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  • section 120-B read with sections 467, 467-109, 471-467, 468, 468-109, 471-468, 417, 420, 474, 471-468-109, 417-109
  • section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code(2)
  • offence.6. Section 120-B,
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  • section 120-B read with sections 467, 467-109, 471-467, 468, 468-109, 471-468, 417, 420, 474, 471-468-109, 417-109
  • section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code(2)
  • offence.6. Section 120-B,
Smart Summary

Court Opinion — Structured Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision application was brought on behalf of seven accused persons committed to stand trial by the learned Presidency Magistrate, 16th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, on charges including forgery, using forged documents as genuine, cheating, and conspiracy to commit these offences. The accused are nationals of South Africa who arrived in India on various dates in 1961 (Accused No. 1: first arrived March 31, 1961 and returned April 23, 1961; others arrived between June and August 1961).

The learned Additional Sessions Judge recast the magistrate's 84 charges into 64 charges and rejected the accused's contention that, at least in respect of Charge No. 1 (conspiracy) and of forgery offences said to have occurred outside India, the Sessions Court lacked jurisdiction to try those counts. The present revision application challenges that refusal.

Relevant factual allegations include: accused No. 1 declared foreign currency on landing and later used that declaration with alterations to cash forged drafts of the Standard Bank of South Africa; accused No. 1 sold forged drafts to John Mascarenhas (Rs. 36,000) on June 21, 1961, and to Goverdhandas Ratansi Bajaria (Rs. 80,000) on July 22, 1961; the drafts were discovered to be forged and complaints led to inquiries and the arrests of the accused.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Additional Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to try Charge No. 1 (criminal conspiracy) and related forgery charges when the conspiracy or some forgeries may have been formed or committed outside India.
  2. Whether section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code applies only to persons who were parties to the conspiracy at the moment of its formation or also to persons who were parties during the continuance of the conspiracy (i.e., whether conspiracy is a continuing offence such that being a party during continuance attracts liability).
  3. Whether sanction of the State Government is required under section 196-A(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code for taking cognizance of an offence of criminal conspiracy alleged to include non-cognizable acts.
  4. Whether the framing of Charge No. 1 (and certain forgery charges) is impermissibly vague because it does not specify the exact place where the conspiracy was entered into or the exact documents forged.
  5. Whether, if jurisdiction or conspiracy charges failed, there would be misjoinder of charges and accused.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused (Mr. Pardiwala) — Main Arguments

  • The criminal conspiracy offence is complete under section 120-A as soon as a completed agreement exists; if the agreement was formed in South Africa (as alleged), Indian courts lack jurisdiction to try the conspirators for that offence. He relied on English and colonial authorities (Reg. v. Elmstone, Reg. v. Pirtai, Gokaldas v. Emperor, In re Dani) and on authorities cited in Ratanlal's Law of Crimes.
  • Section 120-B should be read as applying only to those who were parties at the moment of the formation of the conspiracy (arguing against a continuing-offence interpretation).
  • Section 196-A(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code requires State Government sanction where the object of the conspiracy is to commit non-cognizable offences, and such sanction was not obtained here (this was urged because the conspiracy as pleaded allegedly includes some non-cognizable offences).
  • The conspiracy charge is vague for failing to specify the exact place of formation (“at Bombay and/or at other places in and outside India”); similarly certain forgery charges do not specify place/time of forging.
  • If jurisdiction and the conspiracy charge failed, then there would be misjoinder of offences and accused.

Prosecution / Respondent (Mr. Gumaste and the Additional Government Pleader) — Main Arguments

