AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision is filed by the original defendant No. 1 in a suit pending before the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division Akola, where the plaintiff, M/s. Omprakash Shioprakash, seeks recovery of Rs. 13,489.82. The plaintiff alleges dealings with defendants No. 1 and No. 2 and claims that defendant No. 1 was to clear defendant No. 2’s liability and recover the amount from defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1 challenged the claim, including the genuineness of the transaction. The plaintiff filed about 110 vouchers as documentary evidence, which were produced but initially not exhibited during the trial.

During cross-examination of the plaintiff’s first witness, Kaluram, the trial Judge required the vouchers to be exhibited before questions could be asked about them. Defendant No. 1’s counsel gave no objection to exhibition but did not admit the documents’ genuineness or contents. Subsequent cross-examination of the plaintiff’s second witness, defendant No. 2 Ratanlal, involved some questions on these vouchers, but defendant No. 1’s counsel was denied permission to challenge the contents or genuineness of the vouchers further. Applications by defendant No. 1 to permit such cross-examination and to have the vouchers examined by a handwriting expert were rejected by the trial Court, leading to this revision petition under the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of interlocutory orders passed during pending proceedings.
  2. Whether the trial Court erred in refusing permission to defendant No. 1 to cross-examine the plaintiff’s witness on the contents and genuineness of the exhibited vouchers.
  3. Whether the trial Court erred in rejecting the application to permit photographic examination of the vouchers by a handwriting expert.
  4. Whether the refusal to allow such cross-examination and expert examination amounts to illegality or material irregularity affecting the rights of the defence.

Arguments of the Parties

Original Plaintiff’s Arguments

  • The revision is not maintainable as the case is pending and not decided; thus, the High Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC to entertain the application.
  • Relied on Supreme Court decisions (Misrilal v. Sadasiviah, Ratilal v. Ranchhodbhai, Baldevdas v. Filmistan Distributors) to argue that revision jurisdiction does not extend to interlocutory matters in pending suits.

Defendant No. 1’s Arguments

  • Defendant No. 1 sought to cross-examine on the vouchers’ contents and genuineness, and to have them examined by a handwriting expert, which was denied by the trial Court.
  • Argued that the refusal infringed on the statutory and fundamental right to cross-examination and to challenge material evidence, amounting to an error apparent on the face of the record and material irregularity in procedure.
  • Contended that the trial Court incorrectly treated the counsel’s statement of “no objection” to exhibition as an admission of the documents’ contents and genuineness, which it was not.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Misrilal v. Sadasiviah, AIR 1965 SC 553 Limits on revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC in pending suits. Referenced by plaintiff to argue High Court lacks jurisdiction in interlocutory matters.
Ratilal v. Ranchhodbhai, AIR 1966 SC 439 Similar to Misrilal; restrictions on revisional powers before decision. Used to support plaintiff’s contention on jurisdictional limits.
Baldevdas v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1969) 2 SCC 201 : AIR 1970 SC 406 Interpretation of “case decided” under Section 115 CPC and scope of supervisory jurisdiction. Clarified that Section 115 applies only after a case is decided or a right is concluded.
Chaube Jagdisprasad v. Gangaprasad, AIR 1959 SC 492 High Court’s power to interfere where subordinate Court acts illegally or with material irregularity. Supported the principle that illegal exercise of jurisdiction or material irregularity justifies revision.
Keshardeo v. Radhakissan, AIR 1953 SC 23 Definition of “illegally or with material irregularity” as material defect of procedure. Used to explain the nature of errors attracting supervisory jurisdiction.
Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun, AIR 1960 SC 137 Error must be apparent on the face of the record for supervisory jurisdiction. Emphasized requirement of clear error to invoke Section 115.
Joy Chand Lal v. Kamalakshya Chowdhury, AIR 1949 PC 239 Proper exercise of High Court’s powers under Section 115 CPC in cases involving jurisdictional errors. Illustrated scope of supervisory jurisdiction over interlocutory matters involving jurisdiction.
Lachrni Narayan v. Balmakund, AIR 1924 PC 198 Jurisdictional errors and supervisory powers of the High Court. Supported the principle of High Court’s intervention in illegal exercise of jurisdiction.
Umed Mal v. Chand Mal, AIR 1926 PC 142 Material irregularity includes deciding cases in absence of necessary parties or summary dismissal. Applied to define material irregularity affecting parties’ rights.
Atmaram v. Beni Prasad, AIR 1935 PC 185 Material irregularity in procedure that affects rights of parties. Supported the concept of material irregularity as ground for revision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by acknowledging the plaintiff’s contention that revision jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC does not extend to interlocutory orders in pending suits, relying on established Supreme Court precedents. However, the Court examined the scope of Section 115, particularly Clause (c), which empowers the High Court to intervene where a subordinate Court acts illegally or with material irregularity in exercising its jurisdiction.

