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  • payable.11. Sub-section (1) of s. 5 of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959,
  • instituted.16. Sub-rule (3) of rule 151 of Original Side Rules,
  • s. 54 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act
  • Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869,
  • SECTION 26 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 13 A HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • Sub-rule (3) of rule 151 provides:(3)
  • s. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • Rules. Sub-rule (1) of rule 151
  • Sub-rule (2) of rule 151
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • COURT FEES ACT
  • him.5. Rule 152
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • payable.11. Sub-section (1) of s. 5 of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959,
  • instituted.16. Sub-rule (3) of rule 151 of Original Side Rules,
  • s. 54 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act
  • Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869,
  • SECTION 26 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 13 A HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • Sub-rule (3) of rule 151 provides:(3)
  • s. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act,
  • Rules. Sub-rule (1) of rule 151
  • Sub-rule (2) of rule 151
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • COURT FEES ACT
  • him.5. Rule 152
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On September 5, 1959, respondents No. 2 contracted with respondents No. 1 (the original plaintiffs) for the supply of manganese ore, with the material to be routed through the appellants (the original defendants). On the same day, the appellants contracted separately with respondents No. 1 and respondents No. 2 for supply and delivery arrangements. Respondents No. 1 alleged the goods supplied were of improper quality and short in delivery, and on September 23, 1963, filed a suit claiming damages totaling approximately Rs. 10,25,000 from the appellants.

On November 27, 1963, the appellants obtained leave under rule 151 of the High Court Original Side Rules to issue a third party notice against respondents No. 2, claiming from them the same reliefs claimed by respondents No. 1 against the appellants. The third party notice outlined multiple issues relating to quality, quantity, breach of contract, damages, and liabilities between the parties. Respondents No. 2 appeared on January 17, 1964.

Subsequently, the appellants sought directions under rule 154 regarding whether court-fees were payable on the third party notice. Mr. Justice K.K Desai directed the appellants to pay court-fees on the third party notice, prompting this appeal by the appellants against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether court-fees are payable on a third party notice issued under rule 151 of the High Court Original Side Rules.
  2. Whether a third party notice is to be treated as a plaint or an application/petition for the purposes of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959.
  3. The proper classification and consequent court-fee liability of a third party notice under the Court-fees Act and relevant procedural rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The third party notice is issued by the Court and bears the Court's seal, making it a Court process rather than a pleading of any party.
  • Since it is not a pleading, no court-fee should be payable on the third party notice.
  • The absence of any specific provision in the Court-fees Act for levying fees on third party notices implies no fee is payable.
  • The applicable court-fee, if any, should be a fixed small fee under sub-clause (iii) in clause (f) of article 1 in Schedule II of the Court-fees Act.

Respondents' Arguments

  • A third party notice incorporates the defendant's pleading against the third party and effectively serves as a plaint for the defendant's claim.
  • Under sub-rule (3) of rule 151, a third party is treated as a party to the suit with the same rights as if sued in the ordinary way, thus the third party notice should be considered a plaint for Court-fees purposes.
  • The legal fiction treating the third party notice as a suit for certain purposes supports the view that it is akin to a plaint.
  • The praecipe or application for leave to issue the third party notice is itself an application to the Court, attracting court-fees.
  • The relief claimed in the third party notice is capable of valuation in monetary terms, making article 7 in Schedule I applicable for court-fee calculation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Barclays Bank v. Tom [1923] I.K.B 221 Explanation of third party procedure and the entitlement of a third party to counterclaim. Used to illustrate the purpose and operation of third party notices in binding third parties and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.
Weld & Co. v. Sher Mahomed, 1919 21 Bom. L.R 808 Third party proceedings fall within "suits of every description" under the Letters Patent, requiring leave under cl. 12. Supported the characterization of third party proceedings as substantive suits for procedural purposes.
Assan v. Pathumma, 1899 I.L.R 22 Mad. 494 Definition of "plaint" as a statement of cause of action tendered to a court. Used to analyze whether a third party notice qualifies as a plaint under the Court-fees Act.
Venkata Chandrappa Nayanivarv v. Venkatarama Reddi, 1898 I.L.R 22 Mad. 256 A proceeding must commence with a plaint to be considered a suit under the Code. Clarified that not all proceedings capable of decree are suits if not commenced by a plaint.
Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators, 1932 35 Bom. L.R 319 (P.C.) "Suit" ordinarily means a civil proceeding instituted by presentation of a plaint. Supported the distinction between suits and other proceedings for the purpose of court-fees and limitation.
Farkhundali Nannhay v. V.B Potdar, 1961 63 Bom. L.R 985 (F.B.) Reaffirmed the definition of "suit" as a proceeding instituted by plaint presentation. Confirmed the legal position about the nature of suits and plaints relevant to court-fees.
State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak Chaphalkar, [1953] S.C.R 773 Full effect to statutory fictions must be given and carried to their logical conclusion. Addressed the legal fiction treating third party proceedings as suits for limited purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the nature and purpose of third party notices under rule 151 of the High Court Original Side Rules, noting that the procedure allows a defendant to claim indemnity or contribution from a third party connected to the original suit. The third party notice must state the nature and grounds of the claim and, upon service, the third party becomes a party to the suit with full rights of defense, akin to being sued by plaint.

