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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • sections 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 I.P.C and 394 I.P.C Sentences
  • section 392 read with 397 I.P.C read with 34 I.P.C
  • reduced.24. Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code
  • sections 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 and 394 I.P.C
  • section 392 r/w 34 I.P.C and 394 I.P.C
  • section 392 r/w 34 and 394 I.P.C35.
  • section 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 I.P.C
  • section 392 read with 34 I.P.C
  • section 392 I.P.C r/w 34 I.P.C
  • section 392 r/to 397 I.P.C
  • section 392 r/w 34 I.P.C
  • section 313 Cr. P.C,
  • section 397 I.P.C
  • section 394 I.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • sections 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 I.P.C and 394 I.P.C Sentences
  • section 392 read with 397 I.P.C read with 34 I.P.C
  • reduced.24. Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code
  • sections 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 and 394 I.P.C
  • section 392 r/w 34 I.P.C and 394 I.P.C
  • section 392 r/w 34 and 394 I.P.C35.
  • section 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 I.P.C
  • section 392 read with 34 I.P.C
  • section 392 I.P.C r/w 34 I.P.C
  • section 392 r/to 397 I.P.C
  • section 392 r/w 34 I.P.C
  • section 313 Cr. P.C,
  • section 397 I.P.C
  • section 394 I.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Vishnu Sahai, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant appealed against a judgment and order dated 12-12-1983 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, in Sessions Case No. 389 of 1982, which convicted and sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment under sections 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 I.P.C. and 394 I.P.C., sentences to run concurrently (para 0).

The prosecution case: On the night of 16-17 April 1982 the informant, Sakharam Shankar Lokhande (P.W.1), a watchman, was returning after duty when the appellant and co-accused Ashok Tukaram Salve and Abdul Salam Yusuf Jaitapkar met him. The informant was allegedly assaulted by Ashok Tukaram Salve with a razor and had his wrist watch taken; the appellant allegedly took two Rs.100 notes from the informant's hip pocket and the accused then fled. The informant sought first aid and lodged a complaint at the railway police station (paras 1–2).

Medical examination at St. George's Hospital recorded two incised wounds and an abrasion (para 2). Investigating officers arrested the appellant and co-accused; recoveries were effected — razors and two Rs.100 notes were recovered from a ditch after the appellant removed a stone covering it; the watch was also recovered and identified (paras 5–6, 7).

The case was committed to the Sessions Court. At trial the appellant, Ashok Tukaram Salve and Abdul Salam Yusuf Jaitapkar were charged on counts of 392 r/w 34 I.P.C. and 394 I.P.C.; additionally the appellant and Ashok were charged under 392 r/to 397 I.P.C. All pleaded not guilty. The trial court examined 11 prosecution witnesses (the informant was the sole injured eyewitness), convicted the appellant and Ashok Salve and acquitted Abdul Jaitapkar (paras 7–10).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conviction under sections 392 read with 397 read with 34 I.P.C. and 394 I.P.C. as recorded by the trial court against the appellant was justified (para 22–23)?
  2. Whether, on the facts proved, liability under section 397 I.P.C. can be fastened on the appellant (paras 24–33)?
  3. Whether the appellant is vicariously liable under section 394 I.P.C. despite not being the person who inflicted hurt (paras 30–33)?
  4. What is the appropriate quantum of sentence for the offences proved against the appellant, taking into account age, nature of participation and other mitigating/aggravating factors (paras 34–47)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. R.V. Kini)

  • The appellant was about 23 years of age at the time of the incident (supported by his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C.), implying an impressionable age (paras 39–46).
  • The appellant did not cause any injury himself and there is no material that he inflicted injuries on the victim (para 41, 46).
  • On these grounds, his sentence on both counts should be reduced to the period already undergone, and in addition a fine to be paid as compensation to the victim should be imposed (para 35).

