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  • provisions of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as R.P.F Act) and the RPUP Act,
  • provisions of the Sea Customs Act. For purpose of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of the RPUP Act from the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act
  • provisions of the R.P.F Act and R.P.U.P Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • s. 25 of the Evidence Act and Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)
  • provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act referred
  • s. 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 9(1)
  • s. 160 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 10
  • provisions of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.9.
  • ss. 77 and 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act,
  • Land Customs Act, 1924 and Sea Customs Act, 1878
  • S. 78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915
  • RAILWAY PROTECTION FORCE ACT
  • provisions of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • s. 21 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944,
  • Evidence Act and the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Abkari Act or the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Act. Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • SEA CUSTOMS ACT 1878
  • section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT 1947
  • Orissa Excise Act, the Central Excise
  • s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
  • provisions of s. 8(2) of the RPUP Act
  • ss. 25, 26 and 27 in the Evidence Act
  • BOMBAY ABKARI ACT
  • Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944
  • ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act,
  • s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • s. 41 of the Bombay Abkari Act,
  • section 41 of the Abkari Act
  • s. 25 of the Evidence Act.32.
  • Central Excise and Salt Act
  • sub-s. (1) of S. 21. Section 21
  • s. 165 of the Evidence Act
  • Bombay Salt and Excise Act,
  • s. 25 of the Evidence Act.
  • Exports (Control) Act, 1947
  • section 41, sub-Section (1),
  • section 77, sub-section (2),
  • s. 8(2) of the R.P.U.P Act),
  • Bombay Police Act, 1961.
  • Orissa Excise Act, 1915
  • s. 8 of the Opium Act,
  • Customs Act, 1962.(6) P.
  • LAND CUSTOMS ACT
  • CUSTOMS ACT 1962
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as R.P.F Act) and the RPUP Act,
  • provisions of the Sea Customs Act. For purpose of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of the RPUP Act from the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act
  • provisions of the R.P.F Act and R.P.U.P Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • s. 25 of the Evidence Act and Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)
  • provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act referred
  • s. 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 9(1)
  • s. 160 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 10
  • provisions of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.9.
  • ss. 77 and 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act,
  • Land Customs Act, 1924 and Sea Customs Act, 1878
  • S. 78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915
  • RAILWAY PROTECTION FORCE ACT
  • provisions of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • s. 21 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944,
  • Evidence Act and the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Abkari Act or the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Act. Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • SEA CUSTOMS ACT 1878
  • section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT 1947
  • Orissa Excise Act, the Central Excise
  • s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
  • provisions of s. 8(2) of the RPUP Act
  • ss. 25, 26 and 27 in the Evidence Act
  • BOMBAY ABKARI ACT
  • Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944
  • ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act,
  • s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • s. 41 of the Bombay Abkari Act,
  • section 41 of the Abkari Act
  • s. 25 of the Evidence Act.32.
  • Central Excise and Salt Act
  • sub-s. (1) of S. 21. Section 21
  • s. 165 of the Evidence Act
  • Bombay Salt and Excise Act,
  • s. 25 of the Evidence Act.
  • Exports (Control) Act, 1947
  • section 41, sub-Section (1),
  • section 77, sub-section (2),
  • s. 8(2) of the R.P.U.P Act),
  • Bombay Police Act, 1961.
  • Orissa Excise Act, 1915
  • s. 8 of the Opium Act,
  • Customs Act, 1962.(6) P.
  • LAND CUSTOMS ACT
  • CUSTOMS ACT 1962
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses the interpretation of the term “Police Officer” in section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in the context of officers of the Railway Protection Force (RPF) and the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act (RPUP Act). The Court reviews various conflicting judicial views on whether RPF officers conducting enquiries under the RPUP Act qualify as police officers for the purposes of section 25, which renders confessions made to police officers inadmissible. The petition before the Court challenges certain procedural orders and raises constitutional and statutory interpretation issues related to the RPUP Act and the powers and status of RPF officers.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether officers of the Railway Protection Force conducting enquiries under the RPUP Act are “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
  2. Whether confessions made to RPF officers are inadmissible under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  3. Whether section 9 of the RPUP Act violates Articles 14 and 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
  4. Whether the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure fully apply to enquiries conducted by RPF officers under the RPUP Act.
  5. Whether accused persons are entitled to copies of documents and statements under section 173(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code in prosecutions instituted under the RPUP Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments (Mr. Desai)

  • The RPUP Act’s provisions, including the penal nature of offences and powers of arrest, detention, and investigation conferred on RPF officers, make them “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act.
  • The term “inquiry” in the RPUP Act is a camouflage for investigation, and RPF officers exercising police-like powers should be treated as police officers to protect accused persons from coerced confessions.
  • Confessions made to RPF officers should be inadmissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act to prevent despotism and malpractices.
  • Section 9 of the RPUP Act violates Article 14 (equality before the law) and Article 20(3) (protection against self-incrimination) of the Constitution.
  • Enquiries by RPF officers should be subject to all provisions of Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, including the right to copies under section 173(4).
  • The accused is entitled to copies of documents and witness statements annexed to the complaint as a matter of natural justice and fair trial.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • RPF officers are not “police officers” as they are “railway servants” with limited powers related only to protection of railway property, not general law enforcement.
  • Confessions made to RPF officers are not inadmissible under section 25 because the officers do not fall within the statutory definition of “police officers.”
  • The RPUP Act is constitutionally valid and does not violate Articles 14 or 20(3).
  • The powers conferred on RPF officers by the RPUP Act are limited and do not incorporate the entire Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Section 173(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to complaints filed by RPF officers, and therefore accused persons have no right to copies of documents or statements under that section.
  • The accused can be allowed to inspect witness statements in Court, but there is no general right to demand copies before trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pereira v. Emperor, 1926 28 Bom. L.R 674 Held Excise Officers were not police officers under s. 25 of the Evidence Act. Overruled by later Full Bench in Nanoo v. Emperor; discussed as part of divergent views.
Nanoo v. Emperor, 1926 I.L.R 51 Bom. 78 (Full Bench) Abkari Officers exercising powers under Bombay Abkari Act deemed police officers under s. 25. Adopted as the “broad view” and binding on the Court for similar cases.
Radha Kishun Marwari v. King-Emperor, 1932 I.L.R 12 Pat. 46 (Full Bench) “Narrow view” that only persons formally appointed as police officers are police officers under s. 25. Presented as a contrasting view; Court found it persuasive but not binding.
Badaku Joti Svant v. State Of Mysore, [1966] A.I.R S.C 1746 Central Excise Officers not police officers under s. 25 despite broad interpretation. Considered most pertinent precedent; Court followed its reasoning to find RPF officers not police officers.
Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State Of Bihar, [1964] A.I.R S.C 828 Test for police officer status depends on powers facilitating obtaining confessions. Discussed in detail but distinguished on facts; Court held it was not binding in present context.
Ramesh Chandra v. State of W.B, [1970] A.I.R S.C 940 Customs Officers not police officers; powers limited to revenue enforcement. Supported Court’s conclusion that officers with revenue enforcement duties are not police officers.
State Of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, [1962] A.I.R S.C 276 Officers under Land Customs Act not police officers. Reinforced distinction between police and revenue officers; relied upon by Court.
Illias v. Collector of Customs, [1970] A.I.R S.C 1065 Approved State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram; Customs Officers not police officers. Used to reject argument that revenue officers should be treated as police officers.
Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal, 1884 I.L.R 6 All. 509 Purpose of s. 25 is to avoid false confessions extorted by police officers. Used to interpret the intention behind section 25 and its application.
Asst. Customs Collector, Bombay v. L.R Melwani, [1970] A.I.R S.C 962 Section 173(4) of Cr.P.C. does not apply where prosecution is instituted on private complaint. Supported conclusion that accused under RPUP Act is not entitled to copies under s. 173(4).
Govind Baghunath v. Kakade, 1973 77 Bom. L.R 214 Accused entitled to production in Court of statements of witnesses examined by complainant. Court ordered production and inspection of such statements during trial for fairness.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the divergent judicial interpretations of the term “Police Officer” in section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, noting the “broad view” (Bombay Full Bench) that officers vested with police-like powers under special statutes are police officers for the purposes of s. 25, and the “narrow view” (Patna Full Bench) that only formally constituted police officers qualify.

