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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion records the combined disposal by the Bench of cross-appeals arising from the order of the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) dated 27th July, 1990, for assessment year 1985-86. Two appeals are before the court: ITA No. 7512/Bom/90 (assessee's appeal) and ITA No. 7687/Bom/90 (Department's appeal). The assessee challenged multiple disallowances and additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) and sustained, in part or whole, by the CIT(A). The Department also appealed certain allowances granted by the CIT(A). The court hears submissions from the assessee's counsel and the Departmental Representative, considers earlier tribunal and court decisions (including the assessee's own earlier tribunal orders), and disposes of the cross-appeals by a single, consolidated order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether sundry credit balances written back and credited to profit & loss account (aggregating Rs. 8,16,000) were taxable in the hands of the assessee in view of the cited Supreme Court authority.
  2. Whether provisions made for trade guarantees (warranty provisions) are allowable as deduction, and if so to what extent (relevance of gap between provisions and actuals and consistency across years).
  3. Whether payments made as performance rewards to employees and payments to employees' federation (total Rs. 27,57,729) are deductible under s.36(1)(ii)/s.37 or disallowable under s.40A(9) (and whether they fall under the Payment of Bonus Act).
  4. Whether expenses connected with the issue of partly convertible debentures (proportionate to convertible portion) are capital in nature and therefore disallowable.
  5. Allowability under s.35(1)(i) of amounts reimbursed to a research centre (TRDDC) for research funding in genetic engineering when the assessee is engaged in marketing/distribution rather than manufacturing.
  6. Whether technical know-how fees (Rs. 5,70,000) are revenue or capital in nature.
  7. Allowability of various other expenditures and deductions: guest-house expenses (s.37(4)/(5)), disallowance under s.40A(5), motor car expenses under s.37(3A)/37(3B)(ii), additional depreciation under s.32(1)(iia), interest under s.139(8) and s.217(1A), and classification of certain printing/mailing, commission and conveyance expenses for s.37(3A).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Assessee's) Arguments

  • Sundry credits: the assessee's counsel conceded the Supreme Court decision in CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd. was in favour of Revenue on that specific issue; the court should follow that authority for the sundry credits ground.
  • Trade guarantee provisions: the assessee maintained a consistent, scientific method of estimating warranty liabilities based on past experience; the method was accepted by the Department in years before and after the assessment year; reliance placed on tribunal/high court and other decisions (including Wanson's case, Mitsubishi Motors NZ, Calcutta Co. Ltd., and the Tribunal's decision in assessee's own case for AY 1984-85).
  • Performance rewards: payments were made pursuant to agreements with the employee federation; payments comprised Rs.250 per employee to employees (actual payment) and Rs.200 per employee to the federation to be used for employee welfare; argued these were performance-related incentives outside the Payment of Bonus Act and deductible under s.36(1)(ii) (or alternatively s.37(1)); reliance placed on Sassoon J. Davar & Co. and Tribunal orders (Telco) to support deductibility, and on Raasi Cement (Tribunal Hyderabad) regarding s.40A(9) issues.
  • Convertible debentures: the assessee argued that expenses were incurred in raising loan-funding (debentures) and not for immediate increase of capital; hence proportionate disallowance for the convertible portion was not justified.
  • Technical know-how fees: relied on the assessee's prior tribunal decision (1976 order) and argued the agreement did not involve complete transfer of know-how and was for a limited period; earlier tribunal found similar payment to be revenue in nature.
  • TRDDC research reimbursement: argued that the expenditure was for extension of the assessee's business (pharmaceutical marketing division) and thus qualifies as "scientific research" related to business under s.35(1)(i).
  • Interest under s.139(8): relied on the assessee's earlier tribunal order and a series of authorities that deletion of such interest is justified on similar facts.
  • Other miscellaneous issues: relied on prior tribunal order in assessee's case for AY 1984-85 on guest-house expenses, motor car expenses, and additional depreciation on data processing machines.

