Barucha, J.:— This petition impugns the order, dated 6 April 1988, passed by the Industrial Court in a revision application under S. 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.
2. The petitioner is a sole proprietary concern. It ran a powerloom factory at Madhavnagar, Sangli District. It had 5 workmen.
3. By a notification, dated 1 August 1974, the minimum wages payable to workmen in powerloom factories was raised. The notification was challenged in a writ petition filed in this Court. By an interim order powerloom factories were required to pay to their workmen 75 per cent of the wages fixed by the said notification.
4. It is the petitioner's case that it was not able to comply even with the order to pay even 75 per cent of the wages prescribed by the said notification. Accordingly, a notice was put up on its notice-board on 17 September 1985 to the following effect:
“All the workmen are hereby informed that the factory shall be closed with effect from tomorrow, i.e, 18 September 1985. The workmen may note that the eligible workmen shall be paid retrenchment compensation.”
The closure of the factory became effective on 18 September 1985. The closure of the factory was communicated to the Factory Inspection Office, Sangli, and its licence was surrendered. Three out of the factory's 5 workmen did not accept their terminal dues.
5. On 4 October 1985, the first respondent trade union moved on behalf of these 3 workmen a reference under S. 25 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, before the Labour Court asking for a declaration that an illegal lockout had been declared in the factory from 18 September 1985. The petitioner filed a written statement in which it was contended that it had permanently closed the factory due to financial inability to make payment of the minimum wages.
6. The only oral evidence that was led before the Labour Court was that of one of the workmen. The relevant portion thereof reads thus:
“Opponent (petitioner) closed factory on 18 September 1985 and made lockout. We enquired. Opponent told of closure. Opponent told that if workers were willing to work on less wages then he may start again. The proprietor produces superfine dhoti. Opponent had his beam unit. He then gave beams for weaving to other powerlooms at Kurundwad, etc. He still prepares dhoti. He gets weaving done on piece rate. The proprietor closed unit to pressurise workers to work on lesser wages.”
7. The entire cross-examination on behalf of the petitioner reads thus:
“It is not true that our compensation were paid. It is not correct that proprietor is sick and wants to close units.”
8. It appears that documents were submitted on behalf of the petitioner to the Labour Court and, placing reliance thereon, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that there had been a closure of the factory so that there could be no declaration as prayed. The order of the Labour Court was challenged in the revision application filed before the Industrial Court. By the impugned order, the Industrial Court upset the Labour Court's order and held that an illegal lockout had been declared by the petitioner on 18 September 1985.
9. Sri Srikrishna, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Industrial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction because it had reviewed the evidence placed before the Labour Court in passing the impugned order. He laid great emphasis on the notice of closure which we have quoted above and on a receipt issued by the Factory Inspector, Sangli, which stated that information regarding closure of the factory had been received. Sri Srikrishna also drew our attention to a medical certificate which had been put in at some stage of the proceedings before the Labour Court which showed that Nandlal, who, Sri Srikrishna said, was the man who was in management of the petitioner, was suffering from certain aortic problems and was under treatment. Sri Srikrishna relied upon the fact that a writ petition had been filed in this Court impugning the notification which raised minimum wages payable to the workmen of powerloom factories and the interim order that had been passed therein directing proprietors thereof to pay 75 per cent of the minimum wages so fixed. It was Sri Srikrishna's submission that, having regard to the evidence that was placed before the Labour Court, the Court had corns to the reasonable conclusion that there was no illegal lockout but a genuine closure and that the Industrial Court in revision had no jurisdiction to appraise the evidence to come to the contrary conclusion.
10. The position in law is clear. The power conferred by S. 44 upon the Industrial Court empowers it, in so far as evidence is concerned, to set aside the order under revision when the evidence on record, reasonably read, is incapable of supporting the order. In other words, the Industrial Court may, in exercise of powers under S. 44, over rule the order under revision when its conclusion on evidence is perverse.
11. Now, as Miss Sarnaik, learned counsel for the first respondent, pointed out, it was the case of the first respondent before the Labour Court that the petitioner had without notice, illegally, and by an oral order declared a lockout from 18 September 1985. In the written statement a reference was made to the alleged closure notice but it was not annexed to the written statement. The factum of the closure notice was, therefore, directly in issue. The writ petition refers to two purshis filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court; one, dated 9 September 1986, produced the electricity bills of the factory for the months of November 1985 and May 1986 to show that there had then been no consumption of electricity; the other, dated 23 September 1986, placed on record the factory licence. There is no purshis in relation to the closure notice. The only oral evidence that was led before the Labour Court,. as aforesaid, was that of the workman. He referred to the oral statement made on behalf of the petitioner and not to any closure notice. There was no cross-examination in this regard. The Labour Court in its order speaks of documents submitted and produced by the petitioner, but it does not appear that they were proved before the Labour Court in the ordinary way. Certainly, the closure notice could not have been placed on the record by consent. The closure notice ought to have been proved by the petitioner. The closure notice, if proved, would have been a strong factor in favour of the petitioner's case but, since it was not proved, no reliance could have been placed upon it by the Labour Court.
12. It was submitted by Sri Srikrishna that the petitioner had surrendered its factory licence to the Factory Inspector and in that behalf reference was made to a receipt issued by his office. In the first place, that receipt only states that information regarding the closure of the factory had been received. In the second place, the petitioner placed its factory licence on record before the Labour Court by the purshis, dated 23 September 1986. In the third place, this reciept also does not appear to have properly come on record. That the petitioner's factory licence was surrendered was not proved.
13. Sri Srikrishna drew our attention to the medical certificate issued to Nandlal K. Malu and submitted that the factory had to be closed because he was not fit to run it. It was not the contention of the petitioner in its written statement that the factory was being closed, inter alia, for such medical reasons. This medical certificate was produced, apparently for an adjournment, in the course of the hearing before the Labour Court. Reliance, therefore, could not have been placed upon this certificate and it could not have been held that Nandlal ran the factory, that he was medically unfit to go on running it and that that was one of the reasons for its closure.
14. In these circumstances, it does appear to us the order of the Labour Court that there was a closure of the factory was, upon the record, unjustified and not reasonable.
15. This being so, it lay within the ambit of the Industrial Court's jurisdiction to review the evidence and to reverse the order. Upon such evidence as was on record, the Industrial Court's findings were justified.
16. The petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.