Respondent's Arguments (Mrs. Shilpa Pingulkar)

  • Allowing the appellant's plea for significant reduction would amount to judicially abetting robbery and would undermine law and order, especially in metropolitan Bombay; thus a deterrent approach on sentencing is required (para 36).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raisul v. State of U.P., (1976) 4 SCC 301 : A.I.R. 1977 (referred at para 40) The estimate of age given in the statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. should be accepted as correct; the court should not substitute its own estimate. The court accepted the appellant’s stated age (slightly over 23 at the time of the incident) as recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. and relied on that fact in considering mitigation for sentence (para 40–41).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the evidentiary material (depositions of prosecution witnesses, exhibits, the appellant's section 313 statement and the trial judgment) and reached conclusions on two interrelated fronts: guilt on the charged offences and appropriate sentence.

On guilt:

  1. The court accepted the victim's testimony (P.W.1) as reliable: the victim gave a prompt F.I.R naming the appellant, described the incident in detail and his account was corroborated by medical evidence (Dr. P.W.9 found two incised wounds and an abrasion) (paras 13–15).
  2. Independent police witnesses (P.W.2 Constable Maruti Shinde, P.W.3 Head Constable Ramdas Parekh, P.S.I. Babar P.W.11) and a public panch (P.W.5) corroborated arrest and recovery details. The appellant was apprehended within four hours of the incident and, in the presence of a public panch and police officers, two Rs.100 notes and razors were recovered from a ditch after the appellant removed the stone covering it (paras 16–18).
  3. The court emphasized that independent witnesses, when corroborated by prompt F.I.R., medical evidence and recoveries at the instance of the accused, present strong in-built guarantees of truthfulness; on this basis the court accepted the prosecution case and the trial judge’s finding of involvement (paras 19–22).
  4. However, the court closely analyzed statutory definitions and mens rea for section 397 I.P.C. Section 397 requires that at the time of committing robbery or dacoity the offender (a) uses any deadly weapon, or (b) causes grievous hurt, or (c) attempts to cause death or grievous hurt (paras 24–29). The court concluded that none of these elements applied to the appellant's conduct: there was no evidence that the appellant used a deadly weapon, caused grievous hurt, or attempted to cause grievous hurt or death (paras 30–31).
  5. The court therefore held that liability under section 397 is individual in nature and could not be constructively fastened on the appellant merely because a co-accused inflicted hurt (paras 28, 32–33). Consequently, conviction under section 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 I.P.C. could not be sustained; instead the appellant was properly convicted under section 392 r/w 34 I.P.C. (paras 29, 33).
  6. With regard to section 394 I.P.C. (voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery), the court noted that liability under section 394 is both individual and vicarious: an associate of the person who actually causes hurt is equally liable if jointly concerned in the robbery (paras 30–33). As the appellant was an active associate and participant while Ashok Salve assaulted the victim, the appellant was correctly convicted under section 394 I.P.C. even though there was no allegation he personally caused the hurt (para 33).

On sentence:

  1. The sole remaining question was the appropriate quantum of sentence under the sustained convictions (section 392 r/w 34 and section 394 I.P.C.) (para 34).
  2. The court considered mitigation: appellant's age (about 23 at the time of incident, accepted as per his 313 statement and the precedent in Raisul), absence of direct injury caused by the appellant, and lack of adverse antecedents in the record (paras 39–46).
  3. The prosecution emphasized deterrence and the need to maintain public order in Bombay; the court found that submission weighty but balanced it against mitigating factors (paras 36, 38–44).
  4. Balancing deterrence and mitigation, the court determined that the appropriate sentence is a separate term of three years' rigorous imprisonment on each count (section 392 r/w 34 and section 394 I.P.C.), with both sentences to run concurrently (paras 41, 47–48).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is partly allowed. The court set aside the appellant's conviction under section 392 read with 397 read with 34 I.P.C., and instead convicted him under section 392 read with 34 I.P.C. The conviction under section 394 I.P.C. is confirmed, but the sentence on that count is reduced. The court sentenced the appellant to undergo three years' rigorous imprisonment under section 392 r/w 34 I.P.C. and three years' rigorous imprisonment under section 394 I.P.C., the sentences to run concurrently (para 48).