Respondent's (Revenue / Departmental Representative) Arguments

  • Trade guarantee provisions: argued that liability under warranty arises only upon claim by the customer and therefore provisions (estimates) should not be allowed; emphasized the wide gap between provision and actual expenditure to justify disallowance.
  • Performance rewards: AO treated part of payments as excess over Payment of Bonus Act limits and disallowed under provisions of s.36(1)(ii) and s.40A(9); Department argued deduction should not be allowed and that TDS was not deducted on federation payments.
  • Convertible debentures: AO and CIT(A) treated proportionate expenses as capital since part of the debentures were convertible into shares.
  • TRDDC research reimbursement: AO viewed assessee as a distributor/marketer (not a manufacturer) and hence not eligible for deduction under s.35(1)(i) for scientific research costs.
  • Disallowances under s.40A(5), additional depreciation claims, and other heads: the Departmental Representative relied on lower authority orders and supporting High Court/tribunal decisions to support the disallowances.
  • Interest under s.217(1A): Department supported the levy of interest by AO in assessment proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd. (1996) 136 CTR (SC) 444 : 222 ITR 344 (SQ) Taxability of sundry credit balances written back. The counsel conceded this Supreme Court decision favoured the Revenue on the issue of sundry credits; the court did not interfere with the CIT(A) on that ground in view of this authority.
ITO vs. Wanson (India) Ltd. (1983) 5 TTD 102; 47 ITD 1 Permitted deduction of provisions where there are only marginal differences between estimated provisions and actual expenditure (principle supporting allowance of provisions). The court noted Wanson's premise assumed marginal differences; distinguished Wanson because in the present facts the gap was wider, but ultimately accepted the assessee's consistent scientific estimation and followed the assessee's earlier tribunal decision instead.
Calcutta Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1959) 37 ITR 1 (SQ) Referenced by assessee in support of treatment of provisions (specific rule not detailed in opinion). The opinion records the case was relied upon by counsel; the text does not set out a specific rule from this decision for the court's analysis of the present facts.
Brooke Bond India Ltd. vs. CIT (1997) 140 CTR ... : 225 ITR 798 Expenses incurred in connection with an additional issue of shares were held capital in nature. Applied to distinguish: court held that where conversion into shares is a future event (after two years), treating the proportionate expense as capital in the year of raising the loan would be unfair; therefore disallowance was deleted.
Sassoon J. Davar & Co. (P) Ltd. vs. CTT (1979) 10 CTR (SQ) 383 : 118 ITR 261 Authority relied upon by assessee in support of deductibility of payments to employees/employee bodies. The case was cited by counsel; the court considered it among supporting authorities and, on the facts and other authorities, allowed the assessee's claim.
Telco — Tribunal order (30th May, 1988) ITA Nos. 6087/Bom/86 & 477/Bom/88 Tribunal authority for allowing similar performance-related payments to employees. The court said it was "amply guided" by the Tribunal's Telco decision and followed it to allow the performance reward deduction.
Raasi Cement Ltd. vs. ITO (1993) 47 TTJ (Hyd) 254 : 45 ITD 233 (Hyd) Decision relied on concerning disallowance under s.40A(9) for payments to employee federations. Cited by counsel in support of allowability of payments to federation; the court concluded that so long as contribution to federation is genuine and there is no claim that funds will not be used for employees' benefit, deduction is allowable.
CTT vs. P. Alikunju MA. Nazir Cashew Industries (1987) 62 CTR (Kar) 206 : 166 ITR 611 (Ker) Construction of provisos to s.36(1)(ii): second proviso may permit deduction even where Payment of Bonus Act applies, if the payment is reasonable considering the proviso factors. The court reproduced and relied on the Kerala High Court's reasoning to hold that the payments were not barred by the Payment of Bonus Act and could be deductible under s.36(1)(ii)'s second proviso.
Shahzada Nand & Sons vs. CIT (1977) CTR (SQ) 246 : 108 ITR 358 (SQ) Interpretation of proviso to s.36(1)(ii): the listed factors are guides to determine reasonableness and not strict conditions. The court quoted the decision to support the view that the three factors in the proviso are to be considered as guides/factors for reasonableness, not rigid prerequisites to deductibility.
Supreme Court (unnamed citation) (1968) 69 ITR 692 (SQ) Definition of "scientific research" as any activity for extension of knowledge in natural or applied science. The court invoked this principle to hold that expenditure reimbursed to TRDDC for research that could extend the assessee's business (pharmaceutical marketing) qualifies under s.35(1)(i).
CIT vs. Coromandal Fertilizer Ltd. (1996) 135 CTR (AP) 354 : 220 ITR 298 (AP) Applied on issue of disallowance under rules relating to travel/other allowances (case law unfavourable to assessee). The assessee conceded this authority and the court, following it (and a Bombay High Court decision), dismissed the assessee's claim on that specific travel/allowance point.
Lubrizol India Ltd. vs. CIT (1991) 93 CTR (Bom) 237 : 187 ITR 25 (Bom) Jurisdictional High Court authority applied in disallowance under s.40A(5) (case against assessee on similar facts). The assessee conceded the tribunal's outcome followed Lubrizol and the court decided the s.40A(5) issue against the assessee accordingly.
CIT vs. Ocean Carriers (P) Ltd. (1995) 123 CTR (Bom) 200 : 211 ITR 357 (Bom) Whether an accommodation qualifies as a "guest house" for s.37(4) purposes (cited by Revenue). The court found those authorities not relevant because in the present case the accommodation was admitted to be a guest house; the question here was whether particular costs of a guest house are allowable — the court followed the assessee's prior tribunal order and allowed the claim.
Raja Bahadur Mohanlal Poona Mills Ltd. vs. CIT (1996) 130 CTR (Bom) 348 : 212 ITR 175 (Bom) Cited by Revenue on guest-house/accommodation issues. As above, the court considered these decisions not relevant on the precise point and followed the assessee's earlier tribunal decision to allow the guest-house related expenses.
ITO vs. Ganges Printing Co. Ltd. (1986) 24 TTJ (Cal) 404 : 15 TID 212 (Cal) Authority on additional depreciation for data processing machines. The court followed this decision (and another) and allowed additional depreciation for data processing machines while rejecting additional depreciation claims on other office equipment.
ITO vs. VM Salgookar & Bros. (P) Ltd. (1986) 18 ITD 440 (Bang) Authority on additional depreciation for data processing machines. Followed by the court to allow additional depreciation on data processing machines.
CIT vs. Laxmi Rattan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. (1974) 97 ITR 285 (All) Authority on interest under s.139(8) (cited by Revenue). Referenced by parties; court followed earlier tribunal decisions and authorities to cancel interest under s.139(8) on similar facts.
Kadri Mills (Coimbatore) Ltd. (1977) CTR (Mad) 51 : 106 ITR 846 (Mad) Authority used in support of deleting interest levied under s.139(8). The court followed these earlier authorities and the Tribunal's prior decision in the assessee's case to cancel the interest for the year in question.
CIT vs. Brij Lal Lohia & Mahabir Prosad Khemka (1980) 18 CTR (Cal) 163 : 124 TTR 485 (Cal) Authority supporting deletion of interest under s.139(8) on similar facts. Relied on by the court in cancelling the interest under s.139(8) following consistent precedents.
B. V. Aswathaiah & Bros. vs. ITO (1986) 52 CTR (Kar) 49 : 155 ITR 422 (Kar) Authority used in relation to s.139(8) interest deletion. Followed along with other decisions to delete the interest levied under s.139(8).
Patel Aluminium (P) Ltd. vs. Miss K.M. Tawadia, ITO (1986) 51 CTR (Bom) 322 : 165 ITR 99 (Bom) Authority relied upon by assessee concerning interest under provisions like s.217(1)/(1A). The court held that the specific authority pertained to s.217(1)(a) and was not directly applicable to s.217(1A) in the present matter, and therefore rejected the assessee's ground on that basis (while directing consequential relief if entitled).
Director of Income-tax (Exemption) vs. Shree Sitaram Public Charitable Trust (1995) 124 CTR (Cal) 89 : 207 ITR 1087 (Cal) Authority referenced in relation to interest/estimate filing issues under provisions like s.209A/212(3A). The court noted the assessee did not place facts to show required estimates were filed or not; thus it could not apply this authority and rejected the ground while directing consequential relief if entitled.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each ground methodically, applying statutory interpretation, factual analysis, and precedents (tribunal and higher courts) as applicable. The analysis below follows the opinion's sequence and reasoning.

1. Sundry Credit Balances Written Back

The court accepted the assessee's concession that the Supreme Court decision in CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd. was in favour of the Revenue on this issue, and therefore did not interfere with the CIT(A)'s order on that ground.

2. Provisions for Trade Guarantees (Warranty Provisions)

The AO allowed deduction of current year's warranty expenses but disallowed a significant portion of provisions carried forward. The CIT(A) partly sustained disallowance, citing a "wide gap" between provision and actual expenditure and restricting disallowance to a specified amount. The assessee relied on a consistent, scientific method of estimation, accepted by the Department in other years and supported by certain precedents and the Tribunal's earlier decision in the assessee's own case.

