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Acts
  • S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes "Act". 1947 (hereinafter referred
  • sub-s. 2(c) of S. 4 of the Payment of Gratuity "Act", 1972.
  • sub-s. 2 (c) of S. 4 of the Payment of Gratuity "Act"
  • retrenchment". Sub-section (1) of S. 25B
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Acts
  • S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes "Act". 1947 (hereinafter referred
  • sub-s. 2(c) of S. 4 of the Payment of Gratuity "Act", 1972.
  • sub-s. 2 (c) of S. 4 of the Payment of Gratuity "Act"
  • retrenchment". Sub-section (1) of S. 25B
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Article 226 challenges the legality of the order dated September 27, 1977 passed by the Presiding Officer, 4th Labour Court, Bombay, which dismissed an application filed by the workman under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("the Act").

The petitioner (workman) worked for respondent No. 1 mills between January 1945 and April 1975 and drew daily wages of Rs. 18. He tendered resignation under a Voluntary Retirement Scheme in April 1975, and the company paid Rs. 3,260 as retrenchment compensation. The petitioner claimed an entitlement to Rs. 8,100 and filed an application under S.33C(2) to recover the balance, asserting entitlement under S.25F of the Act.

Respondent No.1 (the mills) contested the claim, arguing the petitioner had not been in continuous service: they alleged he left service in 1958 and was re-employed and, in several years (including 1948, 1958, 1965, 1967 and 1971–1974), did not work the requisite 240 days, so could not be deemed in continuous service under S.25B.

The Labour Court examined evidence and found (a) that the employer's contention of re-employment in 1958 could not be accepted, but (b) that the petitioner did not work 240 days in eight years and thus was not in continuous service; and (c) refused to decide a separate claim about an unlawful deduction of Rs. 916.88 (lay-off compensation) on the ground it was not pleaded.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Labour Court's order dated September 27, 1977 dismissing the workman's application under S.33C(2) of the Act was legally permissible.
  2. Whether the petitioner was in "continuous service" from January 1945 to April 1975 for the purpose of calculating retrenchment compensation under S.25F of the Act, in light of S.25B(1) and S.25B(2).
  3. Whether deduction of Rs. 916.88 as lay-off compensation from retrenchment compensation was justified.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Workman's) Arguments — represented by Shri Desai

  • The Labour Court erred in holding that the petitioner was not in continuous service; the finding that the petitioner had unauthorised leave in some years does not amount to interruption of continuous service as contemplated by S.25B(1).
  • The refusal to entertain the claim about the deduction of lay-off compensation (Rs. 916.88) on the ground of non-pleading was hyper-technical and unjust; Annexure "A" to the application referred to this deduction, and there was an admission in evidence that lay-off compensation had been deducted without agreement.
  • Relied on precedent to argue that mere absence without leave or participation in an illegal strike does not automatically break continuous service unless the employee is dismissed or resigns.

