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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • section 2(8) of the MV Act. Rule 118(1) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 (the MV Rules)
  • MV Act by inserting section 110A to 110F. Section 110(1)(a) entitles
  • Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the MV Act)
  • section 306 of the Indian Succession Act (the IS Act)
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923)
  • Suits Act and the Indian Fatal Accidents Act
  • Section 1A of the Indian Fatal Accidents Act
  • FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT
  • Section 96(2)(b) of the MV Act
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 2(8) of the MV Act. Rule 118(1) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 (the MV Rules)
  • MV Act by inserting section 110A to 110F. Section 110(1)(a) entitles
  • Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the MV Act)
  • section 306 of the Indian Succession Act (the IS Act)
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923)
  • Suits Act and the Indian Fatal Accidents Act
  • Section 1A of the Indian Fatal Accidents Act
  • FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT
  • Section 96(2)(b) of the MV Act
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Abdul Razzaque filed a petition under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, seeking compensation of Rs. 2,05,890.27 for injuries sustained in a motor accident on 14th July 1976 involving a goods truck driven by Taju Ahemad Khan. The truck, owned by Shriram Ramteke and insured with New India Assurance Company, was carrying passengers illegally when it crashed after the driver lost control. Abdul Razzaque suffered serious injuries, was hospitalized for months, declared invalid, and retired from service. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 95,000 in damages solely against the driver, absolving the owner and insurer. Abdul Razzaque appealed against the rejection of claims against the owner and insurer. Abdul Razzaque died during the pendency of the appeal, and his widow and minor children were substituted as appellants. Their substitution was initially opposed on the ground that the right to sue did not survive, but the application was allowed subject to the appeal's determination.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the owner of the truck is liable for the accident and injuries.
  2. Whether the insurer is liable under the insurance policy.
  3. Whether the right to sue the owner and insurer survives to the legal heirs of the deceased Abdul Razzaque.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The owner and insurer should be held liable for the accident and injuries.
  • The right to sue survives to the legal heirs despite the death of Abdul Razzaque during the appeal.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The owner is not vicariously liable as the driver’s act of carrying passengers in a goods vehicle was illegal and outside the scope of employment.
  • The insurer is not liable because the insurance policy excludes liability arising from unauthorized use contrary to policy terms and statutory provisions.
  • The right to sue does not survive to the legal heirs as the claim was personal and extinguished upon the death of Abdul Razzaque.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt, AIR 1966 SC 1697 Master's vicarious liability limited to acts done in the course of employment; illegal acts outside scope of employment do not attract liability. Applied to hold owner not vicariously liable as carrying passengers was a criminal act outside driver's authority.
Pushpabai v. Ranjit G & P. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 745 Extended scope of employment may include unauthorized illegal acts if done in the course of employment, but criminal acts generally excluded. Distinguished and held that owner not liable for criminal act of carrying passengers illegally.
Mohiddinsab Gaffarsab Kundgol v. Rohidas Hari Kindalkar, 1973 ACJ 424 Carrying passengers in a goods vehicle is outside scope of driver's employment; owner not vicariously liable. Followed by this Court to absolve owner from liability.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Manaf Majur Hussain, 1984 ACJ 653 Driver carrying passengers for charges in a goods vehicle is outside scope of employment; owner not liable. Binding precedent applied to reject owner's vicarious liability.
Narayanlal v. Rukhmanibai, 1979 ACJ 261 Owner vicariously liable if no express prohibition against carrying passengers. Distinguished based on presence of owner’s instructions forbidding carrying passengers in present case.
Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. B. Parvathamma, 1984 ACJ 680 Statutory offence of carrying passengers not amounting to criminal act involving moral turpitude; owner vicariously liable. Court declined to accept this reasoning, finding it debatable and inapplicable here.
Mannalal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1986 ACJ 902 Owner liable in absence of evidence driver was prohibited from carrying passengers. Distinguished on facts showing owner’s clear prohibition.
Jiwan Dass v. Karnailsingh, AIR 1980 P & H 167 Employer cannot be deemed to authorize employee’s statutory offence without express command. Supported rejection of owner’s vicarious liability for criminal act of carrying passengers.
Pulin Beharilal v. Narendra Kumar, AIR 1971 Tripura 48 Section 306 Indian Succession Act does not apply after cause of action merges into decree; death does not nullify decree. Applied to hold that right to sue survived to legal heirs after award passed.
Bhupendra v. Chandramani, AIR 1927 Cal. 277 Criticism of English common law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona; Indian courts favor justice and equity over strict application. Supported survival of cause of action to legal heirs despite death of injured.
Meghjibhai v. Chandubhai, 1978 Guj. L.R 216 Motor Vehicles Act is benevolent legislation requiring liberal interpretation for benefit of claimants. Applied to support survival of claim to legal heirs under MV Act provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the owner's vicarious liability by applying established principles limiting such liability to acts done within the scope of employment. Carrying passengers in a goods vehicle is prohibited by statutory rules and constitutes a criminal offence under the Motor Vehicles Act. The driver’s act of carrying passengers was unauthorized and outside the scope of his employment, making the owner not liable. The Court relied on binding precedents, including the United India Insurance Co. decision, which held similarly.