The court considered Wanson's authority but observed that Wanson assumed marginal differences between estimates and actuals — a premise not aligned with the facts here as the CIT(A) found a wide gap. Nonetheless, the court found stronger reasons to uphold the assessee: (i) the CIT(A) agreed in principle that properly estimated provisions could be deductible; (ii) the assessee's method was scientific and consistent rather than ad hoc; (iii) the accounting method ensured excesses were adjusted in subsequent years; (iv) for a national-scale consumer-products business it was reasonable to provide a cushion for claims and marginal-difference cannot be a rigid rule. On these bases and following the Tribunal's own earlier view for AY 1984-85, the court deleted the disallowance of Rs. 64.26 lakhs.

3. Performance Reward Payments to Employees and Employee Federation

The AO disallowed part of the performance reward payments treating them as in excess of statutory bonus limits and disallowed them under s.36(1)(ii) / s.40A(9). The CIT(A) confirmed these disallowances. The assessee produced written agreements showing the structure and purpose of the payments: Rs.250 paid to employees and Rs.200 paid to the federation for welfare. The court analysed whether these payments were "bonus" under the Payment of Bonus Act or were deductible business expenditures.

The court concluded the payments were not "bonus" under the Bonus Act (they were performance rewards/incentives intended to secure employee cooperation and improved performance). The court relied on the Kerala High Court decision in CTT vs P. Alikunju (reproduced passage) to interpret the provisos to s.36(1)(ii) and emphasized Shahzada Nand & Sons on how the three factors in the proviso are to be applied as guides to determine reasonableness rather than strict conditions. The court held: (i) the payments were for business purposes (encouraging performance and industrial peace); (ii) there was nothing to indicate payments were not "wholly and exclusively" for business; (iii) even if regarded as bonus, they would fall under the second proviso to s.36(1)(ii) and the facts did not show violation of its conditions; (iv) payment to the federation for welfare did not defeat deductibility so long as contribution was genuine and there was no departmental claim the funds would not be used for employees' benefit. On these bases, the court directed allowance of the entire Rs.27,57,729.

4. Expenses Relating to Issue of Partly Convertible Debentures

The AO and CIT(A) treated one-quarter of the issue expenses as capital (proportionate to the convertible quarter). The court examined whether the expense related to raising a loan (revenue) or was an expense connected with increase of capital (capital). The court observed that conversion into shares was a certainty but would occur after two years. Relying on the reasoning that it would be unfair to treat proportionate expenses as capital in the year the loan was raised (because capital increase occurs later), the court deleted the disallowance and allowed the expense as revenue in nature for the current year, distinguishing Brooke Bond (which concerned immediate additional share issue expenses) on the facts.

5. TRDDC Research Funding (s.35(1)(i))

The AO disallowed reimbursement to TRDDC for research funding, on the ground the assessee was not a manufacturer. The court relied on the Supreme Court's broad conception of "scientific research" as extension of knowledge in natural or applied science and sec.43(4)(iii) which includes research leading to or facilitating extension of business. The court accepted the assessee's contention that the research was intended to extend its pharmaceutical marketing business and allowed the deduction, deleting the disallowance confirmed by the CIT(A).

6. Technical Know-How Fees (Rs. 5,70,000)

The AO disallowed this payment treating it as capital, while the assessee relied on an earlier tribunal order (1976) where a similar agreement with the same foreign company was held to be revenue in nature. The court examined the agreement terms (duration clauses, renewal, absence of outright sale of know-how) and concluded the agreement did not contemplate an absolute transfer of know-how; it was for a defined term with renewals. Following the earlier tribunal order, the court allowed the deduction as revenue expenditure.

7. Guest House Expenses (s.37(4) / (5))

In respect of guest house expenses (maintenance, rent, repairs, depreciation), the AO disallowed the whole net amount; the assessee relied on its own tribunal order for AY 1984-85 and other high court decisions. The Department relied on Bombay High Court decisions concerning whether accommodation qualifies as a guest house. The court found those authorities inapposite because here it was not in dispute that the accommodation was a guest house; the only question was whether particular expenses incurred on a guest house were allowable. The court followed the assessee's earlier Tribunal order and allowed the guest-house related claims.

8. Disallowance under s.40A(5) and Related Matters

The AO estimated disallowances for certain employee amenities, subscriptions and other personal-type expenses. The CIT(A) reduced AO's estimate. The assessee conceded that the applicable tribunal/high-court precedent was against it (Lubrizol) and the court accordingly decided the s.40A(5) issue against the assessee, following consistent precedent.

9. Motor Car Expenses and Salaries of Drivers (s.37(3A)/(3B))

The court followed the Tribunal's earlier order in the assessee's own case (AY 1984-85) and allowed the assessee's claim on repairs, insurance, taxes of motor cars and rejected the disallowance. For salaries to car drivers, following Dy. CIT vs. Addison & Co. Ltd. (1995) 53 ITD 514 (Mad), the court held the disallowance was uncalled for and allowed the claim.

10. Additional Depreciation under s.32(1)(iia)

The assessee's claim for additional depreciation on various office and data-processing assets was partly rejected. Following the Tribunal's earlier order in the assessee's case, the court rejected additional depreciation claims on copiers, drafting machines and air-conditioning but allowed additional depreciation on data-processing machines (citing ITO vs. Ganges Printing and ITO vs. VM Salgookar & Bros.).

11. Interest under s.139(8) and s.217(1A)

Interest under s.139(8): The return was filed on an extended date (31st July, 1985). The AO levied s.139(8) interest, which the CIT(A) confirmed. The court followed the assessee's prior tribunal decision and earlier authorities (Kadri Mills, Brij Lal Lohia, B.V. Aswathaiah & Bros.) and deleted the interest.

Interest under s.217(1A): The court found insufficient facts (no material was placed to show whether the assessee was required to file an estimate under s.209A(4) or s.212(3A) and whether it was filed). As such, authorities relied upon by the assessee were found not applicable; the ground was rejected but the court directed the AO to grant consequential relief if the assessee is entitled to it under law.