Respondent No.1 (Mills) Arguments — represented by counsel including Shri Shetye

  • The petitioner did not have continuous service because his service was interrupted — he left in 1958 and was re-employed.
  • The petitioner failed to work at least 240 days in several years, thus he cannot be deemed to be in continuous service under S.25B(2).
  • On the point of lay-off deduction, the mills' Assistant Labour Officer admitted that lay-off compensation had been deducted out of retrenchment compensation and that there was no agreement for such deduction; before the High Court, Shri Shetye did not challenge the accuracy of the workman's claimed entitlement to Rs. 2,997.68 (the net amount claimed after adjustments) and conceded the workman would be entitled to Rs. 916.88.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jairam Sonu Shogule v. New India Rayon Mill Co. Ltd., [1958-I L.L.J. 28] (Division Bench) Participation in an illegal strike may amount to misconduct and invite dismissal, but unless the employee is actually dismissed, there is continuity of service — an employee continues in service until dismissed or discharged. The Court relied on this decision to hold that sub-s. (1) of S.25B (in identical terms to earlier S.2(eee)) does not treat unauthorised absence (or strike participation) by itself as breaking continuity; therefore unauthorised leave did not suffice to find interruption of continuous service here.
M/s Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. v. Its Workman, [1961-I L.L.J. 517] (Supreme Court) "Continuous service" postulates continuance of master-servant relationship; resignation or employer-termination or operation of law ends continuity; mere absence without leave or participation in an illegal strike does not necessarily end continuity. The Court treated this authority as concluding the controversy: it supports the proposition that mere failure to work specified days in some years (or absence without leave) does not end continuous service for purposes of retrenchment/gratuity and similar social legislation.
Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and another, [1981-I L.L.J. 386] Used to demonstrate that clauses (1) and (2) of S.25B cover distinct contingencies; sub-s. (2) applies only if the workman is not in continuous service under sub-s. (1). The Court cited this to interpret S.25B: sub-s. (2) is contingent on a finding that sub-s. (1) does not apply (i.e., there is no continuous service), so the 240-day rule in sub-s. (2) comes into play only when continuity under sub-s. (1) is absent.
Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd., [1981-II L.L.J. 70] Also relied upon to show the separate operation of sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) of S.25B and to support interpretation that the deeming provision in sub-s. (2) applies only where sub-s. (1) is not satisfied. The Court referred to this decision to reinforce its interpretation that the existence of continuous service must be first determined under sub-s. (1) before applying sub-s. (2).
Lalappa Lingappa & others v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd., [1981-I L.L.J. 308] (Supreme Court) Considered the ambit of Explanation I and II of sub-s.2(c) of S.4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and addressed the meaning of "actually worked" in that context. The Court held this precedent was not applicable to the present controversy because the issue which arose in that case (the "actually worked" question) was neither argued nor considered in the present case; therefore, the High Court did not apply it to change its result.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court proceeded in two connected strands of analysis: (A) the contested deduction of lay-off compensation (Rs. 916.88), and (B) the principal issue of whether the petitioner had continuous service for purposes of retrenchment compensation under S.25F read with S.25B.

(A) Deduction of lay-off compensation

  • The Labour Court refused to entertain the workman's claim on the deduction on the technical ground that it was not specifically pleaded. The High Court disagreed with this hyper-technical approach because Annexure "A" to the application did specifically refer to the deduction while computing the claimed amount.
  • The High Court placed weight on an admission in cross-examination by the mills' Assistant Labour Officer that "We have deducted lay-off compensation out of retrenchment compensation paid to the applicants" and that there was no agreement for such deduction with either the union or the workers.
  • The employer's counsel (Shri Shetye) did not support the deduction and fairly stated that the workman would be entitled to Rs. 916.88. On these bases the High Court concluded the Labour Court was wrong to refuse consideration of the deduction and accepted that the deduction was not justified.

(B) Continuous service under S.25B (and entitlement to retrenchment under S.25F)

  • The Court set out the text of S.25B(1) and S.25B(2). S.25B(1) defines "continuous service" as uninterrupted service, including interruptions for sickness, authorised leave, accident, legal strike, lock-out or cessation of work not due to the worker's fault. S.25B(2) provides deeming provisions for workmen who are not in continuous service as defined in cl. (1), prescribing the 240 days (or 120 days for six months) thresholds.
  • The Labour Court found that in eight years the workman did not work 240 days and had gone on unauthorised leave; it treated that as interrupting continuous service. Shri Desai argued (and the Court accepted) that mere unauthorised absence does not, by itself, break continuity — only acts such as resignation or dismissal/termination do so unless the employee is actually dismissed.
  • The Court relied on precedents: the Division Bench decision in Jairam Sonu Shogule (1958) which held that participation in an illegal strike invites dismissal but does not in itself destroy continuity unless dismissal occurs; and the Supreme Court in Jeewanlal (1961) which held that continuity postulates master-servant relationship and that mere absence without leave does not necessarily terminate continuity.
  • The High Court reasoned that the deeming provision in S.25B(2) is operative only where sub-s. (1) does not apply — in other words, S.25B(2)'s 240-day rule is a fallback for those not in continuous service as per sub-s. (1). Therefore the Labour Court should first have determined whether there was a break in continuous service under sub-s. (1); since there was no dismissal or resignation, the Court found that there was continuous service throughout January 1945 to April 1975.
  • On that basis, the High Court concluded the Labour Court erred in ignoring the entire period of service when calculating retrenchment compensation under S.25F, and that the petitioner was entitled to retrenchment compensation computed over the whole period of service.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition succeeds. The High Court set aside the Labour Court's order dated September 27, 1977, which had dismissed the application under S.33C(2). The High Court held that the petitioner was in continuous service from January 1945 to April 1975 and therefore entitled to retrenchment compensation calculated over the entire period of service.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • Respondent No.1 is directed to pay the petitioner an amount of Rs. 2,997.68 forthwith (this amount was not disputed as accurate by Shri Shetye).
  • If the amount is not paid within four weeks from the date of the High Court order, the petitioner is entitled to interest at 12% per annum.
  • Respondent No.1 is at liberty to deposit the amount in the Labour Court.
  • Respondent No.1 shall pay the costs of the petitioner.