The Court emphasized that the third party notice incorporates the defendant's pleading and serves both as an intimation and as a pleading equivalent to a plaint for the defendant's claim against the third party. This was supported by prior case law recognizing third party proceedings as substantive suits for certain purposes.

Despite bearing the Court's seal and not being signed or verified like ordinary pleadings, the third party notice is not exempt from court-fees if it otherwise qualifies as a document attracting fees under the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959.

The Court analyzed the definition of "plaint" and the distinction between plaints, petitions, and applications under the Act and related statutes. It found that while a third party notice is not a plaint in the strict sense for all purposes, the legal fiction created by rule 151(3) treats the third party proceeding as a suit for the third party's rights to defense.

The Court concluded that the third party notice itself is not an application or petition but is issued following a prior application (praecipe) to the Court for leave, which is liable to court-fee. The relief claimed in the third party notice is capable of monetary valuation, making article 7 in Schedule I of the Court-fees Act applicable.

Accordingly, the Court held that court-fees are payable on the third party notice, affirming the order of Mr. Justice K.K Desai.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed and the appellants are held liable to pay court-fees on the third party notice issued under rule 151.

The appellants are granted three weeks to pay the court-fees. No order as to costs was made. The Court noted that the appellants' attorneys may withdraw Rs. 1,000 deposited for respondents' costs of the appeal. The Court also suggested that the Government consider amending the Bombay Court-fees Act to specifically provide for court-fees on third party notices and for refund provisions if claims are not tried on merits.

This decision directly affects the parties by confirming the requirement of paying court-fees on third party notices but does not establish any new precedent beyond the interpretation of the Court-fees Act and procedural rules as applied to third party notices.

    The State Trading Corporation Of India Ltd. v. Ironside Limited

    Chainani, C.J:— This is an appeal by the original defendants against the order made by Mr. Justice K.K Desai directing the defendants to pay court-fees on the third party notice taken out by them against respondents No. 2. On September 5, 1959, respondents No. 2 entered into a contract with respondents No. 1, who are the original plaintiffs, for the supply of manganese ore to the plaintiffs. The contract provided that the material shall be re-routed through the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd., i.e, through the defendants. On the same day the appellants defendants entered into a contract with respondents No. 1 for the supply of manganese ore to respondents No. 1. The appellants also entered into a contract with respondents No. 2, who agreed to supply the manganese ore to the appellants. The arrangement arrived at, therefore, was that respondents No. 2 were to supply manganese ore to the appellants, who had to consign it to respondents No. 1. According to respondents No. 1, the goods supplied to them were not of the proper quality and there were also short deliveries. On September 23, 1963, respondents No. 1, therefore, filed a suit against the appellants, in which they claimed about Rs. 2,50,000 as damages from the appellants. They also claimed another sum of about Rs. 7,75,000 from the appellants. On November 27, 1963, the appellants obtained leave from the Court to issue a third party notice against respondents No. 2 and to serve it upon them. This leave was applied for and granted under rule 151 of the High Court Original Side Rules. By this notice respondents No. 2 were informed that the appellants claimed from them the same reliefs, which had been claimed from the appellants by respondents No. 1. The notice also stated:

    “The defendants say that the following questions or issues relate to or are connected with the original subject matter of the above suit and are substantially the same as those arising between the plaintiffs and defendants and the same should properly be determined not only as between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but as between the plaintiffs, defendants and yourselves:

    (i) Whether the said consignment of Manganese ore shipped per s.s ‘Older’ in July 1960 was deficient in quantity and quality as alleged by the plaintiffs in the plaint and you thereby committed a breach of the alleged contract No. 90/1959.

