1. These two petitions impugn the judgment and order passed by the second respondent, a Member of the Industrial Court, on 17 July 1982.
2. The petitioners in the petitions were appointed by the first respondents in 1977. On 26 July 1979, the first respondents sought to retrench the services of the petitioners with effect from that very day. By another letter, dated 31 July 1979, the first respondents informed the petitioners that they were retrenched from the close of working hours on 31 July 1979. The letters stated that retrenchment compensation and one month's notice pay had been offered to the petitioners and that they should collect their legal dues from the first respondents after the receipt of the letters.
3. On 13 September 1979, the services of all workmen of the first respondents were terminated on the basis of the closure of its establishment. On 23 October 1979, the first respondents' establishment was restarted. Some of the original employees were taken back, but re-employment was not offered to either of the petitioners.
4. On 22 January 1980, the petitioners and other workmen filed complaints before the Industrial Court under S. 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. They alleged that the first respondents were guilty of the unfair labour practices mentioned in items 4(a) and 4(f) of Sch. II and items 5, 7, 9 and 10 of Sch. IV of that Act. At the hearing before the Industrial Court, only the complaint in respect of item 9 of Sch. IV was pressed.
5. The Industrial Court by its judgment and order, dated 17 July 1982, dismissed the complaints filed by the petitioners and by two other workmen.
6. In regard to the petitioners, the Indus trial Court noted the aforementioned letters of retrenchment and that the petitioners had not disputed the averments in that behalf contained in the first respondents' pleading. The Industrial Court observed that if a workman was retrenched under S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he had two-fold rights. The first was to challenge the order of retrenchment itself as null and void and to seek reinstatement by raising an industrial dispute. Alternatively, he could claim compensation. It was well-settled law that an order of retrenchment could not be ignored and would subsist until set aside. The question whether the petitioners were law fully retrenched and whether the first respondents had failed to give them an opportunity to offer themselves for re-employment could be determined not on complaint proceedings instituted under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act but while adjudicating an industrial dispute under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was doubtful whether non-compliance with the provisions of Ss. 25-F and 25-H would amount to a failure to implement a settlement or agreement as required by item 9 of Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act. This being so, it could not be concluded that the first respondents had committed an unfair labour practice by failing to give an opportunity to the petitioners to be re-employed when its establishment was restarted. Accordingly, the Industrial Court held that the petitioners had failed to establish that the first respondents had committed any unfair labour practice and, therefore, dismissed the complaints.
7. Smt. Mhatre, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with in that the petitioners had not been offered the payments required thereby to be made as a condition precedent to retrenchment. She submitted that S. 25-G had also been breached by the first respondents because the seniority list of the first respondents' workmen had not been displayed and the rule of “last-come, first-go” had not been followed. She also submitted that the provisions of S. 25-H had been breached in that the first respondents had not given to the petitioners an opportunity to offer themselves for the employment when its establishment was restarted.
8. Smt. Mhatre drew my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal v. Management Of M/S Bharat Electronics Ltd., Ltd. [1981—II L.L.N 23]. The Supreme Court there held that there was a catena of decisions which ruled that where a termination of service was illegal, especially where there was an ineffective order of retrenchment, there was neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration followed that the workman concerned continued to be in service with all consequential benefits.
9. Having regard to this judgment, Smt. Mhatre submitted that the Industrial Court was in error when it said that a workman who was retrenched under S. 25-F had to challenge, the order of retrenchment as being null and void and to seek reinstatement by raising an industrial dispute.