The opinion relies on established precedent to interpret continuity under S.25B and does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law; it applies existing authorities to the facts and corrects what it found to be the Labour Court's erroneous application of the statutory scheme and treatment of the pleadings.

    Ramasamuz Narsing Upadhyaya v. Vinubhai M. Mitra

    1. By this petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the legality of the order dated September 27, 1977 passed by the Presiding Officer, 4th Labour Court, Bombay whereby the application filed by the workmen under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes "Act". 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the

    "Act"
    ) was dismissed.

    2. The petitioner was in the employment of respondent No. 1 mills between January, 1945 and April, 1975 and was drawing daily wages at the rate of Rs. 18. The petitioner tendered resignation in the month of April, 1975 under Voluntary Retirement Scheme. On retirement, the Company paid the petitioner an amount of Rs. 3,260 towards the retrenchment compensation. The petitioner claims that he was entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 8,100 and to recover the balance amount, the petitioner filed the application under S. 33-C(2) of the "Act" before the Labour Court. The petitioner claimed that he is entitled to retrenchment compensation as per the provisions of S. 25F of the "Act". The application was resisted by the respondent No. 1-Mills-Inter-alia claiming that the petitioner had joined the service in January, 1955 but he was not in continuous service till April, 1975. The company claimed that the service of the petitioner was interrupted as the petitioner left the service in the year 1958 and was re-employed. The company also claimed that as the petitioner had not worked for a period of 240 days every year in the years 1948, 1958, 1965, 1967 and 1971 to 1974, the petitioner could not be deemed to be in continuous service as contemplated by S. 25B of the "Act".

    3. The Labour Court, after recording the evidence led on behalf of the workman and the employer, came to the conclusion that the contention of the employer that the petitioner was re-employed in the year 1958 could not be accepted. The Labour Court accepted the claim of the mills that the petitioner did not work for a period of 240 days every year in eight years during his service. The Labour Court thereupon held that the claim made by the petitioner that he was in continuous service could not be accepted. The workman had made a grievance that the company had deducted an amount of Rs. 916.88 towards the lay-off compensation while determining the amount of retrenchment compensation and that was contrary to the rules. The Labour Court declined to consider that question on the ground that it was not pleaded in the application filed by the workman.

    4. Shri Desai, the learned counsel appearing in support of the petition, submitted that the conclusion recorded by the Labour Court that the petitioner was not in continuous service is clearly erroneous. The learned counsel also challenged the observation of the Labour Court that the petitioner did not plead that the company was in error in deducing lay-off compensation out of the retrenchment compensation. It would be convenient to dispose of the ground about the deduction of lay-off compensation before turning to the main controversy involved in the petition. It is not in dispute that the application did not specifically set out that the deduction of lay-off compensation was not justified but Annexure "A" to the application clearly refers to this deduction while computing the amount claimed by the workman. The Labour Court was clearly in error in taking a hyper-technical view of the pleadings ignoring that while determining the disputes under the "Act", it would not be proper to give undue importance to the pleading and ignore the justice to the workman. Apart from that consideration the Labour Court overlooked the specific admission made by Shri Ramnath Upendra Thawlly, the Assistant Labour Officer, examined on behalf of the mills before the Labour Court. In paragraph 7 of the deposition in cross-examination, the officer stated -

    "We have deducted lay-off compensation out of retrenchment compensation paid to the applicants. There was no agreement for deduction with the Snagh. There is no agreement for deduction with the workers also"
    .