The Court acknowledged a “middle view” emerging from Supreme Court and High Court decisions which requires a close examination of the actual powers, duties, and functions of the officers under the relevant statutes rather than mere nomenclature.

Applying this approach, the Court analyzed the provisions of the Railway Protection Force Act and the RPUP Act. It emphasized that RPF officers are “railway servants” primarily tasked with protecting railway property, not maintaining general law and order. The RPUP Act confers certain powers for investigation and arrest limited to offences related to railway property, but does not constitute a police force constitutionally vested in State Governments.

The Court held that conferring limited investigative powers on RPF officers does not convert them into police officers within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. It relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Badaku Joti Svant v. State of Mysore, which held that Central Excise Officers with similar powers were not police officers. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the RPUP Act’s penal nature or the use of the term “inquiry” should change this classification.

Regarding constitutional challenges, the Court found no violation of Article 14 as the RPUP Act’s classification is reasonable and based on intelligible differentia related to railway property offences. It also held that section 9 of the RPUP Act does not contravene Article 20(3) since the protection against self-incrimination applies only after formal accusation, which occurs upon filing of complaint by RPF officers.

On the applicability of Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court interpreted the RPUP Act as conferring only limited police powers “for this purpose” of enquiry, not the entire Chapter XIV. Consequently, section 173(4) of the Cr.P.C. does not apply as no charge-sheet is filed by RPF officers; they file complaints akin to private complaints.

Finally, the Court recognized the importance of a fair trial and ordered production in Court of witness statements recorded by RPF officers, allowing the accused and counsel to inspect and take copies during trial, consistent with principles of natural justice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that officers of the Railway Protection Force conducting enquiries under the RPUP Act are not “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Consequently, confessions made to such officers are not inadmissible under section 25. The Court also upheld the constitutional validity of section 9 of the RPUP Act and clarified that the full provisions of Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, including section 173(4), do not apply to enquiries by RPF officers. However, the accused is entitled to inspect and take copies of witness statements produced in Court during trial.

Implications: This decision confirms that confessions made to RPF officers are admissible in evidence, distinguishing them from confessions made to formal police officers. It affirms the constitutional validity of the RPUP Act’s special provisions and limits the procedural rights of accused persons in prosecutions under this Act regarding supply of copies before trial. The ruling respects the constitutional division of powers between Union and State regarding police forces and clarifies the scope of police powers conferred on RPF officers. No new precedent was created beyond the application and clarification of existing principles.

    Balkishan A. Devidayal v. The State Of Maharashtra

    Vaidya, J.:— [His Lordship, after stating the facts of the case and the contentions raised by the parties proceeded.] In view of these contentions, the first important point, which requires to be considered is regarding the meaning of the word “Police Officer” in s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which runs as follows:

    “25. No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.”

    2. The point is not free from difficulty, in view of the divergent views of the Courts on the question of proper interpretation of the words “Police Officer” in the said section. We find it convenient to discuss the various cases cited at the bar on this point under three heads. The first is, what may be described as the Bombay view, which is referred to in some of the decisions as the “broad view”. In Pereira v. Emperor . 1926 28 Bom. L.R 674. Macleod C.J and Crump J. held, in the case of a prosecution under the Bombay Salt and Excise Act, that an Excise Officer was not a Police Officer within the meaning of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, and that a statement made by an accused person was not inadmissible in evidence, after considering the effect of s. 20 of that Act, which ran as follows:

    “Every officer of the department of Salt and Excise not below the rank of Inspector and every officer of the Customs department not below the rank of Preventive officer, who may in right of his office be authorised by the Local Government in this behalf, shall, within the area for which he is appointed, exercise powers with regard to offences under this Act, similar to those exercised by an officer in charge of a police station under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.”

    3. Madeod C.J held that the same point was considered in Ah Foong v. Emperor . 1918 I.L.R 46 Cal. 411. and relied on that judgment, where it was held that it was not possible to regard the Excise Officers as Police Officers.

    4. In Nanoo v. Emperor . 1926 I.L.R 51 Bom. 78. F.B, S.C 28 Bom. L.R 1196, F.B, which was a case under the Bombay Abkari Act, before a Full Bench of this Court, composed of Marten C.J, Lallubhai Shah, Fawcett, Kemp and Mirza JJ., the decision in Pereira v. Emperor was overruled; and it was laid down by the Full Bench that an Abkari Officer, investigating under the Bombay Abkari Act was a Police Officer within the meaning of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, having regard to s. 41 of the Bombay Abkari Act, which ran as follows:

    “(1) Every Abkari-officer not below such rank as Government may prescribe shall within the area for which he is appointed have power to investigate all offences punishable under this Act.

    (2) Every such officer shall in the conduct of such investigation exercise the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, upon an officer in charge of a police-station for the investigation of a cognizable offence:”

    5. The other provisions of the Bombay Abkari Act were also taken into consideration. Marten C.J observed (p. 94):

    “The result is, that there is no authority precisely in point in this case, and we have really to determine a new point. After giving then my best attention to the arguments, which have been addressed to us, in my judgment, we should hold that as the Bombay Legislature has deliberately conferred upon these Abkari officers substantially all the powers of a Police officer, they have thereby in effect made them Police officers within the meaning of section 25, and that, accordingly, any confession made to such an officer in the course of his investigation under the Abkari Act or the Criminal Procedure Code is inadmissible in evidence.”

    6. Shah J. in a concurrent judgment said (p. 96):

    “Having regard to the reason of the rule laid down in section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and having regard to the decisions which have been already referred to, it is clear to my mind that the term ‘Police officer’ used in the section is not to be understood in any technical sense, but includes an officer who is vested with the powers of the police by law…

    Taking the other sections of the Act under which he has got certain limited powers of arrest and search along with the powers contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, which a Police officer in charge of a police-station is able to exercise, it is clear to my mind that the officer contemplated by section 41, sub-Section (1), is virtually in the same position as a Police officer with regard to the investigation of the offences under the Abkari Act. It seems to me a perfectly fair interpretation of section 25 to say that the Police officer within the meaning of that section is an officer, who exercises the powers of police conferred upon him by law, whether he is called a Police officer or he is called by any other name and exercises other functions also under other provisions of law. He is a Police officer within the meaning of section 25, if in the investigation of offences under particular Act he exercises the powers of an officer in charge of a police-station for the investigation of a cognizable offence conferred upon him by that Act. section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act embodies an important rule, which is to be given effect to as a matter of substance and not as a mere matter of form. It is not merely the name given to any officer that should determine whether he is a Police officer, but the substantial fact whether he exercises the powers of a Police officer conferred upon him by law should determine it.

