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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
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  • provisions of this rule from the provisions of section 27(1) of the Customs Act
  • Central Excises and Salt Act (hereinafter referred to as Central Excises Tariff)
  • provisions of section 27(1) of the Customs Act., 1962.6. Under section 27(1)
  • rule 26 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation (Levy of Octroi) Rules, 1965
  • Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. Under section 83(1) of that Act
  • provisions of Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act
  • provisions of section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962
  • SECTION 27 CUSTOMS ACT
  • SECTION 3 A CUSTOMS TARIFF ACT 1975
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Item 11
  • rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.
  • rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules
  • CUSTOMS ACT 1962
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944,
  • Bombay Municipal Corporation Act
  • section 27(1) of the Customs Act
  • SECTION 72 CONTRACT ACT
  • provisions of section 27(1)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of this rule from the provisions of section 27(1) of the Customs Act
  • Central Excises and Salt Act (hereinafter referred to as Central Excises Tariff)
  • provisions of section 27(1) of the Customs Act., 1962.6. Under section 27(1)
  • rule 26 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation (Levy of Octroi) Rules, 1965
  • Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. Under section 83(1) of that Act
  • provisions of Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act
  • provisions of section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962
  • SECTION 27 CUSTOMS ACT
  • SECTION 3 A CUSTOMS TARIFF ACT 1975
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Item 11
  • rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.
  • rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules
  • CUSTOMS ACT 1962
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944,
  • Bombay Municipal Corporation Act
  • section 27(1) of the Customs Act
  • SECTION 72 CONTRACT ACT
  • provisions of section 27(1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are manufacturers who imported 500 metric tonnes of naphthalene from German suppliers by an invoice dated 23 December 1977. They produced three supplier certificates stating that the imported naphthalene was produced exclusively from crude coal-tar and that no petroleum-derived naphthalene was produced in the Federal Republic of Germany. The goods arrived and a bill of entry was filed on 13 February 1978.

The Customs authorities assessed the import for customs duty under Customs Tariff item 27.07 (products of high temperature coal tar), but for the purpose of countervailing duty assessed the petitioners under Central Excises and Salt Act Item 11-A (petroleum products not otherwise specified). The petitioners contended that the product was coal-tar derived and should be classifiable under residuary Item 68 and thus exempt from countervailing duty by a notification (No. 364-CUS dated 2-8-1976) under section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

The petitioners applied for refund of countervailing duty on 23 January 1979 for an amount claimed of Rs. 7,46,550.24. A related/sister concern (Atic Industries Limited) had successfully appealed a similar assessment and obtained a refund order from the Collector of Customs (Appeals) dated 30 November 1978, holding that such goods were derived from coal-tar and thus classifiable under Item 68.