12. Department's Appeal Points

In the Revenue's appeal, the court considered (a) deletion of the warranty provision addition (already addressed and deleted in the assessee's appeal), (b) expenses claimed for printing/mailing, commission and conveyance alleged to be advertisement/publicity under s.37(3A) — the court held these were not advertisement charges and upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition, and (c) additional depreciation on computer room and electrical work — the court held additional depreciation is allowable only on plant & machinery and disallowed the claim, restoring the AO's disallowance on that point.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: The appeals are PARTLY ALLOWED — both the assessee's appeal and the Department's appeal were partly allowed in the result.

Core Rulings (Direct Effects on Parties)

  • Sundry credit balances written back: the court did not interfere with the CIT(A) in view of the cited Supreme Court authority (CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd.).
  • Provision for trade guarantees: deletion of the disallowance of Rs. 64.26 lakhs (assessee's claim upheld on account of consistent scientific estimation and prior tribunal authority in assessee's own case).
  • Performance reward payments: the disallowance of Rs. 27,57,729 was set aside and the payments were held deductible (allowed), including amounts paid to the employee federation, subject to genuineness and utilisation for employee welfare.
  • Expenses on partly convertible debentures: deletion of the disallowance of Rs. 4,97,953; proportionate expense treated as revenue in the year of raising loan because conversion into capital occurs later.
  • TRDDC research reimbursement (s.35(1)(i)): deduction allowed; disallowance deleted.
  • Technical know-how fees (Rs. 5.70 lakhs): treated as revenue expenditure and allowed following prior tribunal view.
  • Guest-house expenses and certain motor car/salary items: claims allowed following Tribunal's prior order in the assessee's case.
  • Disallowance under s.40A(5) (estimated disallowance): decided against the assessee following Lubrizol (assessed in favour of Revenue for that point).
  • Additional depreciation on data processing machines: allowed; on other office equipment and some plant-like items rejected as per prior Tribunal holdings.
  • Interest under s.139(8): deleted in favour of the assessee; interest under s.217(1A): assessee's ground rejected for lack of factual material but AO to grant consequential relief if entitled.
  • In the Department's appeal, the court upheld deletion of certain additions (printing/mailing, commission, conveyance) as these were not advertisement-related for s.37(3A); however the court restored the AO's disallowance on additional depreciation for computer room/electrical work as these do not constitute plant and machinery for additional depreciation purposes.

Broader Implications / Precedential Notes

The court reached most conclusions by applying established principles and prior tribunal/high court/supreme court authorities. The opinion primarily resolves contested assessments on the facts before the court and relies on earlier tribunal orders in the assessee's own case and on authorities interpreting s.36(1)(ii) provisos, the scope of s.35(1)(i) (scientific research), and capital vs. revenue classification of issue-related expenses. The court did not pronounce any novel principle of law beyond its application of existing authorities; therefore the immediate consequence is the re-computation of the assessee's income in accordance with the deletions and allowances directed above.

Net Outcome

Both appeals are partly allowed: several disallowances sustained by the AO and the CIT(A) were set aside in favour of the assessee (notably warranty provisions, performance rewards, convertible debenture expense proportion, technical know-how fees, TRDDC research reimbursement, and certain depreciation/allowance items), while certain issues went in favour of the Revenue (notably the s.40A(5) estimate disallowance and additional depreciation on items not constituting plant & machinery). The AO is to give consequential relief where appropriate in accordance with law.

    Voltas Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax

    PRADEEP FARIKH, A.M.:

    These cross-appeals are directed against the order of the learned CIT (A) dt. 27th July, 1990 for asst. yr. 1985-86. We find it convenient to dispose of the same by this combined order. The assessee's appeal is taken up first for disposal.

    I ITA No. 75121B=190 (Assessee's Appeal)

    2. The first ground relates to the taxability of sundry credit balances written back, aggregating to Rs. 8,16,000 and credited to P & L a/c. It is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the assessee that the similar issue the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ClT vs. TV. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons. Ltd. (1996) 136 CTR (SC) 444 : (1996) 222 ITR 344 (SQ) is in favour of the Revenue. In view of the said decision, we do not interfere with the order of the CIT(A).

    3. The next ground relating to unpaid statutory liabilities is not pressed and hence the same is rejected as such.

    4. The next ground relates to the disallowance of the provisions made for trade guarantees. To meet the claims of its consumers during warranty period, the assessee makes provision in its accounts for such contingencies. For the year under consideration, and for the subsequent year following was the position in the accounts :

    Asst. yr. 1985-86 Asst. yr. 1985-86 Asst. yr. 1986-87 Asst. yr. 1986-87 (Rs. In lacs) (Rs. In lacs) Opening provision 209.15 237.00 Add : Provision during the year :

    207.00 203.93 Less : Excess provision written back 44.83 162.32 55.73 148.20 371.32 385.20 Less : Expenses during the year :

    (a) against opening balance 88.73 107.15

    (b) during the year 45.59 134.32 49.00 156.15 237.00 229.05 Out of the net provision of Rs. 162.17 as shown above the AO allowed deduction of Rs. 45.59 lacs as current year's expenses and disallowed the balance of Rs. 116.58 lacs.

    5. The CIT(A), however, observed that there was a wide gap between the provision made and actual expenses incurred. According to him the provisions was in excess by 26.21 per cent. As a result of this observation, the CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO in not allowing the deduction of actual expenditure relatable to the old provision. However, out of the gross provision made during the year, be restricted the disallowance to Rs. 54.26 in the following manner :

    Rs. In Lacs Rs. In Lacs Total provision made during the year 207.00 Less : Expenses incurred in asst. yr. 1986-87 107.15 99.85 Less : Expenditure already allowed by the AO 45.59 54.26 Thus, in nutshell, the above facts can be summarised a follows :

    Deduction clamined by the assessee Deduction clamined by the assessee Disallowance made by the AO Disallowance made by the AO Disallowance retained by the CIT(A) Disallowance retained by the CIT(A) Rs. 162.17 lacs Rs. 116.58 lacs Rs. 54.26 lacs (207-44.83) (162.17-45.59) (207.00-107.15-45.59)

    6. The submission of the learned counsel was that this was the consistent approach adopted by the assessee from year to year, which had been accepted by the Department prior to asst. yr. 1984-85 and had again accepted after asst. yr. 1986-87. Besides relying on several decisions reported in H?C vs. Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd. (1996) 222 ITR 697 (PC), ITO vs. Wanson (India) Ltd. (1983) 5 TTD 102 (Ph), 47 ITD 1 and Calcutta Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1959) 37 ITR 1 (SQ), the learned counsel drew our attention to the Bombay Bench decision of the Tribunal in the assessee's own case for asst. yr. 1984-85.

