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Comprehensive Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Prior to August 1957 the partnership firm Allied (A to Z) Agencies consisted of three partners: the two petitioners (Jaganath Prabhashankar Joshi and Shankerlal Prabhashankar Trivedi) and one Shantilal Karsanji Bhatt. The firm had been recognised as an Established Importer and held quota certificates for importing automobile parts and accessories.

By a deed of dissolution dated 6 September 1957, Shantilal retired with effect from 3 August 1957, and the petitioners continued the business. The petitioners claimed that Shantilal released to them all his rights including quota rights under import/export licences. They sought transfer of the quota certificates held in the name of the old firm to themselves.

The petitioners applied to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (respondent No. 2) for transfer of quota rights. Respondent No. 2 initially rejected the application as the documents were defective (on the ground that the deed did not clearly show that the continuing partners had taken over all assets, liabilities and goodwill and that registered deeds, not declarations, were required). After further correspondence and the execution on 27 March 1958 of a "supplementary deed of dissolution and release", respondent No. 2, by letter dated 6 June 1958, directed that quota licences admissible to the old firm "in future" should be issued in the petitioners' names.

The petitioners had applied to the Joint Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay (respondent No. 1) for an import licence for the October 1957–March 1958 quota period on 27 December 1957 (within the filing deadline of 31 December 1957). Respondent No. 1 refused to grant the licence on 23 June 1958, stating he could not consider the application "under the existing instructions" from respondent No. 2. Appeals to respondent No. 2 and to the Minister of Commerce and Industry were unsuccessful. The petitioners then sought writ relief under Article 226, challenging the orders of respondent No. 1 and various communications of respondent No. 2. The single judge (Shelat, J.) dismissed the petition with costs. The petitioners appealed to the Division Bench (including Mudholkar, A.C.J.), which heard the appeal and dismissed it, affirming the single judge's reasoning and orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether respondent No. 1 (the licensing authority) had power or authority to refuse to grant the import licence after respondent No. 2 (the Chief Controller) had given approval to transfer quota certificates in the petitioners' favour.
  2. Whether approval by the Chief Controller, given after the licensing period had expired, could relate back to the date of dissolution so as to entitle the petitioners to import licences for the earlier licensing period (i.e., whether transfer of quota rights takes effect from the date of the deed/agreement or only from the date of the Controller’s approval).
  3. Whether quota certificates/rights are proprietary interests that devolve by operation of law (or contract) such that a devolution or transfer outside the Controller's recognition would bind the licensing authorities.
  4. Whether this Court could, by writ to a subordinate officer within its territorial jurisdiction (respondent No. 1), effectively nullify instructions issued by a superior officer (respondent No. 2) who is outside the Court's territorial jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Petitioners') Arguments

  • Once respondent No. 2 approved the transfer of quota certificates, the transfer related back to the date of the dissolution of the old firm; therefore the petitioners were entitled to import licences for the October 1957–March 1958 period.
  • The deed of dissolution and release and accompanying declarations/documentation showed that the retiring partner had released all rights including quota rights to the continuing partners; the petitioners thus claimed they had acquired those quota rights by operation of the deed/agreement.
  • Counsel (Mr. Kantawala as described in the single-judge portion; R.J. Joshi argued on behalf of the appellants before the Division Bench) relied on authorities and legal commentary to the effect that licences and quota rights are assets of the partnership and thus form part of the partnership estate.
  • Where a superior authority is outside jurisdiction but has an agent or subordinate within the jurisdiction, a writ can be issued against the subordinate to disregard the principal’s order (relied on A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. Venkitachalam Potti as authority for this line of argument).