Despite the certificates and the Atic decision, the assistant Collector rejected the petitioners' refund application on the ground of limitation under section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 (order dated 25-1-1979 / 6-2-1979). Subsequent departmental appeal and revision were dismissed on the same limitation ground (orders dated 30-3-1979 and 28-1-1981 respectively). The petitioners filed the present petition on 27 February 1981.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners are entitled to refund of countervailing duty collected on the imported naphthalene in view of section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.
  2. Whether the levy of countervailing duty on the petitioners' naphthalene (classed under Central Excise Tariff Item 11-A) was an act done without jurisdiction because the goods were coal-tar derived and not petroleum-derived.
  3. Whether the limitation bar in section 27(1) applies to refunds where duty was collected without authority of law (i.e., for acts that are "without jurisdiction").
  4. Whether the petitioners should be denied refund on the equitable ground of "unjust enrichment" because they may have passed on the duty to their customers.
  5. Whether interest should be awarded on the refunded amount and, if so, at what rate and from which date.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The imported naphthalene was produced exclusively from crude coal-tar, not from petroleum, as evidenced by three supplier certificates dated 14-11-1977, 18-1-1978 and 23-1-1978.
  • Given the coal-tar origin, the goods were classifiable under residuary Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff and exempt from countervailing duty by notification No. 364-CUS dated 2-8-1976 under section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
  • Levy of countervailing duty under Item 11-A (petroleum products) was therefore without jurisdiction; where a levy is without jurisdiction the limitation in section 27(1) does not apply and the petitioner can seek refund as having paid under a mistake of law within the appropriate period (three years from discovery).
  • Reliance was placed on the Atic Industries decision (Collector (Appeal)) accepting coal-tar origin and ordering refund in that related matter, and on reported authorities that levy without jurisdiction is not time-barred by limitation rules that apply to intra-statutory refunds.
  • Requested interest on the refunded amount; cited authorities in which courts awarded interest on wrongly collected duty.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The error in classification (assessing naphthalene under Item 11-A) was a mere error of law and did not go to the root of the Customs authority's jurisdiction; therefore section 27(1) limitation applies and bars the refund claim.
  • Relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. City of Jabalpur Corporation to support their view that statutory appeals and remedies could oust ordinary suit remedies (the court noted this reliance but distinguished the statutory regimes).
  • Relied on a single-judge decision (Paper Products Limited v. Union of India) for the proposition that mere classification cannot amount to passing beyond jurisdiction (the court in the present opinion treated that observation as obiter and of reduced force in light of later Supreme Court authority).
  • Argued that granting refund would produce unjust enrichment because the petitioners may have passed on the duty to customers (the court found no material basis for this assertion and noted petitioners imported the raw material for their own consumption).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969 (2) A.C. 147) Administrative tribunal acting beyond its power by asking/answering the wrong question renders its decision a nullity (concept of jurisdictional error). Used as a principal authority to show that if a tribunal asks the wrong question or ignores required material it acts outside its jurisdiction; applied to conclude that misclassification that ignores coal-tar origin is an act without jurisdiction.
In re Recal Communications Ltd. ((1981) A.C. 374) Approval of the Anisminic principle; courts resolve what questions an administrative authority can decide. Cited to reinforce the Anisminic principle that administrative authorities are confined to the question defined by statute; supported the conclusion that a wrong classification could be a jurisdictional nullity.
Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros. ((1971) 1 SCC 486; AIR 1971 SC 1558) Supreme Court approval of Anisminic principle; an officer's determination which he has no right to take into account is no determination and is without jurisdiction. Cited as binding authority to demonstrate that when an authority bases its decision on matters it had no right to consider (or ignores matters it must consider) the decision is beyond jurisdiction and a nullity.
Maharashtra Vegetable Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1981 E.L.T 468 (Bom)) Collection of excise duty on post-manufacturing expenses was an exercise of power without jurisdiction and therefore not barred by limitation under rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. Relied upon as a supporting High Court precedent to show that levies without jurisdiction are not subject to ordinary limitation bars for refunds.
Wipro Products Ltd. v. Union of India (1981 E.L.T 521 (Bom)) If levy of Central Excise is totally without jurisdiction and outside statutory provisions, the limitation bar (rule 11) does not apply. Used as a supporting authority analogous to the present case to show non-applicability of limitation where levy is without jurisdiction.
Bearing Company Limited v. Union of India (1980 E.L.T 415 (Bombay)) Associated authority concerning unlawful levy/limitations (cited in context with Wipro). Referenced as part of a line of High Court decisions treating levies outside jurisdiction as not limited by statutory limitation rules.
Indian Dairy Corporation v. Union of India (1981 E.L.T 926) Recovery of duty on short-landed (non-existent) goods was without authority of law; section 27 of the Customs Act could not be used to bar refund claims in such cases. Cited to demonstrate that where no duty could have been lawfully levied (because goods did not exist), limitation under section 27 does not apply to bar refund claims.
Assistant Collector of Customs, Madras v. Premraj and Ganapatraj and Co. (P) Ltd. (1978 E.L.T (1630)) Recovery where an exemption was not taken into account amounted to recovery without authority of law; section 27 would not apply. Used to show similar treatment by another High Court where unlawful recovery was held not to be time-barred under section 27.
Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India ((1984) 3 SCC 362; AIR 1984 SC 971) Where classification dispute exists, refund claims may be treated as amounts paid under mistake of law and recoverable within three years from discovery of the mistake. Distinguished by the court as authority that in classification disputes refunds may be allowed as mistake of law; the court considered its effect and applied principles to the present facts, noting the decision's relevance to limitation issues.
I.T.C. v. V. Chipkar (Appeal No. 108 of 1977 in Misc. Petition No. 1151 of 1975; Shah J., 9-4-1985) Held (by Shah J.) that a manufacturer cannot be denied refund of unlawfully collected excise duty on the ground that he passed on the burden to customers. Cited to counter the respondents' "unjust enrichment" argument; court relied on this view (as expressed by Shah J.) to reject denial of refund on that equitable ground where no material showed passing-on of the duty.
Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. City of Jabalpur Corporation ((1977) 2 SCC 472; AIR 1977 SC 955) Dealt with statutory appeals/revision under a municipal statute; cited by respondents to support the applicability of special statutory remedies. Cited by respondents but distinguished by the court because the statutory scheme in the Bata Shoe case (special statutory remedies ousting ordinary suits) was not similar to the Customs Act scheme in the present matter.
Paper Products Limited v. Union of India (1981 E.L.T 538 (Bom)) Single-judge decision holding that mere classification cannot amount to an order beyond jurisdiction (obiter observations in that judgment). Referred to by respondents; the court regarded those observations as obiter and of diminished weight after Shri Vallabh Glass Works (supra), and therefore not decisive against the petitioners here.
May & Baker Limited v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (Misc. Petition No. 906 of 1975; Pendse J., 21-9-1979) Under a specific municipal rule (rule 26) a refund claim had to be made within 3 months; distinguished on the basis that rule 26's wording differs from section 27(1) of the Customs Act. Cited by respondents but distinguished by the court as not analogous because the municipal rule contained a specific short limitation provision unlike section 27(1).
Elpro International Ltd. v. Joint Secretary, Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance (1985 (19) E.L.T 3 (S.C)) Supreme Court awarded interest on wrongly collected duty (including a lump sum award where duty was collected many years earlier). Cited in support of awarding interest on wrongly collected duty; the court awarded interest in the present case but at a different rate appropriate to circumstances.
Netal Distributors Ltd. v. Union of India (1984 (18) E.L.T 269 (Bom)) High Court awarded interest at 12% per annum on illegally collected excise duty. Cited as authority for awarding interest; the court granted interest at 12% per annum in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step-by-step analysis confined to the materials and authorities before it:

  1. Factual assessment: The petitioners produced supplier certificates indicating the imported naphthalene was exclusively derived from crude coal-tar. A related case (Atic Industries Limited) had resulted in an appellate order holding similar imports to be coal-tar products and thus classifiable under Item 68.
  2. Legal characterization of the levy: The court distinguished between two categories of improper levies — (a) levies that are entirely without jurisdiction (i.e., the authority had no power to levy at all), and (b) levies made under an error of law or fact within the authority's statutory power. The court held that the distinction is critical for limitation rules: section 27(1) applies to refunds of duties collected under the Act (including where collected under an error of law or fact), but does not apply where a levy was wholly without authority of law.
  3. Jurisdictional error principle: The court relied on Anisminic and its approval in subsequent authorities (including Tarachand Gupta) to explain that when an administrative authority addresses the wrong question or ignores material which it was required to consider, it acts beyond the jurisdiction conferred by statute and its decision is a nullity.
  4. Application to this case: Applying that principle, the court reasoned that if the naphthalene imported was not a petroleum product but a coal-tar product (a fact that must be so at the outset), the Customs authorities had no power to levy countervailing duty under the petroleum product tariff item. Thus the levy was wholly without jurisdiction.
  5. Precedential support: The court collected High Court authorities (Maharashtra Vegetable Products, Wipro, Bearing Company, Indian Dairy) holding that levies without jurisdiction are not subject to limitation bars (rule 11 of Central Excise Rules or section 27 of the Customs Act as applicable). These authorities supported the conclusion that section 27(1) did not bar the petitioners' refund claim.
  6. On contrary authorities: The respondents invoked Bata Shoe and Paper Products decisions. The court distinguished Bata Shoe on the basis that the statutory scheme there (special tribunals and remedies) was different from the Customs Act scheme. As to Paper Products, the court treated some observations as obiter and considered them weakened by later Supreme Court authority (Shri Vallabh Glass Works).
  7. Unjust enrichment argument: The respondents argued refund would unjustly enrich petitioners because a manufacturer may have passed on the duty. The court declined to accept this in the present case: petitioners imported the raw material for their own consumption and there was no material filed by respondents showing the duty had been passed on or reflected in the final product price. Consequently, the court would not deny refund on the unjust enrichment ground in this case.
  8. Interest: The court considered prior decisions awarding interest on wrongly collected duty (Elpro; Netal Distributors) and, looking to the circumstances, held that interest should be allowed at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the petition until payment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition allowed. The court allowed the petition, made the rule absolute with costs, and ordered refund of the amount representing countervailing duty collected (the petition had sought refund of Rs. 7,46,550.24). Interest was awarded at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the petition until payment. The refund was to be paid to the petitioners within four weeks from the date of the judgment.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioners are entitled to a refund of the countervailing duty collected on their imported naphthalene (the amount claimed in the petition was Rs. 7,46,550.24) together with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the petition until payment, and costs. The department was ordered to refund the said amount within four weeks.
  • Limitation principle applied: The court reaffirmed the principle that refund limitation under section 27(1) of the Customs Act does not apply where the levy was wholly without authority of law (i.e., where the levy involved a jurisdictional error). The opinion applied established authorities (Anisminic; Tarachand Gupta; and several High Court decisions) in reaching that conclusion.
  • No broad new doctrine was announced: The opinion applied existing jurisprudential principles (as cited) to the facts at hand; it did not purport to announce a novel legal rule beyond the established authorities it relied upon.
Petition allowed.

