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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition arises from excise assessments and refund claims by the Petitioners, a public limited company manufacturing engineering goods (tool bits, rounds, turnings, hacksaw blades, etc.). After this Court's earlier decision on post-manufacturing expenses in the Bombay Tyres International Private Limited case, the Petitioners submitted a revised price list (16 January 1980) and thereafter paid excise duty on certain post-manufacturing items under protest (letter dated 4 February 1980). They filed a fresh price list and a refund application (26 March 1980) claiming Rs. 15,01,043 for the period July 1977 to December 1979. The Assistant Collector rejected the revised price list (5 May 1980) and the refund claim (25 July 1980). The Collector (Appeals) rejected the appeal on merits (10 September 1980), and the Petitioners filed this writ petition on 8 October 1980 challenging that appellate order.

While the petition was pending, the Supreme Court delivered decisions relating to post-manufacturing expenses. In light of those decisions, the Single Judge (9 December 1983) passed an interim order permitting the Petitioners to submit statements of deductions/amendments and documentary evidence to the Assistant Collector for determination, with the Assistant Collector to pass speaking orders and file them in this Court; all final orders, including payment orders, were to be passed by this Court. Pursuant to notices and hearings, the Assistant Collector passed an order (18 May 1984) allowing certain deductions and rejecting others.

