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Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners challenged the validity of a Government of India notification dated 3 November 1988 issued under Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which banned the manufacture of fixed dose combinations of corticosteroids with any other drug for internal use. The petitioners are manufacturers of "Cartasmyl", a fixed dose combination of corticosteroids and bronchodilators, and asserted that the drug benefits asthma patients and that the ban was imposed without the requisite satisfaction under Section 26A.

Background events recorded in the opinion:

  • From about 1980 the Government examined the rationality of various fixed dose combinations. The then Drugs Controller (Dr. S. S. Gothoskar) solicited manufacturers' views on recommendations to weed out unnecessary or irrational combinations.
  • The Government earlier (circa 1983) had banned fixed dose combinations of steroids for internal use except combinations for treatment of asthma. Dr. Gothoskar had recorded an opinion that adding steroids to bronchodilators allowed lower steroid doses and thereby fewer side effects (evidence of pharmacological synergism).
  • A separate writ petition (Writ Petition No. 1701 of 1984) had challenged a ban on "Celestamine" (a steroid + antihistaminic). In that matter the Government, by affidavit of Deputy Drugs Controller Raghunath Prasad Hinnaria, had supported the use of fixed-dose corticosteroid + bronchodilator combinations for asthma, and the court in that petition issued rule and granted interim injunction restraining enforcement of the ban.
  • The executive record shows that the Drugs Technical Advisory Board (DTAB), constituted under Section 5 of the Act, met on 22 April 1988 and recommended that fixed dose combinations of corticosteroids with other drugs for asthma be banned, on the ground that long-term asthma therapy using corticosteroids can cause more harm than good even in low doses.
  • On 29 November 1988 interim relief had been granted by Mrs. Sujata Manohar, J., and the government was afforded opportunity to file affidavits disclosing material that formed the basis of its satisfaction under Section 26A. The present opinion considers whether the requisite material existed before the Board and the Government when the ban was made.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notification dated 3 November 1988, banning fixed dose combinations of corticosteroids with any other drug for internal use, is validly made under Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
  2. Whether the Government (and the Drugs Technical Advisory Board) had relevant material before it such that it could be properly "satisfied" under Section 26A to impose the ban.
  3. To what extent the Court may review an administrative decision based on expert or technical opinion when rival medical views exist (i.e., the scope and limits of judicial review in the context of scientifically technical decisions taken by the executive after consultation with expert bodies).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioners manufacture "Cartasmyl", a steroid + bronchodilator combination that they contend is of substantial benefit to asthma patients.
  • The ban imposed by the 3 November 1988 notification was made without the Government being properly satisfied in terms of Section 26A — i.e., on a total non-application of mind and in the absence of material to justify the required satisfaction.
  • Mr. Desai (counsel for petitioners) relied on a large body of medical literature supporting the usefulness of the banned drug and asked the Court to hold that the drug is highly useful for bronchial asthma sufferers.

Respondent / Union of India Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The Government relied on the recommendation of the Drugs Technical Advisory Board (DTAB) meeting of 22 April 1988 that fixed dose combinations of corticosteroids with other drugs for asthma should be banned because asthma therapy is long-term and corticosteroids even in low doses over long periods may cause net harm.
  • Mr. Dalal (counsel for the Union) urged that the decision of a high-powered expert body entitled the Government to act, and that courts have limited jurisdiction to re-evaluate technical/scientific opinion adopted by the executive. He relied on precedents that caution against judicial re-evaluation of expert-backed executive decisions.
  • The Government filed an affidavit of Deputy Drugs Controller Hinnaria asserting that a background paper on the agenda item had been before the Board and that the Board had considered it before giving its recommendation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. K. Tejani v. M. R. Dange Principle that courts should not re-evaluate technical or scientific questions where the executive has formed an opinion in good faith after consulting experts; judicial review is limited so long as exercise of power is not tainted by bad faith, extraneous considerations, ignorance of relevant factors, or irrationality. The court acknowledged this principle but distinguished the present case: the primary question here was not whether the Court should re-evaluate scientific controversy generally, but whether there was material before the Board/Government to justify the satisfaction required under Section 26A. The court indicated it would be hesitant to interfere if the authority had properly considered relevant material, but in this instance such material was not shown to have been placed before the Board.
Vincent v. Union of India Observation that judicial proceedings such as public interest litigation are not always appropriate mechanisms for directing the Government to ban products involving complex, technical, and far-reaching implications; courts should be cautious in ordering bans based on contested medical opinion. The court accepted the general caution from Vincent — that if an authority considers rival medical opinions and accepts one, courts should ordinarily be reluctant to interfere — but stressed that the discrete procedural issue remained whether the Board had any relevant material before it when recommending the ban. Here the court found the Government had not demonstrated such material.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in the following steps, as stated in the opinion:

  1. Statutory context: The court sets out Section 26A (inserted by Act 68 of 1982) and observes that the provision allows the Central Government to prohibit manufacture, sale or distribution of a drug where the Government is satisfied that the drug is injurious, lacks claimed therapeutic value, or contains unjustified ingredients/quantities — i.e., the statute permits banning both dangerous and therapeutically useless drugs.
  2. Assessment of competing medical literature: The court notes that petitioners' counsel (Mr. Desai) relied on a large body of medical literature supporting the usefulness of the banned drug, while other medical literature reduced the force of that opinion. The court recognises that where rival expert views exist, judicial interference is ordinarily limited once the executive selects one expert view.
  3. Precedent on limited review: The court examines authority (P. K. Tejani and Vincent) emphasising limited judicial re-evaluation of technical executive decisions based on expert opinion, but underlines that such deference presupposes that the executive actually had relevant material before it when forming the opinion.
  4. Examination of administrative record: The court reviews the DTAB minutes of 22 April 1988 and the affidavit of Deputy Drugs Controller Hinnaria. While the affidavit and minutes reference a background paper and the Board's recommendation, the court finds that the disclosed material does not show specific relevant evidence (such as particular medical literature or clinical test results) having been placed before the Board.
  5. Significance of earlier governmental position and Board composition: The court highlights that the Government had earlier (circa 1983) taken the view that corticosteroid + bronchodilator combinations were effective for asthma, and that the 22 April 1988 minutes show the Board was newly reconstituted (members meeting for the first time). This suggested lack of a continuous administrative review that could explain a change of view. The opinion concludes that if there had been a continuous review supporting the ban, the materials of that review should have been placed before the Board or shown in the record; they were not.
  6. Legal consequence of evidential gap: Because the Government failed to demonstrate that relevant material justified the satisfaction required under Section 26A, the court found a case made out for issuing rule and granting interim relief. The court stresses that injurious drugs should not be allowed and beneficial drugs should not be made unavailable, and urges the Government to re-apply its mind to the question in the light of relevant material and afford hearing to concerned persons, even before final disposal of the petition.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court issued rule returnable on 12 June 1989 and granted interim relief in terms of the petition's prayer clause (e)(i).

Consequences and practical implications as stated in the opinion:

  • The court found that the Government had not demonstrated relevant material before the Drugs Technical Advisory Board or the Government to justify the satisfaction required under Section 26A for imposing the ban.
  • Accordingly, a rule was issued and interim relief was granted (the interim relief had earlier been granted on admission by Mrs. Sujata Manohar, J., and is continued by this order in the terms specified).
  • The court urged the Government to re-examine the matter promptly and to consider relevant material and hear the persons concerned; such reconsideration could occur before the final hearing and may either prevent the use of injurious medicines or remove the cloud over a beneficial medicine.
  • The opinion does not set out a broad new legal precedent on the limits of judicial review beyond reiterating existing authorities that emphasise judicial modesty in matters of scientific controversy when the executive has vetted relevant material. The immediate, direct effect is procedural (rule issued; interim relief granted) and substantive only to the extent that the Government must justify, on the record, any executive satisfaction under Section 26A before the ban can be sustained.

This summary is limited strictly to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Roussel Pharmaceuticals India Ltd. v. Union Of India

    1. By this writ petition the petitioners are challenging the validity of a notification dated 3rd November, 1988 issued by the Government of India under which the Government of India, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, hereinafter referred as "the Act", has banned the manufacture of fixed dose combination of corticosteroids with any other drug for internal use.

    2. The petitioners are manufacturers of a drug called "Cartasmyl", which is a fixed dose of combination of corticosteroids and bronchodilators. They contend that this drug is of great benefit to asthma patients. They also contend that the ban imposed by the aforesaid notification has been done without being properly satisfied, as required under Section 26A of the Act.

    3. Few facts need to be mentioned. Sometime in the year 1980 the question of the rationality or otherwise of the various fixed dose combinations then available in the market began to exercise the mind of the Government. The then Drugs Controller, Dr. S. S. Gothoskar had invited the views of the manufacturer of drugs on the recommendations which had made by the Sub-committee of Drugs Consultative Committee for weeding out the unnecessary and irrational combinations. The industry, presumably, expressed its opinion on the same. The Government thereafter banned the fixed dose combinations of steroids for internal use, except the combination of steroids with other drugs for the treatment of asthma. The material, which has been brought on record by the petitioners and which has not been controverted, shows that the then Drugs Controller, India, Dr. Gothoskar, had stated that there was evidence then when steroids are added to bronchodilators there is lesser dose of steroids required to allay bronchial spasm than when steroids are given alone causing thereby lesser side effects due to steroids. This amounted to saying that there was evidence of pharmacological synergism between corticosteroids and bronchodilators.

