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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Per Couto, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioners are a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 engaged, inter alia, in exporting iron ore from Goa. On 8 March 1985 petitioners presented Shipping Bill No. 33 at Marmagoa Customs for export of 100,000 tonnes of iron ore by the vessel "M.V. Pioneer Maru" and deposited Rs. 3,00,000 towards customs duty and Rs. 50,000 towards cess.

The Customs Authorities granted entry outwards to the vessel on 11 March 1985 and, on that day, issued an order under section 51 of the Customs Act directing clearance and loading. Loading began on the evening of 19 March 1985 and was completed on 22 March 1985 at berth No. 9 (mechanical ore handling plant). Additional iron ore was trans-shipped into the same vessel between 22 and 25 March 1985. The vessel sailed for Japan at about 5:50 p.m. on 25 March 1985.

Notification No. 87-Customs, dated 17 March 1985 (which exempted iron ore from duty), came into force at midnight on 16/17 March 1985. After export, by letter dated 11 April 1985 the petitioners claimed refund of Rs. 3,00,000 deposited under Shipping Bill No. 33 and submitted the prescribed refund application.

By order dated 7 February 1986 the first respondent rejected the refund claim on the ground that the crucial date for determining the applicable rate of duty is either the date of presentation of the Shipping Bill or the date of entry outwards. The petitioners challenged that order by way of writ petition under Article 226.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether export duty (if any) is payable at the moment goods actually cross the territorial limits of India (i.e., when export is complete), or whether the decisive date for levy of export duty is the date of filing the Shipping Bill or the date on which Customs grant entry outwards.
  2. Whether the Court should exercise discretionary relief under Article 226 when a statutory appeal remedy existed but was not pursued by the petitioners.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. S.K. Kakodkar)

  • The levy of customs duty is on "imported or exported goods" (section 12); therefore duty is payable only when goods are actually exported (i.e., have left territorial India), not merely when they are "export goods" intended for export.
  • Section 16 deals only with determination/quantification of the rate of duty and tariff valuation on "export goods" and does not itself create a liability to pay duty; it cannot be read as the charging provision.
  • There is a clear distinction between "export goods" (goods intended to be taken out of India) and "exported goods" (goods which have been taken out of India). Export is complete only when goods cross the territorial limits of India (which include territorial waters).
  • Accordingly, because the censoring Notification No. 87-Customs exempting iron ore came into force before the goods actually crossed the territorial limits, the petitioners were entitled to a refund of the duty deposited.
  • Authorities and cases cited in support: sections 12, 15 and 16 of the Customs Act; B.K. Wadeyar v. Daulatram Rameshwarlal; Yusuf Abdulla Patel v. R.N. Shukla; Lucas T.V.S Padi v. Assistant Collector of Customs (Madras); and Shawhney v. Sylvania and Laxman Ltd., for the chargeability-versus-assessment distinction.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Bhobe, Central Government Standing Counsel)

  • The relevant date for determining liability to export duty is the date of filing of the Shipping Bill or the date of making entry outwards. In the present case the Shipping Bill was filed on 8 March 1985 and entry outwards made on 11 March 1985, both dates prior to Notification No. 87 (17 March 1985), and therefore the exemption did not apply.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Gangadhar Narshighdas Agarwal v. P.S. Thrivikraman (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 351) in support of the submission about the relevant date.
  • The petitioners had an available statutory appeal but did not pursue it; they sought relief under Article 226 instead and, according to the respondent, this should bar the present writ petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
B.K. Wadeyar v. Daulatram Rameshwarlal (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 311) That "export" is the taking out of goods beyond territorial limits (including territorial waters); time of export is when ship goes beyond territorial limits. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to conclude export is complete only when goods cross territorial limits, supporting the view that duty is payable only then.
Yusuf Abdulla Patel v. R.N. Shukla (1970 B.L.R. 575) Supports the proposition that "export" connotes actual taking out of goods beyond territorial limits under section 2(18) of the Customs Act. The court cited this decision to reinforce that export is the physical act of taking goods out of India and thus to support its timing conclusion.
Lucas T.V.S. Padi v. Assistant Collector of Customs (Madras) (1980 E.L.T. 465 (Madras)) Accepted the view that export is complete only when goods leave territorial limits. The court relied on this High Court decision as further authority affirming the timing of export.
Shawhney v. Sylvania and Laxman Ltd. (1975 B.L.R. 380) Distinction between chargeability (levy) of duty and assessment/quantification of the amount payable; analysis of sections dealing with rate/valuation. The court adopted the Division Bench's reasoning to distinguish section 12 (charge) from sections 15/16 (quantification), applying that distinction to export transactions.
Gangadhar Narshighdas Agarwal v. P.S. Thrivikraman (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 351) Invoked by respondent to support the proposition regarding the relevant date for determination of duty. The respondent relied on this Supreme Court decision; the court considered it but reached its conclusion based on its interpretation of the Customs Act and other authorities.
Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Privy Council, 1948 (16) I.T.R. 240) Observations distinguishing chargeability of a tax/duty from the quantification of the amount payable. The court noted that the Division Bench in Shawhney quoted this Privy Council observation to justify the distinction between chargeability and assessment; the observation supported the court's conceptual framework.
Union of India v. Bhagwan Industries Ltd. (A.I.R. 1957 All. 799) Held that there can be no levy of duty on goods which are not exported or which could not be exported; duty can be levied only when export is complete. The court relied on this Allahabad High Court Division Bench decision to support the conclusion that duty can be levied only upon completion of export.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main analytical strands: (A) the procedural/jurisdictional issue about invoking writ jurisdiction despite a statutory appeal being available; and (B) the substantive question of when export duty is payable.