The Petitioners ultimately confined their claim to two items: (1) deduction for a "Surprise Incentive" discount offered to dealers for the year 1983 under certain circulars (dated 23 May 1983 and 1 November 1983), and (2) a refund of excise duty for headings where deductions were allowed, limited by amendment to Rs. 4,07,639 for specified historical periods. The Assistant Collector allowed some deductions but rejected the refund claims as time-barred under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act for being filed after six months; this writ petition raises the challenge to those aspects.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the "Surprise Incentive" discounts given in 1983 qualify as trade discounts deductible from sale price for the purpose of assessing excise duty (i.e., were they known at or prior to removal of goods and in accordance with normal wholesale trade practice)?
  2. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to a refund of excise duty for prior periods (as amended to Rs. 4,07,639) despite the Assistant Collector's rejection on the ground of limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, given that the writ petition was filed within three years of accrual?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The "Surprise Incentive" discounts were trade discounts: they were announced by circulars (23 May 1983 and 1 November 1983), applied to dealers for purchases during specified periods in 1983, and were known to dealers at or prior to removal of the goods (at least for some periods), thus permissible as deductions from sale price.
  • The Petitioners asserted that they had given the discounts to dealers between 1 January and 31 December 1983 and that these discounts should be allowed as trade deductions to reduce excise liability.
  • With respect to the refund claim, the Petitioners pursued relief in this Court (writ jurisdiction) and sought recovery of excise duty for earlier periods; they amended the claim to Rs. 4,07,639.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Assistant Collector rejected the deduction partly because the quantum of the incentive was not known at the time of removal of goods. Respondents maintained that this reason is supported by the facts: for most of the claimed period the dealers were unaware of any such incentive scheme until the announcement dates of the circulars.
  • In addition, Respondents argued that the Petitioners failed to produce documentary evidence (despite being called upon by the Assistant Collector on 7 March 1984) to substantiate that the incentive payments were actually made monthwise and goodswise; therefore, there was no material proof of payment and no basis to allow the deduction.
  • Regarding the refund claim, the Respondents relied on Section 11B to argue that claims filed after six months are barred and that the Assistant Collector had no authority to grant the belated refund; they also disputed the revised quantum claimed by the Petitioners.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India & Ors. v. Bombay Tyres International Private Limited (Supreme Court) — reported in 1983 (12) E.L.T. 869; 1983 (14) E.L.T. 1986; and 1984 (17) E.L.T. 329 (clarifying order) The Supreme Court decisions clarified the treatment of post-manufacturing expenses and trade discounts; the 1984 (17) E.L.T. 329 clarifying order articulated that trade discounts are allowable only if known at or prior to removal of goods. The Court relied on the clarifying 1984 (17) E.L.T. 329 formulation (quoted in the opinion) to apply the criterion that trade discounts must be known at or prior to removal; it used this to assess the Petitioners' incentive scheme and to deny the deduction.
1979 E.L.T. at page 625 (this Court's prior decision in Bombay Tyres referenced) Earlier decision of this Court on post-manufacturing expenses (background to later appeals and Supreme Court rulings). Referenced as part of the procedural and doctrinal history leading to the interim directions and re-assessment process in this petition.
Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana (Supreme Court) [citation not fully reproduced in text] One of three Supreme Court decisions cited as establishing that refunds should not be allowed where the manufacturer has recovered the excise duty from customers (equitable bar on restitution in writ jurisdiction). The Court invoked these Supreme Court authorities to support refusal of the refund claim because the Petitioners had admittedly recovered the excise duty from their customers; permitting the refund would unjustly enrich the Petitioners.
Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab (Supreme Court) [citation not fully reproduced in text] Listed among Supreme Court decisions indicating that courts should not grant refunds where the excise duty has been recovered from customers. Used as authority for the proposition that in equitable writ jurisdiction courts should not countenance refunds that would result in unjust enrichment of the claimant who has passed on the duty.
1985 (1) SCALE at page 196 (Supreme Court) [citation without party name in text] Cited as a Supreme Court authority supporting the position that refunds should not be allowed where duty has been recovered from customers. Relied upon as part of the trio of Supreme Court authorities forming the settled view relied upon by the Court to deny the refund.
I.T.C. Ltd. v. M. K. Chipkar — 1985 (19) E.L.T. 373 (Dissenting judgment of this Court referenced by the presiding judge) The judge refers to his own dissenting judgment in which he discussed the case law on the point (refund when duty recovered) at length. Used to indicate the judge's prior engagement with the doctrine and the available case law; cited as part of the appellate and doctrinal context.
Madras Aluminium — 1981 (8) E.L.T. 478 (Madras High Court) One of several High Court judgments said to take the same view that refunds should not be allowed where duty has been recovered from customers. Listed as supporting authority; relied on as part of a body of High Court decisions aligning with the Supreme Court view relied upon by this Court.
C.S.G.A. & Co. — (1972) 30 STC 120 (Andhra High Court) A High Court decision taking the same view on the refund issue (as described in the opinion). Referred to as consistent authority supporting refusal of refund in the circumstances where duty was passed on to customers.
Hyderabad Asbestos — 1980 (6) E.L.T. 735 (Delhi High Court) High Court decision cited as taking the same view on not granting refunds where duty was recovered from customers. Cited as corroborative High Court authority for denying refund in equitable writ jurisdiction.
Jaswant Sugar — 1983 (13) E.L.T. 920 (Allahabad High Court) Another High Court judgment aligning with the view against granting refunds where duty passed on to customers. Used as part of the corpus of supporting High Court decisions.
Tata Chemicals — 1983 (12) E.L.T. 776 (Gujarat High Court) High Court authority cited as sharing the view on refund/refusal where duty has been recovered from customers. Relied on as additional High Court precedent consistent with the Court's refusal to order refund.
Bharat Chemicals — (unreported) decided on 21-11-1983 (Madhya Pradesh) (copy furnished) Unreported High Court decision noted in the text as taking the same view on refunds where duty was recovered from customers. Referenced as part of the supporting High Court decisions; used to show consistency across jurisdictions.
New India Industries — 1983 (14) E.L.T. 1763 (Gujarat High Court) High Court decision cited in support of the proposition that refunds should not be allowed where duty has been recovered from customers. Listed among authorities reinforcing the Court's conclusion to refuse refund.
Ahmedabad Calico — 1984 (17) E.L.T. 246 (Gujarat High Court) High Court judgment cited as consistent with the view that refunds are inappropriate where the duty was recovered from customers. Used as part of the line of High Court authorities relied upon by the Court to deny refund.
Godawari Plywood — 1984 (18) E.L.T. 732 (Andhra High Court) High Court decision cited as taking the same view regarding refund where duty had been passed on to customers. Included among the High Court authorities relied upon in supporting the Court's discretionary refusal to grant refund.
M/s. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. v. The Union of India — 1975 Cencus, Vol. III, p.115 = 1979 (4) E.L.T. (J) 468 (this Court) A Division Bench decision of this Court that has taken a similar view (on the refund issue), not overruled. Referred to as an earlier Division Bench authority of this Court aligned with the view that refunds should not be allowed where duty has been recovered from customers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two analytical strands corresponding to the two primary issues.