  • Even if the conspiracy had its inception outside India, because overt acts and the effects of the conspiracy occurred in India (and actual offences under the conspiracy were committed within Indian territory), Indian courts would have jurisdiction to try the conspirators. Mr. Gumaste relied on Halsbury's and on the principle that a charge of conspiracy may be laid where an overt act is committed in furtherance of it.
  • The drafts and some acts were endorsable or otherwise connected with Bombay (e.g., endorsements made in Bombay), and specific charges are framed against many accused as to particular drafts; thus the charge is not vague.
  • Where non-cognizable acts are simply steps or means to the commission of an overall cognizable offence (cheating), sanction under section 196-A(2) is not required. The prosecution relied on prior local authority (Durgadas Tulsiram v. State and Emperor v. Ramchandra Rango) to show sanction was unnecessary in such circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Reg. v. Elmstone, Whitwell, et al. (1870 7 B.H.C.R Cri 89, F.B.) Authority relied upon by accused to argue that a conspiracy completed abroad could not be prosecuted in India. The court noted these authorities were relied upon by counsel but expressed doubt about their continued soundness in view of later Supreme Court reasoning (Mobarik Ali Ahmed). The court did not follow them as decisive against jurisdiction.
Reg. v. Pirtai (1873 10 B.H.C.R 356) Similar colonial authority used to support the accused's contention on territorial limits of jurisdiction over conspiracy. The court treated this authority as part of the line of older decisions whose ratio was regarded as doubtful when read with later Supreme Court authorities; not treated as controlling.
Gokaldas Amarsee v. Emperor ([1933] A.I.R Sind 333) Used by counsel to support the proposition that agreement abroad completes the conspiracy and bars prosecution here. The court noted convictions in that case were based on the footing that agreement itself resulted in s.120-B liability, but observed no case established that completion of objects or commission of offences prevents prosecution for conspiracy; the court did not accept counsel's reliance as determinative.
In re Dani One of the authorities cited by accused for the proposition on territorial limits of conspiracy liability. Cited by counsel; the court did not treat it as decisive and contrasted it with later authority supporting broader jurisdictional application.
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 11, s. 23, p. 559 Statement that "The conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design." Quoted by the court to support the proposition that conspiracy may be a continuing offence and that overt acts by any member may bind others.
United States v. Kissel (1910 218 U.S. 601, 54 L.Ed 1168) Mr. Justice Holmes' reasoning that a conspiracy that contemplates a continuous result with continuous co-operation is a single, continuing conspiracy; overt acts of one member may be acts of all. Quoted and relied upon by the court to bolster the view that conspiracy may continue in time and that s.120-B should be read as applying to persons who are parties during continuance.
Leo Roy v. Supdt., Dist. Jail ([1958] A.I.R S.C 119) Decision discussing that conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. The court noted the case was relied on by accused but observed that the Supreme Court in Leo Roy was not invited to decide the precise question of whether s.120-B applies as a continuing offence; the court did not treat Leo Roy as determining that issue.
S. Swaminatham v. State of Madras ([1957] A.I.R S.C 340) Authority that a charge can disclose a single conspiracy spanning years; joining of others later and multiple incidents does not split a single conspiracy into several conspiracies. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a conspiracy may be single and continuing over time and that charges framed as a single conspiracy over several years are sustainable.
Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay ([1957] A.I.R S.C 857) Authority supporting modern construction of the Penal Code and rejecting strict historical limits on jurisdictional notions prevailing when the Code was enacted. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that the Code should be construed with reference to modern needs; used to question older authorities that limited jurisdiction when conspiracies involved foreigners outside the State.
Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales ([1891] A.C 455) Older decision referenced in discussion of limits of territorial jurisdiction (historical context). Cited in the course of discussing the historical background to earlier authorities; used to show the older view of limited legislative competence which has since evolved.
The Queen v. Burah (1878 3 A.C 889) English authority referenced in the historical discussion of jurisdictional competence. Referred to in the context of contrasting older and newer approaches to jurisdiction; not applied to bar jurisdiction here.
Emperor v. Chhotalal Babar (1912 I.L.R 36 Bom. 524; S.C 14 Bom. L.R 147) Principle that when a foreigner starts criminal conduct abroad but completes or perfects the offence within British limits, he is triable by British courts when found within jurisdiction; authority where conviction was confirmed though principal was not in the country when the agent committed the offence. The court cited this decision in support of the proposition that offences completed in the territory are triable there; relied upon it as illustrating that jurisdiction may attach where substantive offences occur domestically even if parts of the conduct began abroad.
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 10, para. 607 Statement that a conspiracy may be tried where conspirators agreed or, where place of agreement is unknown, where one of the criminal acts in pursuance of the common plan is committed. Relied upon by Mr. Gumaste and noted by the court as supporting trial of conspiracy in places where overt acts in furtherance of it are committed. The court said it was unnecessary to decide this point given its view of s.120-B.
Durgadas Tulsiram v. State (1953 56 Bom. L.R 188) Decision that where commission of non-cognizable offences is merely a means to an end (a cognizable offence), sanction under s.196-A(2) is not required. The court stated it was bound by this Division Bench decision and applied it to hold sanction under s.196-A(2) was not necessary in the present case because the conspiracy's object was the commission of cognizable offences.
Emperor v. Ramchandra Rango (1938 41 Bom. L.R 98) Earlier authority on the scope of sanction under the law similar to s.196-A(2), relied on in local jurisprudence. Followed by Durgadas and cited by the court to support the view that sanction was not needed where non-cognizable acts are means to cognizable crimes.
State v. Shankar Sakharam Jadhav (1956 59 Bom. L.R 244) Authority that direct evidence of the place where conspiracy was entered into is rare; usually the place of agreement must be inferred from subsequent conduct and circumstances. Relied upon by the court to reject the contention that the charge was fatally vague for failing to specify the precise place of formation of the conspiracy.
Ratanlal's Law of Crimes (foot-note 9, p.271, 20th ed.) Reference relied on by counsel for authorities supporting the argument regarding territorial limits of conspiracy liability. Cited by accused's counsel; the court did not treat the secondary reference as displacing the court's interpretation of s.120-B and jurisdictional principles.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court engaged in a textual and comparative analysis of section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and of ancillary procedural provisions. The analysis proceeded in these steps:

  1. Section 120-B was examined linguistically: the court emphasised the phrase "are parties" and observed the section is worded in the present tense. The court concluded that s.120-B is not restricted to persons who were parties only at the agreement's formation; rather it applies to persons who are members of the conspiracy during its continuance. The offence is therefore treated as capable of continuation, and liability may attach to those who continue to be parties while the conspiracy persists.
  2. The court supported this construction by reference to foreign jurisprudence and authority: (a) American Jurisprudence's statement that a conspiracy is continued and renewed where any member acts in furtherance of the common design; (b) the United States v. Kissel dictum of Justice Holmes that a conspiracy that contemplates a continuous result and requires continuous co-operation is a single continuing conspiracy. These authorities were used to reinforce the view that a conspiracy may continue in time and that overt acts by one conspirator may bind all.
  3. The court considered prior domestic authorities (Gokaldas, In re Dani, Reg. v. Elmstone et al., Reg. v. Pirtai) relied upon by the accused. It observed that while some older decisions supported a restricted territorial jurisdiction, more modern Supreme Court authority (Mobarik Ali Ahmed) counsels a contemporary construction of the Code and casts doubt on the older line of authority. The court therefore declined to give those earlier authorities a determinative role against jurisdiction.
  4. Applying the foregoing interpretation of s.120-B to the facts: if the petitioners were parties to the conspiracy during its continuance at a time they were in Bombay, the offence was committed within Indian territory. That conclusion made it impossible to hold that Indian courts lacked jurisdiction over Charge No. 1.
  5. On the alternative contention that a conspiracy formed abroad but producing effects and substantive offences in India cannot be tried here, the court observed authorities (including Halsbury and Emperor v. Chhotalal Babar) that support trial where substantive elements occurred in the territory. However, the court considered it unnecessary to decide that line of argument in detail because its view of s.120-B sufficed to establish jurisdiction.
  6. On section 196-A(2) (sanction for conspiracy where object is to commit non-cognizable offences), the court held that the object of the conspiracy in the present case was the commission of cognizable offences (cheating public, banks, Government); minor non-cognizable steps were merely means to that cognizable object. Citing and applying local precedents (Durgadas Tulsiram and Emperor v. Ramchandra Rango), the court held that sanction was not necessary.
  7. On the vagueness challenge to Charge No. 1 (and certain forgery counts), the court observed that direct evidence of where a conspiracy was entered into is rare and that the particulars required in a charge must be sufficient to give notice in the circumstances (per s.222 CrPC). The court accepted the prosecution's submission that specific charges exist against many accused as to particular drafts and that, given the nature of conspiracies and forgeries, the charges were not fatally vague.
  8. Finally, because the court rejected the accused's primary jurisdictional contention, the accused's contingent submission on misjoinder of charges and accused failed as well.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The order of committal was confirmed; the revision application was dismissed and the rule discharged.

