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  • section 22(3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred
  • section 439 read with sections 433(e) and 434 of The Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of section 22 of the said SICA Act,
  • provisions of section 434(1)
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  • section 22(3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred
  • section 439 read with sections 433(e) and 434 of The Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of section 22 of the said SICA Act,
  • provisions of section 434(1)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Creditors' Petition for Winding up of Khatau Dyes and Fibres Ltd.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a creditors' petition for the winding up of The Khatau Dyes and Fibres Ltd. (the Company) under section 439 read with sections 433(e) and 434 of The Companies Act, 1956.

The Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Khatau Kakanji Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (Khatau Mills). Between February and June 1987 the Company drew 47 D.A. bills of exchange amounting to Rs. 1,29,76,000 on Fashion Prints Ltd.; Fashion Prints honoured only 14 bills and paid Rs. 33,00,000, leaving 33 bills amounting to Rs. 96,38,013 unpaid. Between October and December 1987 the Company drew 20 D.A. bills amounting to Rs. 76,06,623 on Khatau Mills; those were accepted but were not honoured on maturity. The petitioners also had a cash credit hypothecation facility and the Company owed sums under that facility.

The petitioners made demand(s) on the Company by letter(s) in September and thereafter; the Company failed to pay. The petition was presented on 25 January 1989.

On 7 August 1989 the Company acknowledged by Consent Terms filed in Court that Rs. 2,30,43,588 was due (as on 30 June 1989) and agreed to pay by instalments; an order in those terms was passed that day. The Company failed to make the agreed payments. The petition was admitted and advertised.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the circumstances of admitted debt and failure to pay under Consent Terms, the Court should exercise its discretion under section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956 to wind up the Company.
  2. Whether the protective stay over the holding company (Khatau Mills) under section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA), extends to and suspends winding up proceedings against the wholly owned subsidiary (the Company).
  3. If the Court is satisfied that winding up is appropriate, whether the Court should grant an immediate winding up order or make any conditional order or stay of enforcement.

Arguments of the Parties

Company's Arguments (as presented in affidavit and by counsel Mr. Cooper)

  • The Company admitted the debt but resisted winding up, asserting that the discretion under section 433 must be exercised judicially and need not result in winding up simply because inability to pay is shown.
  • The Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Khatau Mills, which is under the protective umbrella of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) pursuant to section 22(3) of the SICA Act; therefore, proceedings for recovery, including winding up, cannot be proceeded against Khatau Mills and, by the Company's contention, that protective status prevents equitable relief against the Company as well.
  • The Company contended Khatau Mills, as acceptor of certain bills, was primarily liable and solvent; because the subsidiary could not recover from Khatau Mills the sums due to it, the Company's inability to pay petitioners was inequitable to treat as grounds for winding up.
  • It was contended that securities had been agreed to be created in favour of the petitioners and that petitioners should have sought realization of those securities rather than seeking liquidation of the Company.
  • Counsel alternatively sought a suspension of any winding up order until Khatau Mills was no longer under BIFR protection.
  • Counsel relied on precedent (Jugalkishore Banarsidas v. South India Saw Mills; Misrilal Dharamchand P. Ltd. v. B. Patnaik Mines P. Ltd.; Paramjit Lal Badhwar v. Prem Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.) to support the exercise of discretion and the appropriateness of a stay or refusal in certain circumstances.

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented in rejoinder affidavit and by counsel Mr. Mehta)