Regarding insurer liability, the Court examined the insurance policy and statutory provisions under Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act. It noted that the policy excludes liability for accidents occurring while the vehicle is used contrary to its permitted use, which in this case was carrying passengers illegally. Consequently, the insurer was held not liable.

On the survival of the right to sue, the Court rejected the strict English common law maxim that personal injury claims do not survive death, emphasizing Indian legal developments and benevolent statutory schemes under the Motor Vehicles Act. It found that the cause of action had merged into an award during Abdul Razzaque’s lifetime, and thus survived to his legal heirs. The Court also invoked principles of justice, equity, and the legislative intent behind sections 110A to 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act to support this conclusion.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED the appeal on merits while allowing the substitution of the legal heirs of Abdul Razzaque as appellants.

The Court held that the owner and insurer are not liable for the injuries sustained due to the unauthorized act of carrying passengers in a goods vehicle. However, the right to sue survived to the legal heirs of the deceased Abdul Razzaque. No costs were ordered. This decision does not establish new precedent beyond applying existing binding authorities, but clarifies the application of vicarious liability principles and survival of claims under the Motor Vehicles Act in the context of illegal carriage of passengers in goods vehicles.

    Maimuna Begum v. Taju

    V.A Mohta, J.:— Abdul Razzaque who died during the pendency of this appeal under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (“the MV Act”) had lodged a petition under section 110a of the mv act to recover a sum of Rs. 2,05,890.27 P. as compensation for the injuries suffered by him in a motor accident that took place in the evening of 14th July 1976 on Nagpur-Kamptee Road. The petition was filed against Taju Ahemad Khan, who during the regular course of his employment was driving Truck No. MHG 6167 owned by Shriram Ramteke and insured with the New India Assurance Company Limited, Nagpur. Abdul Razzaque was a resident of Kamptee and was serving as a binder boy at Government Press, Nagpur. On the fateful day, the truck was returning empty from Nagpur to Kamptee after unloading the goods. On the way the driver Taju Khan gave lift to Abdul Razzaque, his friend Meshram and several others on payment of Rs. 0.50 each. The truck was already carrying the conductor and the labourers employed for unloading the goods. Owner Ramteke was not in the truck. Taju lost control over the vehicle on account of negligent driving, as a consequence of which truck dashed against the railing of the bridge and plunged into the bed of the river. Meshram died on the spot and Abdul Razzaque received several serious injuries as a result of which he was admitted as an indoor patient in several hospitals for months together. Even after discharge, physical condition of Abdul Razzaque remained deteriorated. He was declared as invalid and was compulsorily retired from service. Damages to the tune of Rs. 95,000/- on various counts such as loss of earning, loss of earning capacity, physical and mental pain and agony, medical expenses were awarded by an Award dated 24-2-1981 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Nagpur (the Tribunal) but only as against the driver Taju, absolving the owner and the insurer, from the liability. Aggrieved by the rejection of claim as against the owner and the insurer, Abdul Razzaque has filed this appeal as an indigent person on 2-7-1981. Abdul Razzaque unfortunately died on 5-6-1982 and his widow and minor children have been substituted as appellants in his place. Their application for being brought on record in place of deceased Abdul Razzaque was opposed on the ground that right to sue did not survive. The application was granted subject to decision on the point in this appeal. Driver Taju has not challenged the Award passed against him.