Respondents' Arguments

  • Quota certificates are evidentiary documents created by Government notifications; they do not constitute transferable proprietary rights in the sense contemplated by the Transfer of Property Act and therefore do not devolve by operation of law independent of the regulatory scheme.
  • The Import Trade Control Policy (the Policy Book) expressly conditions entitlement to quotas on approval of transfers by the Chief Controller in cases of change in firm constitution; paragraph 72 makes approval a precondition ("until" the transfer is approved). Thus a transferee's right to obtain a licence arises only after approval is given.
  • Under section 6 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, the Chief Controller has authority to direct subordinate licensing authorities (like respondent No. 1) not to grant licences; respondent No. 1 was bound to carry out those statutory instructions and could not be ordered to disobey them by this Court.
  • Even assuming delay on the part of the Chief Controller, the petitioners themselves failed to produce properly worded, registered documents within the licensing period and therefore share responsibility for their predicament.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mariappa v. Anthonisami, [1950] Mad. 697 Cited by commentator (Desai) as authority that quota rights are valuable assets of a partnership; specifically referenced in commentary relied upon by petitioners' counsel. Court noted the case merely indicates a breach of contractual obligation if a party prevents another from applying for licence to the extent of his share; not authority for devolution of quota rights as proprietary transfers binding on licensing authorities.
Hakutmal alias Hukmatrai Daulatram Gopaldas v. Mukhi Wadhumal Naraindas, 1945 O.C.J Suit No. 1558 of 1945 (Unrep.) (Blagden, J.) Held (in the unreported judgment) that licences and quotas are assets of a partnership, but observed that licences are permissions with value, not absolute property. Cited as part of the line of authority acknowledging that while licences may be valuable as between partners, they are by nature permissions and not inherently transferable property in law that bind third parties.
Chimanlal Popatlal v. B.M. Choksey (Unrep.), Chagla, C.J. & Tendolkar, J. (1957) Observation: quota has no market value; it is not ordinarily transferable or assignable; it is a permit personal to the grantee and has no inherent value as transferable property. Court relied on this observation to support the conclusion that quota certificates are not property transferable in law and therefore do not devolve by operation of law to bind licensing authorities.
Joint Chief Controller of Imports v. Jain; Jain v. Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (Madras High Court, cited decisions including 1959 72 L.W. 410) Madras High Court held that where partners divide quota rights on dissolution, the partners' rights accrue from the date of dissolution/agreement and that approval by the Chief Controller, once given, should be deemed to take effect from that earlier date. The present Court considered these Madras decisions closely but rejected their conclusion, holding instead that paragraph 72's "until" language in the Policy makes approval a condition precedent and the effective date for entitlement is the date of approval, not the dissolution.
Itta Venkataramiah Chetty, Proprietor, Rao & Co., Madras v. The Deputy Chief Controller of Exports, Writ Petition No. 569 of 1959 (Madras) (Rajgopalan, J.) Observed that devolution of quota rights by sale (by Official Assignee) was complete on registration of sale-deed and did not depend on Chief Controller's recognition. Court distinguished this reasoning: here there was no admitted devolution by a third-party sale; the Court held quota rights are not proprietary in the Transfer of Property Act sense and that regulatory approval remains a condition for recognition by licensing authorities.
Ebrahim Aboobaker v. U.M. Mirchandani, 1952 O.C.J Appeal No. 88 of 1951 (Chagla, C.J. & Gajendragadkar, J.) Principle that the Court will not indirectly do what it cannot do directly (i.e., the Court should not circumvent a lack of jurisdiction over a principal by indirectly compelling an agent to disregard lawful instructions of the principal). Cited to support the point that this Court cannot, by writ to respondent No. 1 (within its jurisdiction), effectively nullify the instructions of respondent No. 2 (outside jurisdiction); the Court refused to issue an order that would require respondent No. 1 to breach statutory duty.
A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti Cited by petitioners to argue that a writ may be issued against an agent within jurisdiction to compel disregard of principal's order. Court rejected the application of that reasoning here because respondent No. 1 was not an "agent" for transfer-of-quota purposes and had no delegated power to sanction transfers—transfer jurisdiction rested exclusively with respondent No. 2.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by analysing the statutory framework and the Import Trade Control Policy (the Policy Book) together with the practical operation of quota certificates and licences:

  1. Statutory and regulatory framework: The Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 empowered the Central Government to regulate imports (section 3). In exercise of that power the Imports (Control) Order, 1955 (clauses 3, 5 and 6) and the Policy Book (Import Trade Control Policy) prescribes the licensing system, conditions of licences and grounds on which licences may be refused. Clause 5 makes transfer subject to written permission of the licensing authority; clause 6 lists grounds for refusal including that the applicant is not eligible in accordance with Import Trade Control Regulations.
  2. Nature and function of quota certificates: The Court accepted the characterization advanced in the Policy Book and earlier authorities that a quota certificate is essentially a certificate evidencing that an importer is an "Established Importer", the volume of past imports and hence the volume for which an import licence may be issued. The Court emphasised that, although quota certificates have value and may be treated as assets between partners, they are not proprietary rights transferable in the sense of the Transfer of Property Act or devolution by operation of law.
  3. Effect of paragraph 72 of the Policy Book: Paragraph 72 provides that when a change occurs in the constitution of a firm the reconstituted firm "will not be entitled to the quotas of the original firm until the transfer of the quota rights in their favour has been approved by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports." The Court read the word "until" as creating a condition precedent — approval by the Chief Controller is necessary before the reconstituted firm can rely on the quota rights vis-à-vis licensing authorities.
  4. Distinction between dissolution with division of quota rights and reconstitution: The Court acknowledged that paragraph 72(b) contemplates a case where the partners divide the business and quota rights and that those partners may be entitled to their shares according to the agreement. However, even in such situations, entitlements recognised by licensing authorities are subject to the documentary and approval requirements set out in paras. 72–74 (including registered deeds and prescribed supporting documents) and, where paragraph 72 requires approval, that remains decisive for entitlement to licences.
  5. Documentary requirements and timing: Paragraphs 72–74 require transfer-related documents to be registered (except certain exceptions not applicable here) and list the documents to be produced. The Court found that the petitioners initially failed to produce a deed clearly stating the continuing partners had taken over all assets and liabilities; respondent No. 2 therefore reasonably rejected the early application. The petitioners' delay and failure to supply a properly worded registered deed within the licensing period contributed to their inability to obtain licences for the earlier period.
  6. Precedent analysis and rejection of devolution theory: The Court reviewed Madras High Court decisions (Jain and related authorities) that held that approval, once given, could be treated as effective from the date of dissolution/agreement. The Court distinguished those decisions and reaffirmed the view (supported by Chimanlal Popatlal observations) that quota certificates are not proprietary rights that automatically devolve to bind licensing authorities; instead, transfers are creatures of the regulatory scheme and effective only to the extent and from the date provided in the relevant regulations and approvals.
  7. Jurisdictional limits on writ relief: The Chief Controller (respondent No. 2) was located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court; this Court therefore had no power to issue a writ against him. The petitioners' effort to obtain effective relief by directing respondent No. 1 (within jurisdiction) to disregard respondent No. 2's instructions was rejected because respondent No. 1 was bound by respondent No. 2's statutory directions under s.6 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, and this Court cannot compel a subordinate to disobey its lawful superior or indirectly do what it cannot do directly.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition (and on appeal) was dismissed. The Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to import licences for the October 1957–March 1958 period because:

  • The transfer of quota rights to the reconstituted firm could only be relied upon for licence-granting purposes after the Chief Controller had approved the transfer; paragraph 72’s "until" language makes approval a condition precedent.
  • Quota certificates are not proprietary rights transferable by operation of law in a manner that would bind licensing authorities independent of the regulatory approval and documentary requirements; they are evidentiary/regulatory creations exercisable only in the manner and to the extent provided by the regulations.
  • Respondent No. 1 was bound to follow respondent No. 2's directions (under s.6 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955) and this Court could not, by writ directed at respondent No. 1, effectively nullify or prevent lawful instructions of respondent No. 2 who is outside the Court's territorial jurisdiction.

Consequences: The direct effect was that the petitioners were denied licences for the antecedent licensing period (October 1957–March 1958). The petition was dismissed with costs (costs fixed at Rs. 400 in the single-judge order; the Division Bench affirmed dismissal and allowed respondents' attorneys to withdraw the amount deposited by the appellants towards costs). The Court did not treat the decision as creating a novel departure from the statutory/regulatory scheme but applied and clarified how the Policy Book and statutory provisions operate in such transfer circumstances.


Note: This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the opinion's contents have been introduced.

    Jagannath Prabhashanker Joshi v. Varadkar

    Shelat, J.:— The petitioners' case is that the order of respondent No. 1 dated June 23, 1958, (exh. D to the petition), the order of respondent No. 2 contained in the letter dated August 22, 1958 (exh. H), and the order dated October 4, 1958 (exh. J) are illegal and bad in law. Their main ground of challenging these orders is that respondent No. 1 had no power or authority to refuse to grant the licence once respondent No. 2 had, as stated in his letter dated June 6, 1958, given his approval to the transfer of quota certificates of the dissolved firm in favour of the petitioners. Their contention is that once the approval was granted, the transfer of quota rights related back to the date of the dissolution of the old firm and, therefore, they would be entitled by virtue of that approval to the transfer of import licences as from that date and not from the date of approval of respondent No. 2. In other words, they contended that the deed of dissolution and release entitled them to these quota certificates and having acquired under that deed those rights, those rights could not be postponed to a future date merely because respondent No. 2 gave his approval on a later date.

    2. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary at this stage to turn to the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, and the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, made thereunder. Section 3 of the Act provides that the Central Government may by order published in the Official Gazette, make provisions for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling, in all cases and in specified class of cases and subject to such exceptions if any, as may be made by or under the order, the import, export carriage coastwise or shipment as ship stores of goods of any specified description etc. Section 3 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, then provides that no person shall import any goods of the description specified in Schedule I, except under and in accordance with a licence granted by the Central Government or by any officer specified in Schedule II. Section 5(3)(i) lays down that no person shall transfer and no person shall acquire by transfer any licence issued by the licensing authority except under a written permission of that authority. Section 6 provides that the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports may refuse to grant a licence or direct any other licensing authority not to grant a licence on the grounds set out there, the grounds relevant for the purposes of this case being

    (e) if the application for the import licence is defective and does not conform to the prescribed rules and

    (g) if the applicant is not eligible for a licence in accordance with the Import Trade Control Regulations.