  • The petitioners asserted they are concerned only with the Company's liability to them; the solvency or protective status of Khatau Mills is not a defence to the Company's admitted indebtedness.
  • The Company and Khatau Mills are distinct legal entities; the petitioners are entitled to proceed against the Company which has admitted the debt and is unable to pay.
  • The petitioners denied any waiver or concessions beyond what was recorded in the Consent Terms; no security was created in their favour and therefore there was nothing for them to realize before proceeding.
  • There is no bona fide dispute as to the Company's liability; accordingly, in the public interest the Company should be wound up to protect third parties from dealing with a company that will not meet its undisputed debts. Counsel relied on Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Servants of BMTC (CIDCO).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jugalkishore Banarsidas v. South India Saw Mills (P) Ltd., (1975) 45 Company Cases 273 The Court may exercise discretion under section 433; section 434(1) determines when requirements of 433(e) are fulfilled but does not mandate winding up in every such case; equitable/counter-balancing grounds may justify denying an immediate winding up. The Court cited this authority to note that discretion exists and must be exercised on justice and equity; but the Court also observed that discretion must be exercised judicially and depends on facts of the case. Ultimately, the Court found no equitable grounds to deny winding up here.
Misrilal Dharamchand P. Ltd. v. B. Patnaik Mines P. Ltd., (1978) 48 Company Cases 494 Example of a case where winding up was directed but its enforcement was stayed (six months) to allow payment by the company. The Court acknowledged this precedent as illustrating that a winding up order can be made with a stay of enforcement; it distinguished the present facts, finding the Company had not satisfied demands or made payments and that a stay was not appropriate in this case.
Paramjit Lal Badhwar v. Prem Spinning And Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., (1986) 60 Company Cases 420 Interpreting the word "may" in section 433 to indicate that even if inability to pay is shown, the Court has discretion whether to wind up in the interest of justice. The Court relied on this line of authority (including the decision in Alluminium Corporation) to articulate that section 433 confers discretion; however, on the facts before it the Court exercised its discretion to wind up because the Company persistently failed to pay.
Alluminium Corporation of India Ltd. v. Lakshmi Ratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., (1970) 40 Company Cases 259 Authority relied upon for the principle that the Court's power under section 433 is discretionary (the word "may" indicates discretion). Cited (via the Paramjit Lal Badhwar discussion) to support the proposition that the Court must exercise discretion; the Court reiterated that discretion exists but nonetheless found that, given the circumstances, winding up was appropriate.
Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Servants of BMTC (CIDCO), (1991) 2 Company Law Journal 357 (Bom.) Used by petitioners to support the proposition that winding up ordinarily follows where a company is unable to pay and to protect public interest. The Court acknowledged reliance on this authority by petitioners as support for the position that undisputed debts and inability to pay justify winding up in the public interest; the Court found the petitioners' position consistent with this principle.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequential legal analysis that is explicitly reflected in the opinion:

  1. Admission of debt and Consent Terms — The Company had, by Consent Terms filed and ordered on 7 August 1989, admitted liability for Rs. 2,30,43,588 (with interest) and undertook to pay by instalments. The Court observed the payments were not subject to any condition (for example receipt from Khatau Mills) and no payments were in fact made after filing those Consent Terms.
  2. Distinct legal personality — The Court emphasized the statutory distinction between a holding company and its subsidiary under the Companies Act and noted that the protective umbrella afforded to Khatau Mills by BIFR (section 22 of SICA) does not automatically extend to the subsidiary. Therefore, the fact that Khatau Mills was under BIFR protection did not suspend proceedings for winding up the subsidiary.
  3. Discretion under section 433 — The Court accepted the settled position that the power under section 433(e) is discretionary. It reviewed precedents to extract guiding principles: the discretion must be exercised judicially; winding up is ordinarily appropriate where a company is commercially insolvent and it would be unjust to allow it to remain in existence; the commercial solvency analysis is not merely assets-versus-liabilities on conversion to cash but whether the company can meet demands in a commercial sense.
  4. Application of discretion to facts — Although discretion exists to deny or stay a winding up order, the Court found multiple relevant facts here that weighed strongly in favour of winding up:
    • The Company had expressly admitted liability and the payment obligations in Consent Terms were unconditional.
    • No payments were made after the Consent Terms were filed, and the Company had not satisfied petitions' demands for many years, including more than three years after the statutory demand.
    • The petition had been pending in Court for about one and a half years without any offer or demonstration by the Company of an intention or capacity to pay the debt.
    • Given the admitted, undisputed debt and the Company's persistent non-payment, the Court concluded the Company was, in a practical/commercial sense, unable to pay its debts.
  5. Public interest and protection of creditors/third parties — The Court emphasized that winding up is ordinarily appropriate where a trading company refuses to meet undisputed debts, so as to protect the public and creditors from dealing with an insolvent or non-paying company.
  6. Conclusion on remedies — Having applied the legal principles and the facts, the Court concluded that it was just and equitable to wind up the Company and therefore made the petition absolute in terms of the reliefs sought. The Court did, however, grant a limited procedural accommodation by staying the operation of the order for three weeks at the request of the Company's counsel.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition for winding up is made absolute and the Company is ordered to be wound up in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the petition.

