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  • sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 305 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules.
  • rule 306 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959.
  • M.V Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 305 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules.
  • rule 306 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959.
  • M.V Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal filed by the owner of the vehicle and the Insurance Company against an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Sangli dated 12th December 1979. The deceased, Jagannath, died in a motor accident said to have occurred on 17th October 1979 on the National Highway known as Bangalore–Pune Road. The opinion records that Jagannath was sleeping on the road and that the truck (owned by appellant No.1) was coming from the Kolhapur side and proceeding to Pune; the text also contains a reference to the date 17th October 1978 in that description as printed in the opinion. The Tribunal had found that the deceased was to some extent negligent and assessed contributory negligence at 25%. The Tribunal also found that the truck driver drove negligently and rashly; that finding was not challenged on appeal. The only matter contested on appeal was the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was excessive and should be reduced.
  2. What consequential orders (if any) should be made by the Tribunal regarding investment and safeguarding of the awarded amount to protect dependents, particularly in light of amendments to the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules and applicable guidance.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Appellant's counsel (Shri Chaphekar) argued that the deceased could have contributed Rs. 200 per month to his family only for the first seven years; thereafter, as he would likely have married, his contribution to the mother would probably have reduced to Rs. 150 per month.
  • The appellants further contended that the mother, being 55 years old at the relevant time, would receive support for about 15 years (taking into account estimated increases in longevity), not the 20 years assumed by the Tribunal.
  • On these contentions, the appellants argued that even accepting the Tribunal's findings the total compensation should not exceed Rs. 32,000.

Respondent's Position

  • The opinion records that the learned Counsel for the respondent was not able to dispute the appellants' contention that the compensation could not exceed Rs. 32,000.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muljibhai Harijan v. United India Insurance Co., Ltd., 1983 All India Transport & Accidents Cases p. 421 (Gujarat High Court) Guidelines on protecting claimants (especially minors, illiterate persons, widows) by investment of lump-sum awards in fixed deposits, conditions for withdrawals, and other protective measures. The court stated that it generally agreed with these guidelines, reproduced them in the opinion, described them as illustrative (not exhaustive), and directed the Tribunal to consider the claimant's case in light of these guidelines and relevant rules before making consequential orders regarding investment and protection of the compensation amount.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two primary strands of reasoning: (A) assessment and correction of quantum, and (B) guidance on consequential protective orders for the invested award.

A. Quantum of Compensation

  1. The Tribunal's factual findings accepted that Jagannath was partly negligent (sleeping on the road) and found the truck driver negligent and rash; the Tribunal apportioned contributory negligence at 25%. The finding of the driver's negligence was not contested in the appeal.
  2. The Tribunal had evaluated Jagannath's present and prospective earnings: it found present income about Rs. 200 per month (including scholarship and coaching classes), expected that he would have earned Rs. 400–500 per month in future employment, and assumed he would have contributed at least Rs. 200 per month to his mother.
  3. The Tribunal calculated damages on the basis that the mother (aged 55) would receive contributions for about 20 years; it assessed damages at Rs. 48,000 plus Rs. 6,000 general damages, deducted 25% for contributory negligence, and awarded Rs. 40,500.
  4. The appellants argued (and the respondent did not effectively contest) that the deceased would likely have married and reduced contributions after about seven years; accordingly his contributions to the mother would not remain Rs. 200 indefinitely and the mother's realistic period of dependence was nearer 15 years. Based on these contentions the appellants urged a maximum compensation of Rs. 32,000.
  5. After reviewing the material evidence on record — the deceased's net income, amounts he would have spent on himself and dependents, and the life expectancy of the dependent mother — the court concluded that the compensation could not exceed Rs. 32,000 and accordingly modified the Tribunal's award to that figure. The court also modified the order regarding payment of court-fee to reflect the reduced amount and allocation between parties.