A. Procedural/Jurisdictional Analysis

The court acknowledged that a statutory appeal remedy was available to the petitioners but exercised its discretion to hear and decide the writ petition on merits. The reasons given: (i) the petition had been admitted and heard on merits; (ii) the impugned order was manifestly unsustainable; and (iii) dismissal on technical grounds (for failure to appeal) would likely prejudice petitioners because the statutory appeal might be barred by limitation. On that basis the court declined to refuse relief merely because an appeal avenue existed.

B. Substantive Analysis — When Duty is Payable

  • Statutory framework: Section 12 is the charging provision providing that duties of customs shall be levied on goods "imported into or exported from India." Section 16 deals with the date for determination of the rate of duty and tariff valuation for "export goods." Definitions in the Act: "export" (section 2(18)) means "taking out of India to a place outside India"; "export goods" (section 2(19)) are goods which are to be taken out of India; and "India" (section 2(27)) includes the territorial waters of India.
  • The court emphasized the textual distinction: section 12 refers to "exported" goods (levy/chargeability), whereas section 16 deals with "export goods" (for determining rate/valuation). From this, and from the statutory definitions, the court concluded that export is complete only when the goods are actually taken out of India (i.e., cross territorial limits).
  • The court accepted and applied the legal distinction between chargeability (the imposition of duty — governed by the charging provision, section 12) and assessment or quantification (the calculation of the amount of duty — governed by sections 15 and 16). It relied on Shawhney (and the Privy Council observation quoted therein) to support that conceptual division.
  • Applying precedent (Wadeyar, Yusuf Abdulla Patel, Lucas Padi and Union of India v. Bhagwan Industries Ltd.), the court held that export occurs when goods cross the territorial limits and therefore duty can be levied only when export is complete.
  • Factual application: The court noted the undisputed facts that (a) the petitioners filed the Shipping Bill on 8 March 1985 and entry outwards was granted on 11 March 1985; (b) Notification No. 87-Customs (exempting iron ore) came into force midnight of 16/17 March 1985; and (c) the vessel left territorial limits on 25 March 1985. Because the actual export (departure) occurred after the exemption came into force, the court concluded that no duty was payable in respect of the exported iron ore.
  • Consequently, the court held that the first respondent had no authority to retain the deposited Rs. 3,00,000 and that petitioners were entitled to a refund.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition was allowed — the rule was made absolute in terms of the petitioners' prayers. The court held that export duty was payable only when the goods were actually exported (i.e., when they crossed the territorial limits of India). Because the iron ore was actually exported after Notification No. 87-Customs (17 March 1985) exempting such exports came into force, no duty was payable and the deposit of Rs. 3,00,000 should be refunded.

Direct remedial consequences ordered by the court:

  • The first respondent was directed to refund the amount of Rs. 3,00,000 to the petitioners within six weeks from the date of the order.
  • If the refund is not made within the specified period, the amount shall accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the order.
  • There was no order as to costs.

Implications: The decision resolves the specific dispute between the parties by clarifying that, for levy purposes under section 12, the decisive moment is the completion of export (crossing territorial limits). The opinion relies on existing authorities and statutory interpretation and does not purport to announce a novel principle beyond those applications; the direct effect is limited to requiring the refund and prescribing interest if the refund is delayed.

