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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a matrimonial petition filed by the appellant (original petitioner) in the Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay seeking divorce from his wife, the 1st respondent, on the ground of adultery alleged to have been committed by her with respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (original co-respondents Nos. 1 and 2) and alternatively on the ground of cruelty. The appellant had earlier filed an earlier petition (M.J. Petition No. 1973 of 1972) on similar grounds against a different co-respondent (R.), which was lost in the trial court and in First Appeal No. 599 of 1979 (dismissed; reported AIR 1982 Bom 498). That earlier appeal was dismissed on the ground that only one incident was found possibly proved but even assuming it proved no inference of adultery could be drawn, and that cruelty had not been shown to meet the legal requirement (as framed in Madanlal Sharma v. Smt. Santosh Sharma).

During the pendency of the earlier petition, the appellant engaged a new detective agency and, based on its reports, filed the present petition. An application to amend the earlier petition to include the new facts was rejected by the trial court and by the appellate court. The present record contains detailed detective reports and related testimony describing surveillance of the 1st respondent on multiple dates in January 1976 and alleged meetings and intimate conduct between the 1st respondent and respondent No. 2, and an alleged visit to respondent No. 3's office and a subsequent hotel visit on 17 January 1976. The trial proceedings produced findings accepting some surveillance-derived facts as suspicious or proven while rejecting others for want of corroboration. The appeal was heard by the court whose judgment is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence (largely detective surveillance reports and related testimony) proves that the 1st respondent committed adultery with respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
  2. Whether the 1st respondent's conduct amounts to cruelty within the legal meaning — specifically whether it caused danger to life, limb or bodily or mental health or gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger (the statutory/authoritative standard relied upon by the court).
  3. Whether the detective evidence and the surveillance incidents described are sufficiently reliable and corroborated to found a decree of divorce.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied primarily on reports of a detective agency (Globe Detective Agency) and the evidence of an operative, Sunderjit Taeker, who conducted surveillance of the 1st respondent on several dates in January 1976 and reported intimate conduct and meetings with respondent No. 2 and an encounter with respondent No. 3 on 17 January 1976.
  • The appellant contended that the frequency and nature of meetings, intimate conduct observed at restaurants and in taxis, and the visit to respondent No. 3's office and hotel amounted to adultery or, alternatively, cruelty providing grounds for divorce.
  • The appellant relied on prior proceedings and additional surveillance to establish a continuing pattern distinct from the earlier (unsuccessful) petition.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents disputed the allegations of adultery and challenged the reliability and sufficiency of the detective evidence. Certain incidents (for example, at the Oriental Restaurant) were specifically attacked for lack of corroboration such as photographs.
  • The counsel for the 2nd respondent pursued an aggressive line of cross-examination seeking to impugn the petitioner's mental condition by reference to family history and alleged inherited mental debility; the court characterizes this attack as unjustified and unsupported by medical evidence.
  • Respondent-side counsel asked questions and urged inferences designed to show the petitioner’s suspicions were attributable to his own temperament or family background rather than to any proven misconduct by the 1st respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1982 Bom 498 (First Appeal No. 599 of 1979) Earlier appeal concerning a prior petition by the same appellant; held that only one incident was possibly proved and that even if proved no inference of adultery could be drawn; cruelty not established. The court treated the incidents from the earlier petition as largely not usable for the present petition; it noted the earlier dismissal and excluded most earlier incidents from consideration for the present petition.
Madanlal Sharma v. Smt. Santosh Sharma (L.P. Appeal No. 28 of 1980) Articulates the requirement that cruelty must show danger to health or apprehension of such danger (standard imposed by the Division Bench). The court applied this standard when assessing whether the 1st respondent's conduct constituted legal cruelty and concluded that although some conduct was cruel in character, there was no evidence of danger to health or reasonable apprehension thereof.
Parihar v. Parihar, AIR 1978 Raj 140 Used for defining what constitutes mental cruelty; contains considered observations and authorities on mental cruelty. The court relied on the observations in Parihar (quoted at length) to frame the enquiry into cruelty — i.e., cruelty as wilful and unjustifiable conduct causing danger to life, limb or health or causing mental agony — and then applied that framework to the evidence.
Horton v. Horton, 1940 P. 187 Authority for the proposition that cruelty must be wilful and unjustifiable conduct inflicting pain and causing injury to health; mere incompatibility with life is insufficient. The court cited this passage (via Parihar) to support the legal standard that cruelty must be of a character to cause physical or mental injury and not simply the ending of a happy life together.
Siddagangiah v. Smt. Lakshamma, AIR 1968 Mys 115 Holdings that cruelty is not restricted to physical violence and may extend to behaviour causing pain and injury to the mind, rendering continuance in the matrimonial home agonising. The court cited this authority in the doctrinal exposition of mental cruelty used to assess whether the petitioner's allegations met the threshold for divorce.
Smt. Putul Devi v. Gopi Mandal, AIR 1963 Pat 93 Observation that outwardly good relations may conceal behaviour causing extreme mental distress and consequent detriment to health; acts constituting mental agony depend on facts. The court relied on this authority when summarising factors relevant to deciding whether conduct caused mental agony or detriment to health in the present case.
Dastane v. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534 Principle that courts must deal with the particular parties before them, not an ideal husband and wife; guidance on assessing cruelty (decision pre-1976 amendment noted). The court cited Dastane to reinforce that evaluation of cruelty must consider the particular circumstances of the parties before the court.
Rajinder Singh Joon v. Tara Wati, AIR 1980 Delhi 213 Definition and discussion of cruelty as indifference or delight in others' misery; observations on intent versus indifference. The court quoted and applied this decision's exposition of cruelty to conclude that the 1st respondent's conduct, by that test, amounted to cruelty though further legal requirements also had to be satisfied.
Gollins v. Gollins, 1964 AC 644 Quoted for the proposition that conduct intended to hurt is worse than conduct arising from mere indifference. The court used this authority (via Rajinder Singh Joon) in the discussion of whether the 1st respondent's conduct evidenced indifference or intent to hurt the petitioner.
Holden v. Holden (1810) 1 Hag Con 453 Historical dictum: "If bitter waters are flowing, it is not necessary to enquire from what source they spring" — used in context of assessing consequences rather than motives. The court cited this dictum (via Rajinder Singh Joon) to support the view that motive need not be explored in all instances when assessing cruelty.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the detective reports, the oral evidence (principally of the operative Sunderjit Taeker) and the photographic material produced. The analysis proceeded along these lines:

  1. Evaluation of Evidence Reliability: The operative's testimony was that the written report was correct but his recollection of details had faded; the court therefore tested incidents against available corroboration (for example, presence or absence of photographs) and internal consistency. The court rejected certain parts of the detective evidence where corroboration was lacking and where the operative had a tendency to "bolster up" or "add imaginary incidents." Specifically, incidents said to have taken place at the Oriental Restaurant were not accepted in the absence of photographs which could easily have been taken.
  2. Findings of Fact: The court was persuaded of several specific facts (set out in para 29(a)–(f)):
    • The 1st respondent and respondent No. 2 met frequently in suspicious circumstances suggesting a non-innocent purpose.
    • They were seen together in the Shabnam and Paramount Restaurants; alternative explanations (saree centres, hospital) were found not credible.
    • They were observed travelling together in taxis on at least one occasion despite their assertions to the contrary.
    • The visit of the 1st respondent to the office of respondent No. 3 on 17 January 1976 was proved, and its unexplained purpose was noted as arousing suspicion.
    • The 1st respondent continued conduct that fanned the petitioner's suspicions despite earlier complaints and notices.
    • The 1st respondent showed disregard for the petitioner's feelings and made no attempt to allay suspicions.
  3. Adultery Question: Despite these findings of suspicious conduct and frequent meetings, the court expressly held that "there is nothing in the established facts to show that the 1st respondent was guilty of adultery." The court accepted intercourse or sexual relations had not been proved; the surveillance and related evidence showed suspicious intimacy but did not establish the legal fact of adultery.
  4. Cruelty Question: Applying the authorities cited (Parihar, Rajinder Singh Joon, Dastane and others), the court examined whether the 1st respondent's conduct amounted to cruelty in the legal sense (wilful and unjustifiable conduct causing danger to life, limb or bodily or mental health, or giving rise to reasonable apprehension of such danger). The court stated that, on the general tests applied, the 1st respondent was "guilty of cruelty" because her conduct was of such a character (indifference, deliberate conduct that injured the petitioner's feelings). However, the court found no evidence that such conduct had caused danger to the petitioner's health or had given rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. The mere existence of cruelty in behaviour was held insufficient, in the court's view, to satisfy the legal threshold necessary for decree of divorce without evidence of danger to health or apprehension of danger.
  5. Conduct of Counsel and Relevance of Family History: The court criticised attempts by respondents' counsel to impugn the petitioner's mental condition by referencing extensive family history and divorces among relatives. The court found such lines of cross-examination irrelevant and unjustified in absence of medical evidence, and deplored the conduct as intended to "throw mud" at the petitioner.
  6. Disposition on Costs: In view of these findings, the court considered costs. It held that respondents should not be allowed costs of the petition and set aside the order of costs passed by the trial judge against the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF — Appeal dismissed.