    From this admission, it is crystal clear that the employer had deducted the lay-off compensation and the Labour Court was clearly in error in closing its eyes to the reality and proceeding to refuse the claim on the technical ground that it was not specifically pleaded in the application. The deductions by the mills was not supported by Shri Shetye, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the employer and the learned counsel very fairly stated that the workman would be entitled to that amount of Rs. 916.88.

    5. The main question which requires answer in this petition is whether the petitioner could be treated as in continuous service from January, 1945 to April, 1975 for the purpose of determination of quantum of retrenchment compensation under S. 25F of the "Act". It would be convenient at this stage to set out the provisions of sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) of S. 25-B of the "Act" to understand the controversy involved in the petition :

    "25B. Definition of continuous service :

    For the purposes of this Chapter :

    (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;

    (2) Where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of cl. (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer -

    (a) for a period of one year if the workman, during period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than -

    (i) One hundred and ninety days in the cases of workman employed below ground in a mine; and

    (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other cases;

    (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than :

    (i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and

    (ii) On hundred and twenty days, in any other case."

    6. Definition "continuous service" given under S. 25B of the "Act" is for the purpose of Chapter VA which deals with "lay-off and retrenchment". Sub-section (1) of S. 25B of the "Act" provides that the workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service. The question which requires answer in this petition is whether the workman was in continuous service or his service was interrupted service. The Labour Court has recorded a finding that in eight years, the workman had not worked for a period of 240 days every year and the workman had gone on leave which was not authorised. Shri Desai, the learned counsel appearing in support of the petition did not dispute the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court but submitted that the mere fact that the workman had gone on leave which was not authorised would not lead to the conclusion that there was a break in the continuous service as contemplated under sub-s. (1) of S. 25B of the "Act". The learned counsel urged that the definition under sub-s. (1) is a deeming one and the inclusive definition would not lead to the conclusion that the unauthorised leave would amount to interruption in the continuous service. The learned counsel urged that the continuous service would be interrupted only by two modes and that is by the workman leaving the employment or the employer terminating his service by dismissal or discharge. The submission of the learned counsel deserves acceptance. section 25b of the "act" 36 of 1964 and the contents of sub-s. (1) of the "Act" were initially included in S. 2(eee) of the "Act".

    7. Shri Desai relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jairam Sonu Shogule v. New India Rayon Mill Company Ltd., [1958-I L.L.J. 28], where the Division Bench took the view that taking part in an illegal strike amounts to misconduct on the part of an employee and for misconduct an employee invites an order of dismissal; but unless the employee is dismissed from service, it is difficult to see how there could be no continuity of service. In the case before the division Bench, the workman was in service from January, 1945 to the date of his retrenchment which occurred on October 15, 1954. The workman had taken part in a strike between October 6, 1954 and November 24, 1951. The strike was an illegal strike and the claim of the employer was that as the workman was not in service during the period the illegal strike was in operation, the petitioner could not be treated as in continuous service. The Division Bench took the view that once an employee is in service of the company, the employee would continue to be in service until he is dismissed or discharged, The Division Bench observed :

    "When a strike takes place and an employee takes part in an illegal strike, at the date when the strike takes place, the employee is in the service of the company and unless an employee is in the service of the company, it is inconceivable that he will take part in a strike while he is not in the service of the company."

    The Division Bench considered the definition of "continuous service" as given under S. 2(eee) of the unamended "Act" and held that taking part in an illegal strike would invite the dismissal but unless the employee is dismissed it cannot be held that there is a break in the continuous service. The decision undoubtedly supports the claim of Shri Desai that under sub-s. (1) of S. 25B of the "Act" which is in identical terms as that of S. 2(eee) of the unamended "Act", the service of the workman cannot be treated as interrupted merely because the worker is on leave which is not unauthorised.