    2. Against this basic factual background, the following three points fall for determination in this appeal:

    1. Whether the owner is liable?

    2. Whether the insurer is liable?

    3. Whether right to sue the owner and the insurer survives to the legal heirs?

    3. Point No. 1:— The truck in question is a “goods vehicle” as defined Hinder section 2(8) of the MV Act. Rule 118(1) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 (“the MV Rules”) framed under the MV Act prohibits carrying a passenger in a goods vehicle. Indeed, to do so is an offence punishable under section 112 of the mv act. Owner was not in the truck. He used to pay bhatta to the driver whenever the driver was sent outstation and had issued instructions not to carry the passengers. In our judgment, in this basic factual background, the Tribunal was justified in not holding the owner vacariously liable. No doubt the driver was driving the truck in the regular course of his employment but taking passenger was not only outside the scope of his employment and/or authority but was a criminal act. The first leading Indian decision on the point seems to be the case of Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt , AIR 1966 SC 1697. Basic facts of that case were that an owner of a taxi entrusted it to M who appointed a cleanener C.M also trained C for driving. C took the taxi to the office of the R.T.A where the accident took place, due to negligent driving of C. Question arose whether the owner was liable for the negligent driving of C. Following statements of law are to the point:—

    “The law is settled that a master is vicariously liable for the acts of his servant acting in the course of his employment. Unless the act is done in the course of employment, the servant's act does not make the employer liable. In other words, for the master's liability to arise, the act must be a wrongful act authorised by the master or a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master. The driver of a car taking the car on the master's business makes him vicariously liable if he commits an accident. But it is equally well settled that if the servant, at the time of the accident, is not acting within the course of his employment but is doing something for himself the master, is not liable.” (Para 27).

    In Rickett's and Engelhart's cases, 1915 1 KB 644 and 1897 1 QB 240 (respectively) each servant was acting on the master's business at the time. If the two servants in the Engelhart's case had gone for a picnic or the boy had borrowed the cart to give a joy ride to his friends, the master would not have been liable although the effective cause would still have been the elder servant's negligence. The difference lies in this that in the two cases the negligent act took place in the execution of the master's business and in the examples suggested by us, no question of master's business or the scope of the servant's or agent's employment arises, because the acts are dearly outside that scope. Going for a picnic or lending the cart so that the co-servant's friends may go for an outing is not in the course of the master's employment. Beard's case, 1900 2 QB 530 when compared with Ricketts case, 1915 1 KB 644 brings out the difference. In (1928) 44 TLR 294 the master himself lent the car to the servant for the latter's private work and the master was not held responsible for the negligence of the servant in causing injury because neither was the journey on the master's account nor was the master in control at the time. Sir John Salmond, (13th Edn., p. 124) has summed up the law thus:

    “…. a master is not responsible for the negligence or other wrongful act of his servant simply because it is committed at a time when the servant is engaged on his master's business. It must be committed in the course of that business, so as to form a part of it, and not be merely coincident in time with it.” (Para 30)

    4. The principles laid down in the above case have been followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Pushpabai v. Ranjit G & P. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 745 : AIR 1977 SC 1735. As regards vicarious liability of the owner for the criminal acts of a servant it is observed:—

