Patel, J.:— [His Lordship after setting out the facts, proceeded.] The question is whether the revision of the tariff for the supply of the energy on a different principle is ultra vires the Act and/or the rules under the Act. The contention is to be found in para. 11(a) of the written statement where these words are used. Mr. Thakar was not able to show how the revised tariffs were in contravention of the provisions of the Act. When pressed to clarify his contention he said that the tariffs were not fixed in accordance with the regulations which is entirely a different matter. This clearly cannot mean that the Board has acted ultra vires the Act since we speak of an act being ultra vires when the maker of the act has no power or jurisdiction to do the thing. If the maker has got jurisdiction of doing the thing, but if it is done in contravention of the rules, one speaks of the act being only illegal. It is remarkable that though an allegation was made in para. 11 of the written statement in this connection, it was vague and no particular regulation was alleged to have been violated. Mr. Thakar has not been able to show in what manner any provision of any of the regulations has been violated. Plaintiff Board examined an engineer on its behalf but no questions have been put to him in support of the allegation that any provision of the regulations was violated while fixing the tariff. There is no substance, therefore, in this contention of Mr. Thakar.
2. Mr. Thakar contends that even if the Board has rightly revised the tariffs, the same could not be applied to the defendant because of the contract, that the unilateral power given to the Board by clause 30 to increase or decrease the charges for the supply was vague and indefinite and was therefore void, that such power which gave one of the parties to the contract to do something arbitrary was unenforceable and therefore the Board was not entitled to charge according to the new tariffs for the supply of the energy. In any case it is argued that it cannot claim the minimum demand charge under clause 34 of the contract as it has claimed for the unexpired period from February 1, 1961, to May 6, 1962, the Board having unjustifiably cut off the supply. He further contends that even if the Board were entitled to claim the minimum charges, under clause 22-A of the contract the defendant is liable to pay Rs. 3,281-4-0 only annually. Mr. Thakar laid emphasis on cl. 30 of the contract as was done in the trial Court. He also referred to some other clauses which give the Board large powers and relied upon Bennett v. Bennett . [1952] 1 All E.R 413. and Goodinson v. Goodinson . [1954] 2 All E.R 255. in support of his contention that the clauses are void. We are only concerned with cl. 30 and not with others since the Board is not trying to enforce other clauses.
3. Much reliance was placed on cl. 30 in the trial Court and by Mr. Thakar even here. Clause 30(a) runs as follows:
“The rates and other charges set out in the schedule referred to in clause 20 hereof and the miscellaneous charges in the conditions of supply are those in force at the time of executing the agreement in the Southern Grid area. The consumer shall be eligible for whatever reduction in or rebate from these rates and/or in charges is granted by the Board and will be liable for whatever surcharge or increase upon them as may from time to time be charged by the Board or be liable to pay any new rate or tariff or amount which the board may in its discretion deem fit to charge in lieu of the payments fixed under this agreement.”
4. Surprisingly enough, the words of clause 20 have been overlooked. Clause 20 runs as follows:
“The consumer shall pay to the Board every month, charges for the electrical energy supplied to the consumer during the preceding month at the Board's tariff applicable for the Southern Grid area, to the class of service and in force from time to time. A copy of the current H.T tariff No. II Slab Tariff of Notification No. 5-921, 4-2 dated 1.12.52 applicable to the consumer is set out in the Schedule attached to this agreement.”
5. This clause provides in essence that the consumer would be liable to pay to the Hoard every month according to the tariff in force from time to time, that is, the prescribed rates for the supply in accordance with the tariff then in force. It is dear that cl. 30(a) is nothing but a corollary to the liability created between the parties under cl. 20. It only prescribes the consequences of what can happen if the tariff rates are changed. The consumer would be entitled to reduction in the charge if the tariff rates were reduced. On the other hand, the consumer had to pay a higher charge if the tariff were increased. The real liability to pay according to the tariffs in force from time to time is created under cl. 20 itself which prescribes the charges.
