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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Several creditors have filed winding-up petitions in the High Court against Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd. on the ground of non-compliance with statutory notices. These petitions were pending and not yet admitted. Company Petition No. 512 of 1990 was filed by Ramniklal & Co., claiming to be creditors to the extent of about Rs. 39,16,500.11 P. After filing, petitioning creditors in this and other connected petitions sought interim relief by way of Judge's summonses, including appointment of the Official Liquidator as provisional liquidator and an injunction restraining the Company from selling or disposing of specified assets.

The Company conceded financial difficulty and inability to pay admitted debts in the ordinary course. By orders dated 5th October 1990 and 11th October 1990 the Court had granted ad interim injunctive relief (with a modification omitting the words “dealing with”). Counsel for the Company informed the Court that the Company had entered into an agreement to sell the property described at item No. 8 of the schedule to Shri G.D. Agarwal; a certificate under Section 269UL(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued indicating no objection to transfer for an apparent consideration of Rs. 70,00,000/-, but transfer had not been effected because of the injunctions.

The Company made a reference to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. By order dated 11th January 1991 the Board declared the Company a "sick industrial company" under Section 3(1)(o) and adjourned proceedings for three months to enable the Company to present a scheme including disposal of surplus non-performing assets; the Board had yet to pass any order under Sections 17(1) or 17(2).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 is applicable in the present situation and whether the Company can avail itself of Section 22.
  2. Whether the pending winding-up petitions and the applications for interim reliefs are liable to be dismissed or treated as abated, or whether they should be suspended and kept in abeyance.
  3. Whether the ad interim orders dated 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990 are automatically suspended, or whether they are liable to be vacated or modified to facilitate preparation, sanction and implementation of a scheme under the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as stated in the opinion)

  • Mr. Rahimtoola, learned counsel for the petitioners supporting the Judge's Summonses, submitted that the inquiry under Section 16 of the Act was already concluded and no scheme referred to under Section 17 was under preparation or consideration.
  • He argued that the phrase “any scheme referred to under S.17 is under preparation” should be read to mean only a scheme ordered to be prepared by an operating agency under Section 17(3) (i.e., not a scheme proposed by the company for the Board's consideration).
  • Accordingly, he submitted Section 22(1) was not applicable and the winding-up proceedings should not be barred or suspended by Section 22(1).

Company's Arguments (as stated in the opinion)