B. Protection of Dependents and Consequential Orders

  1. The court noted that the amount awarded by the Tribunal had already been deposited in court and invested in a nationalised bank during the pendency of the appeal, with interest being paid to the claimant as an interim arrangement ordered by the court.
  2. The court drew attention to the amendment to Rule 306 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 (amended 31 January 1983) which inserted sub-rules (3) and (4). The opinion reproduces the text of those sub-rules; they permit investment, application and direction by the Tribunal for sums payable to women or persons under legal disability and empower the Tribunal to vary earlier orders in appropriate circumstances.
  3. The court observed that these sub-rules are para materia to sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and referred to section 110AA of the Motor Vehicles Act as leaving options regarding claims covered by the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  4. The court emphasized the legislative purpose behind compensation provisions — to safeguard interests of dependents — and interpreted the expression "just compensation" (used in section 110B) broadly, concluding that the Tribunal is duty-bound to act justly and reasonably so that the benefits of an award reach dependents. Consequently, the Tribunal's jurisdiction to award compensation implies the power and duty to take necessary protective measures, including making consequential orders to prevent exploitation, fraud or misapplication of compensation money.
  5. The opinion expressly adopts and reproduces broad guidelines laid down by the Gujarat High Court in Muljibhai Harijan (1983 AIT & Acc Cases 421), including illustrative directions on investing awards in long-term fixed deposits, conditions for allowing withdrawals, special care for minors, illiterate persons, widows, and permitting applications for emergency withdrawals.
  6. The court clarified that these guidelines are illustrative and additional to the rules (sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 305/306 as referenced in the opinion) and directed the Accident Claims Tribunal to consider the present claimant (described in the opinion as a woman belonging to a backward class community) in light of the relevant statutory rules and the cited guidelines, and to pass appropriate consequential orders after giving the claimant an opportunity to be heard.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The appeal is partly allowed and the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is reduced and modified to Rs. 32,000/-. The opinion states: Rs. 32,000 is the substituted award.

Direct consequences and procedural directions stated in the opinion:

  • The amount previously awarded and deposited is to be treated so that the claimant is entitled to Rs. 32,000 as compensation; the balance sum of Rs. 8,500 may be withdrawn by the appellants.
  • The order regarding payment of court-fee is modified: Original opponents Nos. 1 to 3 are to pay the court-fee on the amount of Rs. 32,000, and the original petitioners (respondents in the appeal) are to pay court-fee on the remaining part of the claims which were dismissed.
  • The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal must pass necessary consequential orders regarding investment of the compensation amount in accordance with law, considering amendments to the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules and the illustrative guidelines reproduced in the opinion. The Tribunal must give the claimant an opportunity to be heard before passing such orders.
  • There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.

Broader implications identified by the court: while no exhaustive, universal rule is laid down, the opinion emphasizes the Tribunal's duty to protect dependents from exploitation, to consider investment of lump-sum awards for vulnerable claimants (minors, illiterate persons, widows), and to exercise its powers to make or vary consequential orders in furtherance of "just compensation". The court adopted and endorsed illustrative guidelines from the Gujarat High Court to assist Tribunals in making such protective orders.

    Nav Bharat Builders v. Pyarabai

    Per Dharmadhikari, J.:— This is an appeal filed by the owner of the vehicle and the Insurance Company against the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Sangli dated 12th of December 1979. It is not disputed that deceased Jagannath died in a motor accident, which look place on 17th of October 1979 on the National Highway known as Bangalore Pune Road. It appears that the deceased Jagannath was sleeping on the road and the motor truck owned by the appellant No. 1 was coming from Kolhapur side and was proceeding to Pune on 17th October 1978. Therefore, it is also not disputed that to some extent the negligence of the deceased. In sleeping on the road was responsible for the accident. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has assessed contributory negligence of deceased Jagannath to the extent of twenty five percent. The learned Member of the Tribunal after appreciating the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the driver of the truck was driving his vehicle negligently as well as rashly and because of his rashness he could not control the vehicle and therefore the accident took place. This finding is also not challenged in this appeal. What is challenged in the appeal is only the quantum of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal. Deceased Jagannath was studying in S.Y.B.A class at the time of his death. He was also getting a scholarship of Rs. 1200/- per annum. He was also conducting coaching classes. The learned Member of the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the income of deceased Jagannath at the time of his death was round-about Rs. 200/- per month and being a student he was handing over his income to his mother. So far as future income of Jagannath is concerned, learned Member found that he would have normally earned Rs. 400/- to 500/- per month by serving in some Government Department or elsewhere and would have given at least Rs. 200/- per month to his mother. Mother of the deceased was 55 years old and therefore she would have received income from her deceased son for at least about 20 years. Therefore learned Member assessed damages at Rs. 48,000/-. To this an amount of Rs. 6,000/- was added being amount of general damages. The learned Member deducted 25 percent from this amount towards contributory negligence of deceased Jagannath and ultimately passed an award of Rs. 40,500/-. It is this award which is challenged in this appeal by the appellants, Shri Chaphekar, learned Counsel for the appellants contended before us that deceased Jagannath could have contributed Rs. 200/- per month to his family for the first seven years, but thereafter he could not have continued to do so because in all probabilities he would have married. In that case it is difficult to hold that he would have continued to contribute Rs. 200/- per month. Learned Member should have held that after marriage Jagannath could have contributed Rs. 150/- only towards family expenditure. The mother of the deceased was 55 years old at the material time and therefore even after taking into consideration estimated increase in the average longevity of life she would have received this amount for another 15 years only. Therefore, according to Shri Chaphekar, even if the findings recorded by the trial Court are accepted, then also total compensation cannot exceed Rs. 32000/-. It was not possible for the learned Counsel for the respondent to dispute this position. With the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing far both sides, we have gone through the material evidence on record. After taking into consideration the net annual income of the deceased by dint of his labour, manual or of the head and heart the amount he would have spent for himself and for his dependents and the expectancy of life span of his dependent mother, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the compensation in the present case cannot exceed Rs. 32,000/-. Hence the award passed by the Claims Tribunal is modified and is substituted by Rs. 32,000/-. The order regarding payment of Court fee also stands suitably modified. Original opponents Nos. 1 to 3 to pay the Court fee on the amount of Rs. 32,000/- and the respondents original petitioners to pay Court fee on the remaining part of the claims made and dismissed.

