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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was a tenant of shop premises (Municipal House No. 352, Begum Peth, Solapur) belonging to Arifulasha Kadari Dargah Trust and had been in occupation since 1959, carrying on a tailoring business. The contractual rent was Rs. 11 per month. The petitioner did not pay rent from 1 January 1970 onward.

On 5 November 1973 the landlord Trust issued a notice under section 12(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the Bombay Rent Act) demanding arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 517. The notice was received by the petitioner on 8 November 1973. The petitioner did not tender the demanded amount and did not apply for fixation of the standard rent within one month of the notice as contemplated by Explanation I to section 12. The petitioner sent a reply to the notice on 6 December 1973.

On 15 December 1973 the landlord filed Civil Suit No. 1282 of 1973 for eviction, relying inter alia on default in payment of rent. Issues in the suit were settled on 7 June 1974. The petitioner made the first deposit of rent in the trial Court only on 19 July 1978. The trial Court (IVth Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Solapur) passed judgment and decree on 28 June 1979; the Extra Assistant Judge of Solapur affirmed in Civil Appeal No. 368 of 1979 on 7 April 1981.

The petitioner challenged those judgments and decrees under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned judgments and decrees suffer from any error of law apparent on the face of the record (i.e., whether the High Court should interfere under Article 227).
  2. Whether section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act is attracted where the tenant did not make an application for fixation of standard rent within one month of service of a notice under section 12(2).
  3. Whether, alternatively, section 12(3)(b) could protect the tenant if a dispute regarding standard rent existed when the notice was issued (and whether existence of such a pre‑notice dispute obviates the one‑month application requirement).
  4. Whether the notice under section 12(2) was issued by persons having proper authority of the trustees (i.e., whether the trustees had authorized issuance of the notice).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (Landlord / Trust)

  • The petitioner was in arrears of rent for more than six months from the date of the notice and failed to comply with the notice, attracting section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act and entitling the landlord to decree for eviction.
  • The petitioner was obliged to raise any dispute about fixation of standard rent by filing an application within one month of receipt of the notice (Explanation I to section 12); raising the dispute only in the suit was insufficient to avoid section 12(3)(a).
  • Even if section 12(3)(b) were applicable, the petitioner had not paid arrears or recurring rent at the first hearing as required and therefore was not entitled to protection under that provision.
  • The petitioner was not ready and willing to pay the rent regularly and was therefore a defaulter.

Petitioner's Arguments (Tenant)

  • The petitioner alleged having made payments (Rs. 66 and Rs. 132) towards rent which the landlord failed to credit.
  • The petitioner relied on a judgment (Gulabchand v. Noorbeg) holding that if a dispute about standard rent existed when the notice was issued, section 12(3)(b) would govern and the mere failure to file an application within one month would not allow invocation of section 12(3)(a).
  • The petitioner also argued that the notice under section 12(2) was not issued under the proper authority of the trustees.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harbanslal v. Prabhudas, (1977) 1 SCC 575 : AIR 1976 SC 2005 The dispute regarding standard rent or permitted increases must be raised at the latest before the expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice under section 12(2); raising the dispute first in the written statement is insufficient to avoid section 12(3)(a). The court applied this principle: because the petitioner did not make an application for fixation of standard rent within one month of service of the notice, section 12(3)(a) applies and supports the decree for eviction.
Chhaganlal v. Narayan Jagannath, 1983 Mh.L.J. 254 (Division Bench) Holds that section 12(3)(a) is applicable if the application for fixation of standard rent is not made within one month from service of the notice; raising a dispute in the suit without filing the one‑month application is ineffective. The court treated this Division Bench decision as binding and on all fours with the facts; it followed the decision and rejected the petitioner's reliance on contrary single‑judge authority.
Gulabchand v. Noorbeg, AIR 1980 Bom. 307 (Jahagirdar, J.) Held that if a dispute about standard rent existed when the notice was issued, the suit would be governed by section 12(3)(b) and existence of such a dispute would oust applicability of section 12(3)(a), even if no application under the Act had been made within one month. The court concluded that the ratio of Gulabchand no longer holds the field in view of the Division Bench decision in Chhaganlal; the court respectfully followed the Division Bench and declined to apply Gulabchand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by asking whether the impugned judgments and decrees contained any error of law apparent on the face of the record. It then examined the petitioner's conduct in relation to the statutory regime created by section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act.