Implications (direct effects on the parties and the case):

  • The accused remain committed to stand trial before the Court of Session on the charges as framed (including Charge No. 1 for criminal conspiracy).
  • The Court held that section 120-B may be applied to persons who are parties to a conspiracy during its continuance, and that where the accused were parties while present in Bombay the offence was committed within Indian territory and is triable there.
  • The Court held that sanction under section 196-A(2) CrPC was not required because the conspiracy's object was the commission of cognizable offences; incidental non-cognizable acts that are means to that object do not attract the sanction requirement.
  • The Court rejected the contention that the conspiracy and related forgery charges were fatally vague and rejected the misjoinder argument, given the primary findings on jurisdiction and sufficiency of particulars.
  • The Court ordered that the learned Additional Sessions Judge should proceed with the trial as early as possible.

The opinion explains and applies legal principles and rejects certain earlier authorities as dispositive in the circumstances; it does not state that it is creating any broader novel precedent beyond interpreting s.120-B and applying established local decisions on sanction and particulars in charges. The direct result is confirmation of committal and continuation of the trial process.

    Abdul Kadar Saleh Mohomad v. The State Of Maharashtra

    Patel, J.:— This revision application is made on behalf of the seven accused, who have been committed to stand their trial before the Court of Session by the learned Presidency Magistrate, 16th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, for various charges, viz., forgery, using forged documents as genuine, cheating, and the conspiracy to commit these offences. When the case reached before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, arguments were advanced before him that in respect of charge No. 1 in particular and in respect of other charges of forgery which may have occurred outside Indian territories, the Additional Sessions Judge would have no jurisdiction to try the case. The learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected these contentions, and against that decision the present revision application is made to this Court.

    2. The accused are nationals of South Africa and they arrived on various dates in India. Accused No. 1 first came to India on March 31, 1961. He left within a short time thereafter and returned on April 23, 1961. Accused No. 5 came on June 16, 1961. Accused Nos. 3 and 6 came on June 23, 1961. Accused No. 2 came on July 14, 1961, and accused No. 4 came on August 11, 1961. It appears that accused No. 1 when he landed in India made certain declarations before the Customs Officer of the foreign currency which he brought into India and later on he utilised this declaration after making certain alterations for the purpose of getting foreign currency from Indian dealers by cashing forged drafts of the Standard Bank of South Africa. As many as 84 charges were framed against these accused by the learned Presidency Magistrate, which have been recast by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and reduced in number to 64. During his stay accused No. 1 sold some drafts to one John Mascarenhas on June 21, 1961, of the total value of Rs. 36,000. Another set of drafts he sold to one Goverdhandas Ratansi Bajaria on July 22, 1961, of the total value of Rs. 80,000. Within a very short time after these sales, it was discovered that these drafts were forged drafts and that these two persons were cheated by the accused. Inquiries were, therefore, set afoot and all the accused were arrested one after the other as a result of the complaint made by these two persons.

    3. The first charge is one of conspiracy and it is directed against all the seven accused and is as follows:—

    “First: That between the 28th day of April, 1960 and the 11th day of August, 1961, at Bombay and/or at other places in and outside India, you Abdul Kadar Saleh Mohamed, accused No. 1, Abdul Jabar Khan, accused No. 2, Peerbhai Chagan, accused No. 3, Abdul Gafar Osman, accused No. 4, Osman Mohomed, accused No. 5, Habib Mohamed, accused No. 6, and Omar Mohamed, accused No. 7, along with (1) Shrimati Rabia alias Bakri alias Nargis, alias Sherbanoo alias Shrimati Kadar wife of Abdul Kadar Saleh Mahomed, (2) Dawood Saleh Mohomed, (3) Allibhai Manjee and (4) Ramji Keshavji, all four of them now absconding, and along with other persons unknown, were parties to a criminal conspiracy to cheat persons by dishonestly inducing them to deliver money in Indian currency by using forged documents, viz., British Sterling drafts purporting to have been issued by the Standard Bank of South Africa, Pretoria and Johansberg Branches and thereafter to remit the moneys so obtained by cheating to South Africa after getting the same converted into foreign currency, knowing or having reason to believe at the time you used the said documents to be forged documents, and also by forging documents and possessing them intending to use them fraudulently for the purpose of carrying out the object of the said conspiracy, and by abetting the offences of forgery and of using as genuine forged documents for the purpose of cheating, and that in pursuance of the said criminal conspiracy the above-mentioned offences were in fact committed, and that you all thus committed an offence punishable under section 120-B read with sections 467, 467-109, 471-467, 468, 468-109, 471-468, 417, 420, 474, 471-468-109, 417-109 and 420-109.”