    2. From the record it appears that the amount awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is already, deposited in the Court and thereafter is invested in a nationalised Bank and the claimant is paid interest thereon regularly. This was an interim arrangement made by this Court during the pendency of the appeal. Since the appeal is being partly allowed, the claimant will be entitled to Rs. 32,000/- towards compensation and the balance of Rs. 8,500/- could be withdrawn by the appellants. However, this is not the end of the matter, as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal will have to pass necessary consequential order regarding Investment of the amount, in accordance with law. In this context we would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal towards the amendment to rule 306 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959. The said Rule stands amended from 31st of January 1983. By this amendment sub-rules (3) and (4) are inserted in rule 306 of the rules, which read as under:—

    “(3) Where any lump sum deposited with the Tribunal is payable to a woman or a person under a legal “disability, such sum may be invested, applied or otherwise dealt with for the benefit of the woman or such person during his disability in such manner as the Tribunal may direct and where a quarterly payment is payable to any person under the legal disability, the Tribunal may of its own motion or on any application made to it in that behalf, order that the payment be made during the disability of the person concerned to any dependent of the injured or heir of the deceased or to any other person whom the Tribunal thinks best fitted to provide for the welfare of the injured or the heir of the deceased.

    (4) Where an application made to the Tribunal in this behalf or otherwise, the Tribunal is satisfied that on account of the neglect of the children on the part of the parents or on account of the variation of the circumstances of any dependent or for any other sufficient cause, an order of the Tribunal, as to the distribution of any sum paid or compensation or as to the manner in which any sum payable to any such dependent is to be invested applied or otherwise dealt with, ought to be varied, the Tribunal may make such orders for the variation of the former order as it thinks just in the circumstances of the case.”

