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  • section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred
  • section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.8.
  • INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT STANDING ORDERS ACT
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred
  • section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.8.
  • INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT STANDING ORDERS ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Per Quazi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent No. 2 was an employee of the appellant whose services were terminated by a notice dated 27-7-1980 on the ground that he demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs. 20/- from another employee to grant leave. The respondent filed a complaint under section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, contending that the dismissal was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice and that his 30 years' unblemished past service record had not been taken into consideration in contravention of Standing Order 25(6).

The Labour Court, by order dated 29-7-1981 (preliminary) and 30-7-1981 (on punishment), recorded that the domestic enquiry was legal and, after giving an opportunity on punishment, held that the sentence of dismissal was legal and proper. The Industrial Court at Nagpur allowed the respondent's revision, quashed the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement with full back wages, on the ground that the Management did not comply with Standing Order 25(6). The Management challenged that decision by way of a writ petition before the High Court; the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition and confirmed the Industrial Court's order. The present Letters Patent Appeal arises from that dismissal by the Single Judge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Management's omission to take into consideration the delinquent's past unblemished service record, as required by Standing Order 25(6), vitiates the dismissal and renders the order unsustainable.
  2. Whether non-compliance with mandatory standing orders (Standing Order 25(6)) can constitute a breach of the principles of natural justice under the Act (including reference to item 1(f) of Schedule IV), even where the domestic enquiry itself was found to be legal and proper.
  3. Whether a court or tribunal may nonetheless uphold a dismissal where, despite consideration (or asserted consideration) of past record, the nature of the offence justifies only dismissal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Deshpande)

  • The past service record is relevant only when it bears on the punishment to be imposed.
  • Non-consideration of past service record should not be inferred merely from omission of reference to it in the dismissal order.
  • The past service record becomes important only if the Labour Court finds the punishment disproportionate.
  • Without a finding that the punishment was disproportionate, the dismissal cannot be held bad solely for omission to mention past service.
  • The Labour Court should have given the Management an opportunity to show whether dismissal was proper in view of past record.
  • All Courts below found the domestic enquiry to be legal and proper; therefore there was no need to reverse the dismissal especially when the Labour Court itself noted the 30 years' service.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondent averred in his complaint that the Management did not take into consideration his 30 years' unblemished service record and that but for that omission the extreme penalty of dismissal would not have been imposed.
  • Counsel for the respondent (Mr. Thakur) relied upon prior authorities to show that standing orders are mandatory and non-compliance (specifically non-consideration of past record where required by a standing order) vitiates the dismissal.
  • The respondent contended that failure to comply with the mandatory terms of Standing Order 25(6) amounted to a breach of natural justice in the circumstances of this case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Borosil Glass Works Limited v. M.C. Chitale & Richard M. D'Souza (1974 LLJ Vol. II p.184) Confirms that standing orders (including model standing orders) govern the terms of employment and that mandatory provisions of standing orders must be complied with. The court relied on this authority to hold that Standing Order 25(6) governs the parties and that failure to comply with its mandatory requirement (to take past record into account) is fatal to the disciplinary proceedings.
Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras (1970 I LLJ 26) Holds that standing orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1948 become part of the statutory terms and conditions of service. Quoted within the Borosil decision and used to support the proposition that standing/orders are binding and must be complied with.
The Management of Mahalakshmi Textile Mills, Pasumalai, Madurai v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai, A.I.R. 1964 Madras 51 Establishes that where a standing order mandates consideration of previous record and other circumstances when awarding punishment, failure to consider those factors leaves no option for the management and renders a dismissal unsustainable. The court cited this decision to reinforce that the mandatory nature of Standing Order 25(6) leaves the Management no option to neglect consideration of past record; hence dismissal without such consideration cannot be sustained.
Travancore Titanium Products Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1970 LLJ p.1) (Supreme Court) Holds that failure to comply exactly with the requirements of a standing order (e.g., notice period) introduces an infirmity in the proceedings; substantial compliance will not cure the defect where the standing order is mandatory. The court relied on this principle to support the conclusion that non-compliance with mandatory standing order requirements (here Standing Order 25(6)) creates an infirmity that cannot be cured by subsequent judicial conclusions about the propriety of the punishment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps based solely on the material in the opinion:

  1. Examination of pleadings: The court reviewed the respondent's complaint which specifically averred that the Management did not consider his 30 years' unblemished service record and that, had it done so, it would not have imposed dismissal. The court then examined the Management's written statement and found that this specific averment had not been denied.
  2. Inference from pleadings: Because the Management's written statement did not specifically deny the positive averment about non-consideration of past service record, the court treated the Management as having impliedly accepted that allegation.
  3. Mandatory nature of Standing Order 25(6): The court emphasized that Standing Order 25(6) imposes an imperative obligation on the Management to take into account the gravity of misconduct, the previous record and any extenuating or aggravating circumstances when awarding punishment. The court described this obligation as mandatory.
  4. Effect of non-compliance: The court held that the Management's omission to consider the past service record, as required by the standing order, vitiated the disciplinary proceedings. This illegality went to the root of the matter and could not be cured by subsequent findings that the offence warranted dismissal.
  5. Consideration of concurrent findings: The court acknowledged that the Labour Court had mentioned the respondent’s 30 years' service and had nevertheless upheld dismissal on the basis of the nature of the offence. However, the Division Bench rejected the argument that such subsequent consideration by the Labour Court cured the initial illegality; the original failure by the Management to comply with the mandatory standing order was independently fatal.
  6. Reliance on authority: The court supported its legal conclusions by reference to prior decisions (Borosil Glass Works, Buckingham & Carnatic Mills, Mahalakshmi Textile Mills, and Travancore Titanium), which together establish (i) that standing orders form part of the contractual/statutory terms governing employment, (ii) that mandatory provisions in standing orders must be complied with, and (iii) that non-compliance introduces an infirmity in disciplinary proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The Division Bench affirmed the Industrial Court's order quashing the dismissal and directing reinstatement with full back wages, and the Single Judge's confirmation of that order. The appellant's Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed with costs.

Broader implications:

The court's decision reinforces the principle, as applied in the cited authorities, that mandatory standing order provisions (here Standing Order 25(6)) must be complied with by the Management when awarding punishment and that failure to consider factors required by those standing orders may vitiate disciplinary proceedings. The opinion does not indicate that a new legal principle or novel precedent was announced beyond application and reinforcement of the cited authorities.

Appeal dismissed.

    The Mill Manager, Savatram Ramprasad Mills v. The Industrial Court, Nagpur And Another

    Per Quazi, J.:— The present Letters Patent Appeal arises out of the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.

    2. The respondent No. 2 was an employee of the appellant. His services came to be terminated vide notice dated 27-7-1980, on the ground that he demanded and accepted bribe of Rs. 20/- from another employee in order to grant him leave. He, therefore, filed a complaint under section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to at ‘the Act’), contending that the dismissal was in utter disregard to the principles of natural justice. Inasmuch as while inflicting the punishment of dismissal his past unblemished service record was not taken into consideration. According to him, he had put in 30 years' service and had earned good testimonials from the Department According to him, the order was in contravention of the mandatory requirement of the Standing order No. 25(6), which reads thus:

    “25(6): In awarding punishment under this standing order the Manager shall take into account the gravity of misconduct, the previous record, it any of the clerk and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist.”

    3. The Labour Court vide order dated 29-7-1981 recorded a finding that the domestic enquiry was legal, proper and as per the principles of natural justice. After having recorded this preliminary finding, the Labour Court proceeded to consider the quantum of punishment and accordingly gave further opportunity to the delinquent to show cause in the matter of punishment. The Labour Court ultimately vide order dated 30-7-1981 recorded a finding that the sentence of dismissal was legal and proper, particularly in view of view of fact that the delinquent was found to have accepted the bribe of Rs. 20/- from another employee.

    4. This order was challedged by way of revision before the industrial Court at Nagpur. The Industrial Court allowed the revision and quashed the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement with full back wages. The Industrial Court allowed the revision essentially on the ground that the order of dismissal was passed without complying with: Standing Order 25(6). This order was challenged by the Management by way of writ petition before the High Court. The matter came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition and confirmed the order of the Industrial Court and hence the present Letters Patent Appeal.

    5. Mr. Deshpande urged the following points for our consideration, viz. (1) the past service record is relevant only when it has any bearing on the punishment to be imposed; (2) Non-consideration of past service record is inferred merely from the fact of omission of it, from the order of dismissal, (3) the past service record will come up for consideration when the Labour Court finds that the punishment imposed is disproportionate, (4) without considering the proportionate or disproportionate nature of the punishment it could not be said that the order of dismissal was bad, (5) the Labour Court should have given an opportunity to the Management to find out whether the punishment of dismissal was proper in view of the past record. Mr. Deshpande vehemently submitted that the Courts below have drawn an inference that the Management did not taken into consideration the past service record of the delinquent merely, because the same has not been referred to in the termination order. In other words, he suggested that the past service record of the delinquent was taken Into consideration even though it has not beer so referred to in the dismissal order. It is difficult to accept this contention. We have gone through the complaint as well as the written statement filed by the Management. In the complaint it has been specifically asserted by the delinquent that the Management did not take into consideration his past unblemished service record of 30 years and had that been taken into consideration, surely the Management would not have imposed the extreme penalty of dismissal. It is expected that this important averment in the complaint should be specifically replied to in the written statement. After having gone through the written statement, we are satisfied that the said averment has not been denied by the Management in the written statement. In our view, the learned Single Judge was perfectly right in holding that the Management would be deemed to have impliedly accepted the allegations of the delinquent that his past service record was not considered while inflicting the punishment. The written statement is fairly exhaustive. It deals with several aspects of the case and it is surprising that it does not even remotely touch the positive averment in the complaint that the past service record of the delinquent was not taken into consideration. Thus, in our view, there is no substance in the contention advanced by Shri Deshpande that the Management took into consideration the past service record of the delinquent while inflicting the punishment. We have already quoted above the Standing Order 25(6). It is mandatory and it clearly casts an obligation on the Management that it shall take into consideration the past service record or any other extenuating circumstance at the time of inflicting the sentence. The omission on the part of the Management to take into consideration the past service record of the delinquent vitiates the proceedings.