Direct consequences and immediate effects:

  • The appellant's appeal seeking a decree of divorce was dismissed.
  • The court found that some of the 1st respondent's conduct amounted to cruelty in a general sense but concluded there was no evidence that such conduct caused danger to the petitioner's health or raised a reasonable apprehension of such danger; therefore the statutory/authoritative threshold for divorce on cruelty was not satisfied.
  • The court found insufficient proof of adultery; accordingly a decree of divorce on that ground was not granted.
  • The court made no order as to costs on the appeal in favour of the respondents and set aside the trial court's order that had awarded costs against the petitioner.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies existing authorities on the definition and threshold of cruelty and on the evaluation of surveillance evidence; it does not purport to create a new legal precedent. The court expressly observes that although it considered the petitioner’s position regrettable, it was constrained by the existing law and evidentiary standards.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to and derived from the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that contained in the judgment excerpt.

Show full summary ...

    P. v. P. And Others

    1. This appeal arises out of the matrimonial petition filed by the appellant (original petitioner) in the Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay against his wife, the 1st respondent (original respondent) for divorce on the ground of adultery alleged to have been committed by her with the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (original co-respondents Nos. 1 and 2) and in the alternative on the ground of cruelty. The appellant husband had also earlier filed an infructuous petition for divorce. The 1st respondent wife however, did not emerge unscathed though she succeeded in the earlier petition.

    2. The petitioner had filed the earlier petition being M.J Petition No. 1973 of 1972 on the same grounds as the present petition. The co-respondent therein was one R. and not the present respondents Nos. 2 and 3. He lost the said petition in the trial Court. He filed an appeal to this Court being First Appeal No. 599 of 1979, which was dismissed by me on 5/6th Aug., 1981: (reported in AIR 1982 Bom 498). He lost the said appeal on the ground that out of the several incidents, only one incident of the 1st respondent and the said R. having been found in the family room of a restaurant can be possibly said to have been proved and even on the assumption that the same was proved, no inference of adultery can be drawn and as regards cruelty there was no evidence of any danger to the health or apprehension of any danger to the health of the appellant which is the requirement now imposed by law as decided by Division Bench of this Court in Madanlal Sharma… v. Smt. Santosh Sharma…., L.P Appeal No. 28 of 1980 by Rege and Kanade, JJ. dated 10th Mar., 1981.

    3. During the pendency of the above petition, the appellant again engaged another detective agency and based on the reports thereof, filed the present petition. An application was made for amendment of the earlier petition to include the new facts, which was rejected by the trial Court as well as by the appellate Court.

    4. The allegations relied on by the petitioner in support of his case are to be gathered from the report of the detective agency rather than the petition which is delightfully and unjustifiably vague, resulting in vague denials in the written statements.

    5. The appellant was suspicious of the character of the 1st respondent and in the year 1967, made a complaint to her maternal uncle as also to her brother about the 1st respondent living in adultery to which no reply was sent. The 1st respondent did not improve in her behaviour and an advocate's notice dated 16th May, 1969 was also sent, which also was ignored by her. Being suspicious, he engaged a detective agency who kept a watch and whose reports led to the earlier petition. The incidents in the earlier petition may be ignored for the purpose of this petition in view of the fact that most of them were held not to be proved and only one incident was held to be worthy of belief by the trial Court, while the appeal was decided without going into the question as to whether the same was proved. It was held that even on an assumption that the same was proved, there cannot be an inference of adultery nor can it be said that evidence established legal cruelty.