1. Deduction for the "Surprise Incentive" (trade discount issue)

  1. The Court examined Section 4(d)(ii) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (as cited in the opinion), which excludes trade discounts (subject to rules) from the value of excisable goods provided such discounts are "allowed in accordance with the normal practice of the wholesale trade at the time of removal." The Court then relied on the Supreme Court's clarifying formulation (1984 (17) E.L.T. 329) which is quoted in the opinion: trade discounts are deductible only if established under agreements, terms of sale, or established practice, and the allowance and nature of the discount must be known at or prior to the removal of the goods (the quoted paragraph appears in the opinion).
  2. Applying that criterion to the Petitioners' circulars and scheme, the Court analyzed the timeline and substance:
    • For the period up to 31 May 1983, the scheme was first announced by circular dated 23 May 1983 — hence dealers were not aware of any such scheme for most of that period, so the discount cannot be treated as known at or prior to removal.
    • For July to October 1983, the relevant incentives were announced only by the circular dated 1 November 1983, so customers were not aware at the time of removal during those months.
    • For June, November and December 1983, although customers were aware that some incentive scheme was operative, the quantum of discount was not declared at the time of individual consignments, and the entitlement itself was contingent on dealers meeting specified purchase targets (i.e., eligibility and quantum were both contingent). Thus the incentive was not an automatic discount accompanying each purchase but a contingent, profit-sharing style benefit.
  3. On these facts the Court concluded that the "Surprise Incentive" scheme did not meet the test of a trade discount known at or prior to removal and in accordance with wholesale trade practice; therefore the claimed deductions were not allowable.

2. Refund claim (limitation and equitable considerations)

  1. The Assistant Collector had rejected the refund claim on the ground that the refund application was filed after more than six months and was therefore barred by Section 11B of the Central Excise Act; the Collector had no authority to grant claims older than six months.
  2. The Court noted that although the petition in this Court was filed within three years of the accrual of the claim (petition filed 8 October 1980), and although in some Supreme Court cases ordinary law of limitation might be applied to allow relief, the determinative factor for this Court was equitable and discretionary considerations under Article 226 writ jurisdiction.
  3. The Court observed that the Petitioners had admittedly recovered the disputed excise duty from their customers. Granting the refund to the Petitioners would therefore result in unjust enrichment and misappropriation of monies properly belonging to customers and ultimate consumers. The Court held that, in its equitable discretion, it should not permit such a result.
  4. The Court relied on a line of Supreme Court decisions and numerous High Court decisions (as catalogued above) to support the principle that refunds should not be ordered where the manufacturer has passed on and recovered the duty from customers; it also noted prior decisions of this Court consistent with that approach.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court reached a final disposition as follows:

DISMISSED. The petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Petitioners are not entitled to claim deductions for the "Surprise Incentive" scheme for 1983; the Assistant Collector's disallowance of those deductions is upheld. The Petitioners are also denied the refund (as amended to Rs. 4,07,639) because (a) the Assistant Collector lacked jurisdiction to grant belated refunds beyond six months and (b) in equitable writ jurisdiction the Court refused to grant restitution where the Petitioners had recovered the duty from their customers, which would lead to unjust enrichment.
  • The Court relied on existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities to support its discretionary refusal to grant refund; the decision was applied to these facts rather than announcing a novel principle. The opinion does not purport to set a new precedent beyond the application of cited authorities and existing statutory provisions.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

    S.S. Miranda Ltd. v. Union Of India

    1. The present controversy arises out of the decisions under the Central Excise Act by the Supreme Court on the subject of the post manufacturing expenses in Union of India & Ors. v. Bombay Tyres International Private Limited reported in 1983 (12) E.L.T. at page 869 and 1983 (14) E.L.T. at page 1986 and also in 1984 (17) E.L.T. at page 329 and the order passed by this Court in the present petition on the 9th December 1983. In order to appreciate the precise nature of the controversy, it is necessary to state the following few preliminary facts :-

    The Petitioners are a public limited company engaged in the business of manufacturing of engineering goods such as tool bits, rounds, turnings, hacksaw blades, etc. After this Court gave its decision on the question of post manufacturing expenses in the case of Bombay Tyres International Private Limited which was reported in 1979 E.L.T. at page 625, the Petitioners submitted a revised price list to the Excise Authorities on the 16th January 1980 on the basis of the said judgment. On the 4th February 1980 they wrote a letter to the Excise Authorities that henceforth they would pay the excise duty on the post manufacturing items under protest. On the 26th March 1980 the Petitioners submitted a fresh price list on the basis of audited accounts for the year ending 31st December 1979 and also made on the same day a refund application for Rs. 15,01,043/- for the period from July 1977 to December 1979. On the 5th May 1980, the Assistant Collector of Excise passed his order rejecting the revised price list, and on the 25th July 1980 he also rejected the claim of refund. The Petitioners preferred an appeal against both the orders, and on the 10th September 1980 the Collector of Excise (Appeals) rejected the appeal on merits. It is to challenge the said Appellate Order that the present petition was filed on the 8th October 1980.

