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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment (Pratap, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs are owners/trustees of a building known as Morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust Building at Kennedy Bridge, Bombay. Since about 1950 the defendant was a tenant of room No. 18 on the first floor. In or about October 1968 the defendant purchased a car and began parking it in the open space of the compound (ground floor open space) of the building. The plaintiffs objected and issued up to three notices asking him to remove the car and to stop parking there; the defendant did not comply or reply.

The plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that the defendant's parking in the compound amounted to trespass and for a permanent injunction. The defendant raised two defences: (1) he had express permission from one of the trustees to park; and (2) he had a statutory right under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the Act) to park.

The trial court rejected both defences, found trespass, and decreed the suit. The defendant appealed; before the single Judge the defendant's contention that he had proved permission was not challenged, but the single Judge held that (a) the ground floor open space was "appurtenant" to the leased first-floor room within S. 5(8)(b) of the Act and thus formed part of "premises", and (b) car parking was an essential service under S. 24(1) of the Act, so the plaintiffs could not withhold it. The single Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the trial decree and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs (originally the appellants) filed this appeal under the Letters Patent challenging that decision.

At this stage the plaintiffs were represented by counsel (Mr. K.J. Abhyankar); the defendant, though served, did not appear.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the open space on the ground floor in the compound of the suit building is "appurtenant" to the leased room on the first floor within the meaning of S. 5(8)(b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (so as to form part of the statutory definition of "premises").
  2. Whether car parking in the compound constituted an "essential supply or service" enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the premises let to him within the meaning of S. 24(1) of the Act, thereby giving the defendant a statutory right to park.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The defendant's parking in the compound constituted trespass and they sought a declaration and permanent injunction to restrain it.
  • The plaintiffs maintained that the ground floor open space was not appurtenant to the first-floor room and therefore did not form part of "premises" under S. 5(8)(b) of the Act.
  • They contended that car parking was not an essential supply or service under S. 24(1) and that the defendant had no statutory right to park.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The defendant asserted he had express permission from one of the trustees to park in the compound.
  • Alternatively, he claimed a statutory right to park emerging from the Act: (a) the ground floor open space was "appurtenant" to the leased first-floor room under S. 5(8)(b) so it formed part of the "premises"; and (b) parking amounted to an "essential supply or service" under S. 24(1), which the landlord could not lawfully withhold.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Trim v. Sturminster Rural District Council, (1938) 2 KB 508 Illustrates that whether adjacent land is "appurtenances" depends on the particular facts; even where land had been enjoyed with a cottage, the word "appurtenances" does not automatically include all adjacent land. The court treated Trim as not helping the defendant. The judgment was read to show that appurtenance depends on facts and that even substantial adjacent land (ten acres) was not automatically appurtenant. The ratio was used to support the plaintiffs' position that ground-floor compound space was not necessarily appurtenant to a first-floor room.
J.H. Irani v. Chidambaran Chettiar, AIR 1953 Mad 650 Held that where grounds appurtenant to a building are let along with the building they fall within the Act's definition of "building"; used the secondary sense of "appurtenant" (e.g., "relating to", "usually enjoyed or occupied with", "adjoining"). The court distinguished this Madras ruling from the present facts: it involved land/site forming part of the structure's occupancy. The ratio was considered to run against the defendant's case; the court concluded that the Madras decision supported plaintiffs because land adjoining a superstructure differs from ground-floor space vis-à-vis a first-floor room.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The judgment proceeds in two principal analytical strands tied to the two statutory provisions relied on by the defendant: S. 5(8)(b) (definition of "premises") and S. 24(1) (prohibition on withholding essential supplies or services).

On S. 5(8)(b) and the concept of "appurtenant":