    In taking this view of section 25, it is essential and quite proper to bear in mind the purpose of the section. That purpose has been already stated. It has been discussed in Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal . 1884 I.L.R 6 All. 509, F.B. In the words of Oldfield J. (p. 513) ‘The broad ground for not admitting confessions made to a police officer is to avoid the danger of admitting false confessions,…’ That ground would apply as much to an Excise officer exercising the powers conferred upon him by section 41 of the Abkari Act as amended as to a Police officer.”

    7. The other three learned Judges concurred in this view.

    8. The above Full Bench decision was extended by Mirza and Baker JJ. in Emperor v. Dinshaw Driver . 1928 31 Bom. L.R 49. by holding that a confession made by an accused person to an excise peon is inadmissible in evidence, under the provisions of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Mirza J. stated (p. 51):

    “…In my judgment, the excise peon having the power to detain, search, seize and arrest any person whom he believes to be guilty of any offence, has powers which are very similar to those exercised by a police officer. I would be prepared, therefore, to extend the principle of the Full Bench ruling in Nanoo v. Emperor to the case of an excise peon, and hold that any confession made to him is inadmissible under the provisions of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.”

    9. Baker J. who concurred with him in that case, where the accused was prosecuted under s. 8 of the Opium Act, observed at p. 51 as follows:

    “…The powers, therefore, exercised by the excise peon are those of search, seizure, arrest and detention. In relation to the Abkari inspector the position of the excise peon is very much that of a police constable towards an officer in charge of a police station. It would, I think, be very difficult to draw a distinction and to say that because an officer has the powers of an officer in charge of a police station, therefore a confession made to him would be inadmissible under s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, while because an officer has only powers of seizure, search, arrest and detention, a confession made to him would not be so inadmissible. It may be that the powers of an ordinary police constable are wider than those of an excise peon, because the duties of a police constable extend to the prevention and detection of offences of all descriptions, whereas the powers of an excise peon are only exercisable in the case of offences falling under the Abkari Act. But when we are dealing with a prosecution under either of those Acts, it is obvious that the position of the excise peon towards the accused is practically the same as that of an ordinary police constable towards an accused charged with some offence under the criminal law, and I see no reason why a confession made to such an excise peon should be held to be admissible on the ground that he does not exercise all the powers conferred upon an officer in charge of a police station. For all practical purposes, in a case of this character, the position is exactly that of a police constable in a case falling under the ordinary law, and in view of the remarks made by this Court in the Full Bench decision in Nanoo v. Emperor, I see no reason why the prohibition of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act should not be extended to incriminating statements made by persons accused of an offence under the Abkari or Opium Act, to excise peons who are actually engaged at the time in the investigation of the offence under the orders of the Abkari inspector, and who have the power both to seize any prohibited articles found in the possession of the accused, and also to arrest the accused and keep him in detention.”

    10. No other reported or unreported judgment of this Court was cited before us on this point where a contrary view has been taken by this Court.

    11. The second head of the divergent views on the interpretation of the words “Police Officer” in s. 25 of the Evidence Act may be conveniently described as the Patna view, which is referred to in some of the cases as a “narrow view” on the strict interpretation of words.

    12. In Radha Kishun Marwari v. King-Emperor . 1932 I.L.R 12 Pat. 46, F.B, decided by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court composed of Courtney Terrell C.J, Fazl Ali and Agarwala JJ. they disagreed with the Bombay view. Courtney Terrell C.J considered the Bombay view as based on two fallacies, the first being a misunderstanding of the decision of Sir Richard Garth in the case of Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose . 1876 I.L.R 1 Cal. 207. which was relied upon by the Bombay Full Bench and the second being an erroneous canon of construction of statutes, i.e the consideration of what is supposed to be the object of this section of the evidence act and the adoption as an initial hypothesis of the theory that object was to make inadmissible confessions made before persons possessing the power of investigation, search and arrest.

    13. Fazl Ali J. (as he then was) at p. 58 observed:

    “…What seems to have greatly weighed with the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court was that in the particular case which they had before them the abkari officer had the power to investigate like a police officer in charge of a police station. But is that to be the real test for excluding a confession? A police constable has generally no power to investigate a criminal offence but nevertheless a confession made before him would be inadmissible because he is a police officer. Such would also be the case if a confession is made before a police officer who though invested with the powers of investigation within his own jurisdiction is not engaged in the particular investigation in the course of which the confession is made. Again if a confession is to be made inadmissible merely because the person before whom it is made is in a position to extort it from the accused, why should not section 25 be extended to those persons who have the power to arrest and detain an accused person for some time and yet have not the power to investigate the offence with which he is charged? Thus once it is held that section 25 refers not only to those who are popularly known as police officers but also to persons who have certain powers ordinarily exercisable by a police officer, it becomes material to consider what is the minimum power or powers to be exercised by such persons so as to make section 25 applicable to them. I think that the question is capable of being answered in more than one way and this fact by itself would introduce an element of great uncertainty and confusion in administering the law.

    As I have already indicated, the question is not altogether free from difficulty, but the view that I have formed on a consideration of the numerous authorities cited before us is that section 25 was intended to apply to police officers and police officers alone and that if the framers of the Act did not have in view, at the time of framing the section, any class of persons other than the police officers, we cannot read the term ‘Police Officers’ as including men who are provisionally and for a limited purpose only invested with some of the powers of police officers.”

    14. The third learned Judge Agarwala J. observed at p. 64 of the report as under:

    “In my opinion no person is a police officer unless he is enrolled in, or appointed a member of, the police force or is declared by statute to be a member of that force.”

    15. It must be noticed here that although this conflict between the Bombay view and the Patna view was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court in Badaku Joti Svant v. State Of Mysore . [1966] A.I.R S.C 1746., the Supreme Court observed in para. 7 of the judgment, at p. 1748, as under:

    “It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed, is the correct view and that the view of the Patna High Court in Radha Kishun Marwari, is not correct. On the other hand it has been urged on behalf of the State that the view taken by the Patna High Court in Radha Kishun Marwari, is the correct one. Prima facie there is in our opinion much to be said for the narrow view taken by the Patna High Court. But as we have come to the conclusion that even on the broad view, a Central Excise Officer under the Act is not a police officer, it is unnecessary to express a final opinion on the two views on the meaning of the words ‘police officer’ in s. 25 of the Evidence Act. We shall proceed on the assumption that the broad view may be accepted and that requires an examination of the various provisions of the Act to which we turn now.”

    16. The third view, if we may say so, is an up-to-date or middle view, as emerging from certain important decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. The view is that the Court should examine closely and thoroughly the powers, disabilities, functions and duties of the officers under the relevant Act empowered to inquire into offences under that Act for determining whether they are ‘police officers’ within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act and for the purposes of Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, even though they may not be described as police officers.

    17. The Supreme Court decisions dealing with this question are as follows:

    (1) State Of Punjab v. Barkat Ram . [1962] A.I.R S.C 276. (decided by Kapur, K. Subba Rao and Raghubar Dayal JJ.) under the Land Customs Act, 1924 and Sea Customs Act, 1878 that officers under the Land Customs Act were not “police officers.”

    (2) Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State Of Bihar . [1964] A.I.R S.C 828. (decided by K. Subba Rao, [as he then was], and Mudholkar JJ., Raghubar Dayal J. dissenting) that Inspector and Sub-Inspector of Excise under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 were “police officers.”

    (3) Vallabhdas Liladhar v. Asst. Collector of Customs . [1965] A.I.R S.C 481, S.C 66 Bom. L.R 482. (decided by Gajendragadkar, A.K Sarkar, K.H Wanchoo, K.C Das Gupta and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) that the Customs Officers under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 were not “police officers.”