    2. In the meanwhile the Supreme Court delivered the aforesaid orders and judgments in appeal against the decision of this Court in the case of the Bombay Tyres International Private Limited. In view of the said orders and decisions of the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge on the 9th December 1983 passed an interim order in this petition. The sum and substance of the said order was that the assessing authorities, namely, the Assistant Collector, Excise was to permit the Petitioners to submit their statements of deductions/amendments in respect of the price list already filed for a proper determination of excise duty-liability in respect of deductions claimed under some headings beyond those dealt with in the decision of the Supreme Court, if they were otherwise admissible. The Assistant Collector was also to permit the Petitioners to submit their refund claims or amendments to their refund claims already pending in respect of the said heads of deductions. The Petitioners were also required to file such documentary evidence which they might be called upon to do by the Assistant Collector. The Assistant Collector was then to finalise the price lists/refund claims after giving an opportunity to the Petitioners, and pass a speaking order. The Assistant Collector was thereafter to file in this court the orders of assessment along with the copies of statements of deductions/amendments and the price lists, etc. All final orders including orders for payment were then to be passed by this Court. After the said order was passed notices were sent by the Assistant Collector calling upon the Petitioners to produce the relevant documentary evidence in support of their claim under each of the heads under which deductions were claimed by the Petitioners and after hearing the Petitioners, the Assistant Collector passed his order on the 18th May 1984, allowing certain deductions and rejecting others.

    3. Although originally the Petitioners were claiming various reliefs in different amounts, the Petitioners have now confined their only to two items. The first item is of deduction for the "Surprise Incentive" offered by them to their customers for the year 1983 and the second item is of the claim for refund in respect of the headings under which the deductions were allowed by the Assistant Collector and covering the period (a) from 1st July 1977 to 27th September 1979 and (b) from 1st January 1980 to 29th January 1980. It may be mentioned here with regard to the claim for refund for the two periods that although the Assistant Collector held that the relevant deductions were permissible, he rejected the same on the ground that the claim was not filed within six months which is the period of limitation for claiming refund under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act.

    4. Taking first the claim for deduction on account of "Surprise Incentives", the case of the Petitioners is that by their circular dated the 23rd May 1983 they had offered to their customers/dealers a discount under a Special Incentive Scheme called "The Miranda Package of Surprise Incentives". This was in addition to the other discounts they had allowed to the dealers. The basic features of the said "Surprise Incentives" scheme were as follows :- If the dealers' purchases in June were 15% above the target, they were entitled to a 1% target incentive on their total purchases from 1st January to 30th June 1983. Even if the dealer's monthly target were not fulfilled, if they fulfilled the said target upto June 1983 over a period of six months together and also exceeded the total target of 15% they were to get the said incentive of 1% on the total purchases for the six months ending June 1983. By this circular the Petitioners also promised that there would be some incentives in the coming months but the quantum of such incentives was not announced and it was specifically mentioned that it would be kept secret and would be announced as a surprise. The Petitioners however made it clear that such further "Surprise Incentive" would by given to the dealers on their total purchases from 1st January to 31st August, if the target for July and August plus 15% was achieved by them. Similarly, the petitioners announced an unspecified amount of incentive for September and October if the target by that time plus 20% was achieved by the dealers. Likewise for the period ending October, a further unspecified discount to cover 10 months' purchases from 1st January 1983 to 31st October 1983 was also announced. The details of the scheme are in the said circular letter which is Ex. 'I-1' to the petition. The Petitioners thereafter issued yet another circular to their dealers on the 1st November 1983 in which they announced incentive for November and December 1983. This further incentive was as follows : The dealers who completed their Annual Bonus target by 30th November and made purchases in November and December for a further 1/12th of the foregoing target were to be given 3% special discount on November and December purchases and the dealers who completed their Annual Bonus target by 31st December and made purchases in December of a further 1/24th of the foregoing target were to be given 2.5% special discount on November and December purchases. This Circular letter is at Ex. I-2 to the petition. It is the case of the Petitioners that they had accordingly given the "Surprise Incentive" discount to their dealers between 1st January 1983 and 31st December 1983. That discount was known to the dealers at the time of and also prior to the removal of the goods. The discount was properly a trade discount and was therefore eligible as a deduction from the sale price. The Assistant Collector had disallowed the same on the ground that it was not known at the time of clearance, which reasoning was contrary to the facts. They therefore claimed that the said claim should be allowed, setting aside that part of the order of the Assistant Collector.