  1. The court began by observing that "appurtenant" is a term of variable import and cannot be the subject of a single fixed test; whether something is appurtenant is a mixed question of fact and law that depends on the facts and context.
  2. Authoritative dictionaries and standard legal texts were surveyed (Words and Phrases Judicially Defined; Halsbury's; Woodfall; Oxford English Dictionary; New Webster's) to extract the secondary, non-technical meaning relevant to S. 5(8)(b): essentially "usually enjoyed with", "relating to", "adjoining", "an adjunct or accessory". The court emphasised that in the context of S. 5(8)(b) the term must be read in this secondary sense.
  3. Applying that understanding, the court set out minimum conceptual requirements for something to be appurtenant: there must be a fair and rational nexus between the leased premises and the appurtenant premises; the appurtenant premises must be inevitably implied in and essential to the use and convenient enjoyment of the leased premises (i.e., necessary for convenient enjoyment and usually enjoyed with the demised part).
  4. The court then applied those principles to the facts: the leased accommodation was a single room on the first floor; the open compound space was on the ground floor. The court found the location and circumstances negative any claim that the ground-floor space was appurtenant to a first-floor room: it neither adjoined nor pertained to nor was usually enjoyed with that room and was not necessary for its convenient enjoyment. Therefore, the compound could not be regarded as appurtenant within S. 5(8)(b).
  5. The court considered the authorities relied on by the single Judge and the defendant (Trim and J.H. Irani) and concluded they did not support the defendant's case because the factual contexts were materially different. Where land or site is integrally associated with a building or superstructure so as to be enjoyed with it, the secondary sense of "appurtenant" may apply; that was not the present situation of a separate open compound area vis-à-vis a discrete first-floor room.

On S. 24(1) and the contention that parking is an essential service:

  1. The court set out the essential ingredients to invoke S. 24(1): (a) the supply or service must be "essential"; (b) it must have been cut off or withheld without just or sufficient cause; (c) it must have been "enjoyed by the tenant"; and (d) it must be "in respect of the premises let to him". All these minimum ingredients must be satisfied to make out a case under S. 24(1).
  2. The court held that car parking is not an essential supply or service within the meaning of S. 24(1). Therefore there was no question of an essential service being withheld. On the facts in this case parking could not be characterised as a service enjoyed by the tenant "in respect of the premises let to him". Consequently S. 24(1) did not apply and could not confer a statutory right to park.

Having found that neither S. 5(8)(b) nor S. 24(1) supported the defendant, and noting that the trial court had correctly rejected the defendant's claim of permission from a trustee, the court concluded that the trial court's finding of trespass and its decree should be restored.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal under the Letters Patent is allowed in favour of the plaintiffs. The court made the following dispositive orders:

  • Appeal allowed.
  • The impugned judgment and decree in First Appeal No. 449 of 1971 (which had set aside the trial decree) is set aside.
  • The decree passed by the trial Court in Suit No. 8776 of 1968 (which had decreed trespass and granted permanent injunction) is restored and confirmed.
  • There is no order as to costs of this appeal.

Implications: The direct effect is to reinstate the trial court's determination that the defendant committed trespass and is not entitled to park in the compound by virtue of either S. 5(8)(b) or S. 24(1) of the Act, nor by virtue of any proven permission. The opinion contains a careful statement of the principles for construing "appurtenant" in the context of the Act, but it does not purport to lay down a universal test — rather it applies the secondary sense of "appurtenant" to the facts and distinguishes prior authorities. The judgment does not announce any broader statutory innovation; its primary consequence is the restoration of the trial court's decree in the particular circumstances of this case.

Appeal allowed.

    Morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust And Others v. Madhav Vithal Kudwa .

    Pratap, J.:— Arising for determination in this appeal by the original plaintiffs is a question of some importance under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter the Act).

    2. Since the year 1950 or so the defendant (respondent) herein has been plaintiffs' tenant of room No. 18 on the first floor of a building known as Morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust Building situated at Kennedy Bridge in the city of Bombay. In or about October 1968, the defendant purchased a car which he commenced parking in the open space of the compound of the said building. The plaintiffs objected. As many as three notices were issued to remove the car from the said compound and cease parking it there. The defendant did not comply nor did he reply to any of these notices. The plaintiffs thereupon filed the instant suit for a declaration that the defendant, by parking his car in the compound, was committing trespass and for permanent injunction restraining him from doing so. The defendant raised two defences viz., (a) he was parking the car under express permission from one of the trustees; and (b) in any event, he had, under the Act, a statutory right to do so. The trial Court negatived both these defences, held the defendant's action to constitute a trespass and decreed the suit.

    3. The defendant appealed to this Court. At the hearing, the trial Court's finding that the defendant had failed to prove permission to park was not challenged. The learned single Judge hearing the appeal, however, held that the ground floor open space in the compound of the building was “appurtenant” to the leased ‘room on the first floor within the meaning of S. 5(8)(b) of the Act and, therefore, “premises” as defined therein. It was also held that parking car was an essential service within the meaning of S. 24(1) of the Act and the plaintiffs' therefore, cannot cut off or withhold the same. The defendant was consequently held to have a statutory right to park his car without any permission from the plaintiffs. The appeal was thus allowed, the trial Court's decree was set aside and the suit dismissed. Hence, this appeal therefrom under the Letters Patent.