Rule made absolute.

    V.M Salgaocar And Brother Pvt. Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector Of Customs, Goa And Another

    Per Couto, J.:— Whether export duty is payable on exported goods when they cross the territorial limits of India, or whether such duty is payable on the date of the filing of the Shipping Bill, or the date on which the Customs Authorities grant entry outwards, is the short and simple question that falls for our determination in this writ petition.

    2. Petitioners are a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and doing, inter alia, the business of exporting iron ore from Goa. On 8th March, 1985, petitioners presented to the Marmagoa customs, the Shipping Bill No. 33 in respect of 1 lakh tonnes of iron ore export to be exported by them through “M.V Pioneer Maru”. Petitioners deposited a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- towards duty of customs as well as a sum of Rs. 50,000/- towards cess. The Customs Authorities granted entry outwards to the said ship on 11th March, 1985 and on the same day, an Order directing clearance and loading of iron ore for exportation through the said ship was made under section 51 of the Customs Act. The loading of the said ship began only on 19th March, 1985, in the evening. In the afternoon of the same day the petitioners by their letter dated 19th March, 1985, informed the first respondent that the loading of the said ship had not commenced till the afternoon of the same day, but it was expected to start sometime later in the evening. They also brought to the notice of the Customs Authorities that they were entitled to the exemption of duty by virtue of the Notification No. 87-Customs dated 17th March, 1985. The loading of the vessel began in the evening of 19th March, 1985 and was completed on 22nd March, 1985 at the mechanical ore handling plant at berth No. 9. Thereafter, the additional quantity of iron ore was loaded in the same vessel by the trans-shipper ‘Gosalia Prospect’ between 22nd and 25th March, 1985, After loading, the aforesaid vessel ‘M.V Pioneer Maru’ sailed for Japan, at about 5.50 p.m, on 25th March, 1985.

    3. Export of iron ore was subject to duty of customs in accordance with the Second Schedule to the Customs Tarriff Act, 1975 read with Notification 331-Customs and 332-Customs, both dated 2nd August, 1986. However, by Notification No. 87 Customs dated 17th March, 1985, which came into force on the midnight of 16/17th March, 1985, iron ore was exempted from the whole duty of Customs leviable thereon under the said Second Schedule when exported out of India. In view of the above exemption and the circumstances that the export of the iron ore took place only on 28th March, 1985, by their letter dated 11th April, 1985 the petitioners claimed a refund of the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- deposited by them towards export duty, under the Shipping Bill No. 33 dated 8th March, 1985. Petitioners also submitted their refund application in the prescribed form. By Order dated 7th February, 1986, the first respondent rejected the petitioner's claim for refund on the sole ground that, the crucial date to determine the rate of duty applicable is the date on which the Shipping Bill is presented or the date on which the entry outwards is granted in respect of the Shipping Sill presented prior to the entry outwards. Hence, this writ petition.

    4. Petitioners challenge the said Order dated 7th February, 1986, mainly, on the ground that the duty is payable on the exported goods and not on export goods. According to them, the iron ore in question was exempted from export duty as it was exported only on 25th March, 1985, when the vessel ‘M.V Pioneer Maru’ crossed the territorial limits of India. Elaborating, Mr. S.K Kakodkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners began to invite our attention to sections 12, 15 and 16 of the Customs Act, 1962. He submitted that section 12 deals with dutiable goods and it becomes clear from the said provision of law, that duty is payable either on imported or exported goods. Then, section 15 deals with the determination of the rate of duty and tariff valuation of imported goods and section 16 with the date for determination of the rat of duty and tariff valuation on export goods. Now, according to the learned Counsel, there is a vast difference between the export goods and exported goods, for export goods are merely goods intended or meant to be taken outside India, whereas exported goods are goods in respect of which this process of export was already completed and therefore, had already left the territorial limits of India. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that only the goods which are already exported are liable to pay duty, if such duty has been imposed by law. Section 16 does not speak of any levy of duty, but deals only with the calculation of the rate of duty and the tariff valuation on export goods. Therefore, for the purposes of levying duty, section 16 is not attracted. The learned Counsel also brought to Cur notice the difference of the wording in sections 15 and 16 inasmuch as in section 15 a reference is made to imported goods, whereas in section 16 the rererence is only to export goods and not to exported goods. This clearly shows that the scope of section 16 is merely to fix a rate of duty or tarriff valuation, in case duty is payable. If no duty is payable, then, according to the learned Counsel, the question of fixing the rate of such duty does not arise. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel in 1(B.K Wadeyar v. Daulatram Rameshwarlal ), A.I.R 1961 S.C 311, 2(Yusuf Abdulla Patel v. R.N Shukla), 1970 B.L.R 575 and 3(Lucas T.V.S Padi. Madras v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Madras) 1980 E.L.T 465 (Madras) in support of his contention that there is a difference between export goods and exported goods and that export is complete only when the territorial waters of India are crossed. He further urged that there is a difference between the chargeability of duty and the assessment or quantification of the amount payable by way of customs duty. He submitted that the chargeability of duty is dealt with in section 12 of the Customs Act, whereas sections 15 and 16 are attracted for the purpose of assessment or quantification of the amount payable by way of customs duty on imported goods and export goods, respectively, as observed in 4(Shawhney v. Sylvania and Laxman Ltd.), 1975 B.L.R 380.