The Court emphasized that the power under Section 115 is supervisory and can be invoked when the subordinate Court’s action is illegal or procedurally irregular, affecting the parties’ rights. It distinguished between mere procedural errors and material irregularities, the latter being sufficient to attract the High Court’s jurisdiction.

Applying these principles, the Court analyzed the trial Court’s orders refusing defendant No. 1 permission to cross-examine the witness on the vouchers’ contents and to have the vouchers examined by a handwriting expert. The Court found that the trial Judge’s assumption—that the counsel’s statement of “no objection” to exhibition amounted to admission of the documents’ contents and genuineness—was unsustainable. The Court held that such a statement was neither a clear nor categorical admission.

The refusal to allow cross-examination and expert examination was held to be a material irregularity affecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial and to challenge evidence crucial to their defence. The Court noted that the applications lacked particulars but that the denial of the opportunity to put forth these challenges was an error apparent on the face of the record.

The Court directed that the defendant No. 1 be permitted to file detailed applications specifying the points for cross-examination and expert examination, and that the trial Court should hear and decide these afresh. It also directed that the plaintiff be allowed to reply and adduce additional evidence if necessary, maintaining procedural fairness.

The Court acknowledged that this process would cause adjournments and accordingly imposed costs on defendant No. 1 as a condition precedent for filing such applications.

Holding and Implications

The revision application is allowed. The impugned orders at Exhibits 55 and 57, which refused permission for cross-examination on the vouchers and for handwriting expert examination, are set aside.

The trial Court is directed to permit defendant No. 1 to file detailed applications specifying the grounds and points for cross-examination and expert examination, to allow the plaintiff to respond, and to decide the matter afresh in a manner consistent with the principles of fairness and procedural regularity.

Costs of Rs. 150/- are imposed on defendant No. 1 as a precondition for filing the applications before the trial Court, and Rs. 75/- costs are awarded in favor of the original plaintiff in this revision. No costs are awarded concerning defendant No. 2.

This decision does not set a new precedent but ensures the protection of the right to a fair trial, emphasizing that interlocutory orders involving material irregularity affecting rights are amenable to revision under Section 115 CPC.

    Sanjay Cotton Co. Partnership Firm Akola v. Omprakash Shioprakash

    1. This revision is filed by the original defendant No. 1 in a suit filed by one M/s. Omprakash Shioprakash, now pending in the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division Akola. It appears that the said plaintiff is seeking recovery of an amount of Rs. 13,489.82 on the allegation that the plaintiff had dealings with defendant No. 1 and another defendant No. 2 and the amount due is recoverable. He pleads as agreement that defendant No. 1 was to clear off the liability of de fendant No. 2 and inter se between the parties, defendant No. 1 was to recover the amount from defendant No. 2 and pay the plaintiff. Thus, it appears that be tween defendants also some agreement is pleaded by the plaintiff. The facts are not very material for the purpose of decision of this revision.

    2. After the written statement was put in, in which defendant No. 1 appears to have challenged the claim of the plaintiff on all counts, including the genuineness of the transaction, some documents were filed on behalf of the plaintiff. Those documents include some 110 vouchers. It appears that these documents were produced on 16-2-1972 and thereafter the case was fixed sometimes in July for evidence. One Kaluram was produced by plaintiff as witness No. 1.

