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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking a declaration that reservation on the petitioner's land has lapsed (i.e., the land is dereserved) and directions to the respondents to take necessary steps for dereservation in their records so the petitioner can develop the land consistent with the adjacent land under the relevant plan.

Material facts disclosed in the opinion:

  • The petitioner is the owner of Gut No. 44 of Shirasgaon, now within the limits of Shrirampur Municipal Council, Ahmednagar. An area of 5,536 sq. metres was reserved for a playground in the development plan.
  • The draft development plan was sanctioned by the State on 9-8-1991 and published in the Government Gazette on 5-9-1991.
  • Because the State or Municipal Council did not acquire the reserved plot for 10 years (the ten-year period ended on 4-9-2001), the petitioner issued a purchase notice under section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act) on 27-6-2003; the notice was served on the Municipal Council on 30-6-2003.
  • The petitioner contended that six months elapsed without any steps being taken by the Municipal Council or State (i.e., by 29-12-2003) and that the reservation had consequently lapsed under section 127.
  • Respondent No. 5 (Municipal Council) filed a reply describing steps it had taken: receipt of notice (30-6-2003); resolution on 30-8-2003 initiating land-acquisition proceedings; submission of a proposal to the Collector on 24-12-2003; subsequent back-reference queries and resubmission of compliance on 25-1-2007; the Collector later issued orders under section 52-A of the Land Acquisition Act read with section 126 of the MRTP Act and delegated powers to the Sub Divisional Officer to take acquisition steps.
  • During submissions, the learned Additional Government Pleader (AGP) fairly conceded orally that no notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act had been issued.

Procedural posture: The Court made a rule, heard the matter by mutual consent and proceeded to final disposal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the reservation on the petitioner's land had lapsed under section 127 of the MRTP Act because no steps for acquisition were taken within ten years and no steps were commenced within six months after the purchase notice was served.
  2. Whether steps such as a Municipal Council resolution, an application to the Collector or communications to the State constitute "steps for acquisition" within the meaning of section 127 of the MRTP Act, or whether a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is necessary to show that steps for acquisition have commenced.
  3. Whether the Court should treat earlier observations in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association (1988) as binding on the interpretation of what constitutes “steps for acquisition,” or whether the Supreme Court's decision in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra (2007) limits the precedential weight of those observations.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted that the ten-year period after sanction of the development plan had elapsed without acquisition and that after service of the purchase notice under section 127 (served 30-6-2003), six months passed without the Municipal Council or State taking steps to acquire the land (six-month point being 29-12-2003).
  • Consequently, the petitioner claimed the statutory effect of lapse of reservation under section 127 had occurred and sought a declaration to that effect together with directions for dereservation in government/municipal records.
  • Counsel for the petitioner relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra (2007) to support the argument that mere applications or resolutions do not constitute commencement of acquisition; a section 6 declaration is required.

Respondent / Municipal Council's Arguments

  • Respondent No. 5 narrated the steps taken after receipt of the purchase notice: a Municipal Council resolution (30-8-2003) to initiate acquisition proceedings and submission of a proposal to the Collector (24-12-2003), followed by compliance with Collector queries (resubmitted 25-1-2007); subsequently the Collector issued orders under section 52-A of the Land Acquisition Act and delegated powers to the Sub Divisional Officer to take acquisition steps.
  • Counsel for the Municipal Council placed reliance on paragraph 11 of the Supreme Court's decision in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association (1988), emphasizing that ten years is long enough and the planning authority must proceed with promptitude in acquisition.
  • The AGP conceded orally that notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act had not been issued.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association, AIR 1988 SC 233; 1988 Supp SCC 55 General observation that a period of 10 years is long enough and planning authorities must take prompt steps for acquisition so compensation bears relation to real value; a fetter in public interest requiring strict observance of conditions. The Court noted that paragraph 11 was relied upon by the Municipal Council, but—following the Supreme Court's analysis in Girnar Traders—treated those observations as not forming the ratio decidendi for the specific legal question now before the Court and therefore not binding as authoritative precedent for the interpretation of “steps for acquisition” under section 127.
Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (6) Supreme 25 Held that only steps towards acquisition (i.e., steps that commence acquisition) count; mere applications or resolutions sent to the State/Government or an application to the State are not steps for acquisition. The Supreme Court concluded that acquisition steps truly commence when the State permits acquisition and publishes the declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court treated Girnar Traders as binding and on-point because the facts were practically parallel. It applied Girnar Traders to hold that, in the absence of a section 6 declaration, the events relied upon by the Municipal Council could not be treated as commencement of acquisition under section 127; therefore the reservation had lapsed and relief was granted to the petitioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded as follows, based strictly on the reasoning set out in the opinion:

  1. The Court identified the operative statutory provision at issue—section 127 of the MRTP Act—which prescribes the consequences where a reserved land is not acquired within ten years and provides a purchaser-owner remedy where acquisition has not commenced within a subsequent six-month period after service of a purchase notice.
  2. The Court examined the factual chronology: development plan sanctioned in 1991; ten years elapsed without acquisition (ending 4-9-2001); purchase notice served on 30-6-2003; Municipal Council took certain actions (resolution 30-8-2003; proposal to Collector 24-12-2003; later compliance and delegation under section 52-A), but no section 6 declaration under the Land Acquisition Act had been issued (a concession made by the AGP).
  3. The Court considered the competing authorities. It noted that Municipal Council relied on an observation in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1988) stressing promptitude in acquisition after a long period; however, the Court observed that the Supreme Court in Girnar Traders had analysed the earlier decision and held that those observations were not the ratio decidendi for the specific question concerning the meaning of “no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition.”
  4. The Court adopted Girnar Traders' interpretation of the phrase “steps as aforesaid” in section 127: that steps must be "towards acquisition" (i.e., steps that actually commence acquisition), and that making an application to the State or sending communications cannot be treated as commencement of acquisition because the State retains discretion under section 126(2) (and related provisions) to permit or refuse acquisition. The Supreme Court in Girnar Traders held that the effective commencement of acquisition would ordinarily be marked by the State's permission and publication of the section 6 declaration under the Land Acquisition Act.
  5. Because the facts in Girnar Traders were practically parallel to the present matter and because no section 6 declaration had been issued here, the Court concluded it was bound to follow Girnar Traders and that the events relied upon by the Municipal Council did not amount to commencement of acquisition within the meaning of section 127.
  6. On that basis the Court allowed the petition and made the rule absolute in terms of the petitioner's prayer clauses (B), (C) and (D).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Writ petition allowed; Rule made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (B), (C) and (D).

Implications as stated in the opinion:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's relief was granted and the rule made absolute in the terms sought in the specified prayer clauses (B), (C) and (D).
  • The Court followed the Supreme Court's decision in Girnar Traders and treated observations in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1988) as not binding for the specific interpretive question; the decision therefore applies existing Supreme Court precedent to the facts and does not purport to create a new precedent beyond following Girnar Traders.

The opinion does not reproduce the specific language or content of prayer clauses (B), (C) and (D); therefore the precise orders issued under those clauses are not reproduced in the provided text.

Petition allowed.
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    Satyabhamabai v. State Of Maharashtra

    N.V Dabholkar, J.:— By this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner seeks a declaration that the reservation on the land of petitioner has lapsed i.e the land is dereserved and also directions to respondents to take necessary steps for dereservation of the land in its records so as to enable petitioner to develop the land for the purpose permissible in the case of adjacent land under the relevant plan.

    2. Heard respective counsel.

    3. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith by mutual consent and the matter is heard for final disposal.

    4. The factual matrix necessary for the purpose of adjudication of writ petition can be narrated as follows.

    5. Petitioner is owner of Gut No. 44 of Shirasgaon, which is now part and parcel of Municipal limits of Shrirampur Municipal Council, Dist. Ahmednagar. An area admeasuring 5536 Sq. Mtrs. is reserved for playground according to development plan. The draft development plan submitted by Municipal Council to the Government was sanctioned by the State on 9-8-1991 and published in the Government gazette on 5-9-1991.

    6. Because the State or Municipal Council did not take any steps for acquiring the reserved plot for 10 years (which ended on 4-9-2001), petitioner issued a purchase notice under section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act for the sake of brevity) on 27-6-2003. Admittedly, the notice was served on Municipal Council on 30-6-2003. Petitioner has approached this Court by contending that in spite of lapse of six months (as on 29-12-2003) since no steps of acquisition are taken by Municipal Council or the State, the statutory effect of lapsing of reservation as contemplated by section 127 of mrtp act has occurred and petitioner is claiming a declaration to that effect.

    7. Reply is filed on behalf of respondent No. 5 and the steps taken by respondent No. 5 as indicated in the said reply, can be stated to be as follows.

    8. Notice was received by Municipal Council on 30-6-2003. It passed a resolution on 30-8-2003 for initiation of land acquisition proceedings of petitioner's plot. It was only on 24-12-2003, Municipal Council had submitted a proposal to Collector, Ahmednagar, for initiation of land acquisition proceedings. There was some back reference with queries by Collector to Municipal Council and Municipal Council resubmitted the matter with compliance on 25-1-2007. The Collector, after being satisfied by the compliance, has issued orders under section 52-A of the Land Acquisition Act read with section 126 of MRTP Act. As can be seen from Exhibit 2, annexed to reply, it appears that the Collector, Ahmednagar, has, in exercise of powers under section 52-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, has delegated all his powers under the said provision to Sub Divisional Officer, Shrirampur Division, to perform all the duties of Collector and to take all necessary steps for the purpose of acquisition of the plot as required for primary school and playground.

    9. During the course of his submissions, learned AGP, as per oral instructions taken, had fairly conceded that so far notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is not issued.

    10. Advocate Shri Hon for Municipal Council has placed reliance upon para 11 from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association, 1988 Mh. L.J (SC) 1 : 1988 Supp SCC 55 : AIR 1988 SC 233 to following effect:

    “It cannot be doubted that a period of 10 years is long enough. The Development or the Planning Authority must take recourse to acquisition with some amount of promptitude in order that the compensation paid to the expropriated owner bears a just relation to the real value of the land as otherwise the compensation paid for the acquisition would be wholly illusory. Such fetter on statutory powers is in the interest of the general public and the conditions subject to which they can be exercised must be strictly followed.”