    (4) Badaku Joti Svant v. State Of Mysore which, in our opinion is the most pertinent for the purposes of deciding the present case [decided by Gajendragadkar C.J, K.N Wanchoo, Hidayatullah (as he then was), J.C Shah (as he then was) and Sikri (as he then was) JJ.] that officers under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 were not “police officers.”

    (5) Ramesh Chandra v. State of W.B . [1970] A.I.R S.C 940, S.C 72 Bom. L.R 787., which is also very relevant for deciding the question before us, (decided by J.C Shah, Ramaswami, Mitter, Hegde and Grover JJ.), that Officers of Customs under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, were not “police officers” and that the position is not different under the Customs Act, 1962.

    (6) P. Rustomji v. State of Maharashtra . 1971 1 SCC 847 (Vaidialingam and A.N Ray JJ.) that Customs Officers under the Customs Act, 1962 were not “police officers.”

    (7) Harbansingh v. State of Maharashtra . 1972 3 SCC 775 (decided by J.M Shelat, Jaganmohan Reddy and Khanna JJ.) that officers of Customs under the Customs Act were not “police officers.”

    (8) Hazari Singh v. Union of India . 1973 3 SCC 401 (decided by Jaganmohan Reddy and Khanna JJ.) that Customs Officers enquiring into the offences under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 were not “police officers.”

    18. The following are the decisions of the High Courts where the third view appears to have prevailed.

    (1) Collector of Customs v. Kotumal . [1967] A.I.R Mad. 263, F.B (decided by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court) that Customs Officers under the Customs Act were not “police officers.”

    (2) State v. D. Surya Rao . [1969] A.I.R Cal. 594. (decided by Talukdar J.) that an officer of the Railway Protection Force holding an enquiry under the RPUP Act was not a “police officer.”

    (3) State of Gujarat v. Abdul Rehman . [1972] Cri. L.J 1101., decided by Sheth J. of Gujarat High Court, relying on the aforesaid Calcutta decision that a Sub-Inspector of Railway Protection Force was not a “police officer” when he is enquiring into the offence’ under the RPUP Act.

    (4) Laxman Padma v. State . 1964 67 Bom. L.R 317., decided by Tambe and Palekar JJ. (as they then were) that an officer of the Central Excise Department enquiring into a case falling under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 was not a “police officer.”

    (5) Pukhraj v. K.K Ganguly . 1967 70 Bom. L.R 231. decided by Patel and Chitale JJ. that the Customs Officers under the Customs Act, 1962 cannot be regarded as “police officers.”

    (6) An unreported judgment in Ajghar Babu Tambe v. The State of Maharashtra . 1970 Criminal Revision Application No. 1135 of 1969, decided by Deshpande J., on January 15, 1970 Unrep.. of this Court decided by Deshpande J. that the officers of the R.P Force enquiring into offences under the RPUP Act are not “police officers.”

    (8) Hari Rachu v. The State . 1971 73 Bom. L.R 891. (decided by Vimadalal J.) that the officers of the R.P Force enquiring into the offences under the RPUP Act were not “police officers.”

    (9) An unreported judgment of Rege J. in The State of Maharashtra v. Vishwanath Rajaram Mourya . 1973 Criminal Revision Application No. 156 of 1973, decided by Rege J., on July 10, 1973 Unrep.. that officers of the R.P Force enquiring into the offences under the R.P.U.P Act are not “police officers.”

    19. The position which emerges out of the above broad survey of the relevant authorities cited before us is that despite the first view, binding on us as the view of the Full Bench of this Court, we must follow the course indicated in the third view of scrutinising the provisions of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as R.P.F Act) and the RPUP Act, to determine the question as to whether the R.P.F Officers inquiring into the offences under the RPUP Act are in reality the Police Officers, subject to all the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and falling within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act. The question is not res integra. It has been already decided in several unreported cases of this Court including the cases decided by Deshpande J. and Rege J. sitting singly, above referred and one aforesaid judgment of this Court decided by Vimadalal J. It has also been decided by single Judges of the Calcutta High Court and the Gujarat High Court.

    20. However, Mr. Desai, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that in arriving at those conclusions, the decisions of the Supreme Court and particularly the decision in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State Of Bihar , all the relevant provisions of the R.P.F Act and R.P.U.P Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure were not considered and were not brought to the notice of the single Judges, who decided the matters. Normally, as we are concerned with the Acts passed by Parliament, as uniformity of interpretation all over India is desirable, we should hesitate to differ from the view taken by the Calcutta High Court and the Gujarat High Court and single Judges of our own Court, even assuming that there was a possibility of taking a different view of the matter. But, as the provisions of the rpf act and the rpup act came up for consideration of the Division Bench of this Court, for the first time in this case, we think it necessary to deal with the provisions of the two Acts in the light of the elaborate contentions made by Mr. Desai before us.

    21. [His Lordship, after dealing with various sections of the two Acts, proceeded.] What is contended by Mr. Desai, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that having regard to: (1) the essentially penal nature of the RPUP Act, which provides for punishment and the machinery of investigation into the offence of unlawful possession and (2) the provisions dispensing with the mandatory duty cast on the R.P Force Officers under s. 14 of the rpf act and providing for arrest, detention and production of the accused persons before the Court by the officers of the R.P Force themselves; (3) the express provisions of s. 8(2) of the RPUP Act which made the entire Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to the officers of the RPF inquiring into the offences under the RPUP Act; (4) the powers vested in the Railway Protection Force to record statements, to summon persons and take their statements and the duty of the persons so summoned to tell the truth before them as provided under the section; (5) the powers of searches, required to be carried on in the manner prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure and (6) the provisions of s. 14 which made the RPUP Act prevail over every other law, which was inconsistent with it, it must be held that the officers of the Railway Protection Force, inquiring into offences under the Act, must be deemed to be “police officers” for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act.

    22. Mr. Desai contended that the Parliament could never have intended to camouflage investigation into offences by the mere use of the word “inquiry” in s. 8(1) and thereby deprive the citizens of the protection given to them by law under s. 25 of the Evidence Act and Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code and the other provisions of law based on the postulate that officers investigating into offences are prone to a temptation to practise torture for the purpose of extorting confessions from persons in their custody in the hope of professional advancement or for some other reason. Mr. Desai submitted that it is well known that the object of ss. 25, 26 and 27 in the Evidence Act is to prevent confessions from being obtained from accused persons through any undue influence, being received as evidence against them.

    23. It is true that in enacting these provisions, as pointed out by Mahmood J. in Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal, the Legislature had in view the malpractices of police officers in extorting confessions from accused persons in order to gain credit by securing convictions, and those malpractices went to the length of positive torture. But it cannot be forgotten that the Law Commission has recommended that in view of the changed set-up since independence it was claimed by the police officers all over India that the police should be shown a greater measure of confidence and statements or confessions made to the police should be made admissible in evidence by modifying ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, though it was unable to accept the claim of the Police Officers that the statements or confessions made to the police should be made admissible in evidence. See Sarkar on Evidence, 1971, 12th edn., p. 270.

    24. These considerations may be relevant in deciding whether the relevant confessions and statements alleged to have been made before the Railway Protection Force Officers are voluntary and true. We have no doubt that any Court called upon to consider the value of such statements and confessions will do so with prudence and utmost caution; but that cannot weigh with us in determining whether such statements and confessions are hit by s. 25 of the Evidence Act. That question can be decided only after considering the intention of the Legislature in clothing the officers of the Railway Protection Force with powers which are usually and normally exercised by a police officer under the Criminal Procedure Code and the relevant police Acts.