    3. It is not in dispute before me and I take it from the learned counsel appearing for both the parties that while this Kaluram was being cross-examined, the counsel appearing for defendant No. the present applicant, wanted to ask cer tain questions relating to these vouchers. At that stage, the learned Judge pointed out to the counsel that the documents were not exhibited and, therefore, he should not ask questions. Upon this it appears that the learned counsel stated on the list of documents that he had no objection for exhibiting these vouchers Further cross-examination was thereafter allowed by the learned Judge. One Ratanlal was called by the plaintiff as its witness No. 2. the said witness was cross-examined and some questions were put upon these documents also. However, a complaint is being made that de fendant No. 1 wanted to challenge the contents of the exhibits, i.e these 10 vouchers being Exhs. Nos. 30 to 39 and wanted to put questions in cross-examination for that purpose. The learned Judge appears to have declined pointing out to the counsel that the documents were exhibited. This necessitated an application which is Exh. No. 57. The said application does not give the nature of the questions nor specify the points. The learned Judge passed an order immediately, it appears, by saying that the documents have been admitted to be exhibited by defendant No. 1's lawyers; sufficient questions have also been put in the matter, and thus rejected the application. This order is under challenge. On the same day. Exh. 55 was also put in by which the defendant No 1 sought permission to take photographs of the said document. The application states that after Ratanlal was examined, who appears to be P.W 2, it has become necessary to get those documents examined by the Hand-writing Expert It may be stated that this Ratanlal is defendant No. 2 and was called by the plaintiff to support the case pleaded by them as their own witness. It has already been mentioned that plaintiff has pleaded a specific case relating to inter se liability between these two defendants. Against these two orders refusing the photographic examination through Hand-writing Expert of the documents and also permitting cross-examination, the defendant No. 1 has moved this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. It is not also in dispute that these Exhs. 30 to 39 are the vouchers and are the material evidence relating to liability of the defendants and particularly, defendant No. 1.

    4. Now, Mr. Mohta appearing for the original plaintiff-non-applicant No. 1 before me, argues that this is not a fit case where this Court be pleased to exercise its powers under section 115 of the cpc. He goes on to argue that the case has not been decided, and it comes in one of the exceptions dealt with by the Supreme Court. In the three decisions which he relied upon, being Misrilal v. Sadasiviah, (AIR 1965 SC 553) Ratilal v. Ranchhod bhai. (AIR 1966 SC 439) and Baldevdas v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., ((1969) 2 SCC 201 : AIR 1970 SC 406. In other words, Mr. Mohta contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present application.

    5. Now these decisions do not cover every case that is contemplated by the terms of section 115 of the cpc, It is no doubt true that the provisions of section 115 confers a supervisory power upon the High Court for the matters enumerated in Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of that section. Clauses (a) and (b) do not furnish any difficulty as they are clear in terms. Neatly stated they can be invoked where a case of want of jurisdiction or non-exercise of jurisdiction is made out. Clause (c) of S. 115, however, since its inception, has proved a cockpit of judicial debate, both as to its efficacy as well as its sweep via the power conferred by this section upon the High Court. As pointed out in the case cited by the learned advocate (1969) 2 SCC 201 : AIR 1970 SC 406 for application of all these Clauses (a), (b) and (c). however, there must be initially a case decided. The term has now been interpreted by the Supreme Court in that decision and would take in a decision in a pending proceeding which concludes a right of a party before the Court.

    6. The provision of Clause (c) of Section 115, if closely scrutinised, would show that it operates upon the action With jurisdiction when such an action is either illegal or is fraught with material irregularity. In Chaube Jagdisprasad v. Gangaprasad, (AIR 1959 SC 492) the Supreme Court observed that if any erroneous decision of a subordinate Court resulted in its exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in it or acting illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the case for the exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court is made out Similarly, in Keshardeo v. Radhakissan, (AIR 1953 SC 23), the words “illegally or with material irregularity” in Clause (c) were treated to have reference to material defect of procedure. The error while exercising the supervisory powers, of course, must be an error apparent on the face of record (See Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun, AIR 1960 SC 137).

    7. In Joy Chand Lal v. Kamala kshya Chowdhury, (76 Ind App 131) (AIR 1949 PC 239). the Privy Council considered that the High Court exercised powers under section 115 of the cpc properly when it held that the applicant under Bengal Money-Lenders Act. 1940 was entitled, to a relief as the debt was not a commercial debt. The Privy Council observed that if the erroneous decision results in the subordinate Court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise the jurisdiction so vested in it, the case arises under Clause (a) or Clause (b) even Clause (c) can be invoked, (See also Lachrni Narayan v. Balmakund, (51 Ind APP 321) AIR 1924 PC 198).