    5. As against this, it was contended on behalf of the Respondents that although in the order only one reason was given, namely, that the quantum of incentive was not known at the time of clearance, there was also an additional reason for disallowing this deduction. That reason was that although by his letter dated the 7th March 1984 the Assistant Collector had called upon the Petitioners to substantiate their claim that they had paid to their dealers such incentive bonus monthwise and goodswise, the Petitioners had not produced any documentary evidence to support their claim and hence there was no material to prove the Petitioners' claim that they had in fact paid such discount to their customers. It was also contended that the reason given by the Assistant Collector in his order that the discount was not known at or prior to the time of the removal of the goods is clear on the facts of the case. In this connection, it is pointed out that from 1st January 1983 almost to the end of May 1983 the dealers were not even aware that there was any such "Surprise Incentive" scheme in the offing. Therefore, the claim for deduction from 1st January to 31st May 1983 is not maintainable at all. As regards the period from July to October 1983 the quantum of incentive which was to be made available to the dealers was admittedly not declared, and therefore, not known. As regards months of June, November and December 1983, although both the factum of the incentive and its quantum was made known, the incentive was to be available only if the dealers had succeeded in fulfilling their quotas and not otherwise. Therefore at the time the dealers cleared their individual consignments during the said three months they were not aware whether they would at all get the incentive bonus and to what extent. In the result for no period of the year 1983 for which the deduction is claimed the quantum of incentive was even known at or prior to the removal of the goods in question.

    6. I find much substance in the contentions raised on behalf of the Respondents. Section 4(d)(ii) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 states that "value" in relation to any excisable goods does not include the amount of the duty of excise, sales tax and other taxes, if any, payable on such goods, and subject to such rules as may be made, the trade discount (such discount not being refundable on any account whatsoever) allowed in accordance with the normal practice of the wholesale trade at the time of removal in respect of such goods sold or contracted for sale. The Supreme Court in its clarifying order reported in 1984 (17) E.L.T. at page 329 while referring to trade discounts which are allowed as deductions has stated as follows :-

    "Trade Discounts. - Discounts allowed in the Trade (by whatever name such discount is described) should be allowed to be deducted from the sale price having regard to the nature of the goods, if established under agreements or under terms of sale or by established practice, the allowance and the nature of the discount being known at or prior to the removal of the goods. Such Trade Discounts shall not be disallowed only because they are not payable at the time of each invoice or deducted from the invoice price"
    .

    This makes it clear that trade discounts if they are to be allowed as deductions from the said price must be known at or prior to the removal of the goods. Judged on this criterion the discounts claimed for none of the periods is permissible as deductions. As Regards the period upto 31st May 1983, admittedly the Petitioner's customers were even not aware that there was going to be any such incentive scheme since it was announced for the first time only by a circular dated the 23rd May 1983. Similar is the situation with regard to the period from July to October 1983, for the incentive was announced for the said period only by the circular dated the 1st November 1983. The customers were therefore obviously unaware of any such incentive at the time they cleared their individual consignments during the said three months. The only period for which it can be said that the customers were made known of the said incentive scheme was the period of three months viz; June, November and December 1983. All that however can be said with regard to the said three months is that the Petitioner's customers were aware that there was some such incentive scheme operative during the period. But even with regard to these three months it can hardly be said that they knew at the time they cleared the individual consignments during the said three months, the quantum of discount that they would be entitled to. In fact at the time they cleared the specific consignments, during the said three months they could not even sure that they would get any discount at all. This was because according to the scheme itself their entitlement to the discount was dependent on their fulfilling certain target within a specific period. Both the availability of the incentive as well as its quantum were contingent upon the customers' purchasing a particular quota during the specific period. If they failed to complete the specified quota during the specific period, they were not entitled to any discount at all. In other words the incentive was not as a matter of course accompanying each purchase. It was more in the nature of a contingent benefit. It could hardly be described as a trade discount. That it was not a discount allowed in accordance with the normal practice of the wholesale trade at the time of removal of the goods is patent on the face of the said scheme itself. Both the circulars did not make a secret of the fact that they were both surprise and incentive schemes. The contents of the circulars themselves show that neither the factum of the incentive nor its quantum was known in advance for a major part of the period. Nor was the quantum known to the purchasers at the time of clearing their individual purchases during the rest of the period. At best this was a profit sharing scheme between the Petitioners and their customers on the customers reaching the targets of purchase. I am therefore of the view that the Petitioners are not entitled to claim any deduction on account of their said surprise incentive scheme for the year 1983.