    5. It was however, contended by Mr. Bhobe, learned Central Government Standing Counsel, that the relevant date for levying the export duty is the date of the tiling of the Shipping Bill or the date of making the entry outwards. In this case, admittedly, the Shipping Bill was filed on 8th March 1985 and the entry outwards was made on 11th March, 1985. On these dates, export levy was payable on iron ore, the exemption under the Notification No. 87-Customs dated 17th March, 1985 having come into force only at midnight on 16/17th March, 1985. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the exemption under the said Notification was not available to the petitioners. Reliance was placed in support of this submission on the decision of the Supreme Court in 5(Gangadhar Narshighdas Agarwal v. P.S Thrivikraman) A.I.R 1973 S.C 351. That apart, he further contended that no remedy can be granted to the petitioners in this writ petition because they approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution without availing themselves of the statutory remedy of appeal.

    6. Before addressing ourselves to the merits of this petition, it is expedient to deaf with the submission of Mr. Bhobe that petitioners are not entitled to any relief as they had not availed themselves of the statutory remedy of appeal. It is not denied that a remedy by way of appeal was available to the petitioners, but in our view, that circumstance does not bar this Court from granting the relief sought. In the first instance this writ petition was duly, admitted and heard on merits and in the circumstances where, manifestly, the impugned Order is not sustainable, justice should not be denied to the petitioners only because they rushed to this Court instead of proceeding in appeal. Secondly, if at the present we dismiss this petition on that technical ground, in all probabilities, the petitioners will not be able to file the appeal as such remedy must be barred by the law of limitation. In the circumstances, therefore, we do not think that we should abstain from going into the merits of this petition only on the ground that the petitioners had not availed themselves of the statutory remedy of appeal.

    7. Coming now to the merits of the petition, it will be pertinent to mention here that the first respondent has rejected the claim for refund on the ground that section 16 of the Customs Act is clear in that the crucial date to determine the rate of duty applicable is the date on which the Shipping Bill is presented or the date on which the entry outwards is granted in respect of the Shipping Bill presented prior to entry outwards. Section 16 the Customs Act deals with the date for determination of rate of duty and tariff valuation of export goods. Sub-section (1) provides that the rate of duty and tariff valuation, if any, applicable to any export goods shall be the rate and valuation in force as laid down in its Clauses (a) and (b), provided that if the Shipping Bill has been presented before the date of entry outwards of the vessel, by which the goods are to be exported, the Shipping Bill shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry outwards. It is clear from the wording of the said section and even from its marginal note that the section does not provide for the levy of duty but only deals with the determination of the rate of duty and tariff valuation. Secondly, it is also clear that the said rate of duty is in respect of export goods and not in respect of exported goods. In its turn, section 12 deals with dutiable goods and in sub-section (1) provides that except as otherwise provided in the Act or any other law for the time being in force, duties of customs shall be levied at such rates as may be specified under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or other law for the time being in force on goods imported into or exported from India. Sub-section (2) lays down that provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in respect of all goods belonging to Government as they may apply in respect of goods not belonging to the Government, it is clear, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Kakodkar that unlike section 16 section 12 deals with duty payable on imported or exported goods and not on export goods. Now, section 2(18) defines “export” as meaning “taking out of India to a place outside India”. “Export goods” are defined in section 2(19) as meaning “any goods which are to be taken out of India to a place outside India”, and “India” is defined in section 2(27) as including “the territorial waters of India”. A careful examination of the aforesaid definitions leads to the necessary conclusion that export of goods takes place only when such goods are taken out of India i.e taken out from the territorial limits of India to a place outside India. Export goods are merely goods which are meant to be exported, i.e to be taken out of India to a place outside India. Therefore, it necessarily follows that export of goods is complete only when such export goods cross the territorial boundaries of India on their way to a place outside India. We are supported in this view by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Wadeyar v. Daulatram (above), of this Court in Yusuf Abdulla Patel v. R.N Shukla (above) and of the Madras High Court in Lucas Padi v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Madras (above). In fact, in Wadeyar's case. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947, observed that “export” has been defined in the said Act as taking out of India by sea, land or air and that in the Exports (Control) Order, 1954, the word must be taken to have the same meaning as in the said Act. Then, it was observed that on that definition, the time of the export is the time when the goods go out of the territorial limits of India. These limits would include the territorial waters of India and consequently, the time of export is when the ship with the goods goes beyond the territorial limits. Similarly, in Yusuf Abdulla Patel's case, it has been observed that there can be no doubt having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Wadeyar's case as well as to section 2(18) of the Customs Act, 1962, that the term “export” connotes the actual taking out of the goods beyond the territorial limits of India, This view has been also accepted in Lucas Padi's case.