    3. Though under the definition section, s. 2, a Chief Controller of Imports and Exports includes a Joint Chief Controller and a Deputy Chief Controller, this order expressly empowers the Chief Controller to give directions to the Deputy Chief Controller, such as respondent No. 1, not to grant licence in the cases enumerated in s, 6. Turning to the regulations made by the Government they are embodied in a book called Import Trade Control Policy issued for the period October 1957-March 1958 which is the relevant period in this case. Paragraph 12 of the Policy Book under the heading “The Licensing System” gives categories of Importers, (a) Established Importers, (b) Actual Users, (c) New Comers and (d) Others. Since the petitioners claim to have the licences on the ground that they succeeded to the business of the old Firm which was recognised as an established importer and as such was given certain quota certificates, it is necessary to see who is an established importer. Paragraph 15 which defines, an established importer provides that an established importer is a person or a firm who has been actually engaged in import trade of the articles comprised in any one serial number of the Import Trade Control Schedule during at least one financial year falling within the basic period. It further provides that on such an importer choosing the best year from such a basic period to show his imports, he may be given quota certificate certifying the value of his best year's imports. Paragraph 18 then provides that Quota Licences are given to established importers at a certain percentage of the total value of imports in any one financial year out of the specified basic period of the importer's choice as evidenced by (a) valid quota certificates and (b) registration numbers issued by J.C.C.I Calcutta or by the Licencing authority concerned in connection with the Quota Registration scheme. Thus in an application for an import licence, a quota certificate is a piece of evidence evidencing

    (1) that the applicant is an established importer,

    (2) his total imports in any one financial year,

    (3) the volume of imports for which at a certain proportion he is entitled to get an import licence.

    4. Prima facie a quota certificate at best is what it is described, viz., a certificate issued to an established importer evidencing certain particulars which entitle him to an import licence for a certain amount.

    5. Paragraph 72 of the Policy Book deals with the transfer of the quotas. It states that the system of granting licences to established importers was based on the presumption that no change has taken place in the constitution of the applicant firm. It provides then that when a change occurs in the constitution or the name of firm or the business changes hands, the reconstituted firm will not be entitled to the quotas of the original firm “until” the transfer of the quota rights in their favour has been approved by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Thus acquisition of quota rights of the original firm by a firm reconstituted as aforesaid is made dependent upon an approval being secured by such a reconstituted firm and therefore “until” such approval is secured, it would appear that the reconstituted firm would not be eligible to obtain an import licence applied for on the basis of the quota rights of the original firm. Paragraph 18 then lays down certain principles to be followed in cases where the reconstituted firm applies for transfer of quota rights of the original firm. The definition of the word ‘firm’ used herein is a wide one for it not only includes a partnership but also a limited company and a proprietory business.

    6. Paragraph 72(a) provides for transfer of quota rights in certain cases therein set out. I set out only two of these cases which are applicable to the facts before me.

    (a)(i) “Where the business of a firm is transferred together with all its assets, liabilities and goodwill to another firm so as to constitute it as its successor in all respects, the transferee firm shall get the quota rights of the transferred firm.”

    (iii) “Where a firm consists of several partners, and its constitution undergoes a change by retirement of some partners or admission of new partners, the reconstituted firm, continuing the original business in the same name and taking over its assets and liabilities, shall be entitled to get the quota rights of the original firm. But the retiring partners starting a new business whether in the same line or otherwise would not be entitled to get any quota rights.”

    7. I may add one more case set out in cl. (b) of this para, as it would be relevant when I come to certain decisions of the High Court of Madras referred to by Mr. Kantawala. That is a case of the division of quota rights.

    “Where a firm is dissolved and the partners agree to divide its business, assets and liabilities or its goodwill is taken over by one of the partners and none of them is allowed to use it, the partners shall get their respective share in the quota rights according to the provision of the agreement.”