    “Lord Denning took the view-that though the second defendant was acting illegally in asking for and receiving a premium and had no actual or ostensible authority to do an illegal act, nevertheless, he was plainly acting in the course of his employment, because his employers, the landlords, had entrusted him with the full business of letting the property, and it was in the very course of conducting that business that he did the wrong of which complaint is made. This decision has extended the scope of acting in the course of employment to include an illegal act of asking for and receiving a premium though the receiving of the premium was not authorised. We do not feel called upon to consider whether this extended meaning should be accepted by this Court. It appears Lord Goddard, Chief Justice, had gone further in Barker v. Levinson, (1950) 66 TLR (Pt 2) 717 and stated that “the master is responsible for a criminal act of the servant if the act is done within the general scope of the servant's employment”. Lord Justice Denning would not go to this extent and felt relieved to find that in the Authorised Law Reports, (1951) 1 KB 342, the passage quoted above was struck out. We respectfully agree with the view of Lord Denning that the passage attributed to Lord Chief Justice Goddard went a bit too far.” (Para 14)

    5. It will thus be seen that Supreme Court has in terms disapproved a proposition that “the master is responsible for a criminal act of the servant if the act is done in the general scope of the servant's employment”. It is a different matter that on the facts found in the above decision vicarious liability was held proved. It was a case of a manager of a Company driving the car. He permitted the deceased to ride the car. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary ostensible authority of the manager to permit such ride was held proved and hence the Company was made vicariously liable.

    6. In the case of Mohiddinsab Gaffarsab Kundgol v. Rohidas Hari Kindalkar, 1973 ACJ 424 it was held by the Mysore High Court that as law does not permit carrying of passengers in a goods vehicle, picking up of a passenger for giving lift by a driver is outside the scope of the employment of the driver and, therefore, the owner was not vicariously liable. In the case of Machiraja Visalkshi v. Treasurer, Council of India, 1978 ACJ 314, the Andhra Pradesh High Court took a similar view.

    7. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Manaf Majur Hussain, 1984 ACJ 653 held that the act of the driver of a truck in carrying the passengers on charges recovered by the driver, was not during the course of his employment and, therefore, the owner was not vicariously liable.

    8. We will now notice the cases which reported strike a somewhat different note. In the case of Narayanlal v. Rukhmanibai, 1979 ACJ 261, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that giving lift to a passenger in disregard to the rules, in the absence of express prohibition by master from giving lift to anybody in the truck, makes the owner of the truck vicariously liable. In the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. B. Parvathamma, 1984 ACJ 680, the Karnataka High Court held that act of giving lift by a driver in a goods vehicle does not amount to a criminal act though it is a statutory offence and that there is a vicarious liability of the owner. Here is relevant extract:—

    “The learned counsel for the claimants further pointed out that a mere breach of a rule though it may be a statutory offence cannot be described as a criminal act on the part of the servant, as the essence of a criminal act is that it consists of moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is there in fraud or in embezzlement, and not in a breach of a rule under the Motor Vehicles Act, which says that the goods vehicle shall not carry more than 6 passengers. Therefore, though the breach may constitute a statutory offence, it cannot strictly be described as a criminal act. There is force in the submission so made by the learned counsel”.

    9. In the case of Mannalal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1986 ACJ 902 the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that in the absence of evidence about the driver of a truck having been prohibited from carrying any passenger, vicarious liability of the owner existed.

    10. In our judgment the basic principles laid down in Sitram Motilal Kalal and Pushpabai (supra) are correctly interpreted and applied in Mohiddinsab, Machiraja and United India Insurance Co. (supra) and the view taken in the above cases commands itself to us. Indeed United India Insurance Co. is a decision of a co-ordinate bench of this Court and is binding upon us. Now, Narayanlal, Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. and Mannalal (supra) are by and large based on the ratio laid down in Pushpabai and English leading case of Twine v. Bean's Express Ltd., 1946 (1) All. ER. 202 in which it is observed:—

    “It was outside the scope of the driver's employment for him to bring within the class of persons to whom a duty to take care was owned by the employer, a man to whom, contrary to his instructions he gave a lift.”