  • Mr. Chagla, learned counsel for the Company, relied on the decision of the High Court of Gujarat in Testeels Ltd. v. Radhaben Ranchhodlal Charitable Trust (1989) 66 Com Cas 555 : AIR 1988 Guj 213, submitting that because the Board had declared the Company sick and a scheme under Section 17 was under preparation, the winding-up petition and the interim application were liable to be dismissed.
  • He also invoked Section 31 of the Act in support of the submission that pending proceedings should be treated in a certain manner (as referenced in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Testeels Ltd. v. Radhaben Ranchhodlal Charitable Trust, (1989) 66 Com Cas 555 : AIR 1988 Guj 213 Held that proceedings for winding-up could not be kept in abeyance and were liable to be dismissed if conditions precedent under the first part of Section 22(1) were satisfied; interpreted “or be proceeded with further” as not permitting mere abeyance. The Court expressly rejected this view and stated it was unable to subscribe to the Division Bench's interpretation; the present Court held that Section 22 should be read as suspending proceedings rather than mandating dismissal/abatement.
Sponge Iron India Ltd. v. Neelima Steels Ltd., (1990) 68 Com Cas 201 (High Court of Andhra Pradesh) High Court ordered company not to alienate assets without leave of the Board and recorded that winding-up petitions were closed with liberty to revive them later if necessary. The opinion noted this decision as adopting an approach of closure with liberty to revive and treated it as supportive of suspending/holding proceedings in abeyance subject to conditions.
K.Sp V. Shanmugam v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Ltd., (1991) 70 Com Cas 440 (High Court of Karnataka) Made observations comparable to the Andhra Pradesh decision in the context of Section 22. The opinion records this case as making somewhat similar observations and treats it as consistent with the view favouring suspension/abeyance rather than dismissal.
Star Industrial and Textile Enterprises Ltd. v. United Bank of India (Appeal No. 1270 of 1987 arising out of Summons for Judgment No. 327 of 1987 in Summary Suit No. 687 of 1987) Held that the suit could be proceeded with and Section 22 did not bar further proceeding in the suit. The opinion cites this decision as supporting the view that Section 22 is primarily directed at restraining proceedings affecting company property rather than barring determination of liability, and as an authority supportive of the Court's interpretation.
Special Steels Limited v. Jay Prestressed Products Ltd., 1990 Mah LJ 29 Held that the Legislature intended to restrain proceedings in relation to the properties of a sick company and not against the determination of liability in a suit. The opinion cites this decision as aligning with the interpretation that Section 22 aims at protecting the company's assets pending BIFR proceedings rather than automatically ousting judicial determination of disputes.
Podar Mills Ltd. v. J.K. Synthetics Ltd., (1989) 66 Com Cas 735 : AIR 1982 Bom 203 Interpreted Section 8(1)(c) of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 and held that the provision applied to pending winding-up proceedings; restrained petitioning-creditors from proceeding without consent. The opinion treats this judgment as indirectly supportive of the view that pending winding-up proceedings may be restrained or kept in abeyance and relied upon the Supreme Court authority cited in Podar Mills.
Maharashtra State Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Official Liquidator, (1978) 48 Com Cas 350 : AIR 1978 SC 476 Supreme Court authority relied upon in Podar Mills to support application of a statutory restraint to pending winding-up proceedings. The opinion notes this Supreme Court judgment as a supporting authority (via Podar Mills) for the proposition that statutory provisions of this type can apply to pending winding-up proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a structured analysis, rooted in the statutory scheme and the factual posture:

  1. The Court reviewed the purpose and structure of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (the Act), noting its object "to secure timely detection of sick companies and speedy determination by a board of experts of remedial measures" and summarising relevant provisions (Sections 4, 14–18, 20 and 22, and 31). It emphasised that Sections 15–34 came into force on 15th May 1987.
  2. The Court parsed Section 22, observing that its marginal note reads "Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc." and that the operative part provides that when an enquiry under Section 16 is pending or a scheme under Section 17 is under preparation/consideration (or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation), no winding-up proceeding shall lie or be proceeded with further except with the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority. The Court noted that Sections 22(3) and 22(4) provide for declarations suspending creditors' rights or remedies in specified contingencies.
  3. Addressing the petitioners' argument (Mr. Rahimtoola) that Section 22 applies only where the operating agency is preparing a scheme under Section 17(3), the Court rejected that narrow reading. The Court held that the phrase "any scheme referred to under S.17 is under preparation" reasonably includes a scheme being prepared by the company for the Board's consideration under the Board's implied powers in Sections 17(1) and 17(2). Thus Section 22 was held attracted to the present facts because the Board had declared the Company sick and proceedings were adjourned to enable preparation of a scheme, i.e., a scheme was indeed "under preparation" for the Board's consideration.
  4. The Court examined divergent High Court authorities. It expressly disagreed with the Gujarat Division Bench in Testeels Ltd., which had held that pending winding-up proceedings should be dismissed if the conditions under Section 22(1) are satisfied. The Court reasoned that unless a winding-up order has been passed the company's corporate existence continues and that the Act's provisions indicate suspension rather than automatic abatement or dismissal. The marginal note to Section 22 and the operative text support suspension ("shall not lie or be proceeded with further, except with consent..."), and the Court found no reason to construe the provision as automatically terminating pending petitions.
  5. The Court observed that Section 31 preserves certain proceedings where a receiver or official liquidator had been appointed before the commencement of the Act, but this did not mean that other pending proceedings must abate; rather Section 22 should be interpreted to suspend pending winding-up petitions and leave them revivable with Board/Appellate Authority consent or if the conditions cease to operate.
  6. On the specific issue of the ad interim injunctions the Court held they were not automatically suspended by virtue of Section 22. However, the Court modified the ad interim orders to permit the Company to alienate assets only with prior leave of the Board (with prior adequate notice to petitioning-creditors), ensured that the injunctions would not preclude the Board from considering/sanctioning/implementing any scheme, and provided that orders of injunction would be vacated if and when the Board sanctions a scheme that sanctions sale of the properties and such scheme comes into force.