    8. It is thus clear that these principles lay down the extent to which in each of the cases enumerated in para. 72 an applicant having his right to an import licence as an established importer and on a transfer of quota rights of the original firm would get quota rights. But it is necessary to bear in mind the basic principle laid down in the first part of this para, that when a change occurs in the constitution and the name of the firm or the business changes hands then the reconstituted firm will not be entitled to the original firm's quotas until the transfer of the quota rights in their favour is approved of by the Controller. Since this part of this para contemplates only a reconstituted firm, as defined there, the case of a firm which is dissolved and where by an agreement amongst its partners, its assets and liabilities including its quota rights are divided amongst the partners, is not one of a reconstituted firm and therefore it is possible that in such a case since each of the partners was an established importer before the dissolution, no approval might perhaps be necessary and the right of each of them to have his share of quota rights might accrue from the date of such agreement. Nonetheless in order that a transfer of such rights should take place an application would have to be made by such a partner to the Controller to establish that there has been a dissolution of the partnership and that he has been given a certain share in the quota rights of that partnership. But since a partnership is a compendium form of expressing the individual members thereof, each of them is an established importer as forming part of the partnership while it exists and continues to be so after it is dissolved and its business, assets and liabilities are divided amongst the partners.

    9. Paragraph 72(e) requires that where a change is effected in the constitution, of a firm or a transfer of business takes place, such a change or transfer must be made by registered documents and unregistered documents would not be taken into consideration. Paragraph 73 lays down what documentary evidence would have to be produced for effecting a transfer of quota rights. In the case of a partnership, among other documents, an affidavit of the retiring partner that he has retired and relinquished all his rights in favour of the continuing partner or partners is necessary. Clause (VIII) of para. 73 also provides that the applicant may also produce all other documents that he may like to produce or may be required to produce in support of his claim for transfer. Finally para. 74 provides that applications for transfer or division of quota rights would not be entertained unless they are accompanied by all the documents complete in all respects.

    10. As I have stated, respondent No. 2 declined to grant his approval to the petitioners' application for transfer on the ground that the deed of dissolution produced by the petitioners did not state clearly that the petitioners as continuing partners had taken over the assets, liabilities and goodwill of the dissolved firm. There can be no question that respondent No. 2 was right in this complaint because although the deed mentions that on an account having been taken, a certain sum was found payable to the retiring partner, there is no express statement therein that the assets, liabilities and the goodwill of the firm had been taken over by the continuing partners. The declaration dated December 3, 1957, was rejected also on the ground that what was required by paras. 72 and 73 of the I.T.C Policy Book was a deed and not a declaration. Ultimately, it was after the document dated March 27, 1958, was tendered that respondent No. 2 gave his approval by his letter dated June 6, 1958, directing that quota licences admissible to the dissolved partnership on the basics of past imports standing in its name should “in future” be issued in the name of the petitioners. On this order, respondent No. 1 construed the words “in future” as meaning as from and after the date of that letter granting approval and not as meaning on and from the date of the dissolution of the firm and declined on that basis to grant licences for the period, October 1957 to March.

    11. One thing is clear from these letters that respondent No. 2 was not satisfied with the documents produced by the petitioners until they produced on April 27, 1958, the deed of confirmation dated March 27, 1958, that is, long after the expiry of the licensing period. The question is whether the petitioners are entitled to obtain a licence for this period although the approval was given for the transfer of quota rights after the expiry of that period? Prima facie it would appear that the petitioners would not be entitled as the approval by respondent No. 2 of such a transfer is a condition precedent to their obtaining a licence on the basis of the quota rights of the dissolved firm. It must be borne in mind that under the regulations contained in the Import Trade Control Policy, it would be the established importer who is entitled to get a licence on the basis of his past imports on the consideration of which he is granted the quota certificates. Thus it was the dissolved firm which was entitled to a licence as the established importer. When Shantilal retired from the partnership and the partnership was dissolved as a result of his retirement, although the petitioners continued the business in the name of the dissolved firm, the original partnership came to an end and a reconstituted firm came into being and, therefore, until the approval was obtained, there could be no transfer of the quota rights of the dissolved partnership. The right to obtain licences on the basis of the quota rights of the dissolved partnership can be said to accrue to the continuing partners only on such transfer being approved and, therefore, only from the date of that approval. It may be that so far as the continuing and the retiring partners are concerned the arrangement made between themselves as to the transfer of quota rights of the firm would be binding from the date of such arrangement but the approval being a condition precedent to the continuing partners' right to obtain licences on the ground of such transfer, that right would accrue on such approval only.