    7. The learned Departmental Representative opposed the claim of the assessee mainly on the ground that the liability of the assessee under the warranty arose only when there was a claim by the customer and not otherwise. The learned Departmental Representative reiterated the observations of the CIT(A) regarding the gap between the provision and actual expenditure, which, it was submitted, remained wide even after write back of excess provision. The decision of the Tribunal in the case of Wanson (India) (supra) was sought to be distinguished and it was urged that deduction should be allowed only when actual expenses were incurred.

    8. We have considered the rival submissions and the material on record, of the several decisions relied upon by the learned counsel, his main stress was on the Wanson's case (supra) and obviously on the decision in the assessee's own case. However, it is worthwhile mentioning that Wanson's case was decided on the presumption that there would be only marginal differences between estimates and actuals. On the other hand, in the instant case, the main ground on which the CIT(A) sustained part of the disallowance was the wide gap he noticed between the provision and the actuals, which, it appears was not the plea before the Tribunal in the appeal relating to asst. yrs. 1984-85. Thus, the basis premise on which Wanson's case (supra) stands is diametrically opposite to the actual fact in this case. Nonetheless there are stronger reasons to uphold the claim of the assessee.

    9. Firstly, the CIT(A) agrees in principle that provision can be allowed as a deduction provided, there is a marginal difference between the estimates and actuals as held in Wanson's case (supra). The CIT(A) also admits that the assessee has been scientifically working out the anticipated liabilities to be provided under mercantile system of accounting based on past experience and no adhocism is involved. When such is the situation, we fail to understand as to why deduction should not be allowed. In this background the so-called wide gap no longer remains wide which would merit disallowance even partly. Moreover, it is not disputed that the accounting method ensures that such excesses are made good in subsequent years and that too with scrupulous consistency.

    10. Secondly, it does not appeal to us that in order to disallow the so-called excess provision, one has always to resort to the actual expenditure incurred in the succeeding year. In our opinion, by doing so the scientific estimation is converted into adhocism.

    11. Thirdly, it has to be appreciated that the assessee deals in numerous consumer products on a national scale, in which case the principle of marginal difference cannot be applied as a thumb rule. In such cases it is always prudent to provide more cushion to absorb possible claims.

    12. Thus, we follow the view taken by the Tribunal in the assessee's own case in asst. yr. 1984-85 and delete the disallowance of Rs. 64.26 lacs sustained by the CIT(A).

    13. The next ground relates to the disallowance of Rs. 27,57,729 paid to employees as performance reward. It was observed by the AO that besides bonus provision of Rs. 127.43 lacs, the assessee also paid Rs. 27,57,729 as performance reward pursuant to a settlement with the union. Out of this sum, Rs. 13,80,495 had been paid to the employees and Rs. 13,77,234 had been paid to the employee's federation for welfare measures to be promoted by the federation. In the tax audit report, payment of Rs. 13,77,234 had been classified as expenditure liable for disallowance under s. 40A(8) (sic). The assessee had put up its claim for the allowance of the impugned expenditure under second proviso to s. 36(l)(ii) or alternative under s. 37(l). Since the impugned payment was in respect of accounting year 1982-83, during which year also 20 per cent bonus was paid, the AO considered this as excess payment over the limits prescribed by Payment of Bonus Act and negatived the claim under s. 36(l)(ii). As for the alternate plea of the assessee, the AO disallowed deduction of Rs. 13,80,495 under the first proviso to s. 36(l)(ii) and the balance amount of Rs. 13,77,234 paid to the employees' federation was disallowed under s. 40A(9) of the Act. The CIT(A) confirmed both the disallowances.

    14. It was submitted by the learned counsel that the impugned payments were made on the basis of agreements, with employee federation. As per the agreement the performance reward was paid to the employees at the rate of Rs. 250 (total Rs. 13,80,495) and Rs. 13,77,234 was paid to the employees' federation directly at the rate of Rs. 200 per employee to be used for the welfare of the employees. In support of his plea the learned counsel relied on several decisions. However, his specific reference was to the decision in Sassoon J Daidd & Co. (P) Ltd. vs. CTT (1979) 10 CTR (SQ) 383: (1979) 118 ITR 261 (SQ) and to the combined order of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of TELCO in ITA Nos. 6087/Bom/86 and 477/Bom/88 dt. 30th May, 1988. As regards the disallowance made under s. 40A(9), reliance was placed on the decision of the Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal in Raasi Cement Ltd. vs. ITO 0 993) 4 7 TTJ (Hyd) 254 : (1993) 45 ITD 233 (Hyd).

    15. The learned Departmental Representative relied on the orders of the lower authorities and reiterated their stand regarding the provisions of s. 36(l)(ii). The disallowance made under s. 40A(9) was also stated to be justified on the ground that the said payment was not subjected to deduction of tax at source.

    16. We have considered the rival contentions and the material on record. The agreements entered into between the management and employees' federation indicate that the impugned payment is a performance reward payable to the workers over and above the bonus payable at 20 per cent calculated on the basis of the Payment of Bonus Act. The agreements also clarify that the performance reward is being paid in expectation of the employees' continued constructive co-operation for improved performance. It is thus clear that the impugned payment is outside the purview of the Bonus Act. In such an event, the only point to be considered would be whether the expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. As mentioned earlier, the payment is for performance achieved and also for anticipated performance. We do not see any thing to indicate that the payment is not exclusively for the purposes of business. Though the payment is not directly linked with any production or sales target, it is for the very much sought-after co-operation ensuring industrial peace which culminates into better performance. Hence, in our view, it is not proper on the part of the CIT(A) to say that "payment of Rs. 250 to all employees irrespective of their production targets or their performance would certainly take it outside the purview of its being production incentive .........

