Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, J.:— The appellants had an import licence dated March 3, 1975 to import alloy steel blooms and stainless steel blooms. Under the said licence the appellants placed orders for import of alloy steel blooms under five invoices, one dated January 28, 1976, three dated December 29, 1975 and one dated December 13, 1975. Two consignments covered by these five invoices arrived per.s.s Eastern Express at Bombay. Bills of entry in respect of these two consignments were submitted by the appellants on March 6, 1976 and March 9, 1976 before the ship's agents had filed their final entry manifest. The said ship entered the Bombay port on March 14, 1976 at about 6 p.m The ship's agents filed the final entry manifest on March 15, 1976 at 2 p.m Entry inwards was granted to the ship on March 19, 1976.
2. Prior to March 15, 1976 the consignments in question were covered under Tariff item 63(8) of the Customs Tariff. Under item 63(8) the appellants were required to pay ad valorem duty of customs on these consignments at the rate of 40 per cent. Under a customs notification issued on March 1, 1968, as amended by a subsequent customs notification dated May 29, 1971 bearing No. GSR 882 the goods in question, however, were exempted from payment of such portion of the duty of customs as exceeded 30 per cent ad valorem. As a result, up to the mid-night of March 15, 1976 the appellants would have been required to pay a duty of customs at the rate of 30 per cent ad valorem on the said consignments. As from the mid-night of March 15, 1986 however, certain entries in the Customs Tariff were amended under the provisions of the Finance Act 1976. As a result of this amendment a new item 63(30) was substituted for the previous item 63(30). Under the amended item 63(30) alloy steel blooms, inter alia, were placed under item 63(30). The original item 63(8) was not amended. But under explanation (1) to item 63(30) it was stated as follows:
“This item is to be taken to apply to the goods mentioned therein even though they may be covered by any other item in this schedule.”
3. By virtue of this explanation, since alloy steel blooms were specifically covered under item 63(30) they ceased to be covered by item 63(8). Under item 63(30) ad valorem duty of customs at the rate of 60 per cent became leviable in respect of the said consignments. The total difference in the duty so leviable as a result of this change come to Rs. 33,96,699.70. The appellants have been charged duty at the higher rate on the ground that entry inwards was granted on March 19, 1976 after the new classification came into force.
4. The appellants filed Misc. Petition No. 1291/76 in this court praying that the assessment in respect of the said two consignments at the higher rate as set out in the assessment orders should be set aside and the excess amount of duty which has already been paid by the appellants should be refunded. Their contentions have been negatived by a learned single Judge of this court. The present appeal is from the order of the learned single judge dismissing the petition of the appellants.
5. It is the case of the appellants that at the date when the said two consignments were imported i.e entered the territorial waters of India the rate of duty leviable was only 30 per cent ad valorem. Hence the rate of duty leviable is as on this date of import. The subsequent increase in the rate of duty as a result of the change in the classification of the said goods under Customs Tariff cannot be allowed to affect the amount of duty to be paid by the appellants in respect of these consignments. This question is covered by a decision of a Full Bench of this court in the case of Apar Private Ltd. v. Union of India. The Judgment of the Full Bench upholds the earlier decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shawhney v. Sylvania & Laxman. As per the judgment of the Full Bench there is a distinction between the charge-ability of goods to the duty of customs and the rate of duty of customs to be levied. Under s. 12 of the Customs Act 1962 duties of Customs are leviable on goods imported into India. Under the Act the goods are imported into India when the goods from a place outside India enter the territorial waters of India. If, at this point of time, the goods are not dutiable, any subsequent levy of duty on goods of this type would not make the importer liable to pay duty on goods imported prior to the imposition of duty. But if the goods are subject to duty when they are imported, the rate of duty under s. 15 of the Customs Act, will be the rate prevailing (inter alia) on the date when a bill of entry in respect of the goods is presented. In other words, if there is a change in the rate of duty between the date of import and the date (inter alia) of presenting a bill of entry, the goods would bear the changed rate of duty.
6. Section 15 of the said Act deals with the rate at which duties of customs have to be paid. Under that section, inter alia, the rate of duty shall be.
“The rate and valuation in force,—(a) in the case of goods entered for home consumption … on the date on which a bill of entry in respect of said goods is presented…”.
7. The proviso to s. 15 is as follows:
“Provided that if a bill of entry has been presented before the date of entry inwards of the vessel by which the goods are imported, the bill of entry shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry inwards.”
8. Under s. 15, therefore, the rate of duty in the case of dutiable goods is the duty prevailing on the date of the bill of entry. The goods in question were admittedly dutiable goods when they were imported into India. Hence the rate of duty will have to be determined in accordance with the provisions of s. 15. The appellants are therefore not right when they contend that the rate of duty should be the rate on the date of import in the sense of the goods entering the territorial waters of India.