    (ii) Whether you committed fraud, misrepresentation and deceit as stated by the plaintiffs in the suit.

    (iii) Whether the damages for the aforesaid breach of contract mentioned in (i) hereof come to the said sum of Rs. 2,49,455.49 nP. as per particulars mentioned in Ex. G to the plaint and the said further sum of Rs. 16,609/- with interest on the aforesaid sums at the rate of 6% per rent per annum from the date of the suit till judgment.

    (iv) Whether you failed to ship the remaining quantity of the manganese ore by the end of November 1960 and thereby committed a breach of the said alleged contract No. 90/1959.

    (v) Whether under the circumstances stated in sub-paragraph (iv) above, you are liable to return to the defendants the said sum of Rs. 5,77,128.68 nP. being the price paid in advance on behalf of the defendants to you under the contract No. 90/1959 with interest thereon at 6% per annum from the 6th day of May 1960 till payment.

    (vi) Whether you are liable to pay to the defendants the costs that the defendants may have to pay to the plaintiffs in the suit and the costs incurred by the defendants in defending the plaintiffs' claims in the suit as also of the Third Party proceedings.”

    2. The notice further stated that if respondents No. 2 wished to dispute the plaintiffs' claim in the suit against the defendants or their liability to the defendants, or if they wished to be heard on the said questions or issues or on the defendants' liability to the plaintiffs or the liability of respondents No. 2 to the defendants, then they should cause an appearance to be entered within eight days from the service of the notice. Respondents No. 2 were further informed that in default of their doing so, they would be deemed to admit the validity of any decree that might be passed against the defendants and their liability to indemnify and pay compensation to the defendants to the extent therein specified. On January 17, 1964, respondents No. 2 filed their appearance. On February 5, 1964, the appellants took out a summons for directions under rule 154 of the Original Side Rules. This summons came up for hearing before my learned brother. He directed that a notice should be served on the State Government for consideration of the point whether court-fees were payable on the third party notice. The summons was thereafter heard by Mr. Justice K.K Desai. He came to the conclusion that the court-fees were payable and accordingly directed the appellants to pay court-fees in respect of the third party notice, which had been issued to respondents No. 2. Against that order the present appeal has been filed. Mr. Mistree, learned counsel of the appellants, has contended that the third party notice is issued by the Court, that it bears the seal of the Court, that consequently it is only a process issued by the Court, that it is not a pleading of any party and that consequently no court-fee is payable in respect of it. In order to determine the validity of these arguments, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the rules. The provisions in regard to third party procedure are contained in Chapter IX of the Original Side Rules. Sub-rule (1) of rule 151 is in the following terms:

    “151. (1) Where in a suit a defendant claims as against any person not already a party to the suit (hereinafter called the third party)—

    (a) that he is entitled to contribution or indemnity, or

    (b) that he is entitled to any relief or remedy relating to or connected with the original subject-matter of the suit and substantially the same as some relief or remedy claimed by the plaintiff, or

    (c) that any question or issue relating to or connected with the said subject-matter is substantially the same as some question or issue arising between the plaintiff and the defendant and should properly be determined not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant but as between the plaintiff and the defendant and the third party or between any or either of them,

    he may, by leave of the Court or a Judge, issue a notice (hereinafter called the third party notice) to that effect, sealed with the seal of the Court. Such notice shall be filed with the Prothonotary and Senior Master and a copy thereof served on such person according to the rules relating to the service of writs of summonses.”

    3. The third party procedure can, therefore, be adopted when the defentant claims from the third party an indemnity or contribution or some other relief connected with the original subject-matter of the suit or when a common question arises as between the plaintiff and the defendant and between the defendant and the third party, or when any question arising between the plaintiff and the defendant can properly be determined as between the plaintiff and the defendant and the third party. Before this procedure can be adopted, it is necessary to obtain leave of the Court. Sub-rule (2) of rule 151 states that the notice shall state the nature and grounds of the claims or the nature and extent of any relief or remedy claimed or the nature of the question or issue sought to be determined and that such notice shall be in Form No. 13 or No. 14 with such variations as circumstances may require. The defendant has, therefore, to state in the notice not only the nature of the claim made by him, but also-the grounds on which his claim is based. He has, therefore, to give the particulars of his claim in the notice. Sub-rule (3) of rule 151 provides:

    “(3) The third party shall, as from the time of the service upon him of the notice, be a party to the suit with the same rights in respect of his defence against any claim made against him and otherwise as if he had been duly sued in the ordinary way by the defendant.”