    8. Therefore, whenever it is shown that the subordinate Court has exercised its powers either illegally or with material irregularity, the provision of section 115 of the cpc would be attracted. It is clear that this illegality or material irregularity must also arise in the exercise of the jurisdiction. What is an error of procedure as distinguished from error of law, can be seen from the decision mentioned supra in (AIR 1953 SC 23) or the Privy Council decision in Umed Mal v. Chand Mal, (53 Ind App 271) : (AIR 1926 PC 142). The Privy Council accepted that it would be a material irregularity to decide a case in the absence of a necessary party or to summarily dismiss an application of a person to be brought on record as a party. (See Atmaram v. Beni Prasad, (62 Ind App 257) : (AIR 1935 PC 185).)

    9. It follows, therefore, that if the Court undoubtedly having jurisdiction proceeds in the matters before it contrary to law or with material irregularity in procedure affecting the rights of the parties to a lis and decides a case which would take in also the interlocutory stages, the matter is amenable to the power conferred by section 115 of the cpc. In that view, If a party complaining before this Court can successfully show that in the conduct of the proceedings pending in the Lower Court a matter has been concluded with material irregularity or involving illegality, I am of the view that the proceedings can be properly brought before this Court under the provisions of section 115 of the cpc. Even on the authorities cited by the learned counsel appearing for the non-applicant No. 1, the matter is still open to be examined. I can not hence accede that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted in the present controversy.

    10. It is, therefore, necessary to find out what the impugned orders produced at Exhs. 57 and 55 have done in the instant case. It is no more in dispute that the plaintiff is seeking to enforce an obligation against the present applicant-defendant No. 1 and to support the liability raised by the plea, he filed certain vouchers. It appears that these vouchers were filed with a list of documents and were not exhibited when the principal witness on behalf of the plaintiff. P.W 1 Kaluram entered the witness-box. No notice as required by the Code of Civil Procedure to admit the documents appears to have been given to the defendant No. 1 or defendant No. 2. What is now admitted before me is this that the counsel appearing for the defendant No. 1 wanted to ask certain questions to the witness P.W 1 Kaluram produced by the plaintiff. The learned Judge did not allow the learned counsel to proceed by asking such questions and it appears observed that unless the documents are exhibited, no questions would be permitted. Presumably, therefore, while the said witness Kaluram was under cross-examination, the counsel appearing for defendant No. 1 gave no objection for their being exhibited. That is plainly admitted before me for the plaintiff-non-applicant No. 1 in this revision. In fact, it is stated that no admission as to the genuineness or as to the contents of those vouchers was given at all and what was stated by the counsel for the defendant No. 1 was that he had no objection if the documents were exhibited.

    11. Taking this as an admission of the documents as well their contents, the learned Judge appears to have made orders now under challenge in this revision Few more developments followed after plaintiff's witness No. 1 Kaluram was examined. Plaintiff called defendant No. 2 Ratanlal as his own witness and put him as witness No. 2. It is now not in dispute that while this witness was under cross-examination by the counsel for defendant No. 1 some questions were allowed by the learned Judge to be asked relating to the vouchers which were exhibited under the aforesaid circumstances as Exhs. 30 to 39. The counsel appearing for the applicant in this revision states that, however, as to the contents of those documents and similarly as to their genuineness the learned Judge did not allow the cross-examination. On the other hand, the counsel appearing for the plaintiff before me says that some questions were allowed and some were not. This resulted in filing an application produced at Exh. 57, which is absolutely cryptic, stating that the defendant No. 1 wants to cross-examine the witness P.W 2 Ratanlal as to the vouchers Exhs. 30 to 39. The learned Judge has rejected that application presumably saying that the documents were admitted and that some questions were allowed. This order is under challenge. It appears that simultaneously the application at Exh. 55 was also made whereby the defendant No. 1 wanted to take photographs through Handwriting Expert and examine contents of the said vouchers as to their genuineness, and now it is stated before me that some of the columns in those vouchers appear clearly to have been inserted or filled in later on. That application was similarly reiected by the learned Judge on the same day. i.e 7-7-1972. That order is also challenged before me.

    12. Now, there appears to be some confusion with respect to the right of the party to challenge the documentary evidence. It must be stated that a party defending has a right to put every piece of evidence before the Court which would include the circumstances that may Ultimately affect the appreciation of evidence in the trial. The purpose of cross-examination is to place all the factors before the Court so as to enable it to come to a just decision on the competing cases and to enable the party to take out material which will help or otherwise show the probability in laying down its defence. This valuable right is a statutory one and is also the part of the basic principles of justice and fairness. I would take it that any arbitrary or unjust inroad on this right would not only affect the merits of the case but also disable a party in its own defence. If, therefore, in a given case it is shown that this salutary right has been made illusory by either a misconception of facts or Jaw, it would not only be an error of jurisdiction but also a material irregularity in the procedure.