    Atul Products Ltd. And Others v. Union Of India And Others

    1. The petitioners carry on business, inter alia, of manufacturing dye stuffs and dye intermediates. In the manufacture of dye stuffs and dye intermediates one of the raw materials used is a product known as “Naphthalene”. The main commercial source of supply of Naphthalene is coal-tar. According to the petitioners although it is technically possible to obtain Naphthalene from petroleum products 90% of the supply of naphthalene comes from coal-tar. The petitioners under invoice dated 23rd December 1977 imported 500 metric tonnes of naphthalene from German manufacturers. The said goods arrived from Germany. Thereafter the petitioners filed their bill of entry dated 13th February 1978. The petitioners had produced three certificates dated 14-11-1977, 18-1-1978 and 23-1-1978 from their German suppliers to the effect that Naphthalene which was supplied by them and which was imported by the petitioners was exclusively produced from crude coal-tar. The certificates also stated that there was no production of petroleum Naphthalene in the Federal Republic of Germany. All the three certificates are to the same effect.

    2. The petitioners were assessed to Customs duty in respect of the Naphthalene so imported under Customs Tariff item 27.07 which item refers to oil and other products of the distillation of “high temperature coal tar.” For the purpose of countervailing duty, however, the petitioners were assessed under Tariff Item 11-A of the first Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Item 11 A of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act (hereinafter referred to as Central Excises Tariff) is as follows:

    “Item No. 11-A.