    4. After the service of a third party notice upon, him, a third party, therefore, becomes a party to the suit between the plaintiff and the defendant. He is, also entitled to raise all defences to the claim made against him by the defendant, which he could have urged if instead of taking out a third party notice the defendant had filed a suit against him.

    5. Rule 152 states that in default of the third party entering an appearance, he shall be deemed to admit the validity of the decree obtained against the defendant and his own liability to contribute or indemnify, as the case may ber to the extent claimed in the third party notice. Rule 153 provides that when a third party makes a default in entering an appearance in the suit, in case the suit is tried and results in favour of the plaintiff, the Judge who tries the suit may pass such decree as the nature of the case may require, for the defendant giving the notice against the third party.

    6. Rules 154 provides that if a third party enters an appearance, the defendant may apply to the Court for directions and the Court or Judge may (a) where the liability of the third party to the defendant giving the notice is established on the hearing of the application, pass such decree as the nature of the case may require in favour of the defendant giving the notice against the third party, or (b) if satisfied that there is a question or issue proper to be tried as between the plaintiff and the defendant and the third party to make the contribution or indemnity claimed, in whole or in part, or as to any other relief or remedy claimed in the notice by the defendant or that a question or issue stated in the notice should be determined not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant but as between the plaintiff, the defendant and the third party or any or either of them, order such question or issue to be tried in such manner, before, at or after the trial of the suit as the Court or Judge may direct, or (c) dismiss the application. Rule 155 states that the Court or a Judge upon the hearing of the application mentioned in rule 154 may, if it shall appear desirable to do so, give the third party liberty to defend the suit, either alone or jointly with the original defendant, or to appear at the trial and take such part therein as may be just, and give such directions as to the Court or Judge shall appear proper for having the question and the rights and liabilities of the parties most conveniently determined and enforced, and as to the mode and extent in or to which the third party shall be bound or made liable by the decree in the suit. The third party notice is to be issued in Form No. 13 or No. 14 with such variations as circumstances may require. The relevant part of Form No. 13 is as follows:

    “Take notice that this suit has been brought by the plaintiff against the defendant….

    The defendant claims to be entitled to contribution from you to the extent of…

    Or to recover damages for a breach of a contract for the sale and delivery to the plaintiff of…

    The defendant claims to be indemnified by you against liability in respect of the said contract, or any breach thereof, on the ground that it was made by him on your behalf and as your agent.

    And take notice that, if you wish to dispute the plaintiff's claim in this suit as against the defendant or your liability to the defendant you must cause an appearance to be-entered for you within eight days after service of this notice.

    In default of your so appearing you will be deemed to admit the validity of any decree passed against the defendant and your own liability to contribute or indemnify to the extent herein claimed, which may be summarily enforced against you pursuant to the rules of the High Court.”

    7. Form No. 14 is to be adopted when a common question or issue is to be determined.

    8. The object of this procedure is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to-enable the defendant to obtain expeditiously, in the same suit in which a claim had been made against the defendant, relief to which he is entitled in respect of that claim from a third party. It saves the defendant the necessity of instituting a separate suit and eliminates the risk of conflicting decisions on any common question or issue, which, may arise between the plaintiff and the defendant and the defendant and the third party. In Barclays Bank v. Tom . [1923] I.K.B 221., it was held that a person who has been served by a defendant with a third party notice is entitled to counterclaim against the defendant. Scrutton L.J explained the third party proceeding in these terms (pp. 223, 224):

