Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Sch. IV, item (6) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.
  • provisions of S. 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971,
  • item(6) of Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971,
  • provisions of (he Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.
  • provisions of Punjabrao Agricultural University (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1968,
  • Maharashtra Agricultural Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeths) Act, 1983
  • Agricultural University (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1968,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Sch. IV, item (6) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.
  • provisions of S. 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971,
  • item(6) of Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971,
  • provisions of (he Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.
  • provisions of Punjabrao Agricultural University (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1968,
  • Maharashtra Agricultural Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeths) Act, 1983
  • Agricultural University (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1968,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Krishi Vidyapeeth Kamgar Union (the union) lodged a complaint under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU & PULP Act) on behalf of certain workers employed at the Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth's Agricultural School at Nimba. The complaint alleged that a group of workers (18 named in the schedule) had been working as daily-wage/badli/casual labourers since about 1971, performing year-round agricultural and cattle-related tasks, and that the employer had deliberately continued to employ them as temporaries to deprive them of permanency and attendant benefits (payment of wages, dearness allowance and leave).

The Industrial Court, Amravati, found that the University had committed an unfair labour practice within item (6) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act and directed that the respondents be granted the benefits and privileges of regular permanent employees (including wages, dearness allowance and leave), ordered the University to approach the Government to create permanent posts for absorption, and directed that the employees be treated as permanent from the date they completed five years of service with a standard date fixed from November 1990.

The University challenged that decision in the present petition, contending that (inter alia) the Industrial Court erred in law and that the University lacked the statutory power to create new posts without prior State approval, having already sought sanction from the appropriate authorities.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conduct of the University falls within item (6) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 — i.e., whether employing workers as badlis, casuals or temporaries and continuing them as such for years can be treated as an unfair labour practice in the absence of tangible evidence of a deliberate object to deprive them of permanency?
  2. Whether an employer who is statutorily barred from creating new posts (unless sanctioned by the State) can be held guilty of item (6) of Schedule IV for continuing workers as temporaries, where the employer has sought the necessary governmental sanction?
  3. Whether the Industrial Court committed a jurisdictional error or misapplied the law in granting relief under Schedule IV, item (6), given the pleaded statutory constraints on the University’s power to create posts?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (University) — Main Arguments

  • The Industrial Court's order is contrary to law and contains jurisdictional error in entertaining and deciding the complaint under Schedule IV, item (6) of the MRTU & PULP Act.
  • The University lacked the power to create permanent posts without prior approval of the State Government (citing the relevant statutory provisions in the Punjabrao Agricultural University statutes), and it had already moved the Government for sanction to create additional posts.
  • There was no mala fide or deliberate design on the part of the University to deprive workers of permanency; the complainant's evidence was inadequate to establish the requisite intention or "object" required by entry (6).
  • The workers were paid as per minimum wages when engaged, and employment was given "as and when" work was available; only two sanctioned permanent posts existed at the school.

Respondent (Union) — Main Arguments

  • The Industrial Court had found that the University engaged in an unfair labour practice, and the High Court should not interfere with that finding.
  • The complaint alleged continuous employment since 1971 and discriminatory treatment where permanent employees received substantially higher pay while daily wagers received minimum wages; such continued casualization warranted granting permanency benefits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Daily-rated Casual Labour Employed under Post and Telegraphs Department v. Union of India [1988 — I L.L.N 48] Illustrates situations where continuous casual employment led to recognition of rights; cited in argument on permanency. The Court noted this decision (and some others) were decided under Article 14 or the Industrial Disputes Act and thus were not governed by the MRTU & PULP Act; accordingly, they were considered irrelevant to the present dispute under Schedule IV, item (6).
Bhullur Nath Yadav v. Mayo Hall Sports Complex, Allahabad [1990 — II L.L.N 946] Example of recognition of rights for continuously employed casual/daily-rated workers. The Court treated this decision as not directly applicable because it arose under Article 14/Industrial Disputes Act principles rather than the MRTU & PULP Act.
Voltas Ltd. v. M.M. Kendrekar [1984 (2) B.C.R 15] Decision relevant to rights of long-continuous casual workers under non-MRTU legal regimes. Treated as not binding for the specific statutory context (Schedule IV, item (6) of the MRTU & PULP Act) of the present case because it was decided under other laws.
Ichalkaranji Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Deccan Co-operative Kamdar Sangh [1990 — L.L.N 538] Decision under Schedule IV, item (6) where employers had power to create posts but failed to do so; supported relief to workers on that factual matrix. The Court observed that in those cases the employers had the power to create posts and a finding of suspicious object was made; they therefore differed from the present case where a statutory bar existed.
Maharashtra Small Scale Industries v. The Industrial Court, Nagpur [1990 — II L.L.N 76] Another decision under Schedule IV, item (6) recognizing rights of casual workers where employers had power but did not regularize employment. The Court noted similarity of principle but distinguished the present facts because in those cases employers could create posts whereas in the present case a statutory embargo was present.
Chief Officer, Sangli Municipal Council v. Dharamsing Hiralal Nagarkar [1991 - II L.L.N 865] Considered whether inability to appoint permanently (due to selection rules) absolved employer from item (6) liability; addressed factual context where posts were available and employer failed to regularize. The Court examined the decision, noted the observations relied upon by respondent, but distinguished it on facts—there posts were available and there was no statutory bar to create posts; in the present case no such posts were available and there was a statutory prohibition without State sanction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and purposive interpretation of Schedule IV, item (6) of the MRTU & PULP Act. It set out two essential elements required to establish the unfair labour practice described in entry (6):