    17. Under such circumstances, the interpretation of s. 36(l)(ii) and the two provisions as sought to be canvassed by the authorities below is not justified. The decision of the Kerala High Court in CTT vs. P. Alikunju MA. Nazir Cashew Industrjes (1987) 62 CTR (Kar) 206 : (1987) 166 ITR 611 (Ker) is a pointer in this direction, we reproduce below the observations of the Court appearing at p. 615 :

    "We do not agree with the argument urged on behalf of the Revenue that the deduction is not permissible in respect of an employee covered by the Bonus Act if what is paid as bonus, or as commission, is in excess of otherwise than what is payable under that Act, even if the payment of the excess amount, whether as bonus or commission, is justifiable when considered with reference to cls, (a) to (c) of the second proviso. In our view, the two provisos must be read together to correctly understand the permissible deduction in terms of cl. (ii) of sub-s. (1) of s. 36. The object of that clause is to encourage the management to pay bonus not only to the extent to which it is statutorily bound to pay to the employee, but also in excess of that limit, provided the payment is justifiable as a reasonable payment. To say that the second proviso to cl. (ii) of s. 36(l) of the Act has no application in respect of employees covered under the Bonus Act, and that bonus or commission paid to them in excess of, or otherwise than what is statutorily required (although reasonable when considered with reference to cls. (a) to (c) of the second proviso) is not deductible under s. 36, is to put an artificial construction upon a beneficial provision. "

    Considering the above decision, it is also not proper for the CIT(A) to say that

    "It is merely an addition to the bonus paid along with the bonus in an ad hoc pro rata fashion because the workers insisted and the management agreed for higher payment due to higher profitability. "
    Thus we do not have any hesitation to hold that the impugned payment was not a bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act.

    18. The CIT(A) has also sought to refute the claim of the assessee on the ground that it has not fulfilled the three conditions mentioned in s. 36(l)(ii). In this connection, the decision of the Supreme Court in Shahzada Nand & Sons. vs. CIT 1977 CTR (SQ) 246 : (1977) 108 ITR 358 (SQ) is relevant and we reproduce the observations of the Hon'ble Court made at p. 365.

    "Turning to the provisions of s. 36, sub-s. (1), cl. (ii), we find that the proviso to that clause lays down three factors for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of the commission paid to an employee. The question whether the amount of commission is a reasonable amount or not has to be determined with reference to these three factors. Sometimes these three factors are loosely described as conditions but they are not really conditions on the fulfilment of which alone the amount of commission paid to an employee can be regarded as reasonable. They are merely factors to be taken into account by the Revenue authorities in determining the reasonableness of the amount of conunission. It may be that one of these factors yields a negative response. To take an example, there may be no general practice in similar business or profession to give commission to an employee, but, yet having regard to the other circumstances, the amount of commission paid to the employee may be regarded as reasonable. What the proviso requires is merely that the reasonableness of the amount of commission shall be determined with reference to the three factors. But it is well-settled that these factors are to be considered from the point of view of a normal, prudent busmessman."

    (Underlined, italicised in print, supplied)

    19. In conclusion, therefore, we hold that the impugned payment is not a bonus but an incentive for anticipated co-operation and performance. Even if it is regarded as bonus, it would not be hit by the first proviso to s. 36(l)(ii) but will be governed by the second proviso to the said section and there is nothing to show that the payment is in violation of the conditions laid down in cls. (a) to (c) of the second proviso to s. 36(l)(ii) of the Act.

    20. Also, in our considered opinion, it would not make any difference if part payment is made to the federation with a stipulation that the amount shall be utilised for the welfare of the employees. As long as the contribution is genuine in absence of any claim on the part of the Department that the federation will not utilise the amount for the benefit of the employees, the deduction is allowable. For this view we derive support from the decision in 45 ITD 233.

    21. Thus, to sum up, we hold that the CIT(A) was not at all justified in upholding the disallowance of Rs. 27,57,729 paid to the employees as performance reward. We direct the allowance thereof. It may not be out of place to mention that in arriving at this conclusion, we have been amply guided by the decision of the Tribunal in Telco's case cited supra.

    22. The next issue relates to the disallowance of Rs. 4,97,953 as capital expenditure incurred in connection with the issue of convertible debentures. During the year the assessee issued partly convertible debentures of Rs. 400 each, 1/4th of which was convertible into shares on expiry of two years. The total expenses incurred on this issue amounted to Rs. 19,91,812. Since 1/4th value of the debentures was to be converted into shares, the AO treated 1/4th of the total expenditure as capital in nature and disallowed a sum of Rs. 4,97,953. The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance.

    23. After hearing the parties we are of the view that the disallowance is not justified. By incurring the expenditure, presently the assessee has raised a loan and not capital. In the case of Brooke Bond India Ltd. vs. CIT in (1997) 140 CTR (SO 598 : (1997) 225 ITR 798 (SO, the Supreme Court held the expenses to be capital in nature as the same were incurred in connection with additional issue of shares. Though the part conversion of the debentures into shares is a certainty, the event is to take place after two years. By disallowing proportionate expenses in the present year for an increase in capital which is to take place after two years, would amount to disallowance of part expenses incurred on the raising of the loan in the current year. This is not fair. Accordingly, we delete the disallowance.

    24. The next ground relating to the disallowance of Rs. 1,80,52,997 as bad debt/business loss is not pressed and hence the same is rejected as such.

    25. The seventh ground relates to considering Rs. 1,74,027 being rent, rates and taxes in respect of guest houses and Rs. 92,779 being depreciation of fixed assets used in such guest houses as part of disallowable expenditure under s. 37(4), In the tax audit report, the expenses on guest house has been quantified as follows :

    Rs.

    Rs.

    Maintenance expenses 3,15,306 Rent, rates & taxes 1,74,027 Repairs & Insurance 2,75,995 Depreciation 92,779 8,58,107 Less : Recoveries 2,63,053 5,95,054 Out of the above, the assessee had treated as sum of Rs. 1,20,490 as disallowance under s. 37(4) and 37(5). Since the assessee had treated the amount of rent, rates and taxes and repairs and insurance as being out of the purview of s. 37(4) and 37(5), the AO included it for disallowance and accordingly the entire sum of Rs. 5,95,054 ws disallowed. The CIT(A) confirmed the same.

    26. In this regard the learned counsel has relied on the order of the Tribunal in its own case for asst. yr. 1984-85 and also on several other decisions of various High Courts. The learned Departmental Representative has relied on two decisions of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Ocean Carliers (P) Ltd. (1995) 123 CTR (Bom) 200: (1995) 211 ITR 357 (Born) and Raja Bahadur MoLual Poona Mills Ltd. vs. CIT (1996) 130 CTR (Bom) 348 : (1995) 212 ITR 175 (Bom). After due consideration, we are of the view that the decisions relied upon by the learned Departmental Representative are not relevant for the issue before us. In those cases the issue was whether a particular accommodation was a guest house or not for the purpose of s. 37(4). In the present case we are concerned as to whether particular expenses, admittedly incurred on guest house, are allowable or not. The issue is squarely covered in assessee's favour by the Tribunal's order dt. 12th Feb., 1997 in ITA Nos. 5582 & 5908/Bom/89 for asst. yr. 1984-85. We follow the same and uphold the claim of the assessee.