Direct consequences and immediate effect on the parties:

  • The appellant, who was on bail, is to be taken into custody forthwith to serve the concurrent sentences awarded (para 48).
  • The court ordered expedited issuance of certified copies of the judgment if applied for by counsel (para 49).

Broader implications: The opinion does not expressly set out wider doctrinal changes or declare a new binding precedent beyond applying existing statutory interpretation and the cited authority on acceptance of age recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C.; the decision's immediate effect is the modified conviction and reduced concurrent sentences for the appellant.

Disposition: Appeal partly allowed (para 50).

    Shravan Dashrath Datrange v. The State Of Maharashtra .

    Vishnu Sahai, J.:— The appellant aggrieved by the Judgment and Order dated 12-12-1983, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, in Sessions Case No. 389 of 1982, convicting and sentencing him to undergo a separate sentence of seven years R.I under both sections 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 I.P.C and 394 I.P.C Sentences to run concurrently has come up in appeal before us.

    2. Briefly stated the prosecution case, runs as under:— The informant Sakharam Shankar Lokhande (P.W 1) at the time of the incident was serving in Bharat Petroleum, as a Watchman. On 16-4-1982, he had been assigned duty at Wadibunder from 4 p.m to midnight. After finishing his duty at about 12.15 a.m when he had reached the footway between Wadibunder and Dockyard Railway Station, the appellant, co-accused Ashok Tukaram Salve and Abdul Salam Yusuf Jaitapkar met him. Ashok Tukaram Salve and appellant caught hold of him. The informant pushed them and started running. He fell with his right cheek on the ground. Ashok Tukaram Salve, thereafter assaulted him with a razor on his left thigh and right hand. He thereafter took his wrist watch. The appellant took out Rs. 200/- which was in the hip pocket of his trousers. Thereafter the appellant and others ran away. The complainant thereafter went to the Station Master Dockyard Railway Station. The Station Master gave First Aid. Thereafter a Police Constable accompanied him to V.T Railway Police Station. At the said Police Station he lodged his complaint.

    3. From the V.T Railway Police Station he was sent to St. George's Hospital. At the said Hospital Dr. Vijaykumar Purshottam Ved (P.W 9) medically examined him at 1.20 a.m and found on his person two incised wounds. One of them was 3″ × ¼″ × ¼″ muscle deep was situated on the right cheek and the other which was about 4″ × ¼″ × ¼″ into skin deep was situated on the left thigh. The said Doctor also found an abrasion on his left eyebrow.

    4. The evidence shows that the informant Sakharam Shankar Lokhande (P.W 1) reached at about 4 a.m Police Station Ghatkopar. There S.I Balkrishna Mahadeo Babar (P.W 11) recorded Exhibit 29 and registered on its basis C.R No. A-113 of 1982.

    5. The evidence also shows that at about 12.30 a.m the same night Police Constable Maruti Ishwar Shinde and Head Constable Ramdas Parekh were called by P.S.I Babar at V.T Railway Police Station and were told that one person was robbed at Dockyard Railway Line. They accompanied P.S.I Babar by the first local train at 4.15 a.m to Dockyard Railway Station. They went to the place of incident. P.S.I Babar remained there. Maruti Ishwar Shinde alongwith Ramdas Parekh started searching for the appellant and others. They saw two persons going in suspicious circumstances at a distance of about 25 feet from the railway line. On seeing them, they started running. Maruti Shinde (P.W 2) caught Ashok Tukaram Salve and Head Constable Ramdas Kishan Parekh (P.W 3) caught the appellant.

    6. At about 4.15 a.m the appellant and Ashok Tukaram Salve were brought to S.I Babar. S.I Babar sent for public panchas. One out of them was Shatrughan More (P.W 5). The appellant and Ashok Tukaram Salve were interrogated and expressed their willingness to get recoveries effected. Consequently Ashok Tukaram Salve and the appellant, in the company of Shatrughan More; P.S.I Babar and other police personnel went to a place near two Railway chawts near Wadibunder Road. There was a small ditch covered by a stone. The appellant removed the stone and thereafter Ashok Tukaram Salve took out two razors (Articles 7 and 8) and two currency notes of Rs. 100/- each from the ditch. The said articles were taken in possession under a panchanama.