  • That the employer has employed persons as badlis, casuals or temporaries and continued them as such for a long period ("years" implying a sufficiently long period raising suspicion); and
  • That such continuation was done with the specific object (intention or mens rea) of depriving those workers of the status and privileges of permanent employees.

The Court emphasized that mere proof of long-standing casual employment is insufficient. The word "object" in the entry imports intention — a deliberate design on the part of the employer — and therefore "tangible evidence" is required to demonstrate that the employer deliberately persisted in casualising employment with the purpose of denying permanency. Mere suspicion raised by duration alone does not discharge the complainant's burden.

Applying this principle to the facts, the Court found the complainant's evidence insufficient: the complaint relied largely on one witness and an unproved chart (which, though used freely in proceedings, was not proved). The University produced a witness (a Superintendent) who stated that employment was given when work was available and reiterated that only two sanctioned permanent posts existed at the school; this evidence was neither robustly challenged nor supplemented by cogent proof from the complainant.

Crucially, the Court examined the statutory framework restricting the University's capacity to create new posts. It relied on Section 50-B of the Punjabrao Agricultural University (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1968 (quoted in the opinion), which imposes an embargo on creating new posts or revising benefits without prior State approval. Given this statutory prohibition and the University's averment (and documentary/pleading assertion) that it had recommended creation of additional posts to the Maharashtra Council of Agricultural Education and Research and the Government, the Court held that it could not infer the specific object required by item (6) — i.e., there was no tangible proof that the University deliberately withheld permanency to deprive workers of benefits.

The Court reviewed the precedents cited by the respondent and distinguished them on the basis that many of those decisions were not decided under the MRTU & PULP Act (but under Article 14 or the Industrial Disputes Act), or, where they were under Schedule IV, item (6), the employers in those cases had the statutory or practical ability to create posts and yet failed to do so — a factual posture not present here.

The Court concluded that the Industrial Court had overlooked the necessity of proving the employer's specific object and had misapplied entry (6) when it reached its finding against the University.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the petition and set aside the Industrial Court's order. In the words of the opinion: the petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the rule is made absolute. The Court made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the directions issued by the Industrial Court (granting permanent-employee benefits, directing the University to approach the Government to create posts, and fixing permanency from dates after five years of service with November 1990 as a standard date) have been vacated.
  • The Court clarified the legal standard for entry (6) of Schedule IV: liability for this unfair labour practice requires proof of a deliberate object to deprive workers of permanency; long continuance as casuals alone, without tangible evidence of intent, will not suffice.
  • The opinion expressly cautioned that this decision should not be read as depriving the workers of any rights they may have under other enactments; the observations were to be read strictly in terms of the facts of the case.
  • The Court did not purport to lay down any broader, novel precedent beyond the correct application of entry (6) to the facts; rather it emphasized the evidentiary threshold (intentional design) necessary under that provision.

This summary is prepared strictly from the contents of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or authorities beyond those appearing in the opinion were added or inferred.

    Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth (By Its Registrar), Akola v. General Secretary, Krishi Vidyapeeth Kamgar Union, And Another

    1. Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth (University for short) has challenged the order passed by the Industrial Court, Amravati, holding that the University has engaged in an unfair labour practice covered by item(6) of Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, and the consequential directions issued therein. In these directions, the learned member of the Industrial Court has directed the responden-University to grant all the benefits and privileges admissible to the regular and permanent employees in so far as payment of wages, payment of dearness allowance and leave admissibility are concerned. The University is further directed to approach the Government with honest intention to persuade the Government to create permanent posts in which these employees can be absorbed. The learned member has also further directed that they should be given the benefit of permanent employees from the date they complete five years of service and the standard date is settled from November 1990.

    2. A complaint came to be made by the union called Krishi Vidyapeeth Kamgar Union from its General Secretary representing the case of its members who were the workmen. In its complaint, the complainant claimed that the complainant was a registered union and had a right to represent its members. It further claimed that the said Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth had under its control number of institutions including an Agricultural School at Nimba. The said school had about 175 acres of land and also owned cattle. It further claimed that in this school, there were more than 150 persons working as labourers and they were working since 1971. It is further contended that, in fact, the school had the work which could keep more than 150 labourers busy for the whole year. According to the complainant, the 18 members who were mentioned in the schedule to the complaint were in continuous service and were working in all the three seasons, i.e, summer, winter and rainy season and they used to do the work of looking after the cattle, watching the crops and also other agricultural operations. In Para. 6 it is claimed that whenever the said union demanded that the workers should be made permanent, the University avoided the issue by answering that it was not within the power of the University and it was the sole discretion of the Government. It is then reiterated in Para. 7 that, in fact, the University was an independent institution and it could lake the necessary decision. In Para. 8 it is contended that for years together, the labourers were continued as daily-wages employees and in fact there was a need. In spite of the need, the workers were being deprived of the benefit of permanency and the principle of “equal work, equal pay” was being trampled by the institution. In Para. 9(a), standard language is used and it is claimed that the applicants were deliberately deprived of the benefit of permanency and were made to work on meagre wages.

    3. This application came to be opposed by the University. 11 denied the claim that the persons named in the schedule were regular workers and that they were busy throughout the year. It also denied the capacity of the school to keep 150 workers busy for the whole year. It claimed that the workers were engaged as and when they were required subject to the availability of work and they were getting the wages as per the wage prescribed by the Government under the Minimum Wages Rules. It has been specifically replied by the University in Para. 6 that in fact, the factual position and the limitation of the management in bringing the workers on regular establishment has already been explained to the union as well as the labour union before the Conciliation Officer several times and that the Conciliation Officer has verified the position with reference to the records. It is further claimed that, in fact, there was neither a cause of action to the complaint nor was the complaint within limitation. It is specifically contended by the University in its written statement further that the University was a creation of the statute called “Maharashtra Agricultural Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeths) Act, 1983” and under its provisions the University was not competent to create any posts unless the posts were sanctioned in budget estimate by the Maharashtra Council of Agricultural Education and Research, Pune, which had to accommodate the expenditure of four Agricultural Universities in the State within the ceiling of the grants given by the Government. It was specifically contended that the power to create regular posts was not then at all available to the University. However, considering the minimum requirement of the additional staff on the regular establishment, the University had already submitted the necessary proposals for creation of the posts of mazdoors/labourers to the Maharashtra Council of Agricultural Education and Research, Pune, and the Government for sanction. It has been specifically stated thereafter that there were no posts as there were no vacancies in the regular cadre and there was no question of the University engaging in any kind of unfair labour practice. It is reiterated further that there was no grudge or any mala fide intention against the workers engaged on daily-wages on day basis in the University and on receipt of the sanction for additional posts, the University would be in a position to accommodate some of the persons form daily wages on regular establishment subject to their seniority and suitability, etc.

    4. On the basis of this, evidence was led and after the evidence, the learned Member of the Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the University had engaged in an unfair labour practice within the definition of item (6) of Sch. IV. It is against this order passed by the Industrial Court that the present petition is directed.

    5. Sri Patil, the learned counsel appearing for the University, has pointed out that, in fact, the order passed by the Industrial Court is totally against the provisions of law and the Industrial Court has committed a jurisdictional error in entertaining this application under the provisions of Sch. IV, item (6) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. It is further the contention of Sri Patil that, in fact, there was no question of University committing an unfair labour practice as the University itself had mooted out the proposal for creation of additional posts with the Government and, therefore, there was no question of any mala fide on the question of jurisdiction. He stated that the evidence tendered by the complainant was short of spelling out any unfair labour practice on the part of the University and that even on merits, the whole order is patently illegal and without jurisdiction.