9. It was submitted by Mr. Doctor learned counsel for the appellants that the ratio of the Full Bench decision should not be applied to the present case because in the present case there is no change in the rate of duty under s. 15. There is only change in the classification of the goods under the Customs Tariff Act. Hence the goods should be classified as per the items of the customs tariff in force at the date of import. We are unable to accept this submission. Classification of goods under Customs Tariff is merely for the purpose of ascertaining the correct rate of duty leviable on the goods in question under Customs Tariff. If, by a change in the classification, there is a change in the rate of duty which is leviable, this change in the rate of duty would certainly be covered under s. 15 of the Customs Act 1962.
10. It is next submitted by Mr. Doctor that the two bills of entries in the present case were submitted on March 6, 1976 and March 9, 1976 prior to the alterations in item 63(30) of the Customs Tariff Act. Hence the goods should be held as falling under item 63(8) and not amended item 63(30) which came into force only on the midnight of March 15, 1976. The bills of entry however, were presented before the grant of entry inwards to the vessel in question. Under the proviso to s. 15 therefore, the bills of entry will have to be deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry inwards. In the present case entry inwards was granted to the vessel on March 19, 1976. Hence the duty as leviable on March 19, 1976 will have to be paid by the appellants.
11. The appellants have contended that in the present case the ship had entered the Bombay port late in the evening on March 14, 1976. The ship had filed final entry manifest on March 15, 1976 at 2 p.m Hence entry inwards ought to have been granted to the vessel on March 15, 1976 itself. But entry inwards has been granted to the vessel only on March 19, 1976. The appellants should not be prejudicially affected by this delay in granting entry inwards. In these circumstances entry inwards should be deemed to have been granted to the said ship on March 15, 1976. In this connection the appellants rely upon, an order of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India in Revision Application No. 87/67-116/66. In that case the delay in grant of entry inwards was due to a mistake or sickness on the part of the Customs officials. The Government also came to a conclusion that the grant of entry inwards on a later date was malicious and entry inwards was deliberately delayed in order to charge the goods at the enhanced rate of duty which came into force on the delayed date. In the above circumstances the Revision Application was allowed and it was held that the Department had exceeded its power and was guilty of laches in refusing to grant entry inwards at the earlier date.
12. This order which is under special circumstances set out above does not have any application to the facts of the present case. In the first place there is no allegation, that entry inwards in the present case was deliberately delayed, or that such delay was in order to charge the higher rate of duty on the goods imported by the appellants. In fact in the present case the Master of the vessel was ready to discharge its cargo only on March 19, 1976 and on the same day entry inwards was granted. In the earlier case the ship had been ready to discharge its cargo on the earlier date and in fact it had discharged cargo on the earlier date in midstream. Such is not the case here. Entry inwards has been granted as soon as the ship was ready to discharge its cargo.
13. In this connection a public notice which is issued on July 11, 1967 by the Additional Collector of Customs in connection with procedures relating to ss. 15 and 16 of the Customs Act 1962 is very relevant it sets out that very often ships arrive in the harbour and stay there for days but are not ready for discharge of cargo or for loading the cargo for want of a berth or for other reasons. To enable the Customs to grant entry inwards with the least possible delay it is notified that all requests made to the Customs House for entry inwards should be made along with a certificate regarding the vessel's readiness to discharge or board the cargo from the Master of the vessel in the form: annexed. In the present case the ship was not ready to unload the cargo-until March 19, 1986. Hence entry inwards was granted on March 19, 1986. There is therefore no deliberate delay in granting entry inwards.
14. Even otherwise the ship had filed final entry manifest only at 2 p.m on March 15, 1976. Entry inwards could have been granted to the vessel only thereafter. Even assuming everything in favour of the appellants, entry inwards; could not have been granted till March 16, 1976 or thereabouts. At least the respondents could not have been accused of negligence or malice had they issued entry inwards on the next day. Mr. Doctor's contention that entry inwards should have been granted forthwith on presentation of final entry manifest, i.e after 2 p.m, but before the midnight of March 15, 1976 appears to be unwarranted. Hence in any view of the matter, the appellants were required to pay the higher rate of duty under Entry 63(30) of the Customs Tariff, Act which came into force from March 16, 1976.
15. Mr. Doctor has relied upon a decision of a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of Madura Coats Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise In that case Central Excise Item No. 18 was amended. A new Tariff Item No. 18-E was introduced, as a result of which the goods in question fell under the new Tariff Item No. 18-E. Under the previous Tariff Item No. 18 which originally covered the goods in question there was an exemption notification which exempted the goods from excise duty. But after the new Tariff Item 18-E was introduced in the excise tariff the benefit of the previous notification under Item No. 18 was not given to the petitioners. They were charged the full duty payable under Tariff Item No. 18-E. The learned single Judge relied upon the provisions of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act 1897 and held that the old exemption notification continued to apply to the new Tariff Item 18-E. With respect to the learned single Judge we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned single Judge.
16. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 1897 provides that where any Central Act or Regulation is repealed and re-enacted (with or without modification) then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any notification inter alia, under the repealed Act will continue to remain in force in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted Act unless and until it is superseded. This section can have no application to a case where a new Tariff entry is introduced by amendment. In such a situation there is no repealed and reenacted Central Act. We are therefore, unable to apply the ratio of that judgment to the present case.
17. In the premises the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
18. Appeal dismissed.