    13. Viewed from this angle, I am unable to see the reasoning behind the orders produced at Exhs. 57 and 55. In fact, the learned Judge has given reasons in an extremely summary manner and one is left to surmises what impelled the learned Judge to reject both these requests. It is perfectly possible that the orders were so made because the applications themselves were wanting in particulars nor pointed the matters on which the cross-examination was sought with respect to Exhs. 30 to 39. Similar is the position relating to the application at Exh. 55. Partly, therefore the applicant cannot be absolved from his liability in this particular case.

    14. However, one thing is clear and admitted before me that defendant No. 1 is seriously contesting the claim of the plaintiff. The said defendant has not accepted the documents as raising any liability nor has given any admission as required by law to its contents, There is no possibility in the record to proceed to judgment on the basis of any admission made by defendant No. 1. In other words, the matters between the parties are very much at issue. If that be so, then fairness and justice require that all procedural steps including showing that the documents Exhs. 30 to 39 are not genuine or their contents have been inserted after the signatures were obtained, should be allowed to the defence. I take it that both these applications produced at Exhs. 55 and 57 were meant to support such a plea and were, therefore, called for a proper consideration from the Court. The present refusal of these applications affects right of the defence to challenge some important pieces of evidence on the basis of which their liability can either arise or would be negatived. In rejecting these applications, therefore, the learned Judge was affecting the right of the party to put its case before it and this refusal amounts to a clear error apparent on the face of record and also partakes in a material irregularity in procedure.

    15. It clearly appears that the assumption which the learned Judge made is unsustainable, that assumption being that the documents which were allowed to be exhibited were either admitted by the defendant No. 1 and the said admission was binding on the defendant No. 1. In my view, from the facts narrated above, no such inference can be formed, for an admission must be clear and categorical. On the other hand, here what one finds is that the learned counsel merely said that he has no objection to exhibit the documents while he was asking questions to the first witness produced by the plaintiff. If that be so it is neither an admission as to documents nor can be treated as an admission of the contents thereof. The error thus committed while passing the orders both at Exhs. 55 and 57 is apparent which has consequently vitiated the further rejection of the prayers by the trial Court, Both these orders, therefore, are liable to be set aside and are set aside.

    16. This, however, cannot con clude the matter. As is apparent the applications were lacking in the material details. It is, therefore, necessary to allow the defendant No. 1, the applicant before me to file proper applications with respect to the matters giving the points on which he wishes to cross-examine the witnesses produced for the plaintiff, Similarly, the application should be detailed enough as to what particular portions of these documents require the examination through an Handwriting Expert and the purpose for photographic inspection through an Expert After such application is made before the learped trial Court, it will be necessary that the plaintiff is allowed to make a reply to such an application. After hearing the parties, the learned Judge would decide ‘those applications. It will be treated therefore that plaintiffs evidence is not over and the plaintiff will be also entitled to give such additional evidence as may be necessary. Only after plaintiff closes his case, the defendants can be called upon to proceed to evidence in support of the defence.

    17. The learned Judge, keeping in view the above observations, will now entertain an application for the purpose of permitting cross-examination, ascertain the points on which such a cross-examination can be permitted, ascertain the purpose on which the Expert opinion is sought and then decide the matter afresh after hearing the parties.

    18. This would necessarily involve postponement in the hearing of the trial which adjournments should be compensated for. The applicant (defendant No. 1) before me would, therefore, pay as a condition precedent for filing such an application before the trial Court a sum of Rs. 150/- to the plaintiff as the costs.

    19. In the result, this revision application is allowed. The orders produced at Exhs. 55 and 57 are set aside and the trial Court is directed to proceed in this regard as indicated above. The application to the trial Court will be made expeditiously and the applicant's counsel undertakes to do it within two weeks from today. The said application will be considered and decided by the trial Court keeping in view the observations made hereinabove. Although this revision is allowed, it is directed that the applicant shall pay further costs of Rs. 75/- of this revision to the non-applicant No. 1 original plaintiff. No costs as far as non-applicant No. 2 is concerned.

    20. Revision allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sanjay Cotton Co. Partnership Firm Akola v. Omprakash Shioprakash
    (Aug 25, 1972)