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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion seeking an injunction to restrain the Defendants from (a) infringing the Plaintiffs' registered trademark "Velcro," (b) passing off the Defendants' hook velvet fabric or fasteners as those of the Plaintiffs, and (c) using the word "Velcro" or any deceptively similar name as part of the Defendants' trading name and style.

It is admitted that Plaintiffs own the registered trademark and that negotiations began in 1968 between the Plaintiffs and Defendants' Indian directors, resulting in the incorporation of the Defendants' company on 6 October 1969 with "Velcro" as part of its corporate name. Subsequently, a Shareholders Agreement and a Licence Agreement were executed on 26 November 1969.

The Licence Agreement stipulated that upon its termination, the Defendants were prohibited from using the word "Velcro" as part of their trade name. A second Licence Agreement was entered into on 12 November 1981, operative until 30 September 1986, during which time the Defendants acted solely as licensees of the Plaintiffs regarding manufacture and use of hook velvet fasteners of synthetic material.

Post-termination, negotiations for a further agreement failed. Plaintiffs have repeatedly called upon the Defendants to cease infringing their trademark, passing off their goods, and using the name "Velcro" in their corporate name. Plaintiffs did not earlier move for injunction due to ongoing negotiations, negating any claim of delay or laches.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Defendants are entitled to continue using the registered trademark "Velcro" or any deceptively similar name in their corporate name and on their products following termination of the Licence Agreements.
  2. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction restraining the Defendants from trademark infringement and passing off.
  3. Whether the Defendants can claim loss of distinctiveness of the trademark or independent reputation to justify continued use.
  4. Whether alleged breaches by Plaintiffs of purchase commitments affect the Defendants' right to use the trademark.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiffs)

  • They own the registered trademark "Velcro" and are entitled to protection against infringement and passing off.
  • Defendants have no right to use the trademark or the name "Velcro" after termination of the Licence Agreements.
  • There was no delay or laches in seeking injunction as Plaintiffs refrained from moving due to ongoing negotiations.

Respondent's Arguments (Defendants)

  • Claimed that the trademark "Velcro" has lost distinctiveness and is now generic for all hook fasteners of synthetic material.
  • Asserted a right to continue using the name "Velcro" as part of their corporate name based on independent reputation developed in India.
  • Alleged breaches by Plaintiffs of purchase commitments under the Agreements.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court rejected the Defendants' contention that the trademark "Velcro" had lost distinctiveness, emphasizing that it remains a registered trademark entitled to protection. The Court noted that the Defendants had acted only as licensees until the expiry of the Licence Agreement in 1986 and thus could not claim any right to continue using the mark or name thereafter.

The Court dismissed the argument that alleged breaches by Plaintiffs justified Defendants' continued use, stating that such grievances should be addressed through a suit for damages rather than as a defense to infringement.

Regarding the Defendants' claim of independent reputation, the Court found no merit. It held that use of "Velcro" in the corporate name post-termination would mislead the public into believing a continuing connection or license from the Plaintiffs. The Court observed that the Defendants' reputation derived solely from licensed manufacture and sale of the relevant products, and that the Defendants failed to provide credible evidence of independent business activities justifying use of the name.

The Court also considered the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1988, wherein the Defendants accepted that a new agreement was necessary to use "Velcro" as their trade name, reinforcing the Plaintiffs' position.

Consequently, the Court granted the injunction in terms of the Plaintiffs' prayers (a), (b), and (c), restraining the Defendants from infringing the trademark, passing off, and using the name "Velcro" in their corporate name.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision was to make the Notice of Motion absolute in terms of the Plaintiffs' prayers to restrain the Defendants from trademark infringement, passing off, and use of the name "Velcro" in their corporate name.

The direct effect is that the Defendants are prohibited from using the registered trademark "Velcro" or any deceptively similar name in connection with their products or corporate identity. No order as to costs was made. The opinion does not establish any new legal precedent beyond enforcing existing trademark protections and contract terms.

    Velcro Industries B.V. v. Velcro India Ltd.