    4. It is argued by Mr. Pardiwala that the offence of criminal conspiracy is complete under s. 120-A as soon as there is a completed agreement between the several accused, in the present case in South Africa, as the circumstances of the present case show, and therefore none of the accused can be prosecuted in Indian Courts. He has relied for this purpose on Reg. v. Elmstone, Whitwell, et al. . 1870 7 B.H.C.R Cri 89, F.B., Reg. v. Pirtai . 1873 10 B.H.C.R 356. Gokaldas v. Emperor . [1933] A.I.R Sind 333. and In re Dani4.. He argues that there is nothing in the evidence on record which could show that any of the accused formed the conspiracy in any part of India, and if the conspiracy was complete in South Africa evidently, in view of these authorities, the accused cannot be prosecuted in this country. He has also relied upon the cases cited at foot-note 9, at page 271 of Ratanlal's Law of Crimes 20th ed., for the purpose of his arguments.

    5. Before these sections were added to the Penal Code, conspiracy to commit offences was not punishable. It became punishable as abetment, if the offence was actually committed. This is evident from the languae of s. 107 (second definition) which defines ‘abetment’. By the amendment of the Penal Code, by addition of ss. 120-A and 120-B, the Legislature brought the law in India in line with the English law and made conspiracy itself punishable as a distinct offence, apart from the object of conspiracy which, if carried out, would itself amount to an offence.

    6. Section 120-B, which is the penal section, says that whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death,… shall… be punishable in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. The omitted words are not relevant for the present purposes. Now, the question is, does s. 120-B limit its operation to those who are parties only to the agreement at the moment of its formation or it is also applicable to those who continue to be parties during the entire period during which the conspiracy continued. It is no doubt true that the offence is complete as soon as an agreement is made between the conspirators and they being parties to that conspiracy, they would be punishable under s. 120-B. But by its very language, s. 120-B must apply to those who are members of the conspiracy during its continuance. The emphasis is on the words “are parties”. It is not that the agreement as such is punishable but “being party to a conspiracy” is punishable. The section is worded in present tense and, therefore, cannot be exclusively read to mean whoever has been or had been party to a criminal conspiracy shall be punished, as if the offence was committed. In other words, it is intended to be treated as a continuing offence and whoever is a party to conspiracy during the period for which he is charged is liable under s. 120-B. The same is the view in foreign jurisdictions.

    7. In this connection, one may with advantage refer to American Jurisprudence, Vol. 11, s. 23, at page 559, where it is stated:

    “The conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design.”

    8. In United States v. Kissel . 1910 218 U.S 601, 54 L.Ed 1168. Mr. Justice Holmes in answer to a contention that the prosecution was barred by the law of limitation said (p. 1178):

    “…But when the plot contemplates bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue without the continuous co-operation of the conspirators to keep it up, and there is such continuous co-operation, it is a perversion of natural thought and of natural language to call such continuous co-operation a cinematographic series of distinct conspiracies, rather than to call it a single one. ..A conspiracy is constituted by an agreement, it is true, but it is the result of the agreement, rather than the agreement itself, just as a partnership, although constituted by a contract, is not the contract, but is a result of it…A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes. That as such it may have continuation in time is shown by the rule that an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.”

    9. It is true that in Gokaldas Amarsee v. Emperor and In re Dani the conviction have been based on the footing that the agreement to commit offences by itself resulted in the offences of conspiracy under s. 120-B. On the other hand, there is not a single case where it has been asserted and accepted that merely because the objects with which the conspiracy was entered into were achieved and actual offences committed, there could be no prosecution for the conspiracy itself or that since the conspiracy might amount to abetment of each of the offences committed, there can be no charge in respect of the conspiracy. Mr. Pardiwala in support of his contention relied on the decision in Leo Roy v. Supdt., Dist. Jail . [1958] A.I.R S.C 119.. That case arose out of a warrant for the apprehension and detention of the petitioners in connection with offences including an offence under s. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. While dealing with the arguments advanced before their Lordships that art. 20(2) of the Constitution protected them from being charged with these offences, their Lordships considered what a criminal conspiracy implied, and it is in that connection that it was said (p. 121):

    “…The offence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy because the conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally the crime attempted or completed does not require the element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients.”