    7. The investigation in the case was conducted by Sub-Inspector Balkrishna Mahadeo Babar in the usual manner. During the course of the same co-accused Abdul Salam Yusuf Jaitapkar was arrested. On seeing him the complainant identified him as the third accused in the case. During the course of the investigation the watch belonging to the complainant was also recovered. It was shown to the complainant. He identified it during the trial. After completing the investigation the charge sheet was submitted against the appellant and Ashok Tukaram Salve on 12-7-1982.

    8. The case was committed to the Court of the Sessions in the usual manner. In the trial Court the appellant, Ashok Tukaram Salve and Abdul Salam Yusuf Jaitapkar were charged on a common dual count namely 392 r/w 34 I.P.C and 394 I.P.C In addition the appellant and Ashok Tukaram Saive were charged under section 392 r/to 397 I.P.C To the said charges the appellant and others pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

    9. In the trial Court in all the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses. Only one out of them namely Sakharam Shankar Lokhande, P.W 1 (the victim and informant) is an eye witness. In defence no witness was examined.

    10. The learned trial Judge believed the evidence vis a vis the appellant and co-accused Ashok Tukaram Salve. He convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner stated in paragraph 1 of this judgment. He also convicted and sentenced Ashok Tukaram Salve in an identical manner. He, however, acquitted Abdul Salam Yusuf Jaitapkar.

    11. We have heard Mr. R.V Kini for appellant and Mrs. Shilpa Pingulkar for the respondent. We have also perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses; the material exhibits tendered by the prosecution, the statement of the appellant recorded under section 313 Cr. P.C and the impugned judgment.

    12. After giving anxious consideration to the matter we are of the view that this Appeal deserves to be partly allowed. In our view the appellant deserves to be acquitted for the offence under section 392 r/w 397.r/w 34 I.P.C and instead deserves to be convicted for the offence under section 392 I.P.C r/w 34 I.P.C In our view the appellant has been rightly convicted under section 394 I.P.C We, however, feel that the sentence of seven years R.I awarded to him under that count is unduly excessive.

    13. The evidence which clinches the involvement of the appellant in the instant crime is that of the victim, Sakharam Shankar Lokhande (P.W 1), Constable Maruti Ishwar Shinde (P.W 2) and Head Constable Ramdas Kishan Parekh (P.W 3).

    14. In paragraph 2 of the judgment while giving out the prosecution case we have mentioned the manner in which the victim was robbed. In short the victim stated that while he was returning after his duty and at about 12.15 a.m had reached the footway from Wadibunder to Dockyard Railway Station, the appellant and co-accused persons met him. Co-accused Ashok Tukaram Salve used his razor on his left thigh and right hand and took his wrist watch and the appellant took out Rs. 200/- which was in the form of two currency notes of Rs. 100/- each, from the hip pocket of his trouser. He further stated that thereafter he went to the Station Master V.T Police Station who sent him for medical aid and at about 4 a.m he lodged his F.I.R In the F.I.R as well as in his statement, the complainant has nominated the appellant.

    15. We have gone through the statement of the informant and we find that it inspires implicit evidence. The manner of the incident as described by him is corroborated by a prompt F.I.R of the incident wherein he has named the appellant. It is also corroborated by the nature of injuries received by him. He categorically stated that co-accused Ashok Tukaram Salve assaulted him with a razor and as seen in the earlier part of this judgment Dr. Vijaykumar Purshottam Ved (P.W 9) found two incised wounds on the person of the informant. Thus the medical evidence corroborates his evidence.

    16. We have been taken through the statement of the informant and we find that the same indicates that he is a wholly independent person and had no rancour against the appellant. In the absence of the same in our judgment, for no plausible rhyme or reasons the informant would not have falsely implicated him.