    25. Mr. Desai submitted that the matter is concluded by the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cases and particularly in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State Of Bihar where it is stated (p. 833):

    “…The test for determining whether such a person is a ‘police officer’ for the purpose of s. 25 of the Evidence Act would, in our judgment, be whether the powers of a police officer which are conferred on him or which are exercisable by him because he is deemed to be an officer in charge of police station establish a direct or substantial relationship with the prohibition enacted by s. 25, that is, the recording of a confession. In other words, the test would be whether the powers are such as would tend to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession from a suspect or a delinquent. If they do, then it is unnecessary to consider the dominant purpose for which he is appointed or the question as to what other powers he enjoys. These questions may perhaps be relevant for consideration where the powers of a police officer conferred upon him are of a very limited character and are not by themselves sufficient to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession.”

    26. Mr. Desai argued that this decision must be considered as binding on this Court as the view expressed in Raja Ram's case has never been overruled by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. Relying on the provisions of ss. 8 and 9 of the RPUP Act, he submitted that these sections empower the officers of the Railway Protection Force to extract confessions and attracted the ratio in Raja Ram's case.

    27. The argument sounds plausible but ignores the fundamental rule relating to precedents that the precedent is an authority for what it decides and not for every proposition of law which flows as a corollary from what it decides. The test was laid down in Raja Ram's case by the majority of the Judges in the context of ss. 77 and 78 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, which are quoted at p. 839 in the dissenting judgment of Raghubar Dayal J., although there is a slight mistake in the printing of the section at that page as can be seen from the corresponding p. 785 of [1964] 2 S.C.R where the most relevant s. 78(3) is quoted as follows:

    “(3) For the purposes of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) the area to which an Excise Officer empowered under section 77, sub-section (2), is appointed shall be deemed to be a police-station, and such officer shall be deemed to be the officer in charge of such station.”

    28. Raja Ram's case was not noticed in the subsequent decision in Vallabhdas Liladhar v. Asst. Collector of Customs.

    29. The effect of that decision was explained in Badaku Joti Svant v. State Of Mysore, by Wanchoo J. speaking for the Court where it was argued relying on Raja Ram's case that an officer inquiring into an offence under s. 21 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, (which was substantially worded like s. 8(2) of the R.P.U.P Act), was a “police officer”. Wanchoo J. rejected the contention observing as follows (p. 1749):

    “…Thus though under sub-s. (2) of S. 21 the Central Excise Officer under the Act has the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station when, investigating a cognizable case, that is for the purpose of his inquiry under sub-s. (1) of S. 21. Section 21 is in terms different from S. 78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 which came to be considered in Raja Ram Jaiswal's case, and which provided in terms that ‘for the purposes of S. 156 of the Cr. P.C, 1898, the area to which an excise officer empowered under S. 77, sub-s. (2), is appointed shall be deemed to be a police-station, and such officer shall be deemed to be the officer-in-charge of such station.’… All that S. 21 provides is that for the purpose of his enquiry, a Central Excise Officer shall have the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station when investigating a cognizable case. But even so it appears that these powers do not include the power to submit a charge sheet under S. 173 of the Cr. P.C, for unlike the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, the Central Excise Officer is not deemed to be an officer-in-charge of a police station.

    It has been urged before us that if we consider S. 21 in the setting cl. S. 14 of the Act, it would become clear that the enquiry contemplated under S. 21(1) is in substance different from investigation pure and simple into an offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not necessary to decide whether the enquiry under S. 14 must also include enquiry mentioned in S. 21 of the Act. Apart from this argument we are of the opinion that mere conferment of powers of investigation into criminal offences under S. 9 of the Act does not make the Central Excise Officer a police officer even in the broader view mentioned above. Otherwise any person entrusted with investigation under S. 202 of the Cr. P.C would become a police officer.”

    30. With respect, these observations clinch the issue before us, as the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act referred to in the judgment are substantially identical with the provisions of the RPUP Act.

    31. Wanchoo J. has further observed in para. 11 (p. 1750):

    “…The scheme of the Act, therefore, being different from the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, the appellant cannot take advantage of the decision of this Court in Raja Ram Jaiswal's case, taking even the broader view of the words ‘police officer’ in s. 25 of the Evidence Act.”

    32. That would have settled the matter so far as this case is concerned; but Mr. Desai has tried to emphasise the tests in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, in order to distinguish the provisions of the RPUP Act from the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act discussed in the decision in Badaku Joti's case. He argued that the real test is whether the provisions of the Act are intended for punishing offenders or for some other purpose such as revenue purpose, which was the dominant purpose of the Central Excise and Salt Act and the various Customs Acts. This submission must be rejected in view of the ratio in Badaku Joti's case, quoted above, which dealt with a statute whose words were identical with the words of the RPUP Act. He relied on the decision in Ramesh Chandra v. State of W.B, where J.C Shah J. speaking for the unanimous Court observed (p. 943):

    “…But a Customs Officer is not a member of the police force. He is not entrusted with, the duty to maintain law and order. He is entrusted with power which specifically relates to the collection of customs duties and prevention of smuggling. There is no warrant for the contention raised by counsel for Mehta that a Customs Officer is invested in the enquiry under the Sea Customs Act with all the powers which a police-officer in charge of a police station has under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the Sea Customs Act, a Customs Officer is authorised to collect Customs duty to prevent smuggling and for that purpose he is invested with the power to search any person on reasonable suspicion (Section 169); to screen or X-ray the body of a person for detecting secreted goods (Section 170A); to arrest a person against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has been guilty of an offence under the Act (Section 173); to obtain a search warrant from a Magistrate to search any place within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Magistrate (Section 172); to collect information by summoning persons to give evidence and produce documents (Section 171-A); and to adjudge confiscation under Section 182. He may exercise these powers for preventing smuggling of goods dutiable or prohibited and for adjudging confiscation of those goods. For collecting evidence the Customs Officer is entitled to serve a summons to produce a document or other thing or to give evidence, and the person so summoned is bound to attend either in person or by an authorized agent, as such officer may direct, and the person so summoned is bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined or makes a statement and to produce such documents and other things as may be required. The power to arrest, the power to detain, the power to search or obtain a search warrant and the power to collect evidence are vested in the Customs Officer for enforcing compliance with the provisions of the Sea Customs Act. For purpose of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code the enquiry made by a Customs Officer is a judicial proceeding. An order made by him is appealable to the Chief Customs-authority under Section 188 and against that order revisional jurisdiction may be exercised by the Chief Customs-authority and also by the Central Government at the instance of any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under the Act. The Customs Officer does not exercise, when enquiring into a suspected infringement of the Sea Customs Act, powers of investigation which a police officer may in investigating the commission of an offence. He is invested with the power to enquire into infringements of the Act primarily for the purpose of adjudicating forfeiture and penalty. He has no power to investigate an offence triable by a Magistrate, nor has he the power to submit a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He can only make a complaint in writing before a competent Magistrate.”

    33. Relying on these observations, Mr. Desai submitted that it is because of the various provisions contained in the Customs Act, relating to adjudication, prevention of smuggling and collection of revenue that the officers vested with the powers under that Act were considered not to be “police officers”. The argument must be rejected because the observation of J.C Shah J. (as he then was) cannot be read in part only. The observations must be read as part of the judgment as a whole. Reading thus, with respect, the whole of the paragraph and the rest of the judgment, we are unable to accept the argument of Mr. Desai that the ratio in that case depended only on objects mentioned in the Customs Act other than the object of punishing offenders. J.C Shah J. has also said that the powers conferred on the Customs Officers were for enforcing the provisions of the Customs Act.