    27. The next ground pertains to the addition of Rs. 6.00 lacs made under s. 40A(5) of the Act. In its return of income, the assessee had made a disallowance of Rs. 5,50,000 on estimated basis under the said provision. In the tax audit report, the disallowance was worked out at Rs. 5,81,306. Before the AO, it was confirmed by the assessee that expenses on soft furnishing repairs and maintenance of premises owned/hired by the assessee- company, depreciation on company owned flats and depreciation on other assets provided to the employees have not been considered. The AO estimated such expenses and coupled with the expenses of Rs. 1,79,686 incurred on subscription to clubs to be of Rs. 8.00 lacs and disallowed the same. The CIT(A) considered the disallowance to be excessive and restricted it to Rs. 6.00 lacs.

    28. It is fairly conceded by the learned counsel that the issue has been decided against the assessee by the Tribunal in asst. yr. 1984-85 following the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in Lubrizol India Ltd. vs. CIT (1991) 93 CTR (Bom) 237: (1991) 187 ITR 25 (Born). Accordingly, we decide this issue against the assessee.

    29. The next ground relates to subjecting the expenses on repairs, insurance and taxes on motor cars for disallowance under s. 37(3A) and 37(313)(ii). The learned counsel has relied on the order of the Tribunal for asst. yr. 1984-85, whereas the learned Departmental Representative has relied on the orders of the authorities below.

    30. This issue also has been considered by the Tribunal in the assessee's case for asst. yr. 1984-85 in the order cited supra. We follow the earlier order of the Tribunal and for the reasons mentioned therein as well as for the reasons mentioned in ground No. 7 above, we decide the matter in favour of the assessee.

    31. The tenth ground pertains to the disallowance made under s. 37(3B)(ii) in respect of salaries paid to appellant's car drivers amounting to Rs. 8,72,784. In this regard we follow the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Dy. CIT vs. Addison & Co. Ltd. in (1995) 53 ITD 514 (Mad) and hold that the disallowance is uncalled for.

    32. The next ground pertains to the disallowance of Rs. 1 lac made under r. 6D of the IT Rules, 1962 (the Rules). It was observed that with regard to the expenses incurred on travelling on other than to and fro fare, the disallowance was worked out on the basis of total trips undertaken by an employee during the year and not on the basis of per trip. The AO, therefore, in keeping with the stand of the Department, in absence of requisite details, estimated the disallowance of Rs. I lac for per trip basis over and above the disallowance of Rs. 4,07,813 as per tax audit report. The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance.

    33. It is fairly conceded by the learned counsel that the decision in CIT vs. Corornandal FertiLizer Ltd. (1996) 135 CTR (AP) 354: (1996) 220 ITR 298 (AP) and that of the Bombay High Court in Acro India Ltd. (hitherto unreported) are against the assessee. Respectfully following the said decisions we dismiss the claim of the assessee and uphold the order of the CIT(A) on this issue.

    34. The twelfth ground relates to the disallowance of Rs. 5,70,000 paid as technical know-how fees, holding the same to be capital expenditure. In terms of agreement dt. 10th March, 1981 with Research Cottrell Inc. USA, the assessee had received from the latter technical know-how, drawings, designs, etc. for manufacture of scrubbers with mint eliminator. The AO observed that as the agreement did not contain any restrictive clause on the manufacture of products after the expiry of the agreement, it gave an enduring advantage to the assessee and hence the sum of Rs. 5,70 lacs payable for the transfer of know how was capital expenditure. The deduction thereof was accordingly disallowed. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition. The learned counsel has relied on the order of the Tribunal dt. 24th Nov., 1976 in ITA Nos. 2917 & 2722/Bom/1974-75 in the assessee's own case, whereas the learned Departmental Representative has relied on the orders of the lower authorities.

    35. We have duly considered the material on record and the order of the Tribunal cited supra. It is a fact that the assessee is engaged, inter alia, in the business of manufacturing pollution control equipments. In order to upgrade its technology in these products, it has been its continuous endeavour to get the requisite know-how. This was one such endeavour for which it entered into an agreement with Research Cottrell, USA. A similar agreement was entered into by the assessee with the same American company during asst. yr. 1971-72. As is evident from the order of the Tribunal cited supra, we do not find any material difference in the relevant clauses of the two agreements.

    36. The earlier agreement was to obtain technical advice, information and know-how necessary for fabricating, manufacturing and installing the equipment for cleaning industrial gas and air of dust, fumes and mist, etc. The present agreement is for the manufacture and sale of particulate scrubbers with mist eliminator. This may entail the manufacture of a new product not hitherto manufactured by the assessee. But in essence, the technological upgradation is in the same line of activity.

    37. This, of course, as held by the Tribunal in the order cited supra, would not be a decisive factor to determine whether the impugned expenditure is of revenue or capital nature. The decisive factor, as observed by the Tribunal, would be whether there was a complete transfer of the know-how by the American company in favour of the assessee or whether it was for a limited period only. The present agreement, in our view, do not contemplate outright sale of the American company's know-how, technical data and information. It is stipulated in cl. 18.1 that the agreement shall remain in force for an initial period of 6 years from the date the licences (i.e. the assessee) commences commercial production of the licenced products or for a period of 8 years from the date of the agreement, whichever is earlier. As per the same clause the agreement is renewable for a further period of 5 years.

    38. On almost similar grounds the Tribunal, in the earlier appeals, held the payment to be of revenue in nature. Following the earlier order, we do not see any reason to deviate. Accordingly, we allow the ground of the assessee and direct that the assessee be allowed deduction of Rs. 5,70,000.

    39. The next ground relating to the allowance of expenditure incurred during construction period, amounting to Rs. 28.38 lacs, was not pressed at the time of the hearing and hence the same is rejected as such.

    40. The next grievance is against the disallowance of a sum of Rs. 3.96 paid to Tata Research Development & Design Centre (TRDDC), Pune. One of the business in which the assessee is engaged is the business of marketing and distribution of pharmaceutical products. In the search of new products, the assessee funded two research products in the field of genetic engineering for which TRDDC was assigned the task and the impugned amount was reimbursed to it. The assessee claimed deduction thereof under s. 35(l)(i) of the Act. Since the assessee was, in this line of activity, marketing the products manufactured by others, and was not manufacturing its own products, the AO was of the view that the impugned sum cannot be said to have been laid out on scientific research related to the assessee's business. The deduction was accordingly disallowed. The CIT(A) concurred with the view of the AO and confirmed the disallowance.