    4. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being Writ Petition No. 1701 of 1984, had been fixed in this Court challenging the order of the Government banning the manufacture of a drug called "Celestamine", which was a fixes dose combination of steroids with antihistaminics for the treatment of bronchial asthma. Lentin J. was sufficiently impressed that there was no material for banning the said drug. Therefore, rule was issued on the said petition and interim injunction restraining the Government from enforcing the ban was also granted. It ought to be noted that during the hearing of that writ petition on affidavit of Raghunath Prasad Hinnaria, Deputy Drugs Controller, had been filed. In that affidavit the Government had supported the use of the fixed dose combination of corticosteroids with bronchodilators on the ground that the said combination was useful for the treatment bronchial asthma. This was naturally consistent with the opinion expressed by Dr. Gothoskar referred to above.

    5. It is contented by the petitioners that after 1984 nothing has which could have legitimately led the Government to impose the ban in November 1988. It is the contention of petitioners that the ban is based upon total non-application of mind and on total of absence of material which could form the basic of the satisfaction under Section 26A of the Act. Section 26A of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which was inserted by act 68 of 1982, is in the following terms :-

    "Without prejudice to any other provision contained in this Chapter, if the Central Government is satisfied that the use of any drug or cosmetic is likely to involve any risk to human beings or animals or that any drug does not have the therapeutic value claimed or purported to be claimed for it or contains ingredients and in such quantity for which there is no therapeutic justification and that is in the public interest it is necessary or expedient so to do, then, the Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, prohibit the manufacture, sale or distribution of such drug or cosmetic."

    It is obvious from the above provision that it is not merely the dangerous drugs which can be banned, drugs which do not have any medicinal value can also be banned. This is because a patient should not be persuaded to consume a drug in the hope that it is useful when in fact it is not useful. If a patient does such a thing, the cure eludes him and he might lose valuable time for controlling his disease. In the instant case, therefore, the ban would held to be justified if it is shown that the drug in question is injurious or is useless.

    6. Mr. Desai, the learned Advocate appearing in support of petition, has invited my attention to large mass of medical literature on the basis of which he wants me to hold that the banned drug is highly useful and is a boon to persons who are suffering from bronchial asthma. There are, on the other hand, certain observations in other medical literature which reduce the value of the opinion on which Mr. Desai relies. If there are two contrary views and if one of them commends itself to authority under Section 26A of the Act, then this Court would not normally interfere with the order passed under Section 26A. Mr. Dalal. The learned Advocate appearing for the Union of India, has invited any attention to some judgments of the Supreme Court which point to the limited jurisdiction of Courts while dealing with the opinion formed by the Government on the basis of expert view. In P. K. Tejani v. M. R. Dange, , it was pointed out that so long as the exercise of power is not smeared by bad faith, influenced by extraneous considerations, uninformed by relevant factors, and is within the limits of reasonableness, it became out of bounds for judicial re-valuation. It was the judicial function to enter the thicket of research controversy or scientific dispute where Parliament has entrusted the Central Government with the power, and therefore the duty, of protecting public health against potential hazards and the Central Government, after consultation with a high-powered technical body, has prohibited the use of a particular product. In the case before the Supreme Court the prohibition was saccharin and cyclamates. The prohibition had been based upon the opinion expressed by a specialist committee which has been constituted under Section 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

    7. In Vincent v. Union of India, , the question arose as to whether the Court could direct the Government to ban some products. The petition before the Supreme Court as by way of public interest litigation and it has been urged that in view of medical opinion prevailing in certain quarters some products ought to be banned and the Government should be directed to ban the same. Having regard to the to the magnitude, complexity and technical nature of the enquiry involved in the matter and keeping in view the far-reaching implications of the total ban of certain medicines, for which appropriate direction was sought, the Supreme Court observed that a judicial proceeding of the nature initiated is not an appropriate one for determination of such matters. I am in agreement with the proposition that if, after considering the rival medical opinions in support of or against a particular drug, the authority accepts one opinion and proceeds to exercise its power under Section 26A of the Act, this Court would be hesitant to interfere with the exercise of that power. The question in this petition, however, is whether there was any material before the Government when it proceeded to pass the impugned order.