    8. It is thus clear that there is a definite difference between export goods and exported goods. Section 12 of the Act deals with the leviable duty on imported or exported goods, while section 16 deals only with the rate of duty end tariff valuation on export goods. In other words, section 16 indicates the way of quantifying the duty which is payable, Section 12 deals, therefore, with the chargeability, whereas section 16 deals with the quantification of the amount payable by way of customs duty. As held by the Division Bench of this Court in Shawhney's case (above), it is well-settled that a clear difference exists between the concepts of chargeability end the concept of assessment or qualification of the amount payable by way of customs duty. The Division Bench, after quoting the observations of the Privy Council In 6(Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax), 1948 (16) I.T.R 240, held that the quoted observations of the Privy Council fully justify the clear distinction that exists, inter alia, between chargeability in respect of a tax or duty and the quantification of the amount payable in respect thereof. The Division Bench further observed that the only charging section in respect of levy of customs duty is section 12(1) and that chargeability in respect of levy of customs ought not to be confused with quantification of the amount or assessment thereof as provided under the scheme of the Act. The Division Bench proceeded to analyse the provisions of section 15 which deal with the determination of rate of duty and tariff valuation on imported goods. These observations of the Division Bench, although made in connection with imported goods are entirely applicable to export goods and to the determination of rate of duty of tariff valuation on export goods. The reason is that the distinction between chargeability and the quantification of the amount payable exists both in respect of imported goods and export goods.

    9. We already mentioned that the chargeable section is only section 12(1) of the Act and that the export, takes place only when the goods have crossed the territorial limits of India. If this is so, duty on exported goods is payable only when the export is complete and not before such time. In this respect, we are supported by the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in 7(Union of India v. Bhagwan Industries Ltd.), A.I.R 1957 All 799. In that case, dealing with the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, the Division Bench observed that there can be no levy of duty on goods which are not exported or which could not be exported. In other words, only when the goods are exported, i.e when the export is complete, the duty can be levied.

    10. It is an admitted position that the petitioners had filed the Shipping Bill on 8th March, 1985 and that the entry outwards had been granted on 11th March, 1985. It is also common ground that while filing the Shipping Bill, the petitioners had deposited towards the export duty, which was payable at that time, the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/-. The Notification exempting the export of iron ore from such duty came into force only on the midnight of 16/17th March, 1985. Further, it is common ground that the vessel ‘M.V Pioneer Maru’ had left the territorial limits of India on 25th March, 1985, i.e much after the exemption of duty came into force. Therefore, it is clear that at the time the iron ore loaded in the said vessel was actually exported, the export of iron ore was already exempted from payment of duty. This being so, there is no authority of law for the first respondent retaining the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- which had been deposited by the petitioners towards the payment of duty. In fact, no duty was payable and therefore, there is no question of retaining such amount of money.

    11. The result, therefore, is that this petition succeeds and consequently the rule is made absolute in iterms of prayers (a) and (b). The refund to be made by the first respondent within six weeks from today. In case the refund is not made within the specified period of time, the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- will accure interest at the rate of 12% per annum from today. There will be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case.

    Rule made absolute.
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    V.M Salgaocar And Brother Pvt. Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector Of Customs, Goa And Another
    (Mar 18, 1987)