    4. The plaintiffs are represented by their learned counsel Mr. K.J Abhyankar. The defendant, though served, has not chosen to appear.

    5. Hearing the learned counsel Mr. Abhyankar and going through the impugned judgment and the relevant provisions of the Act, we find ourselves unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the learned single Judge. The question first arising for determination is:

    Is the open space on the ground floor in the compound of the suit building “appurtenant” to the leased premises viz., the room on the first floor within the meaning of S. 5(8)(b) of the Act? To the extent relevant, the said provision runs thus:

    “‘Premises’ means —

    ………………

    (b) any building or part of a building let or given on licence separately (other than a farm building) including—

    (i) the garden, grounds, garages and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building.

    Now, though one wishes that on the question here the law was certain and succinct, it would, in the very nature of things, not be possible to formulate a precise and singular test or a principle of universal application for determining what is appurtenant. The diversity and the indeterminate nature of the term “appurtenant” and colour, form and shape it can take from case to case can be very interesting indeed. It is a term of variable import, scope and ambit. There can, therefore, be no fixed, invariable or strait-jacket approach or formula in this regard. Besides, whether a thing is appurtenant and if so, to what extent, would be a mixed question of fact and law. The resultant answer must, in each case, turn and depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case and the context in which the question arises. Nevertheless, a look at the standard references should be useful.

    6. In Words And Phrases Judicially Defined (Butterworth & Co.) it is stated thus:

    “The ward ‘appurtenances’ has a distinct and definite meaning, and though it may be enlarged by the context, it the burden of proof lies on those who so contend. Prima facie, it imparts nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass without being specially mentioned.”

    On this aspect, a statement of the law in Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition, Volume 27, page 103, paragraph 130) can also assist:

    “Meaning of ‘house’, ‘messuage’ and ‘appurtenances’.

    “By a lease of a ‘house’ outbuildings occupied with and necessary fox the convenient occupation of the house will pass, and also a courtyard, garden and orchard. ‘Messuage’ has “the same meaning as ‘house’. In the expression ‘house and premises’, ‘premises’ refers only to matters intimately connected with the house. The words ‘with the appurtenances’ do not extend the demise so as to include land or buildings which are used with the demised property, tout are not parcel of it nor do they include a part of the building which has been separated from it and has not been occupied with it tor many years previous to the demise. The wards ‘lands appertaining to’ or ‘lands belonging to’ are more easily extended to land usually occupied with the demised premises.”

    Yet another inkling in this field can be had from Woodfall's Law of Landlord and Tenant (Twentyeighth Edition, Volume 1, 1978). ‘Firstly at page 195:

    “According to the curnent of the most recent decisions it would seem that nothing will pass under the ward ‘appurtenances’ which would not equally pass toy a conveyance of the principal subject-matter, without the ward ‘appurtenances’.”

    And then at page 197:

    “The ward ‘appurtenances’ is not properly apt for the creation of a new right; but the word easily admits of a secondary meaning, where the circumstances require, as equivalent to ‘usually occupied’. Where a strip of ground formed a convenient means of access to the back doors of a row of cottages which were in common ownership, and the cottages were sold to different purchasers, each grant being of a cottage ‘with the garden, out building and appurtenances’ and including the part of the strip adjeining that cottage, it was held that the right of way the facto enjoyed by the tenants up to the date of the conveyances passed by way of express grant under the word ‘appurtenances’, although there was no made road over the strip.”

    The Oxford English Dictionary explains “appurtenance” as follows:—

    “A thing that belongs to another, a ‘belonging’; a minor property, right, or privilege, belonging to another mere important, and passing in possession with it; an appendage.”

    “A thing which naturally and fitly forms a subordinate part of, or belongs to, a whole system; a contributory adjunct, an accessory.”

    And the word “appurtenant” is explained thus:

    “belonging as a property or legal right; constituting a property or right subsidiary to one which is more important.”

    “Appertaining as if by right; proper, suited, or appropriate to; relating, pertinent.”