    34. In the present case also, the Parliament thought it fit to enact the RPUP Act as a more effective measure for preserving and protecting railway property, than the provisions contained in the RPF Act. The mere fact that the RPUP Act provided for an offence or the fact that R.P.F members can arrest, detain and produce the accused persons so arrested before the Magistrate or issue summons to a witness, will not convert the R.P.F officers, who are declared to be “railway servants” under the R.P.F Act and who are essentially concerned with the protection of the railway property, into “police officers” for the purposes of the Evidence Act and the Criminal Procedure Code. It is necessary to notice here that Raja Ram's case was also referred to by J.C Shah J. in para. 7 of the said judgment.

    35. Mr. Desai then referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras . [1970] A.I.R S.C 1065., and urged that since that case has approved of the decision in the State Of Punjab v. Barkat Ram , notwithstanding the disapproval of the test of the power to file a charge-sheet, as laid down in Badaku Joti's case, all the decisions of the Supreme Court must be held to rest on the common feature of the various Acts considered by the Supreme Court, to collect revenue, with which the Customs Officers and Excise Officers are primarily concerned. We do not think that it is possible to extract such a proposition from the decision of the Supreme Court.

    36. It is true that one of the reasons set out in the State Of Punjab v. Barkat Ram , is that a Customs Officer is not primarily concerned with the detention but mainly interested in the detection and prevention of smuggling of goods and safeguarding the recovery of customs duties. But the judgment, with respect, is not entirely based on that aspect of the matter. The Court has considered the various decisions and principles in the context of the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and Raghubar Dayal J. for the majority, observed (p. 280):

    “…We are therefore of opinion that the duties of the Customs Officers are very much different from those of the police officers and that their possessing certain powers, which may have similarity with those of police officers, for the purpose of detecting the smuggling of goods and the persons responsible for it, would not make them police officers.”

    37. We are unable to find any of the decisions of the Supreme Court laying down the proposition that officers exercising some of the powers of the police such as arrest, detention and search were not “police officers” merely because they were exercising the powers only for the purposes of revenue of the State as contended by Mr. Desai. On the contrary, as already stated above, J.C Shah J. has observed that their purpose is to enforce the provisions of the Act, which includes some of the offences also. We, therefore, reject the contention of Mr. Desai that merely because the provisions of s. 8 of the rpup act enable the officer of the R.P.F to exercise powers similar to the powers of the officer in charge of the police station when investigating a cognizable offence, it can be said that the R.P.F Officers, who were declared by the Parliament to be “railway servants,” are “police officers” in any sense of the term. Similarly, we reject the contentions that because the RPUP Act deals only with offences and it has nothing to do with revenue, and that although the word “enquiry” is used in s. 8(1) of the RPUP Act, it is nothing but an investigation of the offences, and, therefore, the officers holding the “enquiry” are “police officers”. We are of the view that all cases including the cases of this Court, reported and unreported, in which it has been held that the officers enquiring into the offences under the RPUP Act are not police officers have, with respect, taken the correct view of law.

    38. Mr. Desai, however, relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Durga Prasad v. State of U.P . [1971] Cri. L.J 1582., and contended that in that case the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court applied the provisions of s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the statements recorded by an officer of the Railway Protection Force because he held that while conducting the enquiry under the RPUP Act, an officer had to be guided by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the enquiry amounted to investigation. With great respect, we do not find any reference to the above Supreme Court decisions in the said case dealing with the question as to whether such an officer is a “police officer”. It appears to have been assumed in that case that an officer conducting an enquiry was a Police Officer. The assumption, with respect, is against the weight of authorities referred to above. Hence Mr. Desai cannot rely on the said Allahabad decision.

    39. In this connection it is also necessary to bear in mind the constitutional background of the enactment by Parliament of the Railway Protection Force Act and the RPUP Act. They are both Acts enacted by the Parliament in exercise of the powers conferred on it under entry No. 2: “Naval, military and air forces; and other armed forces of the Union;” entry No. 22: “Railways,” of the Union List I of the Seventh Schedule and entry No. 1: “Criminal Law,” entry No. 2: “Criminal procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution,” in the Concurrent List III of Schedule VII. The constitution of the police force is normally the exclusive power of the State Government under entry No. 2: “Police, including railway and village police,” of the State List II of the VII Schedule to the Constitution.

    40. To attribute to Parliament an intention to create a police force or police officers, who are normally to be constituted in exercise of the State powers would be, therefore, inconsistent with the Constitution. It is only under entry No. 80 of List I (Union List) of Schedule VII that the Parliament could provide for extension of powers and jurisdiction of the members of the police force belonging to the State to any area outside that State “but not so as to enable the Police to exercise the powers or jurisdiction to any area outside the jurisdiction without the consent of the Government of the State in which such area is situated”. Neither the RPF Act nor the RPUP Act fall within the ambit of entry No. 80.

    41. In fact, so far as the Maharashtra State is concerned, the Police Officers are appointed under the Bombay Police Act, 1961. That Act itself provides in s. 22A for the appointment of the Railway Police. Having regard to the constitutional scheme of the State Governments and the Union Government in relation to the police organisation, it is not possible to attribute to the Parliament an intention to create a police force though it is not empowered to do so under the Constitution except in the manner provided by the aforesaid entry No. 80. The pith and substance of the RPUP Act is to create an adequate machinery for preserving and protecting the railway property. The Railway Protection Force was primarily intended to watch and prevent the pilferring of railway property all over India. The Officers of the Railway Protection Force have no general duty to maintain law and order even in areas or places where Railway property is situated. Their duties are connected only with the preservation or protection of the Railway property. It is, therefore, impossible to hold that when enacting the RPUP Act, the Parliament intended to treat the Members of the Railway Protection Force, who were declared to be only “railway servants” as stated above, to become in law “Police Officers.”

    42. Having regard to the enormous and increasing work in Police Stations in big cities, where usually railway goods are pilferred, the Parliament must have thought it necessary to eliminate the necessity for the Railway Protection Force Officers to go to the police stations at every stage of their enquiry. Having decided to constitute a well organised Railway Protection Force under an Inspector General, the Parliament in its wisdom thought it necessary to clothe those officers with almost all pre-trial powers vis-a-vis the offences in respect of the Railway property. The object of the Parliament was not to create a new police force but to relieve the Railway Protection Force from the inconvenience and waste of time arising from the legal necessity of approaching the police stations at every stage of enquiry into the offences. It will be, therefore, inconsistent with the object of the Act to hold that the Railway Protection Force Officers were Police Officers. To hold that the officers of the Force are “police officers” would also be inconsistent with the Constitutional powers of the Parliament.

    43. The next question is as to whether the confessions made to the RPF Officers are hit by s. 25 of the Evidence Act. Inasmuch as the said officers are not “police officers” it has to be answered in the negative. Section 25 renders confessions made to police officers inadmissible. As we have come to the conclusion that the Officers of the RPF are not Police Officers, s. 25 does not render the confessions inadmissible. The apprehension of Mr. Desai is that this would result in despotism inasmuch as the RPUP Act has departed from the normal presumption of innocence of the accused in respect of the offences charged and has placed the burden of proof on the accused to satisfy the Court that the railway property came into his possession lawfully. Mr. Desai cannot complain regarding the burden of proof on the accused because such a burden is often placed in many laws creating offences. The burden on the accused in such cases is interpreted by the Courts to be not as heavy as the burden on the prosecution. The burden on him is more or less like the burden of proof imposed on a party in civil case, who would fail if he did not prove certain facts. The Courts have adopted the test of preponderance of probability with regard to the burden on the accused and of proof beyond reasonable doubt with regard to the burden on the prosecution. Mr. Desai cannot make a grievance of the RPUP Act merely because such burden is placed on the accused.