    PETROLEUM PRODUCTS NOT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

    Item No. Description of Goods Rate of Duty. Basic Duty Additional Duty. (Rs. per kilolitre at 15°C.) 11-A All products derived from refining of crude petroleum or shale (whether gaseous, liquid, semi-solid or solid in form), not otherwise specified, including refiners gases, lubricating oil and greases, waxes and coke. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx Item 11-A deals with petroleum products not otherwise specified. According to the petitioners Naphthalene imported by them cannot be classified as a petroleum product. It is a product derived from coal-tar. It is therefore, classifiable under residuary item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. Under notification bearing No. 364-CUS dated 2-8-1976 goods falling under Item No. 68 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, when imported into India are exempt from the whole of the additional duty leviable thereon under section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Hence the petitioners contend that Napthalene imported by them which falls under Tariff Item 68 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 is exempt from countervailing duty levied under section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

    3. The petitioners were, however, assessed to countervailing duty under Item 11-A of the Central Excise Tariff. Thereafter the petitioners made an application dated 23rd January 1979 to the assistant Collector of Customs for refund of countervailing duty wrongly levied by classifying Naphthalene under Central Excise Tariff Item 11-A. The amount of refund thus claimed on 500 metric tonnes of Naphthalene came to Rs. 7,46,550.24. It seems that in the meanwhile one Atic Industries Limited which is a “sister” concern of the petitioners imported 30,000 kgs. of Naphthalene. Countervailing duty had been levied on Naphthalene so imported under Item 11-A of the Central Excise Tariff. Atic Industries Limited disputed this assessment and claimed a refund of countervailing duty, inter alia, on the ground that it should have been assessed under item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. This contention of Atic Industries was accepted in appeal by the Collector of Customs under an order dated 30th November 1978. In his order the Collector of Customs has held that there is overwhelming evidence produced by the appellants to show that the goods imported are the product of distillation of coal tar and that there is no evidence that the goods imported are derivatives of petroleum. It is therefore correctly classifiable under item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. The Collector also ordered consequential refund of excise duty collected. It was in view of this decision that the petitioners, relying upon the certificates produced by them at the material time, applied for refund of the countervailing duty collected from them on 23rd January 1979.

    4. In view of the decision of the Collector of Customs (Appeals) in the case of Atic Industries Limited and in view of the fact that the petitioners have produced evidence to show that Naphthalene imported by them under their invoice of 23rd December 1977 is derived from coal-tar and not from petroleum, the petitioners are entitled to classify Naphthalene so imported under Central Excise Tariff Item 68 for the purpose of countervailing duty. In view of the said exemption notification no countervailing duty can be levied on Naphthalene imported by the petitioners under the said invoice. The refund application of the petitioners, however, was rejected by the assistant Collector of Customs under his order dated 25-1-1979/6-2-1979 on the ground that the claim for refund was barred by limitation prescribed under section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioners filed an appeal from this order. The appeal however, was rejected by the 3rd respondent under his order dated 30-3-1979 also on the ground that the claim for refund was barred under section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioners filed a Revision petition from this order. The 1st respondent, however, by his order dated 28th January 1981 rejected the revision petition also on the same ground. The petitioners have filed the present petition on 27th February 1981.

    5. The short question which requires consideration is whether the petitioners are entitled to any refund of the countervailing duty so recovered from them in view of the provisions of section 27(1) of the Customs Act., 1962.

    6. Under section 27(1) at the material time any person claiming refund of any duty paid by him is required to make such application before the expiration of six months from the date of payment of duty. It is, therefore, necessary to consider whether the provisions of section 27(1) apply to the petitioners' claim for refund of countervailing duty. In this connection there is a basic distinction between a duty which is levied without jurisdiction and a duty which is levied under an error of law or fact. In the case of orders passed by the Customs authorities which are without jurisdiction provisions of section 27(1) cannot be attracted because the act of levying duty in such a case is totally without any authority of law. In such a case the party aggrieved can ask for recovery of the duty on the basis that the amount has been paid under a mistake of law within three years of the date of discovery of mistake. For such claims the provisions of section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 are not attracted. The provisions of section 27(1) can be attracted only in respect of refund of such duty which has been collected under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962, either under some error of law or fact or for any other reason which may entitle the party concerned to apply for a refund under the Act.