    12. Mr. Kantawala, however, argued that the rights of the continuing partners to the quota rights accrue to them not by reason of the approval of the Controller but by reason of the assets of the dissolved firm having devolved on them under the deed of dissolution. He relied on a passage in Desai's Law of Partnership (2nd edn.), p. 81, where it is stated that licences and quota rights are valuable assets of a partnership and therefore the property of such partnership. But I do not think that this passage means that quota rights are property in the sense that they are transferable under the Transfer of Property Act or devolve on a person on the death of the holder thereof by operation of law. In their very nature a quota certificate is hut a piece of evidence certifying the past imports of the person to whom it is granted and on the basis of which he would be entitled to a licence in certain proportion. It has no doubt a certain value and may well be considered an asset of the firm as between the partners but it would be far from correct to say that it is capable of devolution by operation of law or contract. The decision relied on at p. 81 by the learned commentator viz., Mariappa v. Anthonisami . [1950] Mad. 697., lays down merely that it would be a breach of a contractual obligation giving rise to a claim for damages if a party to an arrangement whereby quota rights are divided between him and another prevents the other party from applying and obtaining a licence to the extent of his share in the quota rights, Mr. Kantawala next relied on an unreported judgment in Hakutmal alias Hukmatrai Daulatram Gopaldas v. Mukhi Wadhumal Naraindas . 1945 O.C.J Suit No. 1558 of 1945, decided by Blagden, J., on November 7, 1945 Unrep.. where the learned Judge held that licences and quotas are assets of a partnership though he was at pains to point out that all licences are by their very nature merely permissions to do something which would otherwise be unlawful although such permissions in many cases would be very valuable. An unreported judgment of Chagla, C.J and Tendolkar, J. in Chimanlal Popatlal v. B.M Choksey . 1957 O.C.J Appeal No. 12 of 1957 decided by Chagla, C.J and Tendolkar, J., on March 17, 1957 Unrep.. clarifies the position of licences and quota rights in law. The learned Chief Justice observes:

    “But this quota has no market value: it is not ordinarily transferable or assignable. It is merely a licence or a permit given to a particular party to enable him to import paper into India and as such it has no inherent value.”

    13. It is clear from these observations that a licence or a quota certificate is not property transferable in law or in respect of which on sale or transfer otherwise any devolution of rights binding on a third party takes place.

    14. Mr. Kantawala, however, relied on a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in Joint Chief Controller of Imports v. Jain . 1959 72 L.W 410.. The facts were that the respondent was a partner in a firm named Sha Bhagajee Sonmull consisting of four partners and doing business mainly in the imports of various articles. The firm had been recognised as an established importer. The firm was dissolved on and from November 21, 1956. After dissolution, the respondent and the three partners submitted their applications individually for licences against the quota rights of the dissolved firm. They were told that their applications would be considered after the approval of the Chief Controller for transfer of quota rights. Those licences were applied for the periods, July to December 1956 and January to June 1957. By an order dated April 9, 1957, long after the expiry of the first period, the Chief Controller approved the transfer of quota rights. The order stated that “instructions have been issued to the licensing authorities to the effect that quota licences admissible to the dissolved firm… showing in their name should, in future be divided in equal ratio, viz., 25 per cent, each” amongst the four partner. On these instructions the Joint Chief Controller of Exports and Imports, Madras, granted licence to the respondent for January-June 1957 but not for the period, July to December 1956, the ground for refusal for the latter period as stated being that the transfer of quota rights was approved of after the expiry of the licensing period. It was not in dispute that the application was made before the expiry of the licensing period and that application was not rejected in limine but had been just pending till the approval of the Chief Controller. Balkrishna Iyer, J., who heard the petition, held that the approval for transfer of quotas was a condition necessary for obtaining licence by a transferee firm only when there was a change in the constitution or where the business changes hands but that this condition would not apply when a firm has been dissolved and its quota rights have been divided among the quondam partners. That rule, he held, applied to a reconstituted firm only and not to the case of partners who claim a share in the quota rights of the dissolved firm in pursuance of an agreement to divide them in the deed of dissolution. That decision was confirmed by the Appeal Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J, and Ganapatia Pillai, J. who, relying on an earlier unreported judgment of Rajgopalan, J. in Itta Venkataramiak Chetty, Proprietor, Rao & Co., Madras v. The Deputy Chief Controller of Exports, Madras . Writ Petition No. 569 of 1959 Madras. held that even if the approval of the Chief Controller were necessary before a licence could be granted, once such approval is given, the rights of the partners would date from the time when the firm was dissolved and the partners had agreed to divide the quota rights and that there was no justification for the contention that the title to the proportionate quota certificate would date only from the date of the approval. As I have said, the learned Judges came to this conclusion basing it on the judgment of Rajgopalan, J. referred to above where the learned Judge had observed:—

    “It is really a little difficult to understand the position taken by the respondent, that rights accrued to the petitioner only on 4th February 1955. That was not a relevant date at all. The respondent was prepared to admit the devolution of the rights of Janardhan Rao on the petitioner by the sale held by the Official Assignee on 26th September 1954. The sale-deed was registered on 3rd December 1954. The devolution of rights was complete. It did not depend for its legal effect upon any recognition by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports.”