Direct consequences and immediate procedural orders (as stated in the opinion):

  • The winding up order is to take effect as specified by the Court's directions; however, the operation of the order was stayed for a period of three weeks at the Company's request.
  • A certified copy of the order is to be issued expeditiously.

Broader implications (as expressly articulated in the opinion):

  • The Court confirmed that the protective umbrella of BIFR over a holding company (Khatau Mills) does not automatically extend to its wholly owned subsidiary. Consequently, proceedings for winding up the subsidiary are not suspended solely because the holding company is under BIFR protection.
  • The judgment reiterates the established principle that although the Court's jurisdiction under section 433 is discretionary, persistent non-payment of an undisputed debt following statutory demand and an unconditional admission of liability (as here, by Consent Terms) normally justifies winding up in the public interest. The decision does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle but applies existing authorities to the facts before the Court.

Order accordingly. (Certified copy to be issued expeditiously.)

    Dena Bank v. The Khatau Dyes & Fibres Ltd.

    S.M Jhunjhunuwala, J.:— This is a Creditors' Petition fix Winding up of The Khatau Dyes and Fibres Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as “The Company”) under section 439 read with sections 433(e) and 434 of The Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The said Act’).

    2. The Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Khatau Kakanji Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘Khatau Mills’). The Company has been incorporated and registered under the provisions of the said Act having authorised capital of Rs. 10,00,000/- divided into 10,000 Equity Shares of Rs. 100/- each and the issued, subscribed and paid up capital of Rs. 1,00,000/- divided into 1000 Equity Shares of Rs. 100/- each with the object to carry on business of spinners and doublers of fibre substances, makes of bleaching, dyeing, printing and processing materials and of buying, selling, importing and exporting yarn, cotton and other cotton staple fibre, yarn, waste, silk, artificial silk, rayon, nylon, wool, jute and other fibre substance materials. Between the month of February, 1987 and June, 1987, the Company draw 47 D.A Bills of Exchange amounting to Rs. 1,29,76,000/- which were duly accepted by one Fashion Prints Ltd. The said Fashion Prints Ltd. honoured only 14 D.A Bills of Exchange out of me said 47 D.A Bills of Exchange and paid only the sum of Rs. 33,00,000/- to the petitioners leaving the remaining 33 D.A Bills of Exchange amounting to Rs. 96,38,013/- unpaid by them. The Company as drawer of the said 33 D.A Bills of Exchange was bound and liable to pay to the petitioners the amouts of the said D.A Bills of Exchange together with interest thereon. Further, between the month of October, 1987 and December, 1987, the Company drew 20 D.A Bills of Exchange on the said Khatau Mills amounting to Rs. 76,06,623/- which were only accepted. The said Khatau Mills did not honour the said D.A Bills of Exchange on their maturity and the Company as drawer thereof was bound and liable to pay to the petitioners also the amounts of the said 20 D.A Bills of Exchange together with interest thereon. The petitioners had granted a Cash Credit Hypothecation facility to the Company in respect whereof the sum of Rs. 1,29,798.77 with further interest at the rate of 16.5% per annum was found due and payable by the Company to the petitioners as on 30th June, 1988. As on 30th June, 1988, an aggregate sum of Rs. 82,52,483/- together with further interest to be calculated at the rate of 17.5% per annum on Rs. 76,06,623/- as from 1st July, 1988, an aggregate sum of Rs. 1,16,67,341/- together with further interest to be calculated at the rate of 195% per annum on Rs. 52,97,631/- and at the rate of 17.5% per annum on Rs. 43,40,382/- as from 1st July, 1988 and an aggregate sum of Rs. 1,29,798.77 in respect of the Cash Credit Hypothecation Facility granted to the Company with further interest thereon at the rate of 16.5% per annum to be calculated as from 1st July, 1988 because due and payable by the Company to the Petitioners. The petitioners several times and finally by their advocates' letter dated 23rd September, 1988 called upon the Company to pay to the petitioners the said amounts. The Company despite having received the said letter dated 26th September, 1988 failed and neglected to make the payment of the said amounts to the petitioners. By its letter dated 28th November, 1988, the Company requested the petitioners to bear with it and assured that the payment of the does of the petitioners would be shortly made. The Company did not pay the said amounts to the petitioners. Since the Company was unable to pay its debt, on 25th January, 1989, the petitioners presented this petition for the Company being wound up under the provisions of the said Act.