    6. Sri Harkare, the learned counsel for the respondent, supported the order on various grounds and contended that the Industrial Court has found that the University has engaged in an unfair labour practice and this Court should not interfere with the order passed by the Industrial Court.

    7. It will be worthwhile to first see the exact language of the said unfair labour practice which runs as under:

    “Schedule IV, item(6).— To employ employee as ‘badlis,’ casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees.”

    Plain reading of this provision which provides the description of the unfair labour practice covered under Sch. IV would show that firstly it must be established that the employer has, in fact, employed as badlis, casuals or temporaries and has continued them as such for years together. Undoubtedly, the word “years” would not connote years together but would connote a long period, sufficiently long so as to cast suspicion on the credibility of the employer. Secondly, such act of the employer in employing badlis, casuals or temporaries and then continuing them for years together should be with a specific object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees. One thing is, therefore, certain that merely because a particular organisation or a particular employer has employed workers as badlis, casuals or temporaries and has continued them for years together by itself would not bring him into the clutches of the unfair labour practice described above. The object of the employer in employing the workers as such for years together should be to deprive them of the status and the benefits of permanency. Unless, therefore, there is a finding that the employer has deliberately kept on employing the workers with this object, the employer could not be held guilty of this unfair labour practice. Undoubtedly, the continued practice of employing the workers for years together as causal or temporaries would tend to point out such an object being present in the mind of the employer but that by itself would fall short of bringing the action into the clutches of unfair labour practice as described, unless it is found, as a matter of fact, that the employer had a definite design to deprive the workers of their rightful wages and benefits. What then is the position of an employer who does not have the authority to employ such persons permanently owing to a provision of law? Could it be said that an employer who is specifically prohibited from granting the status of permanency by creating posts is also covered under the language of Sch. IV, entry (6).

    8. The answers to these question will depend upon the true interpretation of this entry. Now, the plain language of entry 6 suggests that in continuing the employees as casuals or temporaries, there must be definite object of depriving such workers of their rightful benefits. Then and then alone, this practice could be covered under the entry. How would that object be discerned is the question? By mere showing that there has been a practice of continuing the employees in the manner as shown above, does the complainant discharge his burden? The answer must be given in the negative. It is true that a continued practice of continuing the employees for years together as a badli employee or a temporary employee may definitely raise a finger of suspicion regarding the intention of that employer. However, in order to hold such employee guilty of such unfair labour practice as described in entry 6, something more is required. There must be “tangible evidence” to show that this was deliberately done. The words “with the object of connote intention or mens rea on the part of employer, or a certain design in his mind to achieve certain results. Without that vital intention or that certain design, the employer cannot be dragged in. Unfortunately the Industrial Court has missed this vital aspect in the matter.

    9. On behalf of the complainant all that was reiterated was that some certain labourers were employee and this practice went on for years together and while the permanent employees were getting the pay at the rate of Rs. 1200 or 1500 a month, the daily employees were only paid at the rate of minimum wages. Now, it is also an admitted position that there are only two permanent posts in that particular school — of workers or mazdoors. Besides a single witness who merely reiterated the facts stated above, no other evidence was led by the complainant.

    10. On behalf of the University came a Superintendent to depose and all that he stated was that the complainant gives employment only when the work is available and there were only two sanctioned posts of agricultural labourer. Besides a stray suggestion that the agricultural work was going continuously around the year which suggestion was promptly denied by the said witness, nothing more was asked by way of cross-examination. Thus, such an important case suffers tremendously on account of apathy on the part of the complainant and similar apathy on the part of the respondent. There seems to be a chart which does not seem to have been proved by the evidence. However, a free use has been made of the chart by the Industrial Court as also by both the counsel appearing in this Court. The chart gives out the exact working days of the 18 persons and their seniority.