    15. It is clear from these observations, that the reason for this conclusion of Rajgopalan, J. was that the sale of the quota rights of the original firm by the Official Assignee effected a devolution of rights which became complete on December 3, 1954, when the deed of sale was registered, and that, therefore, the approval by the Controller of such a transfer at a subsequent date cannot postpone the rights of the purchaser.

    16. From the passage in the judgment of Rajgopalan, J. cited by Rajmanar, C.J in Jain's case it will be found that the Dy. Chief Controller of Exports had admitted that there was a devolution of rights of Janardhan Rao by the sale held by the Official Assignee in favour of the petitioner and it was on that admission that Rajgopalan, J. held that the devolution of rights became complete on the registration of the deed of sale. With great respect to the learned Judges of the High Court of Madras there cannot, in my view, be I any devolution of rights in the case of quota rights either by contract of sale or otherwise. As I have said before, a quota certificate is at best evidence of the holder thereof being an established importer who in the basic year had imported a certain quantity of imports on the basis of which he is given import licence. It may be a valuable thing and may be an asset of a partnership, but as Chagla, C.J and Tendolkar, J. held in Chimanlal Popatlal v. B.M Choksey already referred to, it is not ordinarily transferable and assignable and even an import licence is merely a permit given to an importer to enable him to import a certain type of goods in certain volume permitted thereunder. It is personal to the person to whom it is granted and it is, therefore, not a property in respect of which there can be a transfer under the Transfer of Property Act.

    17. It is true that under para. 72 of the Import Trade Control Policy a transfer of quotas is permissible but that is so not because quota rights are transferable under the Transfer of Property Act but because under the rules made by the Government they are permitted to be transferred in cases mentioned in para. 72 of the Import Trade Control Policy and in the manner and on principles therein set out. For these reasons it is not possible for me to accede to the proposition that a devolution of rights takes place when quota rights are divided as on a dissolution of the firm holding them or when they are sought to be transferred by agreement as in the case of a change in the firm or when the firm's business changes hands. To accept such a theory of devolution of rights in the case of a reconstituted firm would mean not to take notice of the express words used in para. 72 which deals with the transfer of quotas. That para, in so many words provides that the reconstituted firm as in the case before me will not be entitled to the quotas of the original firm “until” the transfer in its favour has been approved of by the Chief Controller. The word “until” must mean a condition to a transfer which has to be recognised by the licensing authority but until such approval is obtained, a transfer though valid and binding on the parties to an agreement of transfer, is not binding on the licensing authorities. In this view I must hold that the petitioners had no right to obtain an import licence on the basis of the quota rights held by the original firm until approval of the transfer in their favour was obtained and, therefore, the right to obtain a licence on that basis can only accrue after such approval has been obtained. The transfer not having been approved within the licensing period no right to obtain an import licence during that period accrued to the petitioners and, therefore, respondent No. 2 was right in giving instructions to respondent No. 1 that the petitioners were entitled to get a licence on and after they had been approved as transferees of the quota rights of the original firm.

    18. There is yet another difficulty in the way of the petitioners and that arises from s. 6 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, under which the Chief Controller is empowered to direct any other licensing authority, in this case, respondent No. 1, not to grant licence on grounds set out therein, one of such grounds being that the applicant is not eligible for a licence in accordance with the Import Trade Control Regulations. The fact that respondent No. 2 has the power to give these directions is not disputed. In this case respondent No. 2 did give such instructions and it was because of these instructions that respondent No. 1 declined to issue the licence. Under s. 6 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, respondent No. 2 has the authority to issue directions to any other licensing authority. Respondent No. 1 is an authority subordinate to respondent No. 2 and, therefore, both for that reason and by virtue of s. 6 he is bound to carry out the instructions received by him from respondent No. 2. It cannot be disputed that respondent No. 2 is situate outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, no writ can be issued against him by this Court in respect of these instructions. But it was argued that respondent No. 1, who is the licensing authority, is within the jurisdiction of this Court and a writ can be issued against him. But what respondent No. 1 has done is simply to carry out the instructions of his superior authority which is his statutory duty to do. If, therefore, I were to issue a writ against him, I would be asking him to commit a breach of his statutory duty. It was next argued that if the instructions given by respondent No. 2 are not warranted in law, I can prevent respondent No. 1 from carrying them out. But that in effect would be as Chagla, C.J and Gajendragadkar, J. in Ebrahim Aboobaker v. U.M Mirchandani . 1952 O.C.J Appeal No. 88 of 1951, decided by Chagla, C.J and Gajendragadkar, J., on July 2, 1952 Uarep.. held this Court would not do for the Court cannot be asked to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. This would mean that although I have no jurisdiction to direct respondent No. 2 not to act on his instructions and issue a licence, I would be compelling respondent No. 1 not to carry out those instructions, in effect and substance to render those instructions ineffective.

