviction grounds, and asking that the respondent be evicted.

The Rent Controller, by order dated 11 April 1947, directed possession to the petitioner on the ground the rent for October had not been paid or tendered by 30 November 1946, disbelieving the respondent's assertion of a tender in November, and effectively treated the son as the petitioner. The respondent appealed to the Chief Judge, who held that after the original petitioner's death the correct course for the legal representative was to file a fresh application and that the application to be brought on record was incompetent; the appeal was allowed on that ground. The Chief Judge also briefly dealt with the merits, observing that if the landlord had demanded enhanced rent the tenant could not be expected to tender the old rent; he did not decide whether a tender had been made in November.

The present application sought certiorari to quash the Chief Judge's order dismissing the matter as incompetent to be continued by the legal representative.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, upon the death of the original petitioner in Rent Controller proceedings, the legal representative may be brought on record to continue the petition (i.e., whether the Rent Controller may proceed with the substituted legal representative instead of requiring a fresh petition).
  2. Whether principles or provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure can be applied to proceedings under the Rent Control Act (specifically, whether the Rent Controller is to be treated as a "court of civil jurisdiction" for this purpose so that CPC rules permitting bringing legal representatives on record apply).
  3. Whether the Chief Judge was correct in holding the application incompetent solely because the original petitioner had died and the purported substitution was by affidavit rather than by filing a fresh petition (i.e., the maintainability of the petition as continued by the legal representative).
  4. Whether the factual contention of the respondent that there was a proper tender of rent before the due date (on two occasions) must be adjudicated before final determination of the eviction prayer.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner (son and legal representative) argued that he could be brought on record to continue the proceedings instituted by his deceased father. Counsel further contended that, even though the Rent Control Act rules did not expressly incorporate provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Rent Controller should be deemed a court of civil jurisdiction within the meaning of section 141 of the CPC and therefore the principles of the Code (permitting continuation by legal representatives) should apply.
  • The petitioner's affidavit of 18 February 1947 was relied upon as containing all material particulars required for an eviction application and as sufficient to place him on record to continue the petition.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent contended that the petition was not maintainable because the Rent Control Act or its rules contained no provision for bringing legal representatives on record to continue proceedings already instituted; the only remedy of the legal representative was to file a fresh petition.
  • The respondent also relied on the factual defence that there had been proper tenders of rent before the due date on two occasions (as pleaded in paragraph 5 of the counter-statement), and that these tenders defeated the eviction ground.

Chief Judge / Other Procedural Arguments

  • The learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes held that after the death of the original petitioner the only proper course was for the legal representative to file a separate application; accordingly he treated the brought-on-record application as incompetent and allowed the respondent's appeal on that basis.
  • The Advocate-General for the Chief Judge (who was noticed in this Court) drew attention to the lack of prescribed forms for issuing rule nisi and other notices in certiorari proceedings and emphasized that the tribunal whose order is sought to be quashed should be made a party so that records can be brought up. He urged rule-making to prescribe appropriate forms and parties in certiorari practice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Khadir Hadjiar v. A.K. Murthy (1947) 2 M.L.J. 482 Holds that in the absence of incorporation of provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the rules of procedure for tribunals under the Control Act, the principles of the Code should not be applied to proceedings under the Control Act. The Court relied upon and expressly agreed with this authority to reject the petitioner's contention that CPC principles must be applied to permit bringing the legal representative on record merely because the Rent Controller is a tribunal adjudicating civil rights. The Court cited the case to show there is no justification for applying CPC provisions unless they are made applicable by rules.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by distinguishing procedural principle from practical justice, and by applying the cited precedent on the limited question whether the Code of Civil Procedure could be invoked by implication.

First, the Court rejected the petitioner's primary contention that the Rent Controller should be treated as a civil court for the purpose of importing CPC provisions (section 141 CPC argument). It relied on the decision in Abdul Khadir Hadjiar v. A.K. Murthy, quoting the latter's observations that it is regrettable that the Code has not been made applicable but that, in the absence of rules incorporating it, one cannot apply the Code's provisions or principles by implication. The Court expressly agreed with those observations and declined to accept the petitioner's submission that CPC principles automatically apply.

Second, notwithstanding the legal rejection of the petitioner's CPC-based argument, the Court examined the practicalities of the situation. It found the technical objection—that a separate fresh application should have been filed by the legal representative—unconvincing in the particular facts. The Court noted that the petitioner's affidavit filed 18 February 1947 contained all the material particulars required in an eviction application and that to insist on a formal new petition in these circumstances would be "the height of technicality." The Court therefore treated the Chief Judge's dismissal on competence grounds as erroneous.

Third, the Court identified an important lacuna in the Chief Judge's approach: the Chief Judge had failed to decide the respondent's crucial factual plea (paragraph 5 of the counter-statement) that proper tenders had been made before the due date on two occasions. The Court stated that the question whether a tender was in fact made must be investigated by the learned Judge before a final decision on eviction is reached.