    8. Shri Desai also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. Calcutta v. Its Workman, [1961-I L.L.J. 517], where the Supreme Court was considering the expression "continuous service" in the context of gratuity scheme. The Supreme Court observed :

    "Continuous service" in the context of the scheme of gratuity framed by the Tribunal in the earlier reference postulates the continuance of the relationship of master and servant, between the employer and his employees. If the servant resigns his employment, service automatically comes to an end. If the employer terminates the service of his employee that again brings the continuity of service to an end. If the service of an employee is brought to an end by the operation of any law that again is another instance where the continuance is disrupted; but it is difficult to hold that merely because an employee is absent without obtaining leave that itself would being to an end the continuity of his service. Similarly participation in an illegal strike which may incur the punishment of dismissal may not by itself bring to an end the relationship of master and servant. It may be a good cause for the termination of service provided, of course, the relevant provisions of the standing orders in that behalf are complied with : but mere participation in an illegal strike cannot be said to cause breach in continuity for the purpose of gratuity."

    The observations made by the Supreme Court leave no manner of doubt that merely because an employee is absent without obtaining leave, that itself would not bring to an end the continuity of service. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Surendra Kumar Verma, etc. v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum-labour Court, New Delhi and another, [1981-I L.L.J. 386] and the decision in the case of Mohan Lal v. Management Of M/S Bharat Electronics Ltd.., [1981-II L.L.J. 70]. Shri Desai relied upon these decisions to point out that cl. (1) and (2) of S. 25-B of the "Act" provide for two different contingencies and the claim of the workman would not attract sub-s. (2) unless it is held that he was not in continuous service as contemplated by sub-s. (1) of S. 25-B of the "Act". In my judgment the submission is correct even on a plain reading of the section. Sub-section (2) opens with the words "where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of cl. (1)" and these words unmistakably indicate that the Legislature desired to cover cases even of those workmen who were not in continuous service for the purpose of grant of retrenchment compensation.

    9. As observed by the Supreme Court, while considering the social legislation, the Court should lean in giving an interpretation which would advance the cause of justice and in my judgment, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. case concludes the controversy. The mere fact that the workman had not worked for 240 days in some years during his long employment would not debar him from claiming the entire amount or retrenchment as provided by S. 25-F of the "Act" and the Labour Court was clearly in error in not awarding the retrenchment compensation by taking into consideration the entire period of service from January, 1945 to April, 1975. The mere fact that during some years in this long period, the workman had not worked for 240 days is not a sufficient answer to deprive him of the retrenchment compensation by ignoring the entire period. Once, it is found that the workman is in continuous service, then it is wholly immaterial whether he has worked for a particular number of days in a particular year. The contingency with demands the worker to work for a period of 240 days as provided by sub-s. (2) of S. 25-B would come into play provided the workman is not in continuous service, as required under S. 25-B(1) of the "Act". In the present case it is clear that the workman was in continuous service all along and his claim for retrenchment compensation as made in the application ought to have been granted. There could not be any interruption in the service of the workman because neither he has left the service, nor he has been dismissed for not being on leave which was not authorised and, therefore, the Labour Court was clearly in error in holding that the service of the petitioner was interrupted.

    10. Shri Shetye, invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lalappa Lingappa and others v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. [1981-I L.L.J. 308]. The Supreme Court was considering the ambit of Explanation I and Explanation II of sub-s. 2(c) of S. 4 of the Payment of Gratuity "Act", 1972. The controversy was about the expression "actually worked" in Explanation II. Though the expression "continuous service" in sub-s. 2 (c) of S. 4 of the Payment of Gratuity "Act" is in identical terms as under sub-s. (1) of s. 25B of the "Act", the question which arises in the present case was neither argued, nor considered by the Supreme Court and, therefore, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel could have no application. In my judgment the controversy stands concluded by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court and by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in [1958-I L.L.J. 28] and [1961-I L.L.J. 517], respectively.

    11. Accordingly the petition succeeds and the order dated September 27, 1977 passed by the Labour Court Bombay is set aside. Shri Shetye very fairly did not challenge that the claim of Rs. 2,997.68 made by the workman is accurate and the petitioner would be entitled to that amount in case the decision of the Labour Court is reversed. Accordingly, the rule is made absolute and respondent No. 1 is directed to pay an amount of Rs. 2,997.68 to the petitioner forthwith. In case, the amount is not paid within a period of four weeks from today, the workman would be entitled to an interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The respondent No. 1 is at liberty to deposit the amount in the Labour Court. The respondent No. 1 shall pay the costs of the petitioner.

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    Comments

    Ramasamuz Narsing Upadhyaya v. Vinubhai M. Mitra
    (Sep 29, 1981)