    3. These sub-rules are para materia to sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In this context it is worthwhile to note that by section 110AA of Motor Vehicles Act an option is left open regarding claims for compensation covered by M.V Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act. It cannot also be forgotten that provision for payment of compensation was introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act primarily to safeguard interests of the dependents of the deceased. Therefore, it is the duty of the Tribunal to see that the dependents do not fall prey to machinations or be subjected to deceit or fraud. Provision for payment of compensation is part of social security scheme and the dependents cannot be permitted to be robbed by anti social elements. This is more so, because many times dependents are from lower strata of society, are illiterate and ignorant of their right and had no chance in life to see or handle such a big amount. Therefore, they are not able to understand what is in their best interest. In such circumstances. It is the duty of the Tribunal to assist and guide them. Section 110B has used the expression ‘Compensation’ and not damage, it empowers the Tribunal to determine “just compensation” and specify a person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This determination is known as award. Loss of life cannot be measured in terms of money nor the loss of life of main bread-earner can fully be compensated. However, while determining just compensation the loss to the claimant of future pecuniary benefit is relevant. Therefore, while determining the compensation some times it is taken into consideration as how much interest will be earned on the lump-sum awarded. The reason for this is obvious. A prudent man receiving lump-sum amount, so as to make good his loss over a period, is expected to invest it and to use it gradually. The word “just” used in section 110B has a wider import. Therefore, in our view the use of expressions like “just compensation” and “award” is indicative of the intention of the legislature. It is implicit in these expressions that the Tribunal is duty-bound to act in a just and reasonable manner so that the fruits of the award will reach the dependents. Since the Act has conferred jurisdiction upon the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to determine just compensation and specify the person or persons to whom it shall ??? paid it impliedly also grants the power of doing such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to achieve the said purpose. Jurisdiction and power conferred upon the Tribunal to award just compensation are coupled with a duty. While passing an award for compensation, the Tribunal is duty bound to guard the interest of the dependents for whose benefit it is made. The Tribunal cannot act as an onlooker, but is duty-bound to pass consequential orders to protect the dependents from exploitation, malpractices and misapplication of compensation money. This seems to be the reason why by an interim order this Court directed that the amount deposited should be invested in a Nationalised Bank and the interest thereon should be paid to the claimant. Nature of consequential order will obviously depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in that behalf. Any rule framed or guidelines laid down can never be exhaustive. However, we generally agree with the guidelines laid down by Gujrat High Court in 1(Muljibhai Harijan v. United India insurance Co., Ltd.), 1983 All India Transport & Acc. Cases page 421. Broad guidelines as laid down by Gujrat High Court read as under:

    “(i) The Claims Tribunal should in the case of minors invariably order the amount of compensation awarded to the minor be invested in long term fixed deposits at least till the date of the minor attaining majority. The expenses incurred by the guardian or next friend may however be allowed to be withdrawn;

    (ii) In the case of illiterate claimants also the Claims Tribunal should follow the procedure set out in (i) above, but if lump-sum payment is required for effecting purchases of any movable or immovable property. Such as, agricultural implements, rickshaw, etc. to earn a living the Tribunal may consider such an request after making sure that the amount is actually spent for the purpose and the demand is not a ruse to withdraw money.

    (iii) In the case of semi-literate persons the Tribunal should ordinarily resort to the procedure set out at (i) above unless it is satisfied, for reasons to be stated in writing, that the whole or part of the amount is required for expanding any existing business or for purchasing some property as mentioned in (ii) above for earning his livelihood, in which case the Tribunal will ensure that the amount is invested for the purpose for which it is demanded and paid.

    (iv) In the case of literate persons also the Tribunal may resort to the procedure Indicated in (i) above, subject to the relaxation set out in (ii) and (iii) above if having regard to the age, fiscal back-ground and strata of society to which the claimant belongs and such other considerations, the Tribunal in the larger interest of the claimant and with a view to ensuring the safety of the compensation awarded to him thinks it necessary to so order.

    (v) In the case of widows the Claims Tribunal should invariably follow the procedure set out in (i) above.

    (vi) In personal injury cases if further treatment is necessary the Claims Tribunal on being satisfied about the same, which shall be recorded in writing, permit withdrawal of such amount as is necessary for incurring the expenses for such treatment.

    (vii) In all cases in which investment in long term fixed deposits is made it should be on condition that the Bank will not permit any loan or advance on the fixed deposit and interest on the amount invested is paid monthly directly to the claimant or his gurdian, as the esse may be.

    (viii) In all cases Tribunal should grant to the claimants liberty to apply for withdrawal in case of an emergency. To meet with such a contingency, if the amount awarded is substantial, the Claims Tribunal may invest it in more than one Fixed Deposit so that if need be one such F.D.R can be liquidated”

    4. These guidelines are not exhaustive but are merely illustrative. These guidelines are also in addition and not in derogation to sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 305 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules. We, therefore, direct the Accident Claims Tribunal to consider the case of present claimant, who is a woman belonging to the backward class community, in the light of the relevant rules and aforesaid guidelines and then pass an appropriate order. Obviously such an order will have to be passed after giving an opportunity of being heard to the claimant.

    5. In the result, therefore, the appeal is partly allowed. The amount of compensation is reduced to Rs. 32,000/-. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The parties will now appear before the Accidents Claims Tribunal for seeking appropriate consequential orders regarding investment etc. of the compensation amount and payment of court-fees.

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    Nav Bharat Builders v. Pyarabai
    (Nov 22, 1983)