    11. The Court of Appeal in Convey v. Wimpel and Co. Ltd., 1951 (1) All. E.R 363 while approving the above passage further observed:—

    “If the question is asked: Was the driver, Harrision, in giving a lift to the deceased man acting within the scope of his employment? The answer is clearly ‘No’. He was doing something that he had no right whatsoever to do, and qua the deceased man he was as such on a frolic of his own if he had been driving somewhere on some amazement of his own quite unauthorised by his employers. He was driving his van from one place to another by a route that he was properly taking when he ran into the omnibus, and as he was driving the van he was acting within the scope of his employment. The other thing that he was doing simultaneously was something totally outside the scope of his employment, namely, giving a lift to a person who had no right whatsoever to be there. In my opinion, once the facts are understood the case is a perfectly simple one, and there is only one answer to it.”

    12. We are unable to see how the above observations or the observations in Pushpabai can support a proposition that even where the driver has done an unauthorised criminal act the owner is vicariously liable. It is difficult to hold, as has been done in Oriental Fire Insurance Co., that a statutory offence is not a criminal act in the absence of mens rea or moral turpitude. A proposition that implied authority in the agent to do a criminal act should be presumed in the absence of specific instructions not to do such act, appear to our mind to be highly debatable, but the said controversy need not detain us in the present case. We may, however, in the parting notice the following observations in the case of Jiwan Dass v. Karnailsingh, AIR 1980 P & H 167:—

    “Acting in direct contravention of a statutory provision which is made an offence by an employee cannot be easily conceived as in the normal course of employment. No employer can be deemed or assumed to authorise the contravention of law or the commission of an offence. Assuming so entirely for the argument sake that in such a remote contingency it could only be so by an established express command by the employer and here as already noticed, there is not the least evidence to this effect.”

    13. Point No. 2:— Copy of insurance policy (Ex. 61) is on record and is rightly held admissible in evidence. Chapter VIII of the MV Act generally deals with the compulsory insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks. section 95 of the mv act deals with the subject of “Requirements of policies and limits of liabilities”. Section 95(1) reads:—

    “In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which—

    (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer, or by a co-operative society allowed under section 108 to transact the business of an insurer, and

    (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)—

    (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

    (ii) against the death or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of a vehicle in a public place”.

    Provided that a policy shall not be required—

    (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to any such employee;

    (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or

    (b) if it be a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or

    (c) if it be a goods vehicle, being carried in the vehicle, or

    (ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises, or

    (iii) to cover any contractual liability.

    Explanation. — For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place.”

    14. In this case the injured passenger was not a hirer of a truck, no doubt that he was carried on payment of charges but the carrying of such passenger was in contravention of the Rules and in disregard to the limitation as to the use of the said vehicle. Clause (3) of the General Exceptions to the Insurance Policy reads:—

    “The Company shall not be liable under the policy in respect of—

    (3) any accident loss, damage and/or liability caused, sustained or incurred whilst the motor vehicle is

    (a) _______

    (b) being used otherwise than in accordance with the limitations to use”.

    15. That the passenger risk is not a third party risk is a position fairly settled “in Pushpabai. Section 96(2)(b) of the MV Act deals with the subject of non-liability of the insurer for breach of specific condition in the policy. Thus it seems plain to us that the insurer in the case at hand cannot be held liable to pay compensation. The legal position seems to be further crystallised by United India Insurance Co.

    16. Point No. 3:— The contention of the respondent-owner is that cause of action of the deceased Abdul Razzaque for the claim based on physical and mental injuries did not survive to his legal representatives as it was entirely a personal claim which could not survive after his death and the cause of action died with him. Reliance is placed on old English Common Law Maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” and section 306 of the Indian Succession Act (the IS Act) which reads thus:—

    “306. All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and the except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory.