Holding and Implications

The core ruling: the winding-up petitions and related Judge's Summonses are not liable to be dismissed or treated as abated but are to be suspended and kept in abeyance under Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.

Direct consequences and implications as stated in the opinion:

  1. The winding-up petition is not liable to be dismissed or treated as abated.
  2. The winding-up petition and the Judge's Summonses are suspended and kept in abeyance, with liberty to the parties to revive the same with the consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or the Appellate Authority, or if the conditions precedent in Section 22(1) cease to operate. The Court ordered the petitions and summonses adjourned sine die subject to revival rights.
  3. The ad interim orders dated 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990 are not automatically suspended; the summonses cannot presently be taken up for final orders unless petitioning-creditors obtain the Board's consent or Section 22(1) ceases to apply.
  4. The ad interim orders were modified as follows:
    • (a) The Company may alienate its assets only with the prior leave of the Board, and it must give prior adequate notice to the petitioning-creditors before applying for such leave.
    • (b) The injunction orders shall not preclude the Board from considering, sanctioning or implementing any requisite scheme under the Act; the Board's statutory functions remain unaffected by the Court's injunctions.
    • (c) Except for these modifications, the orders of 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990 shall continue in force pending further orders.
    • (d) If the Board sanctions any scheme that sanctions sale of the Company's properties and that scheme comes into force, the injunction orders of 5th October and 11th October, 1990 shall stand vacated; liberty was given to apply for further directions if necessary after sanction of the scheme.
  5. There was no order as to costs on the hearing of the issue of applicability and effect of Section 22 of the Act.
Order accordingly.

    Ramniklal & Co. And Others v. The Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd., Company

    1. Several creditors have filed winding-up petitions in this Court against a company known as the Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd. on the ground of non-compliance with statutory notices. These winding-up petitions are not yet admitted and are pending in this Court. Company Petition No. 512 of 1990 was filed by Ramniklal and Co. which claim to be creditors of the said Company in the sum of about Rupees 39,16,500.11 P. Soon after filing of this petition, the petitioning-creditors in this petition and the petitioning-creditors in other similar petitions took out Judge's summonses for grant of interim reliefs during pendency of the petitions for winding-up. By the Judge's summons in Company Application No. 316 of 1990 (connected with Company Petition No. 515 of 1990), the petitioning-creditor seek appointment of the Official Liquidator, High Court, Bombay, as the provisional liquidator of all the assets and properties of the Company, including the properties mentioned in the Schedule to the Judge's Summons. By prayer (b) of the said Judge's summons, the petitioning-creditor seeks an injunction restraining the Company and its agents and servants from selling or disposing of or dealing with any of its assets/properties, including the properties described in the Schedule annexed thereto. Similar Judge's summonses have been taken out in the companion petitions.

    2. It is not disputed and it is not disputable that the Company is in financial difficulties and it has not been able to pay its admitted debts in ordinary course.