    “A thing appertaining; a ‘belonging’. “The New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language explains the two terms “appurtenance” and in “appurtenant” as follows:—

    “‘appurtenance’ — ……a belonging. That which appertains, belongs, or is subordinate to something else; an adjunct; an appendage. A right or feature belonging to a property and passing with it if the property is sold.”

    “‘Appurtenant’ — …… Appertaining or belonging; having the effect of a legal accompaniment.”

    7. In the context of S. 5(8)(b) of the Act, the term “appurtenant” has to be construed not in its primary sense but in its secondary, non-technical sense such as “usually enjoyed with.” The concept indicates something appurtenant to the tease and not the lease itself. So construed, it would mean “reining to”, “adjoining”, “an adjunct or an accessory” to the premises let. Plain meaning of the provision simpliciter indicates a nexus between the premises leased and the premises appurtenant thereto. There has to be a fair and rational correlation between the two. Premises to be appurtenant must fee premises inevitably implied in and essential to the use and enjoyment of the premises let. Not a constuent pant of the lease, but necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the lease and, therefore, intended to be “premises” within its definition in S. 5(8)(b) of the Act

    8. Considered in this context, what would be the position here? is it possible, reasonably speaking, to hold that the open space in the compound, cm the ground floor of the suit building; is appurtenant to the leased room on the first floor? The obvious answer is no. The very location of the leased premises on the first floor negatives the defendant's case. After all, to what extent cam the term “appurtenant” go? Can it here be extended to the open space in the compound on the ground floor? We thing not. Is this ground floor space necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the room on the first floor? Once again, our answer is no. It would be a misnomer to describe the ground floor area as appurtenant to the first floor room the ground floor area, neither pertains nor relates to nor adjoins the first floor room. Nor can it legitimately be said that the ground floor area is usually enjoyed or occupied with the first floor room. It is neither an adjunct nor an accessory nor an appendage qua the first floor room.

    9. Coming to the authorities cited before the learner single Judge, we feel with, great respect, that it would not he correct to infer and conclude therefrom in favour of the defendant. Apart from the position that altogether different were the facts, as also the context in which the question arose in those cases, even the broad ratio emerging therefrom does not help the defendant here. Indeed, it supports the plaintiffs. If the “appurtenant” premise is actually let out, then of course, irrespective of whether it is or is not appurtenant, it obviously is part and parcel of the lease itself. That was precisely the position in Trim v. Sturminster Rural District Council, (1938) 2 KB 508, where the ten acres of grass land had been actually let out for years past along with the cottage, garden and orchard as one unit initially to at dairy farmer and thereafter to a poultry farmer. Yet, even so, when later, on — apparently after the expiry of the lease — question arose whether these ten acres were appurtenant to the cottage, garden and orchard, it was held that:

    “……The learned comity judge was wrong in holding that the word ‘appurtenances’ included the ten acres. How such of the adjacent land ought to be included in the word ‘appurtenances’ depends on the facts of the particular case.”

    It is difficult, therefore, to see how this case can be of any help to the defendant. On the contrary, the ruling goes to show that in any event the entire ten acres of land was not appurtenant to the cottage, garden and orchard in question. And to determine on the facts and circumstances of that case how much off the adjacent land could be legitimately called appurtenant, the matter was sent back to the county judge.

    10. In the Madras ruling J.H Irani v. Chidambaran Chettiar, AIR 1953 Mad 650, the plaintiff had obtained a lease of the suit land excluding the theatre thereon known as, Gaiety Theatre which, was owned by defendant No. 1. The land lease in favour of the plaintiff was to come into effect after termination off the subsisting lease in favour of defendant No. 1. As defendant No. 1 did? not remove the theatre structure and did not give vacant possession of the land, the plaintiff filed suit to recover vacant possession after removal of the theatre structure. Defendant No. 1 contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to evict him because what was leased to him (defendant No. 1) viz., the suit land was a “building” within the meaning off S. 2(1) of the Madras Buildings. (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 and he (defendant No. 1) was, therefore, protected by the said Act, and not liable to be evicted by way of such a suit. In that case the definition of “building” in s. 2(1) of the aforesaid act meant not only any building, as such but also included, the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appurtenant thereto. Thus, ground or land appurtenant to a building, was also itself a building under the Act The learned, trial Judge dismissed, the suit holding (at p. 652):

    “Having regard to thee wide connotation that was given to the word ‘building’, the purpose for which the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was enacted the nature of the structures in the suit premises and the manner in which the entire premises were being let out and used for a number of years, at any rate, from 1914 and the purpose for which the building was taken on rent by the lessee from time to time leave no doubt in my mind that the suit premises come within the meaning of the word ‘building’ under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946”.