    41. The submission of the learned counsel was to the effect that it was enough if the expenditure was for assessee's business. It was not necessary that the assessee should be in manufacturing activity in order to be eligible to claim the deduction. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. National Rayons Corpri. Ltd. (1982) 26 CTR (Bom) 234 : (1983) 140 ITR 143 (Born). The learned Departmental Representative supported the orders of the lower authorities.

    42. We do not see any logic in the stand taken by the Department. It is held by the Supreme Court in (1968) 69 ITR 692 (SQ) that "scientific research" means any activity for the extension of knowledge in the fields of natural or applied science. Sec. 43(4)(iii) further clarifies that scientific research related to business includes any scientific research which may lead to or facilitate an extension of that business. Thus, in the instant case, the assessee incurred the impugned expenditure to extend its pharmaceutical division. We do not see any reason why the same should not be allowed. We delete the disallowance sustained by the CIT(A).

    43. The fifteenth ground relates to additional depreciation under s. 32(l)(iia) on certain equipments. The AO disallowed additional depreciation amounting to Rs. 1,66,813 on certain equipments installed in the offices and equipments in the nature of office equipments, and also on data processing machines. The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance except for the additional depreciation on computer rooms and electrical work of computers. The learned counsel has relied on the earlier order of the Tribunal and the learned Departmental Representative has relied on the order of the lower authorities.

    44. We have perused the order of the Tribunal in the assessee's case for asst. yr. 1984-85. In that year the Tribunal has rejected the claim of the assessee for additional depreciation, inter alia, on copiers, drafting machines and airconditioning machineries which figure in this year's depreciation statement forming part of the assessment order. Following the earlier order, we, therefore, reject the claim of additional depreciation on the assets mentioned above. So far as additional depreciation on data processing machines is concerned, we allow the claim of the assessee following the decisions of the Tribunal in ITO vs. Ganges Printing Co. Ltd. (1986) 24 TTJ (Cal) 404: (1986) 15 TID 212 (Cal) and ITO vs. VM Salgookar & Bros. (P) Ltd. (1986) 18 ITD 440 (Bang).

    45. Ground No. 16(a) relates to the levy of interest under s. 139(8) of the Act. The return of income was due on 30th June, 1985 but extension was sought upto 31st July, 1985 and the return was filed on the same day. The AO levied interest under s. 139(8). The CIT(A) confirmed the same. The learned counsel has relied on the earlier order of the Tribunal whereas the learned Departmental Representative has relied on the decision in CIT vs. Laxmi Rattan Cotton MUIS Co. Ltd. (19 74) 9 7 ITR 285 (All).

    46. On similar facts, the same issue was decided by the Tribunal in the assessee's case in ITA No. 9220/Bom/96 dt. 10th Sept., 1997. Following the decisions in CIT s. Kadri Mills (Coimbatore) Ltd. 1977 CTR (Mad) 51 : (1977) 106 ITR 846 (Mad), CIT vs. Brij Lal Lohia & Mahabir Prosad Khemka (1980) 18 CTR (Cal) 163 : (1980) 124 TTR 485 (Cal) and B. V Aswathaiah & Bros. vs. ITO (1986) 52 CTR (Kar) 49 : (1985) 155 ITR 422 (Kar), the interest so levied was deleted. We follow the earlier order and cancel the interest for this year also.

    47. Ground No. 16(b) relates to the levy of interest under s. 217(IA). In the course of assessment proceedings the AO levied interest under s. 217(IA) of the Act. The CIT(A) treated the same as consequential in nature and did not give any further directions. The learned counsel submitted that nil estimate was filed by the assessee and further relied on the decisions in Patel Aluminium (P) Ltd. vs. Miss KM Tawadia, ITO (1986) 51 CTR (Bom) 322: (1987) 165 ITR 99 (Bom) and Director of Income-tax (Exemption) vs. Shree Sitaram Public Charitable Trust (1995) 124 CTR (Cal) 89: (1994) 207 ITR 1087 (Cal). The learned Departmental Representative supported the order of the lower authorities.

    48. We have perused the authorities cited by the learned counsel. The decision in (1987) 165 1TR 99 (supra) pertains to levy of interest under s. 217(l)(a) of the Act, whereas in this case we are concerned with interest under s. 217(lA) of the Act. Hence, the said decision is not applicable here. Further, no facts have been placed before us as to whether the assessee was one who was required to send an estimate under s. 209A(4) or under s. 212(3A) and if so whether such estimate was filed or not. In absence of such details we are unable to appreciate whether the decision in (1987) 207 ITR 1087 (Cal) (supra) is applicable to the assessee's case or not. We, therefore, reject this ground of the assessee, but at the same time direct the AO to grant consequential relief to the assessee, if so entitled, in accordance with law.

    II. ITA No. 76871Bom190 (Department's Appeal)

    49. The first ground relates to the CIT(A)'s direction to delete the addition made on account of provision for trade guarantees. This issue has already been dealt with by us in the assessee's appeal above. In it we have deleted the addition sustained by the CIT(A) and hence in this appeal the ground taken by the Department stands rejected.

    50. The second ground is against not including the following expenses for disallowance under s. 37(3A) on account of advertisement, publicity and sales promotion :

    Rs.

    Rs.

    Printing & mailing 8,94,702 Commission 90,97,347 Conveyance 45,00,000 In our opinion, none of the above expenses relate to advertisement. The first item relates to printing and mailing of catalogues which, by it very nature, is in the form of information demanded by the customers. Commission is paid in respect of services rendered and Rs. 45 lacs pertain to the hiring of taxis, which the Tribunal, for the sake of consistency, allowed the claim of the assessee in asst. yr. 1984-85. On the same ground, the deletion of the said addition by the CIT(A) is upheld for this year also. Thus, the entire second ground stands rejected.

    51. The third ground pertains to the allowability of additional depreciation on computer room at Madras and Murribai and on electrical work of computer at Mumbai. In our opinion additional depreciation is allowed only on plant and machinery and as the above-mentioned items do not constitute plant & machinery, we disallow the claim of the assessee. On this issue, therefore, we restore the disallowance made by the AO and upheld that ground of the Revenue.

    52. The last ground is against the direction to recompute the claim of Rs. 1,43,600 on account of technical know-how expenditure. This ground appears to be misconceived in so far as that we find no such direction given by the CIT(A) in his order. The ground is thus rejected as not arising out of the order appealed against.

    53. In the result, the appeal of the assessee as well as of the Department are partly allowed.

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