    17. Corroboration is also forthcoming to the prosecution case by the circumstance that within four hours of the incident the appellant was arrested by Police Constable Maruti Shinde (P.W 2) and Head Constable Ramdas Parekh (P.W 3). The evidence of Head Constable Parekh is that they had apprehended the appellant at about 4-15 a.m the same night. We have seen that the incident took place four hours earlier i.e at about 12-15 a.m It is significant to point out that after his arrest in the presence of public panch Shatrughan Shahu More (P.W 5) and S.I Balkrishna Mahadeo Babar (P.W 11) under a panchanama two currency notes of the denomination of Rs. 100/- each which are alleged to have been taken out by the appellant from the pocket of trousers of the informant were taken out by Ashok Tukaram Salve from a ditch, the stone covering which, was removed by the appellant. This recovery strengthens the statement of the complainant that it was the appellant who had taken out the said two currency notes from the pocket of his trousers.

    18. Again we find that neither Head Constable Parekh nor Police Constable Maruti Shinde nor P.S.I Babar nor the public panch More had any axe to grino against the appellant. All of them are wholly independent witnesses and that being so we are not inclined to believe that unless the appellant was arrested in the manner stated by them and the recovery took place in the manner disclosed above they would have come out with a concocted version.

    19. It is true that there is no immutable rule of appreciation of evidence that the testimony of independent witnesses should be ipso facto accepted but all the same the circumstance that witnesses are independent goes miles and miles to ensure their truthfulness.

    20. Criminal courts decide cases and the question of acceptance of evidence of witnesses on sound common sense and when they find witnesses to be wholly independent they endeavour to fathom the reason as to why their evidence should not be accepted. Ordinarily it is a safe and sound rule of appreciation of evidence to accept the testimony of an independent witness provided it is in consonance with probabilities. It is better if it is corroborated by in-built guarantees which ensure the truthfulness of the prosecution case, such as a prompt F.I.R, recoveries at the instance of accused persons and the presence of injured eye-witness etc. As seen above these guarantees are forthcoming in the instant case.

    21. Weighed on the said yardstick the evidence of Sakharam Lokhande, Maruti Shinde, Ramdas Parekh, Shatrughan More and P.S.I Babar inspires confidence. We accordingly accept it.

    22. For the said reasons in our view the learned trial Judge acted correctly, in accepting the involvement of the appellant established in the instant case.

    23. One of the questions which remain is whether the learned trial Judge was justified in convicting the appellant under sections 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 and 394 I.P.C We have thoughtfully reflected over the said question and our answer is that he fell in error in convicting the appellant under section 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 I.P.C; instead he should have only convicted him under section 392 r/w 34 I.P.C We however, feel he was right in convicting the appellant under section 394 I.P.C but in our view the sentence awarded to the appellant on that count is unduly excessive and warrants to be reduced.

    24. Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code reads thus:—

    “Robbery, or dacoity, with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt:—

    “If at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years.”

    25. A perusal of the section would show that an act would only fall within its mischief if at the time of committing robbery or dacoity the offender:—

    (a) uses any deadly weapon; or

    (b) causes grievous hurt to any person; or

    (c) attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person.

    26. In the instant case we have gone through the evidence adduced by the prosecution and we find that the act of the appellant falls neither within the ambit of (a) nor in that of (b) or (c).

    27. There is no evidence that at the time of committing robbery the appellant used any deadly weapon or caused grievous hurt or made any attempt to cause death or grievous hurt to any person.

    28. We wish to emphasise that the liability under section 397 I.P.C is individual and not constructive. This would become crystal clear from an analysis of the text of section 397 I.P.C

    29. We feel that for the said reasons the conviction of the appellant under section 392 read with 397 I.P.C read with 34 I.P.C cannot be sustained. In our view instead an offence under section 392 read with 34 I.P.C is brought home against him.

    30. In our judgment the conviction of the appellant under section 394 I.P.C has been rightly recorded by the learned trial judge. Section 394 of the I.P.C reads thus:—

    “Voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery:—

    If any person, in committing or in attempting to commit robbery, voluntarily causes hurt, such person, and any other person jointly concerned in committing or attempting to commit such robbery, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

    31. A perusal of the text of the section would show that not only the person who actually causes hurt but an associate of his/her would be equally liable for the mischief contemplated by the section.