    44. His grievance regarding the possibility of despotism is not justified because the Railway Protection Force is subject to Government control; and since independence, Parliament and public opinion are capable of controlling any Department of the State. As long as democracy is functioning in our country a grievance of potential despotism cannot be made with regard to the Railway Protection Force. Moreover, confessions recorded by the RPF Officers have to be produced before the Court before they can be relied upon by the prosecution. It is open to the accused to retract them and to satisfy the Court that the confessions were neither voluntary nor true. Courts are bound to view such confessions with the usual prudence and caution. Therefore merely because there are likely to be malpractices of extorting confessions, it cannot be said that law has to be interpreted as prohibiting the admission of such confessions at the trial of an offence under the RPUP Act.

    45. Mr. Desai submitted that, in any event, s. 9 of the rpup act was ultra vires art. 14 and art. 20(3) of the Constitution of India. There is no merit in either of these contentions. Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification based on rational nexus with the object to be achieved by enacting a law. Article 14 protects equality before law. It lays down that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. There is nothing in the RPUP Act which discriminates between one citizen and another. Whoever happens to commit an offence under that Act is liable to be dealt with under the Act.

    46. Mr. Desai, however, submitted that in so far as the legislation discriminates against an accused charged with an offence under that Act from, an accused charged with an offence under general criminal law, by denying him copies under s. 173(4) of the Code, by allowing the officers inquiring into the offence to record his confessions; by making the confessions admissible in such a case; and by making other special provisions for the investigation and control of offences under the RPUP Act, the Act is hit by art. 14 of the Constitution. It is no doubt true that art. 14 condemns discrimination not only by substantial law but also by the law of procedure. But, as stated above, it does not prohibit reasonable classification with the rational object. When it declares that every one is equal before the law, it means that no one shall claim special privilege and all classes of persons are equally subject to the ordinary law of the land. When it guarantees equal protection of the laws, it means that all persons in the same situation and in the like circumstances are protected equally.

    47. No person who has committed an offence relating to Railway property within the meaning of the RPUP Act is discriminated against from any other person who has committed a like offence. Article 14 does not forbid reasonable classification between persons who are accused of offences under RPUP Act and persons who commit offences outside that Act. The classification is based on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped together in the category of persons found in unlawful possession of Railway property from persons committing other offences. The differentia in question has also a reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the RPUP Act, namely, to protect the railway property and to provide a special machinery for enquiring into and punishment of offences. The officers of the Railway Protection Force have to appear before the ordinary Courts as complainants. The offence will be tried in ordinary course in the manner prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code.

    48. The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances, in the same position. The varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. Having regard to the nature of the “railway property” as defined in the RPF Act and the RPUP Act and having regard to the number of offences, which are taking place in the Railway, the Parliament in its wisdom distinguished for the purposes of enquiry into such offences, persons who commit such offences from the person who committed other offences. It is, therefore, a classification for good reasons. It is based upon real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained. The classification is not made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis. The State has the power of “classification” on a basis of rational distinctions relevant to the particular subject dealt with. There is a nexus between the basis of classification and the object in this case because the object is to facilitate detection and enquiry into offences relating to unlawful possession of railway property. The argument of Mr. Desai that s. 9 of the rpup act is in contravention of art. 14 of the Constitution must be therefore rejected.

    49. It was argued by Mr. Desai that s. 9 of the rpup act is in contravention of art. 20(3) of the Constitution inasmuch as it requires a person, who may be an accused person and who is summoned by an RPF Officer to state the truth. He also submitted that if the word “person” in that section does not include the “accused”, then any confession taken by the RPF Officer is in contravention of art. 20(3). A similar point has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in Ramesh Chandra v. State of W.B J.C Shah J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court has dealt with the point in para. 15 of the judgment at p. 947. It was held following the decision in Bhagwandas Goenka v. Union of India . 1963 Criminal Appeals Nos. 131 and 132 of 1961, decided on September 20, 1963 Supreme Court Unrep.. and over-ruling the decision of the Calcutta High Court to the contrary that a person does not stand in the character of an accused person until there is a formal accusation made against him before a Court of justice.

    50. Article 20(3) lays down that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It is only when a person can be said to be a witness before Court that the prohibition prescribed by art. 20(3) comes into operation. If a person who is not accused of any offence, is compelled to give evidence, and evidence taken from him under compulsion ultimately leads to an accusation against him, that would not be a case which would attract the provisions of art. 20(3). The main object of art. 20(3) is to give protection to an accused person not to be compelled to incriminate himself and that is in consonance with the basic principle of criminal law accepted in our country that an accused person is entitled to rely on the presumption of innocence in his favour and cannot be compelled to swear and condemn himself. The accusation of any offence which is an essential condition for the application of art. 20(3) is a condition precedent for the application of the principle prescribed by the said article.

    51. There is no such accusation until the officer of the Railway Protection Force files a complaint against the person. The argument of Mr. Desai that s. 9 of the rpup act is in contravention of art. 20(3) must be therefore rejected. In our opinion, an officer of the Railway Protection Force is not a Police Officer. He has to file a complaint before a Magistrate, after completing his enquiry, if he is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to be placed before the Court, which prima facie discloses the offence having been committed by a person. Hence until such a complaint is filed, there is no formal accusation which is the condition precedent for the application of art. 20(3) of the Constitution.

    52. It was next contended by Mr. Desai that in any event having regard to the provisions of s. 8(2), the officer of the Railway Protection Force was bound to follow the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to information to the Police and their powers to investigate, as if the offence under s. 3, which is non-cognizable under s. 5, was a cognizable offence and as if the enquiry, which was being made by the Enquiry Officer was an investigation by a Police Officer. In other words, he tried to submit that all the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, without any limitations whatsoever, were attracted to the enquiry held by an officer of the Railway Protection Force because s. 8(2) lays down that the officer of the Force, “may exercise the same powers and shall be subject to the same provisions as the officer in charge of a police-station may exercise and is subject to under the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

    53. In making this submission, Mr. Desai ignores the words: “for this purpose” in s. 8(2) of the RPUP Act, which has a reference to the enquiry to be conducted under s. 8(1). The powers of the Police invested in the officers of the Railway Protection Force are limited to the purpose for which they must be exercised. The purpose is “to enquire into the charge” against a person, when the person is arrested by an officer of the Railway Protection Force for an offence punishable under the Act. Having regard to the limited purpose of the powers, it is not possible to say that the Parliament intended to incorporate the entire Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code with regard to the enquiry into the offence under the RPUP Act. What was intended was merely conferring certain powers and imposing certain restrictions on the officers of the Railway Protection Force, conducting the enquiry under s. 8(1).

    54. Considering the nature and purpose of the enauiry, all that the Parliament intended was to confer on the officers some of the powers of the Police and not all the powers and duties prescribed in Chapter XIV of the Code. In spite of the provisions of s. 8(2), Parliament has enacted some sections which are somewhat similar to the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. Proviso (a) to s. 8 correspond to s. 60 and s. 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Proviso (b) to s. 8 is substantially similar to s. 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 9(1) is similar to s. 160 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 10 is similar to s. 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Having regard to the provisions of s. 14, it is clear that these provisions were enacted by the Parliament in substitution of the corresponding provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the argument that the Parliament intended that the entire Chapter XIV is applicable is untenable.