    7. The distinction between an action of the tribunal or an administrative authority which is without jurisdiction and an action which is under an error of law has been considerably whittled down by judicial decisions over a period of time. Commenting on “jurisdictional erross” Wade in his book on Administrative Law, 5th Edition at page 263 has observed,

    “In fact ‘jurisdiction’ has traditionally borne the wide sense, synonymous with ‘power’; for plainly a tribunal must not only have jurisdiction at the outset but must retain it unimpaired until it has discharged its task …….if a tribunal in the course of its inquiry addressed itself to the wrong question or violated the rules of natural justice, it thereby stepped outside its jurisdiction.”

    8. Jurisdictional errors can also be based on wrong findings of fact e.g a tribunal dealing only with agricultural land cannot rule on non-agricultural land. Since the factual position regarding land is the same at the outset, the tribunal was never entitled to entertain the cast at all. Error as to the nature of land goes to the root of jurisdiction. Applying the same logic in the present case, if Naphthalene is not a petroleum product but is a product derived from coal-tar, this must be so at the outset. The Customs authorities were not entitled to levy any countervailing duty at all on this product. The levy, of countervailing duty, therefore, is an act which is wholly without jurisdiction.

    9. This concept of actions without jurisdiction was expounded and extended in the case of Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969 (2) A.C 147). The decision has been subsequently approved by the House of Lords in the case of In re Recal Communications Ltd. reported in (1981) A.C 374, at page 382. The Court in that case has observed as follows:

    “…….where Parliament confers on an administrative tribunal or authority, as distinct from a court of law, power to decide particular questions defined by the Act conferring the power, Parliament intends to confine that power to answering the question as it has been so defined: and if there has been any doubt as to what that question is, this is a matter for courts of law to resolve in fulfilment of their constitutional role as interpreters of the written law and expounders of the common law and rules of equity. So if the administrative tribunal or authority have asked themselves the wrong question and answered that, they have done something that the Act does not empower them to do and their decision is a nullity. Parliament can, of course if it so desires, confer upon administrative tribunals or authorities power to decide questions of law as well as questions of fact or of administrative policy; but this requires clear words, for the presumption is that where a decision-making power is conferred on a tribunal or authority that is not a court of law, Parliament did not intend to do so.”

    10. Hence if a tribunal asks itself a wrong question and answers it ignoring the material which was available to it, it does something which it is not empowered to do in law and thus acts outside the jurisdiction conferred. The decision in the Anisminic case has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros. reported in (1971) 1 SCC 486 : AIR 1971 SC 1558 at page 1565. In that case in para 21 the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the observation of Lord Reid in that case and has held that “a determination which the officer has no right to take into account, is no determination and in such cases the officer acts without jurisdiction.” It has said that determination and in such cases the officer acts without jurisdiction.” It has said that when such a decision is made, inter alia, by refusing to take into account something which the tribunal was required to take into account or when it bases its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account, it would be acting in excess of jurisdiction. In such a case the order would be a nullity though it was an order of the kind which it was entitled to make in a proper case.

    11. In the course of his able arguments, Mr. Shroff, learned counsel for the petitioners cited several judgments before me. In the case of Maharashtra Vegetable Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 1981 E.L.T 468 (Bom) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was required to consider refund of excise duty wrongly collected on post manufacturing expenses. The court held that such collection was exercising powers without jurisdiction. It would not, therefore, attract the bar of limitation prescribed under rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 for the purpose of refund.

    12. Similarly another Division Bench of this court in the case of Wipro Products Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 1981 E.L.T 521 (Bom) held that if the levy of Central Excise was totally without jurisdiction and outside the provisions of Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act the bar of limitation prescribed under rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules was not applicable. That was also a case where the excise duty was levied by taking into account post manufacturing expenses. (See also in this connection associated Bearing Company Limited v. Union of India reported in 1980 E.L.T 415 (Bombay).