    8. On behalf of the Government it is stated that the Drugs Technical Advisory Board constituted under Section 5 of the Act has, in its meeting held on 22nd April 1988, recommended fixed dose combination of corticosteroids with other drugs for use in asthma should be banned because asthma therapy is a long-term therapy and corticosteroids even in low doses when administered for longer periods are reported to cause more harm than good to the patients. Mr. Dalal says that this is the option of a high-powered body consisting of high functionaries as mentioned in Section 5 of the Act. If the Government, therefore, acted on the basis of this opinion, this Court should not interfere with the action of the Government. He has also relied upon the affidavit of Raghunath Prasad Hinnaria, Deputy Drug Controller, filed for the purpose of opposing the admission of this petition. In this affidavit it has been mentioned that a paper giving the background of the Agenda Item 25 (regarding the banning of fixed dose combination of corticosteroids with bronchodilators) was before the Board and after considering the said paper the Board has given its decision. I have, with the assistance of Mr. Dalal, gone through the affidavit of Mr. Hinnaria, including the annexures thereto. In my opinion, the material which has now been disclosed does not show that there was any material before the Board while it considered the ban of the drug in question. It is true that there was a paper which gave certain background information about the drug in question, but it seems to be more in the nature of opinion. The members of the Board themselves do not seem to have been given the benefit of a particular information which could have them to take a view contrary to the view which had been taken earlier by the Drugs Controller. It has not been mentioned, for example, that any medical literature or the results of any clinical test were made available to the members of the Board who meet on 22nd April, 1988. While considering this question, one cannot forget the fact that the Government of India had taken a decision that the fixed dose combination of corticosteroids with bronchodilators was a good and effective drug for the treatment of bronchial asthma as early as in the year 1983. That view was re-affirmed by the Government in the affidavit of Mr. Hinnaria in Writ Petition No. 1701 of 1984 in this Court. Neither in the proceedings of the Board nor in the present affidavit of Mr. Hinnaria is there anything to show as to why the view of the Government has swung to the other extreme. Mr. Dalal says, and not without justification, that it is not necessary to mention in the minutes of the meeting the various materials that might have been considered by the members of the Board as long as indication is available that the said material has been considered and a decision on the same has been taken. I agree that mention need not necessarily be made in the minutes of the meeting as to what material had been considered by the Board at its meeting. But when challenged, it must be shown that certain relevant material had been placed before the Board and the Board had considered the same. Unfortunately, this has not been done in the instant case.

    9. In fact the only question which arises in this petition is whether there was some material before the Board to take the view which it has taken. On 29th November, 1988 when this petition first came up for admission Mrs. Sujata Manohar, J. granted interim relief on the ground the material on record showed advantages of using the banned drug. Therefore the petition was adjourned more than once in order to enable the Government to file an affidavit showing that there was material before the Government which could legitimately form the basis of the satisfaction as per required under Section 26A of the Act before imposing the impugned ban.

    10. It is also interesting to note the following to be found in the minutes of the Board meeting held on 22nd April, 1988 :-

    "The Chairman welcomed the members attending the meeting and stated that meeting of the Board could not be held after December, 1984 because then Drugs Controller (India), Dr. S. S. Gothoskar retired in November, 85 and it took sometime for Government to appoint new Drugs Controller (India). Thereafter the term of the elected and nominated members of the Board had expired and it took time to reconstitute the Board. Since the reconstituted Board is meeting for the first time, the Chairman requested all the members to introduce themselves."

    From this it appears that the members of this Board were new or, at any rate, were meeting as a Board for the first time. If there was a continuous review of the relevant material from the year 1980 and if, as a result of the exercise of that review, the Board had taken a particular view, that view would not be subject to a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. From the extract of the minutes of the meeting reproduced above, it seems to me that there was no such continuous review. If there was one, the material of that review is not shown to have been placed before the Board. It is not so mentioned in the minutes of the meeting. It has not been so asserted by Mr. Hinnaria in his present affidavit.

    11. In view of the failure of the Government to demonstrate that the ban is based upon relevant material, a case is made out of issuing rule on this petition and also for granting interim relief. I am inclined to grant interim relief because from all the material which is before the Court and on the view taken by the Government itself in the year 1983, it is seen that the banned medicine is of benefit to persons who are suffering from bronchial asthma. The proper approach in such cases is that injurious medicines should not be allowed to be manufactured and distributed. Similarly, beneficial medicines should not be made unavailable. While proceeding to issue rule and grant interim relief, I would strongly urge the Government, even at this stage, to apply its mind afresh to the whole question in the light of the relevant material and hear all the persons concerned on this question and then take an appropriate decision. This can be done even before the hearing and final disposal of this petition.

    A proper decision taken may prevent the use of any injurious medicine or it may remove the cloud which is hanging over the banned medicine.

    12. Hence, rule, returnable on 12th June 1989. Interim relief in terms of prayer clause (e) (i) of the petition. Leterly to appear for a fixed date.

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    Comments

    Roussel Pharmaceuticals India Ltd. v. Union Of India
    (Feb 21, 1989)