    “…I think it is important to keep clearly in mind what the third party procedure is. A plaintiff has a claim against a defendant. The defendant thinks if he is liable he has a claim over against a third party. With that matter between the defendant and the third party the plaintiff has obviously nothing to do. He is not concerned with the question whether the defendant has a remedy against somebody else. His remedy is against the defendant. But the defendant is much interested in getting the third party bound by the result of the trial between the plaintiff and himself, for otherwise he might be at a great disadvantage if, having fought the case against the plaintiff and lost, he had then to fight the case against the third party possibly on different materials, with the risk that a different result might be arrived at. The object of the third party procedure is then in the first place to get the third party bound by the decision between the plaintiff and the defendant. In the next place it is directed to getting the question between the defendant and the third party decided as soon as possible after the decision between the plaintiff and the defendant, so that the defendant may not be in the position of having to wait a considerable time before he establishes his right of indemnity against the third party while all the time the plaintiff is enforcing his judgment against the defendant. And thirdly, it is directed to saving the extra expense which would be involved by two independent actions. With these objects in view the third party order usually provides that the third party may appear at the trial between the plaintiff and the defendant.”

    9. It will be seen that in the third party notice the defendant has to specify the relief claimed by him and the grounds on which he claims it, as he would do in a plaint, if instead of taking out a third party notice he files a suit in order to obtain the same relief. The third party notice, therefore, contains a statement of the cause of action of the defendant agains the third party. It incorporates the pleading of the defendant in respect of his claim against the third party. It is to this pleading that the third party is called upon to make his reply. It is the claim made in this document which the third party has to defend and it is on the claim made in this document that the Court may pass a decree in favour of the defendant against the third party. A third party notice, therefore, serves two purposes. It is an intimation to the third party that a claim to contribution, indemnity or some other relief had been made against him by the defendant and that if he does not appear and dispute his liability, a decree may be passed against him. It also serves the purpose of a plaint. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of Marten J., as he then was, in Weld & Co. v. Sher Mahomed . 1919 21 Bom. L.R 808., in which he held that third party proceedings fall within the words “suits of every description” in cl. 12 of the Letters Patent. The learned Judge observed (p. 813):

    “…We have under the Bombay High Court Rules a form of procedure which is in substance a ‘suit’ against the third party within the letters patent. Before the third party notice has been served on him, he is a free man and no Court can pass a decree against him. As a result of that third party notice he is in peril, and may, unless he takes certain steps, have a decree passed against him. It seems to me therefore that substantially the case falls within cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, just as the case of an added defendant or of a counter-claim against a new party does, and that leave under cl. 12 is necessary.”

    10. A third party notice bears the seal of the Court. This must be so because it is a process issued by and under the authority of the Court. For the same reason it is not signed or verified by the defendant as an ordinary pleading is required to be signed and verified. But as a third party notice also incorporates the defendant's pleading in respect of his claim against the third party, the fact that it bears the seal of the Court or that it is not signed or verified by the defendant in the manner in which a pleading is required to be signed and verified, would not save the defendant from liability to pay Court-fee if it is otherwise payable.

    11. Sub-section (1) of s. 5 of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959, provides that no document of any of the kinds specified as chargeable in the first and second schedule to this Act annexed shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of Justice, unless in respect of such document there had been paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated in either of the said schedules as the proper fee for such document. A third party notice is filed in Court. It will, therefore, attract duty if it can be said to be a document of any of the kinds specified in the first or second schedule to the Act. The two schedules prescribe Court-fees on plaints, applications and petitions filed in Court. The Act was enacted in 1959 many years after the third party procedure had been introduced. No separate provision has been made in the Act for levy of Court-fees on third party notices. A third party notice is also not included in the definition of “plaint” given in cl. (c) in s. 2 of the Act. It has, therefore, been contended by Mr. Mistree that no Court-fee is leviable on a third party notice, as, if the Legislature intended that Court-fee should be levied on such a notice, it would have made a provision to that effect. If, however, it can be said to be a plaint, application or petition, it would be liable to Court-fee under one or other of the articles in the two schedules.

    12. The question, therefore, arises whether a third party notice is a plaint within the meaning of the Court-fees Act. According to the Oxford dictionary, a plaint means a statement of grievances made to a Court of Law for the purpose of obtaining redress. In Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, “plaint” is defined as a statement in writing of a cause of action. In Assan v. Pathumma . 1899 I.L.R 22 Mad. 494., Subramania Ayyar J. observed (p. 502):

    “…Plaint, in law, means (and has, since before the days of Blackstone, whose phraseology in regard to the explanation of the term has been accepted by Lexicographers, meant) nothing more than ‘a private memorial tendered to a Court in which the person sets forth his cause of action; the exhibition of an action in writing’. In the absence of a distinct and direct statutory definition to the contrary we have no right to put a more restricted construction on the term.”