    3. By an order dated 5th October 1990, I granted ad interim relief in terms of prayer (b) of the Judge's summonses up to 10th October, 1990 after omitting the words “dealing with” therefrom. On 5th October, 1990, I was informed by the learned Counsel for the Company, on instructions, that the Company had already entered into an agreement to sell the property described at item No. 8 of the Schedule to the Judge's Summonses in favour of one Shri G.D Agarwal. By the said order, the Company was restrained from taking any further steps in respect of the said alleged liquidation till 10th October, 1990. The Company was directed to file an affidavit disclosing true facts regarding disposal of the properties mentioned in the Schedule to the Judge's summonses and the agreements already entered into in respect thereof, if any. By my further Order dated 11th October 1990, I continued the ad interim order dated 5th October, 1990 till the disposal of the Judge's Summons subject to various limitations, restrictions and conditions set out therein. As regards the property described at item No. 8 of the Schedule to the Judge's summonses is concerned, the appropriate authority has now issued its certificate under Section 269UL(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, stating therein that it has no objection to the transfer of the said property for an apparent consideration of Rs. 70,00,000/-. The said property is not yet transferred in view of the orders of injunction granted by this Court on 5th October 1990 and 11th October, 1990.

    4. The Company made a reference to the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (for short, “the Board”) constituted under Section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (Act No. I of 1986) (for short, “the Act”), in terms of Section 15 of the Act. By its order dated 11th January 1991, the Board has declared the said Company as a sick industrial company under Section 3(1)(o) of the Act. A copy of the order passed by the Board dated 11th January, 1991 is annexed to the affidavit of Hemant Pratapsingh Vissanji, a Director of the Company, dated 25th February, 1991 made in support of the application for vacating the ad interim orders dated 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990. The said application is being considered by this Order. The Board is seized of the said proceedings and is still to pass its orders under Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the Act. It is obvious from the said order dated 11th January, 1991 that the Board has adjourned the proceedings for a period of three months in order to enable the Company to present an agreed scheme for consideration of the Board inter alia providing for disposal of its surplus non-performing assets. Only after consideration of the scheme which may be proposed by the Company, the Board will decide as to whether it is practicable for the Company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time. Powers of the Board under Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the Act are very wide. The said provisions impliedly authorise the Board to permit the Company to prepare a scheme for its consideration before the Board decides as to whether it is practicable for the Company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time. If the Board ultimately decides that it is not practicable for the Company, which is a sick industrial company, to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time, the Board may direct any of the operating agencies to frame a scheme providing for taking of such measures in relation to such company as the Board deems fit. It is obvious from the plain reading of Section 18 of the Act that such a scheme may provide for the sale or lease of a part or whole of the industrial undertaking to any of its assets and prescribe the method to be adopted for sale of some of its assets, as deemed fit, for rehabilitation or reconstruction of the sick unit.

    5. The questions which arise for consideration of this Court are whether Section 22 of the Act is applicable in the present situation and whether the same can be availed of by the Company. The second question for consideration of the Court is as to whether the winding-up petitions and the applications for interim reliefs are liable to be dismissed or treated as abated or whether the said proceedings are merely liable to be suspended and kept in abeyance. Another connected question which will arise for consideration of the Court would be as to whether the ad interim orders dated 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990 are automatically suspended or are liable to be vacated or modified in order to facilitate the preparation, sanction and implementation of the scheme under the Act.

    6. I must state at the outset that there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question of effect of Section 22 of the Act on the pending winding-up proceedings. There is no direct judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court or of this Court on the subject. The High Courts of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka have differed in their respective interpretation of the said provisions. It is necessary to consider the scheme and the salient features of the Act.