    11. On this whole material, the Industrial Court has based its finings. It is really a matter of great concern hat such an issue should have been decided in this casual fashion. There if absolutely no pleading nor any supporting evidence to reiterate the stand taken in the complaint. There is absolutely nothing to show that the University was continuing these employees as badlis, casuals or temporaries for years together and secondly, that the University was doing this with the specific object of depriving them of their status and the privileges. The language speaks of a specific object. It does not merely indicate the result of the action of the employer. If the result of the action of the employer is of depriving employees of the status and privileges of permanent employees that by itself does not bring the act within the ambit of entry (6). There has to be a definite object of that action, which has to be proved by evidence. Now the question is whether there was such an object on the part of the employer in this case and if so, was this object proved by cogent and tangible evidence. The Industrial Court has miserably failed to look into this issue. It is to be found that the University has specifically raised this question in its written statement and had pointed out that it was power less to create any new employment and that in order to accommodate all the members of the complainant-union, first it had to create the permanent posts. It has also pointed out that under the Punjabrao Agricultural University (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1968, there was a specific prohibition to create any such employment unless sanctioned by the Government. My attention was drawn to the provisions of Punjabrao Agricultural University (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1968, and more particularly to S. 50-B which runs as under:

    “50B. Without the prior approval of the State Government, or an officer authorised by it in this behalf, the University shall not—

    (a) create any new posts of any officers and other employees, both in the teaching and non-teaching categories;

    (b) revise the pay allowances, post-retirement benefits and other benefits of any such officers and employees:

    (c) grant any special pay, allowance or other extra remuneration of any description whatsoever, including ex gratia payment or other benefits having financial implications to any such officers or employees:

    (d) divert earmarked funds for any other purpose, or

    (e) incur any expenditure on any development work.”

    12. A plain reading of this section shows that there is a complete embargo on the powers to University to create new posts whether it he of a professor or a labourer, unless a specific sanction is obtained from the State Government in that behalf. Indeed, in its pleadings the University has specifically contended that considering the demands of labourers it had in fact, written to the Government that such posts be created and had sought sanction of the Government in that behalf. Now if the University was powerless to create the posts and thereby clothe the labourers with the status of permanency and if the University had, in fact, recommended, such creation of the posts, could it be said that the University was continuing these employees as badlis casuals or temporaries for years together with the object of depriving them of their status and privileges of permanent employees. The answer has to be in negative. The learned Member of the Industrial Court has completely missed this vital aspect of the matter. When any action is complained of under this entry, the Court will have to discern into the mind of the employer whether the action is deliberate or not. This is the vital and the key question which the Court will have to answer before it finds such employer guilty of any such unfair labour practice. Unfortunately, nothing has been done by the learned member of the Industrial Court here. This is how the learned member of the Industrial Court deals with the question:

    It does appear that the Government controls the financial status of the University. Also creation of regular employment without the approval of the Government is not possible for the authorities of the University as per the provisions of law. Nevertheless, the poor employees cannot be deprived of the benefits which the labour legislation entitles them to claim. The labour legislation disapproves discontinuance of the daily wager on a job which is of a permanent nature. Therefore, the employees in this case shall be entitled to all the privileges of the permanent employees in their cadre.”

    13. I am afraid, the treatment meted out is really shocking. The real import and the language of entry 6 in Sch. IV has been completely missed by the learned member.

    14. Sri Harkare, appearing on behalf of the respondent, drew my attention to various decisions reported in Daily-rated Casual Labour Employed under Post and Telegraphs Department v. Union of India [1988 — I L.L.N 48], Bhullur Nath Yadav v. Mavo Hall Sports Complex, Allahabad [1990 — II L.L.N 946], Voltas Ltd. v. M.M Kendrekar [1984 (2) B.C.R 15]. Lehalkaranji Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Deeean Co-operative Kamdar Sangh [1990 — L.L.N 538] and Maharashtra Small Scale Industries v. The Industrial Conn, Nagpur [1990 — II L.L.N 76]. In none of these cases the situation as occurring in the present case is available. In all those cases, the employers were in a position to create employment and yet though it was within their powers to create an employment and to grant the benefits of permanency to the employees, they have failed to do so. In all these cases, the rights of the employees who were continuously employed as daily-wagers or badlis or casual labourers for years together, have been recognised in their favour, inasmuch as it is said time and again that such employees would get the benefit of permanency. There cannot be any dispute with, this proposition. Indeed; the workers who are so treated to be the casual workers for years together have, undoubtedly, the right to be appointed permanently, of course, subject to the availability of the posts funds, etc. There cannot be any dispute on this proposition. However, such is not the situation here. The reported decisions in 1988 — I L.L.N 48;1990 - I L.L.N 538 as also 1984 (2) B.C.R 15 (vide supra), are not under the provisions of (he Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. They are under the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India or under the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the said case are totally irrelevant for the purposes of the present controversy, though the cases reported in Ichalkaranji Co-operative Spinning Mills, Ltd. and Maharashtra Small Scale Industries (vide supra), are on Sch. IV, item (6). The employers had undoubtedly a right to create the posts or to grant the benefit of permanency on the casual labourers. In both the cases there is a finding of fact arrived at whereby the object of the employer was found to be suspicious within the language of entry (6).