    13. In the same volume at p. 256 there is the report of another decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, to which also the learned Judge was a party, (Venkata Chandrappa Nayanivarv v. Venkatarama Reddi . 1898 I.L.R 22 Mad. 256.), in which it was held that a suit must commence with a plaint and a proceeding which is capable of terminating in a decree or an order having the force of a decree cannot, on that ground alone, be deemed to be a suit within the meaning of the Code, if it has not commenced with a plaint.

    14. Even though the dictionary meaning of the word “plaint” is very wide, it has in legal phraseology come to acquire a more limited meaning and that is a statement in writing of the cause of action in a suit. Every proceeding in a Court is not commenced by a plaint. Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, states that any husband may present a petition to the District Court praying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife had been guilty of adultery. The section also provides for a petition by a wife for dissolution of her marriage on certain grounds. Section 18 states that any husband or wife may present a petition praying that his or her marriage may be declared null and void. Sections 14 and 19 provide for decrees being passed in such eases. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides for a petition being presented to the Court by either the husband or the wife for dissolution of marriage by a decree for divorce on the grounds specified in this section. These proceedings, therefore, commence with a petition, which is not called a plaint, even though the proceeding ends in a decree of the Court. The Court-fees Act also makes separate provision for such petitions. Article 20 in Schedule II provides for a Court-fee of Rs. 37.50 on every petition under the Indian Divorce Act, except petitions under s. 44 of that Act. The same Court-fee has been prescribed by art. 21 on a petition under the Hindu Marriage Act. An additional Court-fee is payable when in addition to divorce damages are claimed. Court-fees are, therefore, levied on these documents as petitions and not as plaints. Article 4 in Schedule I refers to a plaint, application or petition which is capable of being treated as a suit. Similar phraseology is used in some other articles, such as article 23 in Schedule II. The Court-fees Act itself, therefore, makes a distinction between a plaint and an application or petition presented to a Court. It recognises that every document containing a statement of the cause of action or by which a proceeding is commenced in a Court is not a plaint.

    15. Section 26 of the Civil Procedure Code states that every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. Order IV, r. 1, lays down that every suit shall be instituted by presentation of a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. In Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators . 1932 35 Bom. L.R 319, P.C, the Privy Council held that the word “suit” in s. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act, ordinarily means a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint. The same view has been taken by a Full Bench of this Court in Farkhundali Nannhay v. V.B Potdar* . 1961 63 Bom. L.R 985, at p. 988, F.B where it is observed that the word “suit” is a term of art and ordinarily means a proceeding instituted in a Civil Court by the presentation of a plaint. It was held in that case that a proceeding under s. 54 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act is not a suit. These authorities, therefore, establish that a plaint is a document, by the presentation of which in a Civil Court a suit is instituted.

    16. Sub-rule (3) of rule 151 of Original Side Rules, which I have quoted above, states that a third party shall have the same rights in respect of any claim made against him as if he had been duly sued in the ordinary way by the defendant. A third party is, therefore, given a right to defend himself as if a suit had been filed, that is, as if a plaint had been presented. The defence is to be made to the claim set out in the third party notice. By a legal fiction created by sub-r. (3) of rule 151 a third party proceeding is, therefore, treated as a suit for certain purposes. In State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak Chaphalkar . [1953] S.C.R 773, at p. 778, 55 Bom. L.R 526., the Supreme Court has observed that full effect must be given to a statutory fiction and that it should be carried to its logical conclusion. It has, therefore, been contended by Mr. Nariman and Mr. Sanghvi that as a third party proceeding is by legal fiction to be regarded as a suit, the third party notice must necessarily be held to be a plaint. The legal fiction has, however, been introduced in order that no prejudice may be caused to the third party by a third party notice being taken out instead of a suit being filed against him and in order to give the third party full opportunity to defend himself. He is, therefore, placed in the same position as if a suit had been filed against him. The legal fiction has, therefore, been enacted for a limited purpose. There is nothing in the rule which suggests that a third party notice must be treated as a plaint for all purposes. Rule 151 itself provides that for the purposes of enforcing his claim against a third party, the defendant may take out a third party notice. A third party proceeding is also a proceeding in the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant. In our opinion, therefore, a third party notice is not a plaint at least for the purposes of the Court-fees Act.