    7. On 8th January 1986, the Act received the assent of the President of India. As obvious from the preamble to the Act, the Act was passed to make, in the public interest, special provisions with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings and the speedy determination by a board of experts of the preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such companies. The Act came into force on 12th January, 1987, except in respect of Sections 15 to 34 Sections 15 to 34 came into force with effect from 15th May, 1987. Section 4 of the Act provides for establishment of the Board. Section 5 of the Act provides for constitution of the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. Section 14 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Board or the Appellate Authority are judicial proceedings. Section 15 of the Act requires the board of directors of an industrial company, which has become a sick industrial company, to make a reference to the Board within sixty days from the date of finalisation of the duly audited accounts of the company for the financial year as at the end of which the company has become a “sick industrial company” within the meaning of the said expression as defined in Section 3(1)(o) of the Act. Section 16 of the Act provides for holding of an inquiry into the question as to whether the industrial company has become a sick industrial company. The said Section also enables the Board to appoint one or more special directors of the company under inquiry. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the Act can be considered together. Section 17(1) of the Act provides that if after making an inquiry under Section 16 the Board is satisfied that a company has become a sick industrial company, the Board shall, after considering all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, decide, as soon as may be by order in writing, whether it is practicable for the company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time. Section 17(2) of the Act provides that if the Board decides that it is practicable for a sick industrial company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time the Board shall, by order in writing, give such time to the company as if may deem fit to make its net worth positive. No order has been passed by the Board under Section 17(1) or Section 17(2) of the Act so far. The scheme proposed by the Company is under preparation. The Bord has adjourned the proceedings in order to enable the Company to prepare the agreed scheme or a proposal which will enable the Board to consider as to whether it is practicable for the Company to make its net worth positive. Only if the Board comes to the conclusion that it is not practicable for a sick industrial company to make its net worth positive within a reasonable time, the Board would invoke its powers under Section 17(3) of the Act by directing any of the operating agencies to prepare a scheme in terms of Section 18 of the Act. Section 18 of the Act provides for preparation and sanction of the scheme by operating agency. Such scheme may inter alia provide for the sale of surplus assets, for sale of non-performing assets, for sale of lease or part of an industrial undertaking or the method of such sale or lease. The scheme when sanctioned shall come into force on such date as the Board may specify. Section 20(1) of the Act provides that the Board may, in a given situation, record its opinion that it is just and equitable to wind up the company. In such an eventuality, the Company is required to be wound up.

    8. Section 22 of the Act is directly relevant. The marginal note to Section 22 of the Act reads as under:—

    “Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc.”

    The said Section provides that where in respect of an industrial company an enquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to in Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or an appeal under Section 25 is pending, then notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act I of 1956, no proceeding for the winding-up of the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority. The said Section also makes provisions for suspension of proceedings for appointment of receiver, levy on execution, distress or the like against the properties of the company, with which we are not directly concerned for the moment. Sections 22(3) and 22(4) of the Act provide for making of declarations suspending the rights or remedies of the creditors and the suspension of proceedings before the various authorities in the contingencies specified therein.

    9. Section 31 of the Act provides that where a receiver or official liquidator has been appointed in any proceedings pending immediately before the commencement of the Act in any High Court for winding-up of an industrial company, such proceedings shall not abate but continue in the High Court.

    10. The Act has an overriding effect over the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.

    11. Mr. Rahimtoola, the learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of the Judge's Summonses, has submitted that the inquiry under Section 16 of the Act is already concluded and is not pending and no scheme referred to under Section 17 of the Act is under preparation or consideration. The learned Counsel has submitted that the expression “any scheme referred to under S. 17 is under preparation” can only mean the scheme to be prepared by operating agency in pursuance of order of the Board under Section 17(3) of the Act. Mr. Rahimtoola has submitted that Section 22(1) of the Act is not applicable to the situation prevailing in this case, as the conditions of applicability of the Section are not satisfied. The object of a winding up order is to destroy the corporate personality of the company. The Act was passed by Parliament with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning the industrial undertakings and taking of remedial measures by the Board, as more particularly provided in the Act. The first part of Section 22 of the Act cannot be, therefore, interpreted hyper-technically so as to defeat the very object of the Act. No scheme is still under preparation by the operating agency as no order is yet passed under Section 17(3) of the Act. Before the Board makes up its mind under Section 17(1) or Section 17(2) of the Act, the Board can consider a scheme which may be proposed by the parties and then decide as to whether it is reasonably practicable for the Company to make its net worth positive. The first part of Section 22(1) of the Act does not state that the said Section shall apply only if the scheme under Section 17(3) of the Act is under preparation and not otherwise. The proposed scheme which is under preparation by the Company for being considered by the Board is a step preparatory to taking of a decision by the Board under Sectional 7(1) and Section 17(2) of the Act. All ancillary powers are always implicit in the conferment of the main power. Accordingly, I have no hesitation in rejecting this submission of Mr. Rahimtoola and in holding that Section 2 of the Act is clearly attracted and is applicable, as the proposed scheme is referable to the implied power of the Board under Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the Act. I shall now consider the effect of applicability of Section 22(1) of the Act on pending winding up petitions.