    13. In the case of Indian Dairy Corporation v. Union of India reported in 1981 E.L.T 926 the goods were short landed. The Bombay High Court held that the recovery of duty on short landed cargo was without authority of law as no duty could have been levied on non-existent goods. It was not open, therefore, for the department to fall back upon the period of limitation prescribed in section 27 of the Customs Act and hold the refund claim as time barred. A Devision Bench of the Madras High Court has also taken a similar view in the case of assistant Collector of Customs, Madras v. Premraj and Ganapatraj and Co. (P) Ltd., reported in 1978 E.L.T (1630). That was a case where the duty was paid without taking into account an exemption unification. The Madras High Court held that this amounted to recovery of tax without the authority of law and hence section 27 of the Customs Act would not apply to such a case.

    14. In the present case also countervailing duty has been recovered While in law no countervailing duty is leviable. Therefore, the collection of such countervailing duty is without authority of law. Hence the provisions of section 27 of the Customs Act would have no application to the recovery of such duty. The Supreme Court in the case of Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (1984) 3 SCC 362 : AIR 1984 SC 971 was concerned with a case where there was a dispute as to classification. In that case there was a dispute between the manufacturer and the department as to the taxability of the goods under a certain tariff item. The claim of the manufacturer was upheld by the Government. The claim of the manufacturer for recovery of excise duty on the ground that the goods were taxable under a tariff item different from that under which they were claimed to be taxable earlier, was held maintainable. The Supreme Court held that the period of limitation in such cases would be on the basis that it was a claim for refund of amounts paid under a mistake of law. The Supreme Court, therefore, allowed the claim for refund for three years from such time as the petitioners discovered their mistake. In that case it allowed refund of all excess payments made on or after September 28, 1973 i.e within a period of 3 years prior to the date on which the Civil Application concerned was filed.

    15. In view of these authorities learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the mistake in the present case relating to classification is a mistake which goes to the root of jurisdiction. I am inclined to accept this submission.

    16. On behalf of the respondents it was pointed out by Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the respondents that the error in classifying Naphthalene under Tariff Item 11-A was merely an error of law which does not go to the root of jurisdiction of the Customs authority. In support of his contention he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. City Of Jabalpur Corporation ((1977) 2 SCC 472 : AIR 1977 SC 955.) In that case the question related to the recovery of octroi under the C.P & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. Under section 83(1) of that Act appeal is provided against the assessment of octroi. Under sub-section (1-a) of that section the person aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate authority has a right to apply to the State Government for revision on the ground (a) that the decision is contrary to law or is repugnant to any principle of assessment of a tax, or (b) that the appellate authority has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law. Under section 84 the orders passed by the special tribunals are final and no objection shall be taken to any valuation, assessment or levy etc. in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in the Act. Thus under the provisions of the said Act power was given to the Special Tribunal to examine the question of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction in levying octroi. In view of these provisions the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of a civil Court to try a suit challenging assessment or levy of octroi was ousted. The Supreme Court said that by reason of the existence and availability of these special remedies, the ordinary remedy by way of a suit would be excluded on a true interpretation of section 84(3). In the absence of similar provisions in the Customs Act, this decision does not help the Respondents.

    17. The respondents also relied upon a decision of a single Judge of this Court in the case of Paper Products Limited v. Union of India, 1981 E.L.T 538 (Bom.). In that case the dispute related to the clasification of certain type of paper. The Court held that if the duty paid by mistake is declared by the competent court to be invalid in law, it will fall within the purview of section 72 of the Contract Act and the Government is under an obligation to refund it. The respondents relied upon the observations in that case in paragraph 44 where the learned Judge has observed that “mere classification of entries cannot amount to the passing of order beyond jurisdiction.” The observations in the above case which are obiter, lose much of their force after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. (supra). In the present case the goods imported were not subject to countervailing duty. By virtue of a wrong classification, countervailing duty was levied upon these goods. Such a levy is, therefore, without the authority of law and is therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.