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Harbanslal v. Prabhudas, the court reiterated the principle that to avoid the operation of section 12(3)(a) a tenant must raise any dispute about standard rent or permitted increases by filing an application within one month from service of the section 12(2) notice; it is not sufficient to raise that dispute for the first time in the written statement. The petitioner admitted that no such application was filed within one month.

The court noted and followed the Division Bench decision in Chhaganlal v. Narayan Jagannath, which applied the same one‑month requirement and held that raising a dispute in the suit without filing the one‑month application was of no consequence. The court expressly held that the earlier single‑judge decision in Gulabchand v. Noorbeg, which had taken a contrary view, was inconsistent with the Division Bench decision and therefore no longer authoritative for the court.

On the facts, the trial and appellate Courts had found that the petitioner had not paid the arrears within the notice period, did not pay arrears at the first hearing, and failed to comply with contractual and statutory obligations to pay rent regularly. The petitioner alleged payments (Rs. 66 and Rs. 132) but failed to prove them; those factual findings were held to be final and not perverse.

The courts below fixed the standard rent at Rs. 2.65 per month. The court observed that section 12(3)(a) makes it obligatory for the court to pass a decree for eviction when its conditions are satisfied; having found those conditions satisfied (the one‑month application was not made and arrears/default established), the courts below were correct in passing the decree for eviction.

The petitioner also challenged the authority of the trustees to issue the notice. The appellate Court had found that the trustees had passed the necessary resolution and that Mr. Kasim Ankalgi had authority to issue the notice. Under Article 227 jurisdiction the present court declined to re‑appreciate the factual material and held that the appellate finding on authority was correct.

Although the petition failed on merits, the court provided a limited and conditional indulgence: the decree for possession would not be executed for six months provided the petitioner filed a written undertaking within one month to hand over vacant possession on expiry of that period and to pay compensation in the meanwhile regularly. If the undertaking was not filed, the decree holder would have liberty to execute the decree after one month.

Holding and Implications

Petition dismissed.

Direct consequences and operative effects:

  • The impugned judgments and decrees of the trial Court and the appellate Court (eviction decree) are upheld; no error of law apparent on the face of the record was found by the court.
  • The petitioner is not entitled to escape the operation of section 12(3)(a) because no application for fixation of standard rent was filed within one month of the section 12(2) notice; accordingly the decree for eviction stands.
  • The standard rent had been fixed by the Courts below at Rs. 2.65 per month.
  • The court ordered that execution of the decree for possession shall be stayed for a period of six months from the date of the order provided the petitioner files, within one month, a written undertaking on affidavit to hand over vacant possession on expiry of six months and to pay compensation in the meanwhile regularly. If no undertaking is filed, the decree holder has liberty to execute the decree after one month from the date of the order.
  • Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.

Broader implications:
The opinion adheres to binding Supreme Court and Division Bench authority (Harbanslal and Chhaganlal) on the one‑month application requirement under section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act, and it declines to follow a conflicting single‑judge decision (Gulabchand). The court's decision does not purport to lay down a new precedent but applies existing authoritative precedent to the facts of the case.

Petition dismissed.

    Ladlesaheb Shah Ahmed Sayyed v. Arifulasha Kadari Dargah Trust, Solapur .

    1. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has impugned the judgment and decree passed by the IVth Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Solapur, in Regular Civil Suit No. 1282 of 1973 on 28th June 1979 and judgment and decree passed by the Extra Assistant Judge of Solapur on 7th April 1981 in Civil Appeal No. 368 of 1979.