    55. Again if at all the Parliament intended that a charge-sheet under s. 173(i) is to be filed by the Officers of the Railway Protection Force, the Parliament would have said so. We have carefully considered all the sections in Chapter XIV and we find that it is possible that the Parliament intended by enacting the provisions under the RPUP Act that a person from whom or against whom an enquiry is made by the Officers of the Railway Protection Force should not be able to question the authority of these officers to inquire into the offence or to collect facts relating to the offences, and/or to refuse to state the truth before them. We do not wish to lay down, however, that any particular section in Chapter XIY may not apply to the enquiry to be held by the RPF Officer because the only section which was discussed in the course of arguments before us was s. 173; and the present application under s. 561A is directed against the order refusing copies which were demanded under s. 173(4). It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to pronouns any final opinion with regard to the applicability of any other sections of the Chapter XIV or any other Chapter of the Criminal Procedure Code to the enquiry held by the Railway Protection Force Officer.

    56. The only question that remains to be considered is whether Mr. Desai is right in his contention that s. 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to an enouiry under s. 8 of the rpup act. This point is not res integra. It is well-settled that s. 173(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply unless there is a charge-sheet filed by the Police under s. 173(1). See Asst. Customs Collector, Bombau v. L.R Melwani . [1970] A.I.R S.C 962, S.C 72 Bom. L.R 782.. Where the criminal prosecution is instituted on a private complaint, the documents mentioned in sub-s. (4) of s. 173 cannot be made available to the accused. In State v. Dattalraya Maharudra Borker . 1968 Criminal Revision Application No. 321 of 1968, deeded by Kotval C.J, on July 15, 1968 Unrep.. Kotval C.J held that even where the police filed a complaint and not a charge-sheet or report as required by s. 173(1), the accused was not entitled to copies under s. 173(4). In Ajghar Babu Tambe v. The State of Maharashtra Deshpande J. held that in respect of a prosecution instituted on a complaint by the R.P.F Officer under s. 3(a) of the RPUP Act, the accused was not entitled to the benefit of s. 173(4). A similar view was taken by Rege J. in the unreported judgment in The State of Maharashtra v. Vishwanath Rajaram Mourya which arose out of a prosecution under the RPUP Act. We agree with these decisions.

    57. Mr. Desai, however, submitted that the said judgments cannot be said to be correctly decided as there was no rational explanation as to why the Parliament, which stated that the offence should be inquired into as a cognizable one though it is declared to be not a cognizable offence, should discriminate against an accused charged under RPUP Act in the matter of supply of copies. It is not for us to question the wisdom of Parliament. We have to interpret the section as it stands. Section 173(1) can have no application to complaint filed by an officer of the Railway Protection Force as he is not a “police officer” and the complaint which he files is not a “police report” within the meaning of s. 173(1) and/or s. 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    58. An officer of the Railway Protection Force has to file a complaint like any person other than a police officer. The complaint made by him is a complaint as defined in s. 4(h) of the Criminal Procedure Code, as it is a complaint made in writing to the Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code that some person had committed an offence. It may be that in certain cases a police report may also be regarded as a complaint. That is why in defining the word “complaint,” the Criminal Procedure Code expressly excludes the report of the Police Officer in s. 4(h). As an officer of the Railway Protection Force is not a “police officer,” he can only ask the Court to take cognizance of his complaint under s. 190(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Desai's argument that the enquiry under s. 8 of the rpup act is a camouflage for investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure or in substance and in reality a “police report” or charge-sheet under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code and therefore, any complaint filed by the Officer of the Railway Protection Force is a report by Police Officer within the meaning of s. 173(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code is, therefore, untenable.

    59. Mr. Desai next argued that even if s. 173(4) is inapplicable to an enquiry under s. 8 of the rpup act, every accused against whom a complaint was filed before a Magistrate, was entitled to ask the complainant to supply copies of at least the documents which are referred to in the complaint as a matter of fair play and natural justice. He submitted, relying upon the list of witnesses and the list of documents annexed to the complaint in this case, which are referred to above, that the accused is entitled to all the copies of the documents which are mentioned in the list of documents annexed to the complaint. This contention is without any merit. A party to a litigation cannot demand copies from the other side as a matter of right. It is only if law enables him to get the copies from the other side that he can ask the other side to furnish copies. Mr. Desai is unable to point out any provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and/or any other relevant Act which entitled the accused in a case under the RPUP Act to demand copies from the complainant.

    60. Mr. Tipnis, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, drew our attention to a judgment of Deshmukh and Apte JJ. in The State of Maharashtra v. Hind Cycle Ltd. . 1971 Criminal Revision Application No. 1037 of 1970, decided by Deshmukh and Apte JJ., on July 14, 1971 Unrep.. which arose out of a prosecution under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and wherein it was laid down that the accused had no right to obtain copies of the police statements before the commencement of the trial, as s. 173(4) of the Code was inapplicable to a prosecution under that Act. Mr. Tipnis, therefore, submitted that even in the present case, as s. 173(4) of the Code is inapplicable, the accused cannot ask for supply of copies of documents mentioned in the list annexed to the complaint, which includes the statements of the witnesses already examined or are likely to be examined by the complainant. The contention of Mr. Tipnis must be upheld as the accused has no right to be furnished with copies by the complainant under any law.

    61. Notwithstanding this, relying on a judgment delivered by me while sitting singly, in Govind Baghunath v. Kakade . 1973 77 Bom. L.R 214. Mr. Desai submitted that the statements of at least the witnesses, who were examined by the complainant before the framing of the charge and of the witnesses, who are lively to be examined in proof of the case must be ordered to be produced in Court by the complainant and inspection of the said documents must be given to the counsel of the accused, including the right to take copies of the said statements in Court, if so required. Mr. Tipnis, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the State, fairly stated that the State had no objection to the production in Court of such statements. Mr. Porus Mehta appearing for the Attorney General also agreed that although he was appearing for the Attorney General and was concerned with the constitutional point only, the requisites of a fair trial required such an order to be made in every case. In his opinion, the judgment in Govind Raghunath v. Kakade was welcome in the interest of fair trial of the accused charged with offences under the RPUP Act and in cases instituted by officers like the Railway Protection Force clothed with powers of the police in the matter of enquiring into the offences.

    62. The grounds discussed so far were the only grounds urged in support of the petition. No other ground was urged in support of the prayer for quashing the proceedings or the charge.

    63. The only order to which the petitioner is, therefore, entitled to is an order for production in the trial Court of statements of witnesses already examined by the complainant or likely to be examined hereinafter in the Court, recorded by the Officers of the Railway Protection Force in the course of the inquiry relating to the offences which is the subject-matter of the complaint in the present case. We, therefore, order that the said statements be produced in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate trying the case. The accused and his counsel shall be entitled to take copies thereof.

    [Gandhi, J. delivered a concurring judgment.]

    64. P.C: For the reasons stated above, the orders passed by the Presidency Magistrate dated August 3, 1973 and September 7, 1973 are set aside and the complainant is directed under s. 165 of the Evidence Act to produce in the Court the true copies of the statements of the witnesses already examined and to be examined hereafter by the complainant and of the documents on which the complainant desired to depend, and it is declared that the accused and his counsel shall be entitled to inspect the same and take copies thereof if necessary in Court. It is declared that s. 9 of the rpup act is not ultra vires the Constitution. Rule made absolute to the extent mentioned hereinabove. Rule in terms of prayer (aa) in the petition is discharged.

    65. Order accordingly.

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    Balkishan A. Devidayal v. The State Of Maharashtra
    (Jan 19, 1974)