    18. My attention was also drawn to a decision of my brother Pendse J. in the case of May & Baker Limited v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay being Misc. Petition No. 906 of 1975 decided by Pendse J. on 21st September 1979. This was again a case where the levy of octroi duty under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act on glass ampoules brought into Bombay by the petitioners was under consideration. Under rule 26 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation (Levy of Octroi) Rules, 1965 there was a provision for refund of octroi paid wrongly or in excess. Under that rule, when octroi has been wrongly recovered or has been recovered in excess through inadvertence, error, misconstruction, misinterpretation or any other reason on the part of the Municipal Octroi staff, such excess may be refunded provided that such a claim for refund together with various documents mentioned therein is lodged within 3 months from the date of its recovery. In view of the specific provisions of this rule the learned Judge held that the application for refund should have been made within 3 months, even in the case of mis-interpretation of an entry. The learned Judge in terms distinguished the provisions of this rule from the provisions of section 27(1) of the Customs Act and held that the wording of Rule 26 was totally different from the wording of section 27(1) of the Customs Act and distinguished that section by saying that there was no provision under section 27(1) for refund in case the recovery is through inadvertance, error, mis-construction or mis-interpretation. In view of these observations it is difficult to see how this decision can be of any assistance to the Respondents.

    19. It was next submitted by the respondents that even if the petitioners are right in contending that countervailing duty has been wrongly recovered, refund should not be granted to them in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because this would amount to an unjust enrichment of the petitioners. This doctrine of “unjust enrichment” is at times invoked in matters relating to recovery of excise duty. In such cases the State urges that a manufacturer who has passed on the burden of excise duty to his customer, should not be allowed to obtain a refund of such duty from the State. I need not go into the merits or demerits of this doctrine. But in the case of I.T.C v. V. Chipkar, being Appeal No. 108 of 1977 in Misc. Petition No. 1151 of 1975, on a difference of opinion between two brother Judges of this Court, Shah J., by his judgment dated 9-4-1985 has held that a manufacturer cannot be denied refund of excise duty unlawfully collected on the ground that he passed on the burden of duty to his customers. In his judgment he has considered the latest Supreme Court decisions while arriving at this finding.

    20. as far as the present petition is concerned, the petitioners imported Naphthalene for their own consumption. This is a raw material required by the petitioners themselves for the manufacture of dye stuffs and dye-intermediates. The question of passing on the burden of duty to consumers does not therefore arise. Mr. Shah has urged that ultimately the countervailing duty levied on Naphthalene will be reflected in the price at which the final product manufactured by the petitioners will be sold. There is no material on the basis of which I can hold that this will, in fact be so. Price fixation of any product is a result of several factors. Market conditions may or may not permit a manufacturer to charge any price he may want to impose. The respondents have not filed any affidavit disclosing anything which would indicate that there is any change in the price of the final product manufactured by the petitioners and sold by them as a result of the levy of countervailing duty on Naphthalene. In any case, in the absence of any factual basis for this submission, such a submission cannot be accepted.

    21. The petitioners have prayed for interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the duty collected from the date of the petition till payment. In the case of Elpro International Ltd. v. Joint Secretary, Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance reported in 1985 (19) E.L.T 3 (S.C) the Supreme Court has awarded interest on duty which was wrongly collected. The Supreme Court has awarded a lumpsum interest of Rs. 50,000/- in that case when the duty had been wrongly collected in the year 1966. In the case of Netal Distributors Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 1984 (18) E.L.T 269 (Bam.) this High court also awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the excise duty which was collected illegally. In the interest of justice and looking to the circumstances of the case it would be just and fair to award to the petitioners interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the petition till payment. In the premises the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute with costs as prayed, save and except that interest will be at the rate of 12% per annum. The said amount will be refunded to the petitioners within a period of 4 weeks from today.

    Petition allowed.
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    Atul Products Ltd. And Others v. Union Of India And Others
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