    12. Relying on the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in the case of Testeels Ltd. v. Radhaben Ranchhodlal Charitable Trust reported in (1989) 66 Com Cas 555 : (AIR 1988 Guj 213), Mr. Chagla, the learned Counsel for the Company, has submitted that the winding-up petition and the interim application herein are liable to be dismissed, as the Company is declared as a sick industrial company by order dated 11th January, 1991 passed by the Board (a copy whereof is Exhibit 3 to the above referred affidavit dated 25th February, 1991) and the scheme pertaining to the Company referable to Section 17 of the Act is under preparation. The learned Counsel for the Company has also invoked Section 31 of the Act in support of his submission. In the above referred judgment, the Hon'ble Chief Justice Shri P.R Gokulakrishnan, speaking for the Bench of the High Court of Gujarat, observed that the proceedings for winding up could not be kept in abeyance and were liable to be dismissed if the condition precedents prescribed under the first part of Section 22(1) of the Act were satisfied. The Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat held that the words “or be proceeded with further” cannot be interpreted to mean that winding-up proceedings already started should be kept in abeyance without further proceeding in the matter. The Hon'ble Division Bench referred to the statements and objects pertaining to the Act and held that the Act contemplated dismissal of winding-up petitions in the contingencies specified in Section 22 of the Act. I have carefully gone through the judgment with the help of the earned Counsel on both sides. With respect, I am unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Hon'ble Division Bench. Unless the winding-up order is passed by the Company Court, the corporate existence of the company is intact. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that a winding-up petition is required to be kept merely in abeyance pending the enquiry under Section 16 or framing of the scheme under the Act or pending the implementation of the scheme framed thereunder. The marginal note to Section 22 of the Act provides an indication that the proceedings in question are merely required to be suspended. The operative part of Section 22(1) of the Act provides that the winding-up proceedings may continue with the consent of the Board or the consent of the Appellate Authority. If the proceedings can continue with the consent of the Board or consent of the Appellate Authority or in the event of the conditions precedent prescribed under Section 22(1) of the Act ceasing to exist, there is no reason as to why the pending winding-up petitions must necessarily abate or must necessarily be dismissed. Section 31 of the Act provides that certain pending proceedings shall not abate where the receiver or the official liquidator was already appointed before the commencement of the Act. This Section cannot be reasonably pressed into service for the purpose of making a submission to the effect that in all other cases the proceedings abate when the operative part of Section 22 of the Act can be reasonably interpreted to mean that the winding-up proceedings are merely required to be suspended and kept in abeyance and are not required to be dismissed and they do not abate.

    13. In almost similar situation, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was required to interpret Section 22 of the Act and the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Sponge Iron India Ltd. v. Neelima Steels Ltd. is reported in (1990) 68 Com Cas 201. In this case, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh passed an order to the effect that the Company shall not alienate its assets without the leave of the Board. In this case, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh passed a further order to the effect that the winding up petitions were closed, with liberty to the petitioners to make an application for reviving them in the event of it becoming necessary by virtue of any subsequent decision of the Board. The High Court of Karnataka has made somewhat similar observations in the case of K.Sp V. Shanmugam v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Ltd., reported in (1991) 70 Com Cas 440.