    7. Coming now to the second claim of the Petitioners, namely, the refund of the excise duty paid for the period from 1st July 1977 to 27th September 1979 and 1st January 1980 to 20 January 1980 on items for which the deductions are allowed, the Petitioners have now confined their claim by an amendment only to Rs. 4,07,639/- although originally they had claimed a higher amount. As stated earlier, the Assistant Collector has rejected this claim on the ground that an application for refund was filed after more than six months, and therefore, was barred by limitation. There is no doubt that the Assistant Collector was justified in rejecting the said claim since he had no authority to grant a claim more than six months' old. However, the question before this Court is whether the said claim though time-barred by Section 11B of the Central Excise Act should be allowed by this Court in this writ petition since the petition is filed within three years of the accrual of the said claim. The petition was filed on the 8th October, 1980 and if the ordinary law of limitation is applied as held by the Supreme Court in some cases the Petitioner's claim would be within time. The Respondents have no doubt disputed even the new quantum claimed by the Petitioners. It is not however necessary for me to go into the dispute with regard to the quantum. This is because I am the view that the Petitioners in this case are not entitled to the refund of any amount even if this Court has power to grant the claim since the Petitioners have admittedly recovered the said amount of excise duty from their customers. To grant the Petitioner's claim in such circumstances will amount to permitting them to enrich themselves unjustly and to misappropriate the monies which properly belong to their customers and to the ultimate consumers. In an equitable and discretionary writ jurisdiction such as of Article 226, the Courts should not countenance such claims. This is now well settled by three decision of the Supreme Court reported in (i) , Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana, (ii) , Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab and (iii) 1985 (1) SCALE at page 196. I have also dealt with this aspect of the matter in a dissenting judgment which is reported at 1985 (19) E.L.T. 373 - I.T.C. Ltd. v. M. K. Chipkar where I have discussed the entire case law on the point till date. There are also judgments of other High Courts taking the same view. They are (1) Madras Aluminium - 1981 (8) E.L.T. 478 decided on 27-11-1979 Madras; (2) C.S.G.A. & Co. (1972) 30 STC 120 decided on 14-7-1975 Andhra; (3) Hyderabad Asbestos - 1980 (6) E.L.T. 735 decided on 23-5-1980 Delhi; (4) Jaswant Sugar - 1983 (13) E.L.T. 920 decided on 4-5-1982 Allahabad; (5) Tata Chemicals - 1983 (12) E.L.T. 776 decided on 31-1-1983 Gujarat; (6) Bharat Chemicals (unreported) decided on 21-11-1983 M.P. (copy furnished); (7) New India Industries - 1983 (14) E.L.T. 1763 decided on 22-2-1983 Gujarat (8) Ahmedabad Calico - 1984 (17) E.L.T. 246 decided on 6-4-1984, Gujarat and (9) Godawari Plywood - 1984 (18) E.L.T. 732 decided on 18-9-1984 Andhra. Our own Division Bench has in the case of M/s. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. v. The Union of India reported in 1975 Cencus, Volume III, page 115 = 1979 (4) E.L.T. (J 468), has taken a similar view which has so far not been overruled. Although some later Division Benches of this Court have taken a different view, all that can be said is that there is a difference of view on the subject in this Court. However, it must be noted here that none of these later Benches had the benefit of the three Supreme Court judgments referred to by me earlier. I have also not come across any further Supreme Court judgment which has taken a contrary view.

    6. In the result the petition is dismissed and the Rule is discharged with costs.

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    S.S. Miranda Ltd. v. Union Of India
    (Apr 24, 1985)