    10. The Court was not invited to consider the meaning of or the application of s. 120-B, and the question as to whether or not a conspiracy continues and the language of s. 120-B applies to those who are parties to the conspiracy during every moment of its continuance was not canvassed before their Lordships. On the other hand, in S. Swaminatham v. State of Madras . [1957] A.I.R S.C 340., while rejecting the contention of misjoinder of charges on the ground that different people had joined the conspiracy at different times and also the charges were lumped together, the Court said (p. 344):

    “…The charge; as framed, discloses one single conspiracy, although spread over several years. There was only one object of the conspiracy and that was to cheat members of the public. The fact that in the course of years others joined the conspiracy or that several incidents of cheating took place in pursuance of the conspiracy did not change the conspiracy & did not split up a single conspiracy into several conspiracies.”

    11. It is urged by Mr. Pardiwala that though ss. 120-A and 120-B were added to the Indian Penal Code in 1913, in no case has a similar view been taken. That, however, does not mean that cannot be the meaning of s. 120-B. It may be that in those cases it was not necessary to consider the application of s. 120-B since the conspiracies were formed in India and the members thereof were amenable to the jurisdiction of Indian Courts. International offences of this kind and such magnitude are of recent growth and hence the question. We do not see why we should give unnatural and perverted meaning to the section. In Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay . [1957] A.I.R S.C 857, S.C, 61 Bom. L.R 58. Mr. Justice Jagannadhadas said in paragraph 31:

    “It is not necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the Indian Penal Code at the present day in accordance with the notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the Code was enacted. The notions relating to this matter have very considerably changed between then and now during nearly a century that has elapsed. It is legitimate to construe the Code with reference to the modern needs, wherever this is permissible, unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular section to indicate the contrary.”

    12. It is doubtful if the ratio of the decision in Reg. v. Elmstone, Whitwell, et al, Reg. v. Pirtai, and Gokaldas Amarsee v. Emperor can be regarded as sound law in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in that case. After referring to the above cases and also the case of Emperor v. Chhotalal Babar . 1912 I.L.R 36 Bom. 524, S.C 14 Bom. L.R 147. Mr. Justice Jagannadhadas in the above case says in paragraph 30:

    “…Undoubtedly some of them seem to support the view pressed before us on behalf of the appellant that criminal jurisdiction cannot extend to foreigners outside the State. These, however, are decisions rendered at a time when the competence of the Indian Legislature was considered somewhat limited, under the influence of the decisions like those in Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales . [1891] A.C 455. in spite of the decision in The Queen v. Burah . 1878 3 A.C 889..”

    13. It is significant to note in this connection that their Lordships confirmed the conviction of the appellant under s. 420, though charged under s. 420 and s. 34, for an offence which he committed by an agent, himself not being in this country at the time.

    14. In the view that we take of s. 120-B, it is clear that if the petitioners before us were parties to the conspiracy during its continuance when all of them were in Bombay, they clearly committed this offence within Indian territories, and that being so, it is impossible to hold that the Courts in India would have no jurisdiction to try the offence which is the subject-matter of Charge No. 1.

    15. Mr. Gumaste relied upon another alternative argument that even if the conspiracy had taken place outside India, even if at the time when the offences were committed any of them were outside India, since its effects were felt here and the actual offences in pursuance to the conspiracy were committed in the Indian territory, the Courts in India would have jurisdiction to try all of the accused even for conspiracy. He relied for this purpose on a passage in Hals-bury's Laws of England, Vol. 10, para. 607, at page 329. There it is stated:

    “Conspiracy may be tried in the place where the conspirators agreed to do the wrongful act which is the object of the conspiracy, but as the place of agreement is often unknown, conspiracy is generally a matter of inference deduced from criminal acts of the accused persons which are done in pursuance of a common criminal purpose, and are often not confined to one place; a charge of conspiracy may consequently be laid at common law in any country where one of these criminal acts is committed.”

    16. He relied on the decision in Emperor v. Chhotalal Babar, particularly on the observations to the following effect:

    “Where a foreigner starts the train of his crime in foreign territory, and perfects and completes his offence within British limits, he is triable by the British Court when found within its jurisdiction.”

    17. He also relies for the purposes of his argument on the dicta of Mr. Justice Holmes which have been cited in Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay, at p. 868, para. (24). In the view which we have taken of s. 120-B, we do not think it is necessary for us to consider this aspect of the matter.