    6. After the earlier petition was filed, another detective agency viz; Globe Detective Agency was engaged by the appellant. One Sunderjit Taeker, an employee of the said agency was the operative in charge of gathering material about the 1st respondent. The work was done by the said Tacker along with other employees of the agency but only he has given evidence. Basically, the evidence is that what is stated in the report is correct but that because of passage of time when he is giving evidence, he is not able to recollect anything except what is stated in the report. As per the report, he kept the 1st respondent under surveillance on 2, 8, 9, 13 to 17, 19, 20 to 24, 28 and 29 Jan., 1976. Out of this nothing material transpired on the dates other than 13th to 17th and 24th and 29th Jan., 1976. The relevant date as regards the 3rd respondent (original 2nd corespondent) is the 17th Jan., 1976 and the remaining dates concern the 2nd respondent (the original 1st co-respondent). The case of the appellant as emerges from the petition, the report and the evidence is as follows.

    7. On 13th Jan., 1976, the 1st respondent came out of the house and met the 2nd respondent near Taj Talkies. They hired a taxi and they proceeded in the direction of Grant Road but the detective missed them near Shalimar Talkies. On 14th Jan., 1976 at about 4.15 p.m the 1st respondent hired a taxi bearing No. MRR 3932 which at about 4.32 p.m stopped at the corner of Khetwadi Backroad and 7th Lane. The 2nd respondent got into the taxi, the taxi proceeded towards Charni Road junction and then went to Chowpatty and stopped in front of Paramount Restaurant. The couple went into the cabin on the first floor at about 4.40 p.m They came out at about 5.20 p.m and thereafter the photographs, were taken. A taxi was hired in which the couple were seen sitting very close to each other. The taxi came to the Mercantile Bank near High Court, the 1st respondent got down and the taxi entered the High Court compound. The 2nd respondent paid the bill and then followed the 1st respondent in the High Court but remained only in the verandah on the ground floor of the High Court. The 1st respondent came down. Both, the respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 took a taxi. The 1st respondent got down on the khetwadi Main Road and walked to her residence. The 2nd respondent went away in the taxi. On 15th Jan., 1976, at about 3.18 p.m the 1st respondent went to the Roxy Theatre and found that the tickets were not available and waited for someone. The 2nd respondent came, both of them hired a taxi, went to Swastik Theatre, found that the tickets were sold out, hired another taxi, went to Shabnam Restaurant near Minerva Theatre and entered a family room. A photograph was taken showing them near Shabnam Restaurant. They entered the restaurant at about 3.43 p.m and came out at about 5.10 p.m More photographs were taken. They took a taxi bearing No. MRR 3376. The 2nd respondent was observed putting his arms around the 1st respondent and talking intineately. Several photographs were taken. The 1st respondent then got out of the taxi at about 4.20 p.m did some shopping and went home. On 16th Jan., 1976, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 again met at a bus stop near Messrs A.B Mistry and Co., a taxi bearing No. MRP 8964 was hired and the couple got down near Original Restaurant, Gowalia Tank, entered a cabin on the first floor; the detective entered the next cabin and from the mirror which was fixed outside the cabin on the roof observed the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 kissing each other and also observed the 2nd respondent holding breasts of the 1st respondent. The detective went out of the cabin once or twice and saw both the respondents sitting very close and indulging in the aforesaid acts. They were inside the cabin from about 5 to 6.30 p.m After coming out, a taxi bearing No. MRB 1759 was hired, the two respondents were sitting in the rear and the 2nd respondent was observed putting his arms around the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent was dropped near her residence. On 24th Jan., 1976, the 1st respondent went by a taxi to the corner of 7th Khetwadi Lane, where the 2nd respondent entered the taxi and again went to the said Oriental Restaurant, where similar events took place as earlier and were observed by the detective through the mirror on the roof. On this occasion the couple had been there between 5.35 p.m and 6.50 p.m and they returned by a taxi. On 29th Jan., 1976, the 1st respondent took a taxi near her residence and in the same way as earlier picked up the 2nd respondent and both of them went to San-gam Vegetarian Restaurant at Marine Drive and entered the same. The petitioner was informed about this and came there. The said respondents rushed out of the restaurant and there was a scuffle, they were taken to the police station and complaints were lodged.