    17. The next question to be considered is whether Court-fees would be leviable on a third party notice as an application or petition to the Court. A third party notice being a process issued by the Court, is not itself an application or petition to the Court. Before such a notice can be taken out, leave of the Court has to be applied for. After leave has been granted, the defendant is, however, not bound to proceed further or to take out a third party notice. If he decides to take further steps in the matter, he has to move the Court to issue the notice and to seal it. Thereafter it is to be sent for service. The practice which we have been informed is followed on the Original Side is in accordance with the requirements of the rule. The practice seems to be that after the Court has granted leave to take out a third party notice, a praecipe is addressed to the Prothonotary of the High Court and along with the praecipe a draft of the third party notice is sent to him for approval and for the approved copy of the notice being sealed. It is by this praecipe or application that the Court's jurisdiction is invoked and the Court is moved to summon the defendant and adjudicate upon the claim set out in the draft third party notice between the defendant and the third party. This praecipe is, therefore, liable to Court-fee as an application made to the Court to obtain relief specified in the third party notice.

    18. It has been urged by Mr. Sanghvi that if the relief claimed in the third party notice is capable of being valued in terms of money, the article which would be applicable is art. 7 in Schedule I. This article specifies the Court-fee payable on any plaint, application or petition, not specified in the earlier articles in this Schedule, to obtain substantive relief and which is capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss, including cases wherein application or petition is either treated as a plaint or is described as the mode of obtaining the relief as aforesaid. Mr. Mistree, on the other hand, has contended that the Court-fee which would be payable in such a case is that indicated against sub-cl. (iii) in cl. (f) in art. 1 in Sch. II, that is, a fixed fee of Rs. 5. Clause (f) in art. 1 in Sch. II refers to an application or petition when presented to a High Court. Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) mention certain kinds of applications or petitions with which we are not concerned. Subclause (iii) refers to “any other case not otherwise provided for by this Act”. Mr. Mistree has argued that this sub-clause will apply in the case of every application or petition presented to a High Court, unless there is some other specific provision with regard to applications or petitions to a High Court.

    19. We have been taken through the various articles in the two Schedules. We find that Court-fees vary according to the subject matter of the plaint, application or petition and also according to the authority before which it is presented. For instance, under art. 6 in Sch. II a Court-fee of Rs. 2 is prescribed for an application for leave to appeal as a pauper, when presented to a District Court. If presented to the High Court the fee is Rs. 5. There are other articles such as arts. 1 to 7 in Sch. I, which prescribe Court-fees with reference to the subject matter, irrespective of the Court in which they are presented. No sufficient reason has been shown why sub-cl. (iii) in cl. (f) of art. 1 in Sch. II should be construed as referring only to absence of other provisions in the Act specifically in regard to applications to the High Court. If there is an article which prescribes Court-fees with reference to the subject matter of the application and if the applicability of that article is not restricted to Courts other than the High Court, it will also exclude the application of sub-cl. (iii) in cl. (f) of art. 1. Thus if the application made to Court is to obtain relief of the nature referred to in art. 7 in Sch. I, this article and not sub-cl. (iii) in cl. (f) of art. 1 in Sch. II will apply.

    20. In the present case the reliefs, which the appellants have claimed from the third party, are all capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss. Consequently, Court-fees payable will be according to the scale indicated against art. 7 in Sch. I to the Act.

    21. In our opinion, therefore, the learned Judge was right in holding that the appellants are liable to pay Court-fees in respect of the third party notice taken out by them.

    22. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs.

    23. The appellants are given three weeks' time to pay Court-fees.

    24. The appellants' attorneys are allowed to withdraw Rs. 1,000 deposited by the appellants for the respondents' costs of the appeal.

    25. It seems to us that in order that there may be no doubt in the matter, Government may consider whether the Court-fees Act should not be amended and specific provision made therein for the levy of Court-fees in respect of third party notices. If it is decided to make an amendment, provision should also be made for refund of whole or part of the Court-fees, if the claim made by the defendant against the third party is not tried on merits either owing to the original suit filed by the plaintiff being dismissed or if the third party notice is dismissed on the application for directions made under rule 154.

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