    32. Thus unlike section 397 I.P.C wherein the liability is only individual the liability under section 394 I.P.C is both individual and vicarious.

    33. In the instant case the evidence is that the appellant was an active associate and a co-participant with co-accused Ashok Tukaram Salve, who is alleged to have assaulted the victim with knife while committing robbery. In that view of the matter he would still be liable under section 394 I.P.C inspite of the fact that there is no allegation that he caused or attempted to cause any hurt to the victim.

    34. The only question which survives is what should be the quantum of sentence to be awarded to the appellant under section 392 r/w 34 and 394 I.P.C

    35. Mr. R.V Kini, learned Counsel for the appellant with his customary persuasive advocacy urged that bearing in mind:— that the incident had taken place over 13 years ago, that no injury was caused by the appellant, and the appellant was aged about 23 years at the time of the incident, it is a fit case in which his sentence on both the counts be reduced to the period already undergone by him and instead some fine which should be directed to be paid as compensation to the victim be imposed.

    36. Mrs. Shilpa Pingulkar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor with her suave but equally effective advocacy repelled the said contention and advocated that if we were to fall a prey to the submission of Mr. Kini, we would almost be judicially abetting the commission of highly antisocial offences like robbery in the metropolis of Bombay. She urged that such an approach would vitiate the even tempo of life in Bombay.

    37. We have carefully considered the rival contentions.

    38. Although the submission of Mr. Kini appeared to be pregnant with substance on the first blush but on a deeper reflection we found the submission of Mrs. Pingulkar to be more weighty.

    39. All the same the dilemma staring us is the quantum of sentence. Mr. Kini is right in contending that the appellant was aged about 23 years at the time of the incident. The correctness of his submission is vindicated by the fact that in the statement of the appellant recorded under section 313 Cr. P.C, on 30-11-1983, he has mentioned his age as 25 years, meaning thereby that at the time of the incident, i.e on 17-4-1982, he was aged slightly over 23 years.

    40. In the decision reported in (1976) 4 SCC 301 : A.I.R 1977 Raisul v. State Of U.P )1, the Apex Court has held that the estimate of age given in the statement recorded under section 313 Cr. P.C should be accepted as correct and the Court would not be justified in substituting it by its own estimate. Fortunately here there is no observation of the trial Judge that the age given out by the appellant was not correct. This means that the appellant was aged slightly over 23 years at the time of the incident, an impressionable age in the contention of Mr. Kini. Mr. Kini is also right that from the material on record it does not appear that the appellant either caused an injury to the victim or has any adverse criminal antecedants.

    41. In such a situation, having due deference to the submission of Mrs. Shilpa Pingulkar, we feel that the ends of justice would be amply satisfied if the appellant is awarded a separate sentence of three years R.I on both the counts, namely 392 r/w 34 I.P.C and 394 I.P.C

    42. In the result this appeal is partly allowed and partly dismissed. We acquit the appellant for the offence under section 392 r/w 397 r/w 34 I.P.C and set aside his sentence of even years of R.I on that count. Instead we convict him for the offence under section 392 r/w 34 I.P.C and sentence him to undergo three years' R.I Although we confirm the conviction of appellant under section 394 I.P.C but we reduce his sentence from seven years R.I to three years R.I We direct that the sentences of the appellant under section 392 r/w 34 I.P.C and 394 I.P.C shall run concurrently. The appellant is on bail. He shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentences awarded to him. Before parting with this judgment we would like to put on record our appreciation for the assistance rendered to us by the learned Counsel for the parties in the disposal of this Appeal.

    43. In case an application for a certified copy of the judgment is made by Counsel for the parties, the same shall be issued on an expedited basis.

    44. Appeal partly allowed.

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    Shravan Dashrath Datrange v. The State Of Maharashtra .
    (Jan 13, 1997)