    3. On 7th August, 1989, the Company acknowledged and admitted that the sum of Rs. 230,43,588/- was due and payable by it to the petitioners as on 30th June, 1989 which me Company agreed to pay to the petitioners together with further interest thereon in instalments as provided for in the Consent Terms signed by the petitioners and the Company on 7th day of August, 1989 and filed in this Court on that day. On 7th August, 1989. Order in terms of the said Consent Terms was passed by this Court. As per the said Consent Terms, the Company became liable to pay to the petitioners the said sum of Rs. 2,30,43,588/- and interest in instalments as mentioned therein which the Company failed and neglected to pay. Neither the said Khatau Mills not even Sural Chandrakant Khatau made any payment on behalf of the Company to the petitioners under the said Consent Terms. The Petition accordingly stood admitted and the same has been duly advertised.

    4. On behalf of the Company, affidavit of the said Senit Khatau has been filed in reply to the petition. Though the Company has admitted that the said amount is due and payable by the Company to the petitioners, the Company has resisted a winding up Order being passed against it. According to the Company, it is wholly subsidiary Company of the said Khatau Mills which is under a protective umbrella of Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred as ‘BIFR’) and as such, by reason of Order passed under section 22(3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred as ‘The said SICA Act’), no proceedings for recovery of any amount including winding up proceedings can lie or proceeded with either against the said Khatuau Mills or the Company. It is also the case of the Company that the said Khatau Mills being acceptors of the said Bills of Exchange is primarily liable to pay the amount and though the said Khatau Mills is solvent, in view of protective umbrella of BIFR, the Company is unable to recover from the said Khatau Mills and in its turn, unable to pay to the petitioners and in the circumstances, it is inequitable and unjust to permit any winding up proceedings against the Company being proceeded with. It is also the case of the Company that at the time when the said Consent Terms were filed, it was in contemplation of the parties that the said Khatau Mills would be primarily be liable to pay to the petitioners and that the Company would be secondarily liable for the payment and it is wholly reprehensible on the part of the petitioners to take advantage of the said Consent Terms and seek winding up of the Company. According to the Company securities have been agreed to be created in favour of the petitioners to secure the debt and the petitioners ought to have proceeded to have the securities created and/or realised in respect of amount due to the petitioners rather than to force the Company into liquidation.

    5. On behalf of the petitioners, affidavit of one S.B Malgi has been filed in rejoinder. According to the petitioners, the petitioners are neither concerned with the solvency of the said Khatau Mills nor with the Company being wholly subsidiary Company of the said Khatau Mills. The fact that the said Khatau Mills and the Company are two distinct and separate legally entities and that the Company is indebted to the petitioners and is unable to pay its debt is sufficient to have the Company wound up under the provisions of the said Act. According to the petitioners, the petitioners are also not concerned with as to what amount if any, is due by the said Khatau Mills to the Company. The petitioners have not been member of consortium of Banks and neither there was any waiver of interest nor any concession was granted by the Petitioners to the Company otherwise than what is mentioned in the said Consent Terms. Since no security was created in favour of the petitioners. The question of the petitioners first getting the securities realised did not arise. The petitioners have denied that at the time when the said Consent Terms were filed, it was in contemplation that the said Khatau Mills would be primarily liable to pay to or that the Company would be secondarily liable to pay to the petitioners. The petitioners have also denied that by reason of the said Khatau Mills being under the protective umbrella of BIFR as contended by the Company, no proceedings for recovery of any amount including winding up proceedings can lie or proceeded with against the Company. According to the petitioners, there is no bona fide dispute to the debt due and payable by the Company and the Company being unable to pay its debt, it is just and equitable that the Company should be wound up.