Fourth, on procedure for certiorari, the Court accepted the Advocate-General's practical point that the inferior tribunal whose order is sought to be quashed must be made a party so that records can be produced; it emphasized the necessity of issuing the writ to the inferior court (drawing on the classical description of certiorari and citing Short and Mellor's Crown Practice for descriptive authority). The Court suggested the Rule Committee should prescribe forms for issuance and return of rule nisi and rule absolute in certiorari proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CHIEF JUDGE DISMISSING THE PETITIONER'S APPLICATION AS INCOMPETENT IS QUASHED; THE RULE IS MADE ABSOLUTE.

Consequent directives and immediate effects:

  • The appeal (H.R.A. No. 446 of 1947) before the learned Chief Judge must be heard afresh — the matter is returned for reconsideration on its merits.
  • The learned Chief Judge is directed to consider the respondent's important factual plea (that there was a proper tender before the due date on two occasions) before coming to any final decision on the eviction application.
  • The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this certiorari application to the petitioner.

Implications regarding precedent and procedure: The Court did not create or purport to lay down a new general rule extending the Code of Civil Procedure to Rent Control proceedings; rather it applied existing authority to refuse the general CPC-based argument. The Court also expressed the view that rule-making is desirable to provide for bringing legal representatives on record in appropriate cases and to prescribe forms and parties in certiorari practice, but it did not itself alter statutory procedure. No new legal precedent extending CPC provisions to the Rent Control Act was established by this order.

    Sha Devichand Moolchand v. Sha Dhanraj Kantilal.

    1. This is an application to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, made by him in H.R.A. No. 446 of 1947 from the order of the House Rent Controller in H.R.C. No. 7277 of 1946.

    2. The petitioner before us is the son of one Sha Moolchand Jodhajee who owned premises No. 201, Govindappa Naicken Street, G.T., Madras, in which the respondent was carrying on business as a tenant. On the 12th December, 1946, Jodhajee filed a petition before the Rent Control Officer, Madras, under Section 7(2)(1) of Madras Act XV of 1946, seeking to evict the respondent from the premises. The ground alleged by him was that the respondent had failed to pay the monthly rental of Rs. 225 for the month of October on or before the last day of the month next following, that is to say, on or before the 30th November, 1946. He alleged that the rent for the months of October and November, 1946, was sent to him only on the 5th December, 1946 and received by him on the 9th December and was refused and was returned by him. He also alleged that he was himself carrying on business in a rented building, No. 88, Nyniappa Naicken Street, Madras, and that he required the premises in question bona fide for his own business. It is common ground that this latter circumstance by itself would not have justified the landlord in seeking to evict the tenant. On the 6th January, 1947, the respondent filed a counter-statement in which the main defence urged was that the landlord had demanded in the middle of October, 1946, an enhanced rent of Rs. 337-8-0 with effect from the 1st October, 1946 and there was a discussion between the parties on the subject of the demand for an enhanced rent and that in the beginning of November the respondent tendered to the petitioner the rent of Rs. 225 but the landlord refused to take it. It was further stated that when the landlord's bill-collector came towards the last week of November for collection of rent at the enhanced rate, the respondent tendered to him the rent for October and November at Rs. 225 per month but the bill-collector refused to receive the amount. Reference was made to arbitration and on the intercession of one Javerchand Kasaji an agreement was reached between the parties by which Rs. 280-8-0 was fixed as the rent payable. The respondent alleged that in spite of this agreement when a cheque was sent by him at the rate of Rs. 280-8-0 for the months of October and November on the 5th December, 1946, the cheque was refused and returned.

    3. On the 22nd January, 1947, before the application came on for hearing Jodhajee, the father of the petitioner, died. The present petitioner thereupon Sled an affidavit before the Rent Controller on the 18th February, 1947, stating that his father had died and that he was his only son and legal representative entitled. to be brought on record. He reiterated the material allegations in the original petition filed by his father, namely, that the respondent had committed wilful default in payment of rent for October, 1946 and that he was liable to be evicted, and that he (the petitioner) was carrying on business in a rented building and was put to considerable trouble and he required the premises for his own business.... The concluding paragraph in the affidavit is as follows: I pray I may be brought on record as the legal representative of the petitioner herein and the respondent may be evicted." The respondent filed a short counter-statement urging that the petition was not maintainable as there was no provision in the Act to bring on record legal representatives' to continue the proceedings instituted already and the petitioner's only remedy was to file a fresh petition. He pleaded that the statement filed by him already may be read as part of his second statement.