6. The first question is whether the power given to the Board to change the tariffs is so arbitrary that it should be held to be unenforceable. Clause 30 has to be read with cl. 20, the effect being that the consumer must pay for the energy supplied at the prevalent tariff rates. The Act and the rules prescribe the principles and the manner of fixing the same. Tariff is not to be fixed for a particular individual but for all to whom the energy is supplied. It is, therefore, impossible to hold that cl. 30 read with cl. 20 gives arbitrary powers to the Board to vary the contract unilaterally and, therefore, is rendered void. It is not necessary to consider the matter in greater details, as in Amalgamated Electricity Co. v. N.S Bathena . [1964] A.I.R S.C 1598 L.R 994. a similar provision in a contract between a licensee and a consumer was upheld by the Supreme Court. In that case the judgment of J.C Shah J. in this Court in Babulal v. Chopda Electricity Supply Co. . [1955] A.I.R Bom. 182, S.C 56 Bom. L.R 994. where it was held that a term, such as this, which gave rights to a licensee to vary the charges for the supply unilaterally could not be enforced, was considered and was disapproved by the Supreme Court. The conditions prescribed for the exercise of the power of fixing the tariff or for revising it obtaining in that case are applicable in the present case as well. The Board has not got unbridled discretion in fixing the tariff. Under s. 46 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the tariff has to be fixed or revised, in accordance with the regulations framed under s. 79 of the Act and it is to be done on the basis of certain principles. Having regard to the provisions of the Act, it cannot be said that the agreement of the consumer to pay according to the tariff which may be in force from time to time is illegal or void, and if that is so, it is impossible to hold that cl. 30(a), which is merely a corollary to cl. 20, can be void and unenforceable. In view of this, it is not necessary to consider the other cases cited on behalf of the defendant by Mr. Thakar. He referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court in Keshavlal v. Lalbhai T. Mills Ltd. . [1958] A.I.R S.C 512. the relevant observation being in para. 8. The principle of this case has no application to the present case. In the present case the plaintiff is a statutory body which has no unbridled power to fix the tariffs according to its arbitrary choice. It has to be fixed according to the well defined principles contained in the Act as well as the regulations framed and the observations, therefore, made in that case have no possible application to the present case.
7. Mr. Thakar then contended that under cls. 20 and 30 of the contract he is not liable to pay the demand charges. He argues that even if the charges for the supply could be varied by the Board, the principle of the charges must remain the same and the Board would have no power to change the principle. In other words, he contends that the system of charging cannot be changed. There might have been some substance in the contention if the minimum billing demand charge were not a part of the tariff. In order to see whether the “demand charge” is a part of the tariff, we must go to s. 46 which enables the Board to fix the Grid tariff from time to time. Sub-section (3) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 says:
“The Grid Tariff shall be so framed as to include as part of the charge, and show separately a fixed kilowatt charges component and a running charges component:
Provided that if in respect of any area the electricity to be sold by the Board is wholly or substantially derived from hydro-electric sources, the running charges component may be omitted.”
8. Sub-section (4) says:
“The fixed kilowatt charges component in the Grid Tariff may be framed so as to vary with the magnitude of maximum demand.”
9. Sub-section (6) says:
“The Grid Tariff may contain provisions for—
(a) adjustment of price having regard to the power factor of supply taken or the cost of fuel or both;
(b) a minimum charge related to a past or prospective demand of a licensee on the Board.”
10. Having regard to the terms of s. 46, it must be held that the demand charge is a part of the tariff, and if that is so, by cl. 20, the defendant is bound to pay this charge as well as the charge for the actual energy consumed.
11. It is then contended by Mr. Thakar that, in any event, after discontinuation of the supply, defendant was not liable to pay either the minimum charges fixed by the contract or any amount as the discontinuance of supply was not justified. He contends that as there was a bona fide dispute between them in that the defendant was contending on the one hand that it should be charged at the contractual rate, while the Board was insisting on applying the new tariff rate, the non-payment of the bill did not justify the Board in disconnecting the supply under s. 24(7) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and that the disconnection of the supply being wrongful it could not claim the minimum charge. Mr. Phadke disputes this contention of Mr. Thakar. He contends in the first place that such a contention has not been raised in the written statement and as the question as to whether there was a bona fide dispute between the parties or not, is a question of fact the same ought not to be allowed to be raised now. Secondly, he contends that s. 24(7) of the Indian Electricity Act is not applicable in the case of the Board and, if that is so, it acted only under cl. 34 of the contract under which, the defendant having failed to pay the charges for the supply, the Board was entitled to discontinue the same and to demand the minimum charges which was the “minimum demand charge” fixed under the new tariff.
12. It is difficult to appreciate the contention that the question as to whether or not the supply was properly discontinued has not been raised in the pleadings. The defendant's contention was all along that he was prepared to pay the charges according to the contractual rate, the contract was for a period of five years and the Board had no right to apply the new tariff rates and that the charges under the new tariffs were excessive. In para. 1 of the written statement the defendant alleges that the disconnection of the supply on all these occasions was wrongful. As to the minimum charges in para. 2(b) of the written statement it says that the plaintiff wrongfully cut off the supply and hence it was not entitled to claim the minimum charges. True that it is not contended that the Board was not entitled to discontinue the supply under s. 24 of the Electricity Act as there was a dispute between the parties. But then law need not be pleaded. It is our duty to apply the law to facts proved and found. Though, therefore, the point was not argued in the Court below, we would not be justified in not allowing the defendant to argue the point.