    15. Lastly, Sri Harkare, the learned counsel for the respondent relied on the reported decision of Chief Officer, Sangli Municipal Council… v. Dharamsing Hiralal Nagarkar…. [1991 - II L.L.N 865]. Sri Harkare, the learned counsel for the respondent, strenuously relied on the observations made by this Court in the said decision. In Para. 5, at page 867 it is observed:

    “Sri Jamdar further submitted that the intention of the petitioner-council was not to deprive the respondent-workman of his status and privileges of permanent employee but he could not be made permanent in view of the fact that the petitioner-council could only appoint a person recommended by State Selection Board. There is no substance in this argument of Sri Jamdar for the simple reason that the State Selection Board was a source for appointing a fresh candidate and in the matter of a person already appointed, it would not be difficult for the petitioner-council to make him permanent. For the purpose of making a workman permanent the petitioner-council had not to consult the State Selection Board. Under the circumstances, I find it difficult to persuade myself to agree with the submission of Sri Jamdar that the petitioner-council did not commit unfair labour practice covered by item (6) of Sch. IV of the MRTU and PULP Act.”

    Sri Harkare submits with reference to this observation that in the reported decision the Municipal Council of Sangli did not have the authority to appoint the petitioner permanently and, therefore, it had discontinued the service of the petitioner which is a similarity in the reported decision and in the present case. There also the Municipal Council was bound to accept only a candidate selected by the Selection Board and yet the Municipal Council was held to have committed an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Sch. IV, item (6). The submission, though attractive, lacks the necessary logic. The observation in a particular reported decision cannot be read shorn of its background and they must be read in the background of the facts of the case itself. Immediately after the aforementioned observation the Court makes the further observation as under:

    “But assuming for sake of argument that there is substance in the submission of Sri Jamdar and that the petitioner-council did not commit unfair labour practice covered by item (6) of Sch. IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, it would not carry the petitioner-council case further because there is no defence available to the petitioner-council for an allegation that they indulged in an act of unfair labour practice covered by item (9) of Sch. IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. As per item(9) it would be generally unfair labour practice on the part of an employer to fail to implement award, settlement or agreement. The record shows that as per the provisions of an award made in Reference (II) No. 102 of 1955 the respondent-workman had to be made permanent.”

    (emphasis supplied.)

    The observation and the language used, particularly in Para. 6, is really telling. Be that as it may, even the facts in Sangli Municipal Council v. Dharamsing (vide supra), were entirely different. This was a ease where the posts were, undoubtedly, available. Since the persons selected by the Service Board were not available, the petitioner was employed and continued. It is in that context, really speaking, that the observations are made in Para. 5. In the present case, however, such posts are not available at all.

    16. Again, in the reported decision, the available posts were to be filled in and the Municipality has failed to fill in the available posts for considerable time of 15 months. Such is not the situation in the present case. In fact, there are no posts available and there is a specific bar to create any such new post. This distinction itself is sufficient to discard the contention of Sri Harkare.

    17. Again, present is not a case where any workman is cither discontinued or terminated as was the case in Sangli Municipal Council v. Dharamsing (1991 - II L.L.N 865] (vide supra). Here is a situation where the University has continued to employ the workman and has also shown its bona fides by writing to the State Government for creation of additional posts so that it is able to clothe the workmen with the status of permanent employees. Indeed, the facts in the two cases are different on this aspect also.

    18. The third aspect on which the reported case differs from the situation in the present case is that there was no statutory bar in the Sangli Municipal Council case [1991 — II L.L.N 865] (vide supra), to create any new post. Under the circumstances, the reliance placed by Sri Harkare on this reported decision must fail.

    19. In view of the discussion above, it is clear that the complaint made under the provisions of S. 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, could not be granted as has been done by the Member, Industrial Court, Amravati. This is, however, not to bring a permanent cloud on the rights of the workers so as to deprive them permanently from any benefit which they are entitled to, under the provisions of any other enactment. The observations made in this case will have to be read strictly in terms of the facts stated in this case.

    20. With this observation, the petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the rule is made absolute. However, without any order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Punjabrao Krishi Vid... v. General Secretary, K...
    (Jun 29, 1993)