    2. The crucial facts required to be stated for disposal of this petition are as under:—

    (a) The petitioner was the tenant of the suit premises since the year 1959. The contractual rent of the suit premises was Rs. 11/- per month Arifulasha Kadari Dargah Trust is the landlord of the property bearing Municipal House No. 352 at Begum Peth, Solapur. The petitioner carries on tailoring business in the shop premises in question.

    (b) The petitioner did not pay rent for the period commencing from 1st January 1970. On 5th November 1973, the landlord Trust issued a notice to the petitioner under section 12(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act) demanding arrears of rent for the period commencing from 1st January 1970. The said arrears amounted to Rs. 517/-. The said notice was duly received by the petitioner on 8th November 1973. The petitioner did not tender any amount to the landlord and the said notice remained uncomplied with. The petitioner did not file any application for fixation of the standard rent within one month after service of the said notice as contemplated under Explanation I to section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act. The petitioner sent a reply to the said notice on 6th December 1973.

    (c) On 15th December 1973, the landlord Trust filed Civil Suit No. 1282 of 1973 for eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises on various grounds. None of these grounds is now relevant except the ground of alleged default in respect of payment of rent within the notice period.

    3. It is the contention of the respondents that the petitioner incurred liability to be evicted from the suit premises under section 12(3) (a) of the Act as the petitioner was in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months from the date of the notice and the notice of demand was not complied with. It was the contention of the respondents before the Court below that the petitioner was bound to raise the dispute regarding fixation of standard rent, if any, by filing an application within a period of one month from receipt of the said notice and that was the only mode by which such dispute could be raised if the petitioner desired to avail of the statutory presumption of readiness and willingness to pay the amount of rent within the contemplation of Explanation I to section 12 of the Act. The respondents also contended before the Courts below that even if section 12(3)(b) of the Act were to be held applicable, the petitioner was not entitled to the protection of the Act under the said provision as the petitioner had not paid the amount of rent due and payable by the petitioner at the first hearing of the suit within the contemplation of section 12(3)(b) of the said Act. It is contended that the petitioner tenant was not ready and willing to pay rent in respect of the suit premises and the petitioner was a ‘defaulter’ in this respect.

    4. It emerges from the record that issues in the suit were settled on 7th June 1974 and the petitioner made the first deposit of rent in the trial Court only on 19th July 1978.

    5. The petitioner alleged before the Courts below that the petitioner had made payment of Rs. 66/- and Rs. 132/- towards rent for which the landlord had failed to give credit. The petitioner failed to prove the said allegations. The findings of fact recorded by the Courts below have become final. The said findings are not shown to be perverse.

    6. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court held in terms that section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act was clearly attracted to the facts of the case and the decree for eviction must therefore follow in view of the ‘default’ proved. The appellate Court observed in paragraph 12 of its judgment that even if section 12(3)(b) of the Act were to be applied, decree for possession shall have to be passed as the petitioner had failed to comply with the requirements of the said section also. It was observed by the Appellate Court in the said paragraph of its judgment that the petitioner had not paid the arrears of rent and recurring rent regularly within the contemplation of the said section. The petitioner did not pay arrears of rent within the notice period. The petitioner did not pay the said arrears at the first hearing of the suit. The petitioner failed and neglected to comply with his contractual and statutory obligation to pay the rent regularly.

    7. Both the Courts below held that the standard rent of the suit premises was liable to be fixed at Rs. 2.65 per month.

    8. The first question which arises for my consideration is as to whether the impugned judgments and decrees suffer from any error of law apparent on the face of the record. In Harbanslal v. Prabhudas, (1977) 1 SCC 575 : AIR 1976 SC 2005, the Apex Court held that in order to avoid operation of section 12(3)(a) of the Act, the dispute in regard to standard rent or permitted increases must be raised at the latest before the expiry of one month from the date of service of notice under section 12(2) of the Act and it was not enough to raise a dispute for the first time in the written statement. Admittedly, no application was made by the petitioner tenant for fixation of standard rent within one month from the service of the notice under section 12(2) of the Act.