    8. As regards the 3rd respondent, the report is that on 17-1-1976, at about 5.42 p.m the respondent No. 1 was seen entering the office of the 3rd respondent. They came out of the building at about 5.52 p.m and entered Moonlight Hotel at 5.53 p.m They went to the 3rd floor. The detective got hold of a woman of easy virtue from nearby and followed them in the hotel. The 1st and the 3rd respondents were supposed to have been registered as Mr. & Mrs. Shah. The detective registered himself in the register. The detective came out soon thereafter and the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 came out at about 6.55 p.m The report does not mention any photographs having been taken, but three photographs are produced, alleged to have been taken at the same time, that is at about 5.53 p.m

    9-28. (His Lordship then considered the evidence and proceeded).

    29. In the circumstances I am convinced of the following facts:

    (a) that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were meeting frequently in a dubious manner and in suspicious circumstances and it is clear that the purpose of meeting was not innocent or what is alleged in the instant petition.

    (b) that they were seen by the detective in the Shabnam and Paramount Restaurants and the story that they had met at saree centres or hospital is not worthy of any credence.

    (c) that they were travelling together in taxis and were seen travelling in a taxi at least once. Assertion by both of them to the contrary cannot be believed.

    (d) that the visit of the 1st respondent at least to the office of the 3rd respondent on 17th Jan., 1976, is proved and that, visit was for some unexplained purpose which is bound to arouse anybody's suspicion as to the purpose of the visit.

    (e) that the 1st respondent carried on with her flirting in spite of two complaints in writing by the petitioner, to which there is no reply nor any explanation as to why replies were not given.

    (f) It is clear that the 1st respondent did not care for the feelings of the petitioner and had at no time made any attempt to allay such suspicions; on the contrary she continued to act in a manner which would fan the fire of suspicion.

    30. Another thing which requires mentioning is the attack on the other family members of the petitioner. The instructions of the 2nd respondent to his advocates to attack the petitioner's mental condition by referring to the family history was thoroughly unjustified. Before me, Mr. Vakharia for the 2nd respondent referred to the case put to the petitioner about the litigation between himself and his brother and about his father being of unsound mind and the case put that the suspicions of the petitioner were due to his mental debility inherited from his father. The advocates have also raked up the family history about the brother of the petitioner by alleging that the brother of the petitioner and his wife had been living separately before their death; that one of the sons of his another brother had taken divorce twice; that two sons of another brother had taken divorce and that in those cases the wives had filed the petitions. It is also raked up that another son of an uncle of the petitioner had left his wife and children. I do not think that this type of attack is at all justified and the cross examination on this line ought to have been stopped by the trial Court. The family history of the relatives does not and tan not reflect on the mental condition of the petitioner. When such questions were asked, the learned Judge ought to have enquired from the advocates for the respondents how they were relevant and as to whether they were going to lead any medical evidence on the subject that the father of the petitioner suffered from mental debility which could have been inherited by the petitioner and that the character of the other family members who were involved in divorces would also medically make the petitioner prone to entertain unjustifiable suspicions. It is obvious from the fact that no such evidence was led, that the respondents did not at any time desire to lead any such evidence and the entire cross-examination to say the least, is irresponsible and was conducted only to throw mud at and run down the petitioner and ought not to have been indulged into. The learned advocate for the 1st respondent ought not to have indulged in such scurrilous cross-examination. Even the advocate for the 2nd respondent after adopting the contention of the 1st respondent in this appeal insisted on relying on this part of the cross-examination in spite of my request not to do so. This attitude of the advocate has to be strongly deprecated.

    31. There is nothing in the established facts to show that the 1st respondent was guilty of adultery, though there is enough evidence to show that she was carrying on with the 2nd respondent. As regards the other incidents in the report regarding Oriental Restaurant, I am not prepared to accept them in the absence of any corroborative evidence. There are no photographs near that place, which the detective could have easily taken. Therefore, I deem it inadvisable to rely on this evidence, particularly, in view of the tendency on his part to bolster up fee incidents or add imaginary incident.