    11. As against this, Shri A.B Kale has placed reliance upon recent judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the matter of Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (6) Supreme 25. It must be stated that the portion from para 11 in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra) is considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Girnar Traders at length in paras 20 to 30. After taking a survey as to what is judicial precedent, the Supreme Court concluded in para 30 thus:

    “Thus, observations of the Court did not relate to any of the legal questions arising in the case and, accordingly, cannot be considered as the part of ratio decidendi. Hence, in light of the aforementioned judicial pronouncements, which have well settled the proposition that only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding or authoritative precedent, it is clear that the reliance placed on mere general observations or casual expressions of the Court, is not of much avail to the respondents.”

    12. On reference to para 29 of the judgment in the matter of Girnar Traders, it is evident that the issue with which the Court was dealing in the matter of Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay, was “Whether the period of six months specified in section 127 of the Act is to be reckoned from the date of service of the purchase notice dated July 1, 1977, by the owner on the Planning Authority i.e the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay here or the date on which the requisite information of the particulars is furnished by the owner?” Since the Court in the case of Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation was not considering the interpretation of clause “no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition”, the observations of the Supreme Court in earlier judicial pronouncement are recorded to be not binding or authoritative precedent.

    13. While considering the interpretation of the phrase “or no steps aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition” as contained in section 127 of mrtp act, which was tried to be placed reliance upon by learned counsel for Municipal Council, the Supreme Court observed thus in para 31 of the judgment in the matter of Girnar Traders:

    “The step taken under the section within the time stipulated should be towards acquisition of land. It is a step of acquisition of land and not step for acquisition of land. It is trite that failure of authorities to take steps which result in actual commencement of acquisition of land cannot be permitted to defeat the purpose and object of the scheme of acquisition under the MRTP Act by merely moving an application requesting the Government to acquire the land, which Government may or may not accept. Any step which may or may not culminate in the step for acquisition cannot be said to be a step towards acquisition.”

    14. In the matter of Girnar Traders, revised development plan was sanctioned on 16-9-1991 and 10 years expired on 15-9-1991 without there being any acquisition or steps being taken for acquisition. The purchase notice under section 127 dated 15-3-2002 issued by the appellant was received by the authorities on 19-3-2002. Under the second part of section 127, the land was either required to be acquired or steps in that regard were required to be commenced by 18-9-2002 (expiry of six months). For the first time, after the service of purchase notice on 9-9-2002, a proposal was made by the Improvement Committee recommending the Municipal Corporation for sanction to initiate the acquisition proceedings. On 13-9-2002, without there being any resolution by the Government, the Chief Engineer (Development Plan) sent an application to the State Government for initiating the acquisition proceedings. For the first time on 16-9-2002, a resolution was passed by the Municipal Corporation whereby sanction was given to initiate the acquisition proceedings of land and the Municipal Commissioner was authorised to make an application to the State Government. On 17-9-2002, a letter was sent by Chief Engineer (Development Plan) to the Secretary, Urban Development Department in the Government of Maharashtra for initiating acquisition proceedings. It can be said that facts in the reported matter are practically parallel to the facts in the present matter before us. There has been silence for 10 years since the development plan was sanctioned and the resolution and communication to the State or the Collector are the events, which have taken place within six months from the service of purchase notice under section 127.

    15. The Hon'ble the Supreme Court, while interpreting the clause “steps as aforesaid” as contained in section 127 observed thus in para 32:

    “The making of an application to the State Government for acquisition of the land would not be a step for acquisition of the land under reservation. Sub-section (2) of section 126 leaves it open to the State Government either to permit the acquisition or not to permit, considering the public purpose for which the acquisition is sought for by the authorities. Thus, the steps towards acquisition would really commence when the State Government permits the acquisition and as a result thereof publishes the declaration under section 6 of the la act.”

    16. Para 33 is concluded by the Hon'ble Apex Court as follows:

    “Thus, unless and until section 6 declaration is issued, it cannot be said that the steps for acquisition are commenced.”

    17. Lastly, we may quote observations with which para 35 of the judgment is concluded:

    “Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, the step taken by the Municipal Corporation under section 126(1)(c) of making an application could be said to be a step for the commencement of acquisition of the land. After the expiry of one year, it is left to the Government concerned under sub-section (4) of section 126 to issue declaration under section 6 of the la act for the purposes of acquisition for which no application is required under section 126(1)(c). sub-section (4) of section 126 of the MRTP Act would come into operation if the State Government is of the view that the land is required to be acquired for any public purpose.”

    18. In view of the interpretation of the relevant clause, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Girnar Traders, we are bound to follow even the result in the said case since the facts in the reported judgment and the matter before us are practically similar.

    19. Writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (B), (C) and (D).

    Petition allowed.
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    Satyabhamabai v. State Of Maharashtra
    (Oct 3, 2007)