    4. The Rent Controller by his order, dated the 11th April, 1947, directed the respondent to put the petitioner in possession of the premises on the ground that the rent for the month of October was not paid or tendered on or before the 30th November, 1946. He refused to believe the case of the respondent that there was a tender in November. The Rent Controller assumed that the present petitioner could be brought on record as the legal representative and in effect he treated him as the petitioner in the case. There was an appeal by the respondent to the learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes. The learned Judge held that when the father of the petitioner died, the only course open to the petitioner as his legal representative was to file a separate application before the Rent Controller on the same ground and the application was incompetent after the death of the original petitioner, by which apparently he meant that the application could not be proceeded with. On this finding the appeal was allowed; but as he was invited to give a finding on the merits, he briefly dealt with them. He was of the opinion that the landlord, having demanded enhanced rent for the property, could not complain if the tenant did not tender the original rent. He did not go into the question whether any tender was made in November as pleaded by the respondent. This application is to quash the order of the learned Chief Judge.

    5. The learned advocate for the petitioner contended that though there was no provision either in the Act or in the rules made thereunder incorporating or making applicable any of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, neverthe-less the principle of those rules would apply because the Rent Controller must be deemed to be a Court of civil jurisdiction within the meaning of section 141 of the code as the Rent Controller was invested with powers to adjudicate upon civil rights of parties. We are not inclined to agree with this contention. It is sufficient to refer on this point to the observations of Sir Frederick Gentle, C.J. and Govindarajachari, J., in the recent case of Abdul Khadir Hadjiarv. A.K. Murthy (1947) 2 M.L.J. 482. The learned Chief Justice observed as follows:

    It is, in my view, to be regretted that the provisions of the Code have not been made applicable to proceedings under the Control Act, and that, when the Provincial Government, exercising the power conferred by Section 17 of the Act, made rules of procedure, they did not in those rules do what would have been, I think, desirable; they did not enable the provisions of the Code, so far as applicable and relevant to be made use of in proceedings under the Control Act. In the absence of rules, it was argued, nevertheless the principles of them must be applied. I am unable to accept that contention.

    6. At another place he says:

    I have already expressed the view that in the absence of incorporation of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the rules of procedure for the tribunals under the Control Act, there is no justification for the application of the principles of those provisions, otherwise it would mean applying those provisions when they are not made applicable.

    7. We respectfully agree with these observations. We likewise express regret that the rules do not provide for the application of at least some of the important rules of procedure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure to proceedings under the Rent Control Act.

    8. But in this case we are not much impressed with the technical objection taken that a separate application should have been filed by the petitioner instead of an application to be brought on record to continue the petition filed by his father. The affidavit of the petitioner dated the 18th February, 1947, to which reference has already been made contains all the material particulars required to be mentioned in an application praying for eviction and it appears to be the height of technicality to disregard this fact and insist upon a formal petition for the same purpose. The question whether it would be competent for the legal representative to be brought on record as such in an application before the Rent Controller in every case need not be decided by us. We desire however to point out that it appears to be necessary for a rule to be made providing in appropriate cases for the bringing on record of legal representatives on the death of the original applicant.

    9. We therefore hold that the order of the learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes dismissing the application of the petitioner on the ground that it was incompetent and not maintainable is wrong and must be quashed. The result would be that the appeal must be heard afresh.

    10. It may be pointed out that the learned Judge failed to record any finding on the important plea of the respondent contained in paragraph 5 of his original counter-statement, namely, that there was a proper tender before the due date on two occasions. It would be necessary for the learned Judge to go into this question before he comes to a final decision on the matter.

    11. The learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes to whom notice was directed to issue by order of this Court, drew our attention to the fact that there are no forms prescribed for the issue of rule nisi and for other notices in proceedings for the issue of a writ of certiorari and that in many cases the tribunal, whether it be a Judge of a Court or Board of (Commissioners or an officer of the Government is not made a party to an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari. We are of the opinion that it is absolutely necessary that the tribunal to quash whose order the application for the issue of a writ is taken should be a party because without notice issuing to such tribunal, the records of the proceedings cannot be brought up to this Court. The writ of certiorari is the process by which the King's Bench Division in Britain, 5n the exercise of the superintending power over inferior jurisdictions, requires the judges or officers of such jurisdictions to certify or send proceedings before hem into the King's Bench Division, whether for the purpose of examining into the legality of such proceedings, or for giving fuller or more satisfactory effect to them than could be done by the Court below. (See Short and Mellor's Crown Practice, page 14). That being so, a writ of certiorari must issue to the inferior Court. Whether the officer or authority concerned should also be required to appear in person or by pleader is a matter which may depend on the circum-tstances of each particular case. We consider this matter should receive the attention of the Rule Committee at an early date so that rules may be made prescribing the forms for the issue of rule nisi, return, as well as rule absolute.

    12. In the result the rule will be made absolute. The respondent will pay the costs of this application to the petitioner.

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    Sha Devichand Moolchand v. Sha Dhanraj Kantilal.
    (Jan 19, 1948)