    14. I shall now turn to some of the cases decided by our High Court. Some of the said decisions deal with the applicability of Section 22 of the Act to pending suits and not winding up petitions.

    15. In Appeal No. 1270 of 1987 arising out of Summons for Judgment No. 327 of 1987 in Summary Suit No. 687 of 1987 (Star Industrial and Textile Enterprises Ltd. v. United Bank of India), Barucha and Parekh, JJ., held that the suit could be proceeded with and Section 22 of the Act did not bar further proceeding, in the suit. In Special Steels Limited, Bombay…Plaintiffs; v. Jay Prestressed Products Ltd.…Defendants., 1990 Mah LJ 29, Suresh, J., held that the intention of the Legislature was to provide for restraint against proceedings in relation to properties of the company, which was sick, and not against determination of liability in the suit. In Podar Mills Ltd. v. J.K Synthetics Ltd., (1989) 66 Com Cas 735 : (AIR 1982 Bom 203), the Division Bench of our Court interpreted Section 8(1)(c) of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983. The said Section provided that in the contingency specified therein, no proceeding for winding up of the textile company or appointment of a liquidator shall lie in any Court, except with the consent of the Central Government. It was held by the Division Bench of our High Court that the said Section was applicable also to pending proceeding of winding up and the expression “shall lie” could not be interpreted so as to exclude pending winding up petitions from its scope. The Division Bench relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra State Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Official Liquidator reported in (1978) 48 Com Cas 350 : (AIR 1978 SC 476) wherein a similar view has taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. By the operative part of its order, the Hon'ble Division Bench restrained the Petitioning-Creditors from taking any further proceedings in the petition for winding up until the Petitioning-Creditors obtained the consent of the Central Government under Section 8(1)(c) of the said Act for proceeding further with the said Company Petition. At least indirectly, the reasoning of this judgment supports the view which I am inclined to take.

    16. In the result, I hold as under:—

    The effect of applicability of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, is as under:—

    (1) The winding up Petition is not liable to be dismissed or treated as abated.

    (2) The winding up Petition and the Judge's Summonses are liable to be suspended and kept in abeyance, with liberty to the parties to revive the same with consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or with consent of the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, as the case may be, or in case the conditions precedent prescribed under Section 22(1) of the Act cease to operate. I accordingly order that the winding up Petition and the Judge's Summonses do stand adjourned sine the subject to the right of the parties to revive the same as aforesaid.

    (3) Ad interim orders dated 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990 are not automatically suspended, even though the Judge's Summonses in which the said orders are passed cannot be now taken up for passing of final orders, unless the Petitioning-Creditors obtain the consent of the Board or Section 22(1) of the Act ceases to apply by reason of disappearance of conditions precedent prescribed thereby.

    (4) Ad interim orders dated 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990 are modified as under:—

    (a) The Company shall be at liberty to alienate its assets only with the prior leave of the Board and not otherwise. The Company shall give prior adequate notice to the Petitioning-Creditors before applying for such leave.

    (b) The orders of injunction dated 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990 shall not preclude the Board from considering, sanctioning or implementing the requisite scheme under the Act as it deems fit. In other words, the Board shall be free to exercise its statutory functions under the Act, unaffected by the orders of injunction passed by this Court.

    (c) Save and except the above modification, the orders dated 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990 shall continue to be in force pending further orders.

    (d) In case the Board sanctions any scheme sanctioning sale of the properties of the Company and such scheme comes into force, the orders of injunction dated 5th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990 shall stand vacated. Liberty to apply for further directions, if necessary, after the scheme is sanctioned.

    (5) There shall be no order as to costs of the hearing on the issue of applicability and effect of Section 22 of the Act.

    Order accordingly.
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    Ramniklal & Co. And Others v. The Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd., Company
    (Apr 12, 1991)