    9. Mr. Lalit, the learned counsel for the landlord, has also invited my attention to the Division Bench judgment in the case of Chhaganlal v. Narayan Jagannath, 1983 Mh.L.J 254, which is on all fours. The Division Bench of our High Court clearly held in this case that section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act was applicable if the application for fixation of standard, rent was not made within one mouth from service of the notice. In that case the Court had fixed the standard rent at Rs. 11/- even though the contractual rent was Rs. 35/- per month. It was therefore argued before the Division Bench of our High Court in this case that the amount deposited by the tenant was liable to be considered as adequate and sufficient compliance in view of the standard rent having been fixed at a much lower rate than the contractual rent. Dealing with the submission, the Division Bench of our High Court presided over by Chandurkar, J. (as His Lordhsip then was) held that in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court and of our High Court, the tenant was not entitled to raise any dispute and accordingly raising of the dispute in the suit itself without filing an application within one month from service of the notice was of no consequence. On any view of the matter, the petitioner tenant having not complied with his obligation to pay the arrears of rent within one month from service of notice of demand or make an application to the Court for fixation of standard rent within one month from service of the notice under section 12(2) and make payment of the rent and permitted increases regularly and as may be specified in the order of the Court, the decree for possession passed by the Courts below cannot be faulted with. Section 12(3)(a) of the Act makes it obligatory on the Court to pass the decree for eviction where the conditions prescribed by the said section are satisfied. The Courts below have rightly held that all the conditions prescribed by the said section were complied with and the petitioner had failed and neglected to pay arrears of rent and recurring rent in accordance with his statutory obligations.

    10. Mr. Maniyar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, invited my attention to the judgment of Jahagirdar, J. in the case of Gulabchand v. Noorbeg, reported in AIR 1980 Bom. 307. In this case it was held by the learned Judge that the suit will be governed by the previsions of section 12(3)(b) of the Act if the dispute about the standard rent existed when the notice was issued and existence of such dispute was sufficient to oust the applicability of section 12(3)(a) of the said Act. In other words, the learned Judge held that the landlord could not invoke the provisions of section 12(3)(a) of the Act if the dispute as to standard rent existed on the date of the notice merely because the tenant had not made an application under section 11(3) of the Act within one month from the receipt of the notice. In my judgment; the ratio of this judgment no longer holds the field in view of the Division Bench judgment of our High Court in the case of Chhaganlal v. Narayan Jagannath, 1983 Mh.L.J 254 (supra). The interpretation of the Supreme Court's judgment in Harbanslal's case reported in (1977) 1 SCC 575 : AIR 1976 SC 2005, by the abovereferred Division Bench decision is binding on me. I respectfully agree with the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench judgment of our High Court and respectfully follow the same. With respect, I hold that the ratio of the abovereferred judgment in Gulabchand v. Noorbeg, is in conflict with the Division Bench judgment in Chhaganlal's case and no longer holds the field.

    11. Mr. Maniyar also argued that the notice under section 12(2) was not issued under proper authority of the trustees. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Appellate Court below has clearly held that the decision to adopt proceedings against the petitioner was taken by passing necessary resolution and Mr. Kasim Ankalgi had the requisite authority to take steps for issue of the said notice. It is not possible to re-appreciate the factual material in exercise of my jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The finding recorded by the Appellate Court is correct.

    12. In the result, the petition fails. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. The decree for possession shall not be executed for a period of six months from today, provided the petitioner files usual undertaking on affidavit to hand over vacant possession of the suit premises to the decree holder Trust on expiry of the period of six months and pay the amount of compensation in the meanwhile regularly. Written undertaking must be filed within one month from today. If the undertaking is not filed, liberty to the decree holder to execute the decree on expiry of one month from today.

    Petition dismissed.
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    Comments

    Ladlesaheb Shah Ahmed Sayyed v. Arifulasha Kadari Dargah Trust, Solapur .
    (Nov 14, 1991)