    6. Mr. Cooper, the learned Counsel appearing for the Company, has submitted that the fact that the Company is unable to pay its debt, does not necessarily entitle the Court to order winding up of the Company as the discretion to pass such an order, even in the case of the inability of a Company to pay its debts, is by section 433 of the said Act vests in the Court. Mr. Cooper has further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, even though the Company has not paid the amount payable to the petitioners, neither it can be deemed that the Company is unable to pay its debt nor it is equitable and fair to Order winding up of the Company. Alternatively, Mr. Cooper has submitted that the Order of winding up can, in the facts and circumstances of the case, be suspended till the said Khatau Mills is out of the protective umbrella of BIFR. In support of his submissions, Mr. Cooper has relied upon the following cases:

    i) (Jugalkishore Banarsidas v. South India Saw Mills (P) Ltd.)1, reported in (1975) 45 Company Cases 273;

    ii) (Misrilal Dharamchand P. Ltd. v. B. Patnaik Mines P. Ltd.)2, reported in (1978) 48 Company Cases 494; and

    iii) (Paramjit Lal Badhwar v. Prem Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.)3, reported in (1986) 60 Company Cases 420.

    7. Mr. Mehta, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that so far as the debt due and payable by the Company is concerned, the petitioners are not concerned with the said Khatau Mills and since no bona fide dispute is raised regarding the liability of the Company to pay the debt to the petitioners, the winding up ought generally to follow in the public interest, so that the public does not unwarily deal with the Company and jeopardise its interest. In support of his submission. Mr. Mehta has put reliance on the case of (Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Servants of BMTC (CIDCO))4, reported in (1991) 2 Company Law Journal 357 (Bom.).

    8. In the said Consent Terms filed on 7th August, 1989, the Company has in terms admitted its liability to pay to the petitioners the sum of Rs. 230,43,588/- together with further interest thereon to be calculated at the rate of 17.5% per annum from 1st July, 1989 with quarterly rests. The payment of the said amount by the Company has not been subjected to any condition such as the receipt thereof by the Company from the said Khatau Mills or the petitioners first realising the same by enforcing any securities. It is an admitted position that the Company has not paid any amount to the petitioners after filing of the said Consent Terms, in this Court. Since neither the said Khatau Mills nor the said Sunit Khatau has paid any amount to the petitioners on behalf of the Company, the question of the petitioners giving credit to the Company in respect of the amount due and payable by the Company to the petitioners did not arise. It is not borne out from the said Consent Terms that at the time of filing of the same, it was in contemplation of the parties thereto that the said Khatau Mills would make payment of the amount due thereunder in the first instance and that the Company would only be secondarily liable for payment of the same. Although the Company is a Subsidiary Company of the said Khatau Mills in respect whereof a reference has been made to the BIFR and an enquiry is pending, and, as a result whereof, all proceedings for winding up or execution in respect of any properties of the said Khatau Mills and for appointment of a receiver of the property or undertaking of the said Khatau Mills has been suspended under the provisions of section 22 of the said SICA Act, yet the various provisions of the said Act dealing with holding Companies and their subsidiaries maintain the distinction between the two as separate legal entities. The Company is a separate legal entity than the said Khatau Mills and the existing protective umbrella of BIFR over the said Khatau Mills is not extended to and does not cover the Company. The Company being not under the protective umbrella of BIFR, proceedings for winding up of the Company are not suspended by reason of the said Khatau Mills being under the protective umbrella of BIFR.