    32. This brings me to the question as to whether the conduct of the 1st respondent was such, as to have caused danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mentally of the petitioner or as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of such danger.

    33. Mr. Shah has relied on Parihar v. Parihar, AIR 1978 Raj 140, for the purpose of showing as to what constitutes mental cruelty. We are not concerned with the facts of this case. Various judgments are considered in the said judgment and observations made on the basis thereof. The relevant observations are as follows:

    “19. .. … … Curelty is wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health bodily or mental as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of such a danger. It includes action or omission which injures the susceptibilities of the affected spouse and causes him or her mental agony which the sufferer alone can state. Bucknill J. in Horton v. Horton. 1940 P. 187 at p. 193 was of the view that a man takes the woman for his wife for better, for worse. He cannot establish cruelty merely because he finds life with hes is impossible. He must prove that she has committed wilful and unjustifiable act inflicting pain and misery on him and causing him injury to health. In Siddagangiah v. Smt. Lakshamma, AIR 1968 Mys 115, it was held that it is not restricted to acts of physical violence and may extend to behaviour which may cause pain and injury to the mind as well, and so renders the continuance in the matrimonial home an agonising ordeal. In Smt. Putul Devi v. Gopi Mandal, AIR 1963 Pat 93 it was observed that a husband or a wife may not prima facie do anything directly against the other and apparently there may be good relations. Nonetheless, the behaviour may be such as to cause an extreme mental distress and consequent detriment to health. What acts will constitute mental agony will obviously depend upon the circumstances of each case. Several factors will have to be taken into account, such as, environment, status in society, education, cultural development, local custom, social condition, physical and mental condition of the parties etc. In Dastane v. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534 a decision handed down before the Act was amended in 1976, the Supreme Court held that the Court has to deal not with an ideal husband and an ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The threat by the wife to her husband that she will put an end to her own life or that she will set the house on fire, the threat that she will make him lose his job and have the matter published in newspapers and the persistent abuses and insults hurled at the husband and his parents were held all of so grave an order as to imperil the husband's sense of personal safety, mental happiness, job satisfaction and reputation. … … ..”

    34. He then relied on Rajinder Singh Joon v. Tara Wati, AIR 1980 Delhi 213, wherein it is observed:

    “7. Cruelty means “delight in or indifference to pain or misery in others”. It connotes acts which give unnecessary pain to others, or which are savage or inhuman or merciless. As an adjective the word “cruel” is often used to indicate the quality of the thing described. For example the sea and the fate are called “cruel”. This means each is without mercy. The wife's conduct was one of indifference. She was self-centred. If she appreciated but was indifferent to the husband's suffering, the cruelty was worse. If she intended to hurt it was worst of all. “Conduct which is intended to hurt strikes with a sharper edge than conduct which is the consequence of mere obtuseness or indifference”. (Gollins v. Gollins, 1964 AC 644, 670, 688, 689). Is it necessary to enquire into motives and causes of the wife's insensitiveness to husband's pain and suffering? I think not. Sir William Scott, that great Judge, in 1810 in, the case of Holden v. Holden (1810) 1 Hag Con 453, said: “If bitter waters are flowing, it is not necessary to enquire from what source they spring”.

    35. Applying this test, it is clear that the 1st respondent is guilty of cruelty. However, in spite of that there is no evidence at all, not a single word in the evidence that the conduct of the 1st respondent has caused any danger to the health of the petitioner or has given rise to any apprehension of such danger. Such an allegation is made in the petition but there is no evidence to the effect given in examination-in-chief. Mr. Shah has relied on cross-examination of the petitioner in which he stated that it is not true that he had neither suffered in health or reputation as was alleged. This denial, in my view, is no evidence to establish the danger or apprehension of danger. In any view, looking to the circumstances of the case though it is unjust to compel the petitioner to continue his marriage with the 1st respondent, it is unfortunate that, the law being what it is, I have no alternative but to dismiss the appeal.

    36. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs on the appeal. In my view the respondents should not be allowed the costs of the petition and I accordingly set side the order of costs passed by the learned trial Judge against the petitioner.

    Appeal dismissed.
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    Comments

    P. v. P. And Others
    (Aug 11, 1981)