    6. Mr. Deshpande then submitted that at any rate the Labour Court has taken into consideration the past service record. He has invited our attention to paragraph 4 of the order dated 30-7-1981 passed by the Labour Court in support of his contention. It does appear that the Labour Court has taken into consideration that the delinquent had 30 years' unblemished service record. However, according to the Labour Court, the nature of the offence was such that there could be no question of any other sentence except that of dismissal. According to Mr. Deshpande, all the Courts have concurrently recorded a finding that the domestic enquiry was legal and proper and that there was no violation of the principles of nature justice. Therefore, according to him, there was he need to reverse the order of dismissal, particularly when the Labour Court took into consideration the past service record of the delinquent. In our view, the illegality that has been committed by the Management in not taking into consideration the past service record of the delinquent, as required by Standing order 25(6), vitiated the entire proceedings. The illegality goes to the very root of the matter and it would not be cured even if the Courts considered this aspect end came to the conclusion that looking to the nature of the offence the punishment of dismissal was just and proper.

    7. In this behalf, Mr. Thakur has invited our attention to the decision of this Court reported in 1974 Labour Law Journal (Vol. II) page 184 : 1(Borosil Glass Works Limited v. M.C Chitale & Richard M. D'Souza, the relevant portions of which read thus:

    “13. Mr. Shetye, the learned advocate for the second-respondent has drawn our attention to the case reported, namely, 2(Worker in Buckingham and Carnatie Mills, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnetic Mills Madras), (1970) I, L.L.J 26, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the standing order certified under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1948 became part of the statutory terms and conditions of service between industrial emoloyer and employee and they will govern the relationship between the parties. We are of the opinion that the same holds good in respect of the model standing orders where there arena-standing orders certified under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act. Admittedly the Standing Order 25(6) will govern the parties in this case end the mandatory provisions of the said standing orders have to be compiled with.

    14. Mr. Shetye on behalf of the 2nd respondent, has also drawn our attention to the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of 3(The Management of Mahalakshmi Textile Mills, Pasumalal, Madurai v. The Presiding Officer Labour Court Madurai), A.I.R 1964 Madras 51, wherein it has been held that—

    “Where the Standing Order framed in respect of an industry specifically providing that, in awarding punishment for misconduct of a workman the management shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist having regard to the mandatory nature of the Standing Order, there is no option left to the management to neglect these relevant factors. When these factors have not been taken into consideration by the management while passing an order of dismissal of a workman, such order cannot be sustained.”

    15. These observations are clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. We may further observe that in the present case, it is patent on the fact of the Report of the enquiry Officer as well as the impugned order of punishment that the petitioner did not, in awarding the punishment, take any account of the past record of the respondent No. 2, which is imperatively required by Standing Order 25(6). Looking into the past record is required, by the Standing Order while awarding punishment by the employer. There is no knowing that the petitioner would have-awarded the extreme penalty of discharge had the past record been looked, into. The omission to comply with Standing Order 25(6) was an independent ground upon which the Tribunal was entitled to reject the application for approval of discharge under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.”

    8. We may here also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1970 Labour Law Journal, page 1 : 4(The Management of Travincore Titanium Products Ltd. v. Their Workmen). The Supreme Court observed as under:

    “Mr. Pal for the appellant attempted to argue that the failure of the appellant to give three clear days' notice of the intended enquiry was more technical than substantial. According; to Mr. Pai, Pillal had notice of two and half days and that, Mr. Pai suggests, should be taken to be substantial compliance with the requirement of the relevant standing order. We are not impressed by this argument. Since the standing order insists upon notice of three clear days being given to the workman, failure to comply with the standing order does introduce an infirmity in the proceedings.”

    9. Mr. Deshpande invited our attention to item 1(f) of Schedule IV to the Act, which reads as under:

    “1. To discharge or dismiss employees—

    xxxxxxx

    (f) in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of domestic enquiry or with undue haste.”

    10. According to Mr. Deshpande, there can be no question of violation of principles of natural justice or for that matter any undue haste in the instant case since the Courts below have recorded a finding that the domestic enquiry was proper and legal. In our view, such a restricted meaning cannot be given to the words ‘principles of natural justice’. The fact that the Standing Orders are mandatory and the same were since not complied with, that by itself, in our view, would amount to breach of the principles of natural justice in a given situation and particularly in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case where delinquent had 30 years unblemished service record of that has not been taken into consideration. Thus, in our view, the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge were perfectly right in setting aside the order of dismissal and directing reinstatement of the respondent No. 2. The appeal is wholly without substance and the same is dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.
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    The Mill Manager, Savatram Ramprasad Mills v. The Industrial Court, Nagpur And Another
    (Nov 25, 1986)