    Illustrations

    (i) A collision takes place on a railway in consequence of some neglect or default of an official, and a passenger is severely hurt, but not so as to cause death. He afterwards dies without having brought any action. The cause of action does not survive.

    (ii) A sues for divorce. A dies. The cause of action does not survive to his representatives.”

    17. Against the backdrop of very peculiar set of facts of the case we find it wrong and unjust to non-suit the heirs of the deceased on this ground. In the first place the said maxim is criticised even in the country of its origin as unjust, obscure in its origin, inaccurate in its expression and often resulting into grave injustice. Indian Courts have generally taken a view that the maxim should not be applied as a part of our law except of course where specifically engrafted in a statute and that the principles of justice, equity and good conscience should be followed. (See Bhupendra v. Chandramani, AIR 1927 Cal. 277). It was anomalous that while action could be maintained by an injured against a wrong doer for causing injury, (and not death) no such action was permissible after his death. This anomaly was sought to be removed in England by the Law Reforms Act and Fatal Accidents Act. Soon thereafter even in India on similar lines the Legal Representatives Suits Act and the Indian Fatal Accidents Act were enacted as a result certain causes of action under tort were made to survive and be available to the legal heirs. Section 1A of the Indian Fatal Accidents Act created special rights in favour of a class of dependents.

    18. Unending rush of motor vehicles on the road and constant increase of their use as a mode of transport posed a constant threat of death, and injury to persons as well as property. The long drawn and expensive process of a civil suit was considered too inadequate to render quick justice demanded by the situation. A new forum was therefore created under the MV Act by inserting section 110A to 110F. Section 110(1)(a) entitles an injured person to make a claim for compensation for injury sustained by him. Injury includes all species of injuries, injury to property not excluding. Newly added sub-clause (aa) permits claim for damages to the property by the owner. It is thus clear that even the legal representatives can claim damages for loss to the estate of the deceased. It is difficult to see as to why an action initiated by an injured for damages on account of loss to his property should not be made to survive to his legal representatives on his death pending an action already launched by him.

    19. Assuming that section 306 of the is act is attracted in the case of legal heirs (and is not confined only to executors or administrators) illustration (i) to the said section gives indication that the provision is not attracted once an action is brought. In the instant case the death is not only after the action is brought but after an “award” contemplated under section 110B is passed. There can be no manner of doubt that even a total rejection of a claim is an “award”. The term “award” is not defined under the MV Act but it quite obviously and plainly means a judgment in the instant case, the award has not resulted into dismissal of a claim. Compensation is awarded under various heads noticed earlier, to the satisfaction of the injured in his life time against a wrong doer. The injured was not satisfied with findings that (i) no vicarious liability arose and (ii) insurer was absolved in terms of the policy of insurance. The injured merely challenged those findings in the present appeal and during its pendency unfortunately he died. The case of Pulin Beharilal v. Narendra Kumar, (AIR 1971 Tripura 48) has taken a view that section 306 of the is act does not apply once a cause of action has merged into a decree of court and death of a party will not per se nullify a decree.

    20. There is yet another angle to the point. As rightly held in the case of Meghjibhai v. Chandubhai, 1978 Guj. L.R 216 the MV Act is a benevolent legislation which calls for liberal and broad interpretation so that real object underlying sections 110 to 110F is achieved. Thus, if any doubt exists on the construction of a statute its benefit must be given to the claimant for whose benefit the law has been made.

    21. We have therefore no hesitation to conclude that the cause of action had survived to the legal representatives and this point has to be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the appellants' legal representatives. To conclude, appeal dismissed on merits though maintainable in law. No order as to costs.

    Appeal dismissed.
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    Comments

    Maimuna Begum v. Taju
    (Oct 15, 1987)