10. Smt. Mhatre also cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees Union v. S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading, Ltd. [1986 — I L.L.N 986]. It was contended before the Supreme Court on behalf of the employer in that matter that though it might have contravened the provisions of S. 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, it nonetheless would not amount to a failure to implement a settlement entered into between it and the union of its workmen and, therefore, that the act of closing down a particular division was not an unfair labour practice under S. 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention Unfair Labour Practices Act read with item 9 of Sch. IV thereof. The Supreme Court found itself unable to accept the view taken by a Single Judge of this Court cited in support of the employer's submission. The Supreme Court held that it was an implied condition of every agreement, including a settlement, that the parties thereto would act in conformity with the law. Such a provision was not required to be expressly stated in a contract. The Supreme Court found that the division had been closed in contravention of the provisions of S. 25-O. There was, thus, it held, a failure on the part of the employer to implement the settlement and the employer was guilty of the unfair labour pratice specified in item 9 of Sch. IV.
11. Smt. Mhatre submitted that the Industrial Court was, therefore, in error when it said that it was doubtful whether non-compliance with the provisions of Ss. 25-F and 25-H amounted to a failure to implement a settlement or agreement.
12. Sri Bhat, learned counsel for the first respondents, drew my attention to the fact that the complaints proceeded upon the basis that the petitioners' services had been retrenched on the day upon which there was a closure of the first respondents' establishment. The retrenchment of the petitioners on an earlier date was not the subject of challenge in the complaints nor was it alleged that the first respondents had breached the provisions of Ss. 25-G and 25-H. It was in the pleading and evidence of the first respondents that reference was made to the letters by which the petitioners' services were retrenched on a day earlier to the closure of the establishment. The petitioners had even thereafter not amended their complaints so that the first respondents had had no opportunity to refute the allegations in regard to Ss. 25-F, 25-G and 25-H either in their pleading or in evidence. Sri Bhat submitted that an amendment on remand at this stage would be tantamount to permitting the petitioners to file a new complaint.
13. What Sri Bhat says in regard to the pleadings and evidence is correct but it is apparent from the Industrial Court's judgment that both sides advanced arguments on Ss. 25-F, 25-G and 25-H. The Industrial Court, in its judgment, proceeded in this regard upon a basis which is erroneous. Had it been established that the first respondents had breached the provisions either of S. 25-F or S. 25-G or S. 25-H, there would have been an unfair labour practice as contemplated by item 9 of Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention Unfair Labour Practices Act. The Supreme Court's judgment in the case of S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading, Ltd. [1986—I L.L.N 986] (vide supra), puts the matter beyond doubt. The Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Mohan Lal [1981—II L.L.N 23] (vide supra), also puts beyond doubt the competence of the Court hearing a complaint under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act to determine whether the employer had committed a breach of Ss. 25-F, 25-G, 25-H and 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Court was in error, therefore, in holding that a breach of S. 25-F could only be established upon a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act.
14. It is correct that the petitioners ought to have, in the first place, pleaded that they had been sought to be retrenched on a day earlier than the day of closure of the first respondents' establishment and ought to have averred breaches of Ss. 25-F, 25-G and 25-H. At any rate, they ought to have done so by amendment after the pleading and evidence on behalf of the first respondents disclosed that they had been sought to be so retrenched. Nonetheless, it seems to me that it would be inequitable to workmen-complainants in a labour matter to take so strict a view as to dismiss these petitions. The interests of justice require that the petitioners ought to have an opportunity of amending their complaints as aforesaid and the first respondents of establishing their case in this behalf.
15. Accordingly, the order of the Industrial Court is set aside in so far as it affects the petitioners in these two petitions. The petitioners should within a period of four weeks from today amend their complaints in the manner indicated above. If this is not done within the stated time or any permitted extension, their complaints shall stand dismissed. In the event that the amendments as aforesaid are carried out, the first respondents shall put in pleadings in reply within a further period of four weeks. The parties shall be at liberty to adduce further evidence, both documentary and oral, before the Industrial Court in the complaints. The Industrial Court shall then decide the complaints having regard to the material and evidence that has been placed on record and the observations herein contained. It shall as far as is possible, hear and decide the complaints on or before 31 March 1987.
16. Rule accordingly.
17. No order as to costs.