    18. Mr. Pardiwala then argued that the sanction of the State Government is necessary under s. 196-A(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, inasmuch as conspiracy that is alleged includes some non-cognizable offences. The Legislature added s. 196-A(2) requiring the sanction of the Government in such cases with a view that there should not be frivolous prosecutions on the ground of criminal conspiracy to commit non-cognizable offences which were petty in nature. The question is whether the present case falls within the ambit of sub-s. (2) of s. 196-A. So far as relevant, s. 196-A(2) reads:

    “No court shall take cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code—…

    (2) in a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence,…unless the State Government, or a Chief Presidency Magistrate…empowered in this behalf by the State Government has, by order in writing, consented to the initiation of the proceedings:”

    19. The primary question is whether it can be said that the object of the conspiracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence. No doubt the words are plain. But then, as the words themselves suggest, the object of the conspiracy must be to commit any non-cognizable offence. In the present case, the object was to commit cognizable offence, and the minor steps were merely steps in the committal of the main and cognizable offence of cheating the public, the Government and the banks, which clearly is outside the purview of the exception contained in the sub-section. It seems to us that such conspiracies as have their object only the commission of non-cognizable offences, are within the section. It may also be that there may be a conspiracy to commit non-cognizable offences and also distinct cognizable offences, in which case there may be scope for saying that as to non-cognizable offences, if prosecution is sought for conspiracy, there must be sanction. But where the only object of the conspiracy is, as stated above, commission of cognizable offences, then there can be no question of sanction for the steps that are being taken to the fulfilment of the conspiracy. Even apart from this, a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view in Durgadas Tulsiram v. State . 1953 56 Bom. L.R 188. that where commission of non-cognizable offences is merely a means to an end, sanction under s. 196-A(2) would not be necessary. This case followed the earlier case in Emperor v. Ramchandra Rango . 1938 41 Bom. L.R 98.. We are bound by this decision and it would not be open to us to reconsider the matter.

    20. It is then contended that in the first charge, the charge of conspiracy is vague in that it does not specify the exact place where the conspiracy was entered into; for, the charge says “at Bombay and/or at other places in and outside India”. It is also contended that the documents in respect of which forgeries and cheating were committed have not also been specified in that charge. As to the latter, it is sufficient to say that specific charges have been made against many of the accused individually in respect of the drafts and the other documents connected with cheating. It is clear, therefore, that there is no substance in the contention. As to the first contention, we may refer with advantage to the decision in State v. Shankar Sakharam Jadhav . 1956 59 Bom. L.R 244. and the authorities cited there. It is clear on authorities that direct evidence of conspiracy is almost an impossibility. It is in a rare case only that there is direct evidence of the place where conspiracy is entered into. In almost every case, such conspiracies are to be inferred from the subsequent conduct of the parties having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Under these circumstances, from the very nature of things it is almost impossible to give the particulars, as the accused would now have the prosecution to give them. In this connection, Mr. Pardiwala referred us to the Criminal Procedure Code and contended that under s. 236 the only alternatives that are permissible are as to the nature of the offence, but not any other matter. He relies particularly on s. 222 and says that the particulars must be supplied. Section 222, however, says that the charge must contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which be is charged. It would be clear, therefore, that it is not in every case necessary to give the place of the offence. It depends upon the circumstances of the individual case. The same argument was advanced as to the charges with regard to certain forgeries.

    21. But then it was pointed out by the learned Additional Government Pleader that many of the drafts were endorsed in Bombay, though they may have been forged in or out of Bombay. Even here, what we have said above in connection with conspiracy applies. Carried to its extreme, in every case of a forged document the prosecution would be required to supply the particulars of the place and time at which the document is forged though it may be that it is forged in the house, in a running tram, in a running train or in a bath-room. This is putting too much strain on the section. It is, therefore, impossible to counteanance the argument that in connection with the forgeries also the charges, as framed, are vague.

    22. Mr. Pardiwala then contended that if he succeeded on the first point regarding jurisdiction and if the charge of conspiracy failed, there would be also misjoinder of charges both as to offences and as to accused. Since we are against him on the first point, this contention must fail, as is admitted by him.

    [His Lordship after considering some matters of evidence, concluded:] In the result, the order of committal is confirmed. The application is dismissed and the rule is discharged. The learned Additional Sessions Judge should proceed with the trial of the case as early as can possibly be done.

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    Abdul Kadar Saleh Mohomad v. The State Of Maharashtra
    (Aug 21, 1963)