    9. Undoubedetely, the power to be exercised under section 433 of the said Act is a discretionary one and it is competent for the Court in consideration of the circumstances in a given case to refuse to pass an order of winding up even if the Company is unable to pay its debts. It is equally open to the Court in its discretion to make a conditional order. From a discussion of precedents, the following principles can be culled out:

    i) The Court's jurisdiction under section 433(e) of the said Act is discretionary;

    ii) An Order of winding up is ordinarily made when it ts shown that the Company is commercially insolvent and it is not just and proper to allow such an insolvent Company to be in existence in the broader interests of commercial morality;

    iii) A Company may have liabilities more than its assets, but still may have in particular circumstances, the capacity to meet the demands from its creditors; and

    iv) On an application to wind up a Company on the ground that it cannot meet its debts, what has to be ascertained is not whether the Company, if it converted all its assets into cash, would be able to discharge its debts but whether in a commercial sense Company is solvent.

    10. Following the decision in the case of (Alluminium Corporation of India Ltd. v. Lakshmi Ratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd.)5 reported in (1970) 40 Company Cases 259 (All) in the case of Paramjit Lal Badhwar v. Prem Spinning And Weaving Milk Co. Ltd., (supra) the Allahabad High Court has held that the word ‘may’ used in the opening part of section 433 of the said Act dearly indicates that even if the Company sought to be wound up is unable to pay its debts, it is a matter of discretion for the Court whether, in the circumstances of the case, it would be in the interest of justice to wind up the Company. It is true that in the case of J. Banarsidas v. South India Saw Mills (P) Ltd., (supra), the Kerala High Court has held as under:

    “The provisions of section 434(1) determine when the requirements of section 433(e) will be deemed to be fulfilled, but they do not lay down when a winding-up order must necessarily be passed. It is true that a creditor is not bound to wait and give time to the Company beyond the time prescribed after the statutory notice, before filing his petition. But the Court may, if there are sufficient counter-balancing equitable grounds, deny an immediate winding up order, or, in appropriate cases, even refuse it altogether in spite of the proved inability of a Company to pay its debts. Exercise of such discretionary power must necessarily be governed by justice and equity.”

    11. However, the discretion has to be exercised judicially.

    12. The Orissa High Court, in the case of Misrilal Dharamchand P. Ltd. v. Patnaik Mines P. Ltd., (supra) has, on the facts of the case before it, thought it appropriate to direct the winding up of the Company but to stay its enforcement for a period of six months from the date of the order to enable the Company to pay up the dues of the Petitioning Company therein. However, in the instant case, although according to Mr. Cooper, the Company is solvent, since 7th August, 1989 i.e the day when the said Consent Terms were filed in this Court and the Company in terms admitted its liability to pay to the petitioner the sum of Rs. 2,30,43,388/- together with interest in instalments as provided for therein, the Company has not paid an; amount to the petitioners. The Company has not been able to satisfy the demands of the petitioners for many years and definitely for more than three years after the statutory demand. By reason of self operative order passed on 7th August, 1989, the petition to wind up the Company stood admitted on 1st October, 1990. The outstanding feature that even during the one and half years that this petition has been pending in this Court, the Company has not been able to offer to pay up the amount offers sufficient basis to hold that the Company is not able to pay its debts. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is neither appropriate nor in the interest of justice or the creditors of the Company to stay or postpone the enforcement of orders to wind up the Company which I propose to pass.

    13. The Company is a Trading Company. The debt due by the Company to the petitioners is not disputed. It is not enough that the Company has ability to pay the debt but if the Company chooses not to pay debt due to the petitioners, the Court will have no choice but to pass an Order of winding up of the Company. By non-payment of undisputed debt within the period of statutory demand, the Company is deemed unable to pay its debts and where the Company is unable to pay its debts, winding up ought generally to follow in the public interest, so that the public does not unwarily deal with the Company and jeopardise its interests. The petitioners have established that the debt is clear, valid in law, unimpeachable and undisputable and are entitled to a winding up order ex debito justitiae. In my opinion, the petitioners are not acting unreasonably in having the Company wound up. On the facts and in the circumstances, it is just and equitable that the Company is wound up. The Petition is made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c).

    14. At the request of Mr. Cooper, the operation of this order has been stayed for a period of three weeks.

    15. Certified copy to be issued expeditiously.

    Order accordingly.
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    Dena Bank v. The Khatau Dyes & Fibres Ltd.
    (Mar 26, 1992)