    S.N Variava, J. (Oral):— This Notice of Motion for injunction is filed by Plaintiffs to restrain Defendants inter alia from (a) infringing Plaintiffs trade mark “Velcro” (b) passing of Defendants' hook Velvet fabric of synthetic material or fastners of Defendants as hook Velvet fabric of Plaintiffs' and (c) using the word “Velcro” or any other name deceptively similar thereto as part of Defendants trading name and style.

    2. Admitted facts are that Plaintiffs are the owners of Trade Mark set out in paragraph 4 of the Plaint for the classes set out therein. It is also an admitted position that in 1968 negotiations started between Plaintiffs and Defendants Indian Directors for purposes of entering into a collaboration Agreement. It is clear that it is because of those negotiations that Defendants Company was incorporated on 6.10.1969 with the name “Velcro” as part of its Corporate name. This is also clear from fact that thereafter on 26.11.1969 a Shareholders Agreement, as well as, a Licence Agreement were entered into.

    3. The Licence Agreement Exh. ‘C’ specifically provides that on termination of the Agreement Defendants are not to use the word “Velcro” as part of their trade name. Before expiry of this Agreement on 26.11.1981 a second Licence Agreement dated 12.11.1981 (Exhibit ‘E) was entered into. This was operative upto 30.9.1986 Thus till this date Defendants have only acted as Licensees of Plaintiffs so far as manufacture and use of hook velvet fastners of synthetic material is concerned.

    4. Thereafter negotiations have taken place but these have not fructified in any further agreement. Plaintiffs have been calling upon the Defendants to stop infringing the Plaintiffs mark and to stop passing of their goods as those of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have also called upon the Defendants to stop using the name “Velcro” as part of Defendants Corporate name. Plaintiffs have not earlier moved because of pending negotiations. There is thus no delay or latches on the part of plaintiffs.

    5. At this stage it is not possible to accept Mr. Shah's contention that trade mark “Velcro” has lost its distinctiveness and is now associated with all hook fastners in synthetic materials. This is a Registered Trade Mark of plaintiffs and plaintiffs are entitled to protection. In India Defendants have only been manufacturing under licence from plaintiffs. They therefore cannot now claim a right to continue to use the Mark or the name.

    6. In my view it is no answer to state that plaintiffs have commited breaches of the Agreements by not fulfilling their commitment to purchase regular quantities. The Defendants' remedy for this, if any, is to fire a suit for damages.

    7. It is also not possible, at this prima facie stage, to accept Mr. Shah's argument that, Defendants are entitled to continue to use the name Velcro as part of their Corporate name, because they have independantly developed a reputation in India. As stated above. Defendants were merely acting as Licensees from 1969 to 1986. In my view, the fact that, in Agreement Exh. ‘E\ it is not provided that on termination, Defendants will cease to use “Velcro” as part of its trade name makes no difference. This is a registered Trade Mark. To allow Defendants to use it as part of its Corporate name is to permit Defendants to give an impression to the public that they are still connected with or have a licence from the Plaintiffs. In this behalf it is relevant to note that the reputation, if any, of the Defendants in the Indian Market is obviously from manufacture and sale of hook fastners of synthetic materials which were only under licence. It is relevant that for this they have given sales figures but have given to particulars of details of manufacture and sales of leather and stainless steel watch straps and novelty items which they now claim they manufacture. Significantly not stated when they started manufacturing those items, in what quantities, when and where they are sold, to whom they are sold, how, where and when they were advertised etc. To Court it does appear that these must be negligible and/or started only after termination of Agreement Exhibit ‘E’ and receipt of Notice Exhibit ‘J’. Also relevant to note that in Memorandum of Understanding (Exhibit II to the Affidavit-in-Rejoinder) which was signed as late as 17.3.1988, Defendants accept the position that a new Agreement must be arrived at order to enable Defendants, inter alia, to use “Velcro” as their Trade Name in India.

    8. Under the circumstances Notice of Motion is made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c). There will be no order as to costs.

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    Velcro Industries B.V. v. Velcro India Ltd.
    (Feb 11, 1992)