13. The question is whether there was a bona fide dispute between the parties when the defendant failed to pay for the supply of energy and the supply was unjustifiably cut off. It is undoubtedly true that on two prior occasions, when the supply was discontinued, the defendant made full payment of the arrears and obtained reconnection of the supply. Even so, it cannot be denied in the present case that there was a genuine dispute between the parties. The defendant had entered into an agreement to take the supply and the plaintiff had agreed to supply the electrical energy for a period of five years. No doubt, cl. 20 which prescribes the rates shows that the rates were flexible in the sense that they were payable according to the tariff fixed by the Board from time to time. Even so, having regard to the terms of the contract and having regard to the fact that the system of charging was changed by the new tariff, it could not be said that the defendant could not honestly believe that the Board would not be entitled to charge according to the new tariffs. Mr. Phadke contended that the defendant did not raise this dispute until after the last notice exh. 48 was given on January 4, 1960. But then, even prior to that the defendant had by exh. 47 challenged the right of the Board to levy the new tariff. Similarly, thereafter by exh. P-52 the defendant had already challenged the rights of the Board to revise the rates. Moreover, the decision of this Court in Babulal's case supported this stand. In view of the bona fide dispute between the parties it cannot be said that the Board was justified in cutting off the electric supply.
14. In Corporation of Nagpur v. Nagpur E.L & P. Co. . [1958] N.L.J 457. it was held that if there was a bona fide dispute between the parties as to what is payable, the failure to pay the dues does not amount to a neglect to pay within the meaning of s. 24(1) and action under s. 24(1) could not be taken by an electrical undertaking in such a case. If the Board, therefore, is obliged to act under s. 24(1), then in view of the dispute between the parties, it could be said that the Board was not justified in cutting off the supply. The question is whether s. 24(1) is applicable to the Board.
15. Section 26 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, applies some of the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, to the Board and is as follows:
“26. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board shall, in respect of the whole State, have all the power and obligations of a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), and this Act shall be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act.”
16. The first proviso excludes the application of certain sections and some clauses in the schedule to the Electricity Act, 1910, the sections being 3 to 11, sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 21 and ss. 22, 23 and 27 of that Act and clauses I to V, VII and IX to XII of the Schedule to that Act. The second provide applies clause VI of the Schedule in the Electricity Act to the Board in respect of an area where distribution mains have been laid by the Board and the supply of energy through any of them has commenced. The effect of s. 26 is that if the Board has laid supply mains and has commenced to supply the energy, then it becomes a licensee to that extent and acquires all the powers and obligations under that Act (Electricity Act of 1910) and all the provisions of that Act must apply except such as are excluded. As s. 24 is not excluded by the provisions it must apply to the Board and it has to act strictly in accordance with the same.
17. Mr. Phadke contends that the Board cannot be tied down to the limited power of cutting off the supply contained in s. 24 because it is not obligatory on it to supply electrical energy. Mr. Phadke relies on s. 70 of the Electricity (Supply) Act which, he says, exempts the application of the Electricity Act, 1910. It only says that no provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, or of any rules made thereunder or of any instrument having effect by virtue of such law or rule shall, so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act, have any effect.
18. In order that the sections which are expressly applied by s. 26 should be excluded by s. 70 of this Act, the provisions thereof must be shown to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act. It is said that s. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, vests a discretion in the Board to supply electrical energy to a consumer and is, therefore, in conflict with s. 24 of the Electricity Act and, therefore, s. 24 ought not to be applied.
19. It is not possible to accept this contention. Section 49 itself provides that the Board may supply electricity to any person subject to the provisions of the Act and of the regulations made in this behalf and one of the provisions of the Act is s. 26 under which it has got the same powers and the obligations as a licensee. We cannot disregard the word “obligations” in s. 26. Once it has laid the mains and started the supply it is obliged to continue to do so as a licensee. Section 24(1), therefore, applies to the case of a supply of electrical energy by the Board to a consumer and, if that is so, it can discontinue the supply only if the conditions of s. 24(1) are satisfied, i.e there must be neglect on the part of the consumer to pay the electrical charges. If cl. 34 gave wider power to the Board, to that extent, that power would be ineffective.
20. It is not also correct to say that the Board acted only under cl. 34 of the contract. When the defendant called upon the Board to refer the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the contract by exh. 47, the Board gave notice by exh. 48 under s. 24(1) of the Electricity Act threatening to disconnect the supply if the bills were not cleared. This shows that the Board itself acted in exercise of the powers vested in it under s. 24 of the Electricity Act.
[The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.]