    In plaintiff's appeal, the Division Bench affirmed this finding and conclusion. It was held that a building consisted not only of the superstructure (theatre) but also the site on which it stood and in which its foundation is erected. Therefore, what in substance was let to defendant No. 1 was the entire property including the land on which the theatre stood and which land formed part of the building. (See paragraph 13 of the ruling). It was further held that the ground, if any, appurtenant to a building was included in the definition of “building” in the Act. Consequently, if the entire ground was occupied for continuing the superstructure (theatre) along with the lessor's building and the whole treated as one unit, the site may be treated as an appurtenance in the secondary sense of the word. (See paragraph 15 of the ruling). Again, in paragraph 26 of the ruling, it was observed thus:

    “In my opinion the word ‘appurtenant’ occurring in the definition of ‘building’ in the Act with which we are concerned is used in the broad secondary and non-technical sense of ‘relating to’, ‘usually enjoyed or occupied with’ and ‘adjoining’ just noticed by me. The idea of the legislature seems to be that if grounds appurtenant to the building in this sense are let along with the building they should stand attracted to the operation of the Act.”

    11. As in Trim's case (1938) 2 KB 508, so also in this case, it is difficult to see how it supports the defendant. On the contrary and shorn of factors and elements not relevant hereto, the decision and ratio thereof favours the plaintiffs. There is, indeed, a world of difference between a land adjoining or adjacent to or underneath a structure as in the Madras ruling and land on the ground floor in relation to a room on the first floor as in the present case. The former is a clear instance of land being appurtenant to the structure and the latter equally so a clear instance but to the contrary viz., the land on the ground floor by no stretch being appurtenant to the room on the first floor. Again, as in the Madras ruling, here also the word “appurtenant” is used in the secondary sense. Thus, the authorities sought to be relied upon by the defendant do not really help him but rather aid the plaintiffs. The principle of both these authorities runs counter to his case. His case is also not based on any recognised principle of law. It also stands unsupported by any binding authority. It also cannot be reconciled with justice. We, therefore, conclude this aspect against him and hold that the open space in the compound of the suit building is not appurtenant to the leased suit room on the first floor and, therefore, does not constitute “premises” within the meaning of S. 5(8)(b) of the Act.

    12. Yet another ground on which the defendant claimed right to park his car — and which claim also was upheld by the learned single Judge — was that car parking was an essential service within the meaning of S. 24(1) of the Act. We are afraid, here also, with great respect, we are unable to agree. S. 24(1) reads thus:

    “No landlord either himself or through any person acting or purporting to act on his behalf shall without just or sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the premises let to him.”

    Now, to attract the said provision, the supply or service must be essential; it must have been, without just and sufficient cause, cut off or withheld; it must have been enjoyed by the tenant; and it must be in respect of the premises let to him. It is only on the fulfilment of these minimum ingredients that a case under S. 24(1) can be said to have been made out. The defendant has failed to establish these conditions. In the first place, car parking is itself not an essential supply or service. In objecting thereto, there is no question, therefore, of cutting off or withholding any essential supply or service. What is more, on the facts here, car parking cannot be said to be a service or a supply:

    “……enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the premises let to him.”

    within the meaning of S. 24(1) of the Act. The said provision has thus no application to the present case. Reliance placed thereon by the defendant can, therefore, be of no avail.

    13. The defendant thus fails to prove that he has, as a result of either S. 5(8)(b) or S. 24(1) of the Act, a statutory right to park his car in the suit compound. Even under the general law, we see no such right in him. And finally, his plea of permission to park has also rightly stood rejected. The suit, being an action in trespass, had been rightly decreed. Its reversal in appeal would, therefore, have to be rectified;

    14. In the result, this appeal under the Letters Patent succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree in First Appeal No. 449 of 1971 is set aside and the decree passed by the trial Court in Suit No. 8776 of 1968 is restored and confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs of this appeal.

    Appeal allowed.
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    Comments

    Morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust And Others v. Madhav Vithal Kudwa .
    (Nov 23, 1982)