    19. On both the grounds, therefore, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs; costs fixed at Rs. 400.

    20. The petitioners appealed.

    21. R.J Joshi, with Suresh D. Parekh, for the appellants.

    22. M.P Laud, with S.J Sorabjee, for the respondents.

    23. Mudholkar, A.C.J:— This is an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice Shelat in Misc. Petition No. 81 of 1959. This petition was instituted by the two petitioners under art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the decision of respondent No. 1, the Joint Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay, refusing to grant a licence to them for importing certain motor vehicle parts and accessories.

    24. Prior to August, 1957, the firm of Allied (A to Z) Agencies consisted of three persons as partners, those persons being the two petitioners Jaganath Prabhashankar Joshi and Shankerlal Prabhashankar Trivedi and one Shantilal Karsanji Bhatt. This firm carried on business of import and export and was recognized by the Import and Export Authorities as an Established Importer. Certain quota certificates were granted to this firm for importing automobile parts and accessories.

    25. By a deed of dissolution dated September 6, 1957, the firm was dissolved by the retirement of Shantilal as from August 3, 1957. The firm was thereafter reconstituted and the only members thereof since then are the two petitioners. At the time of Shantilal's retirement, a sum of nearly Rs. 75,000 was found due and payable to him in consideration of his releasing in favour of the continuing partners his right, title and interest in the assets and goodwill of the firm. On September 9, 1957, Shantilal made a declaration in which he has made the following declaration amongst others:

    “Under the Deed of Dissolution of Partnership and Release dated 6th September, 1957, made between me (therein called “the Retiring Partner”) on the one hand and the said Shri Jagannath Prabhashankar Joshi and Shankerlal Prabhashankar Trivedi (therein called “the Continuing Partners”) on the other hand, I as Retiring Partner having released relinquished transferred all my share right title interest claim and demand whatsoever in the said partnership business including all the stock in trade goods assets debts liabilities cash capital as also the goodwill, tenancy rights, quota rights in the Import and Export Licences etc. in favour of the said Continuing Partners.”

    26. Then again it is stated:—

    “Accordingly I say that the said Mr. Jagannath Prabhashankar Joshi and Mr. Shankerlal Prabhashanker Trivedi have since the 3rd day of August, 1957, been carrying on the said business for their own benefit in the same firm name and style and at the said place.”

    27. It may be mentioned, however, that neither the affidavit nor the deed of dissolution contains a clear statement to the effect that the continuing partners have taken over all the assets and liabilities of the dissolved firm.

    28. On September 28, 1957, the petitioners made an application to respondent No. 2, the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, for the transfer to them of the import quota certificates which were held in the name of the original firm and forwarded with that application copies of the deed of dissolution and of the declaration made by Shantilal. In that application they informed respondent No. 2 that they desired to have the import licences formerly standing in the name of the old firm transferred to them. On November 13, 1957, respondent No. 2 informed the petitioners that their request for the transfer of the quota rights could not be considered because the documents furnished by them were defective. He pointed out that the deed of dissolution dated September 6, 1957, did not state in clear terms that the continuing partners had taken over the entire assets, liabilities and goodwill of the dissolved partnership concern and that in the absence of any statement to that effect in the deed of dissolution, the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports was of the opinion that the documents were defective. On December 3, 1957, the petitioners' attorneys addressed a letter to respondent No. 2 expressing their surprise “at the reading and interpretation of the Deed of Dissolution and Release dated the 6th of September, 1957”. According to them the recitals and the operative part of those two documents clearly showed that the retiring partner had released and transferred all his ‘share right title interest claim and demands whatsoever’ in the dissolved firm and then added,

    “In other words our clients have as such taken over the said partnership concern together with all assets debts liabilities goodwill tenancy rights etc. thereof absolutely which fact we are instructed by our clients to confirm which we hereby do and say that they have not only in fact taken over all assets, goodwill, cash capital profits debts tenancy rights furniture fixtures etc. including the quota rights under the export import licences of and belonging to the old firm but they have also undertaken and agreed to pay and discharge all the debts and liabilities etc. thereof without holding the retiring partner liable or responsible therefor.”

    29. Along with this letter they enclosed a copy of the document called “deed of confirmation” executed by the petitioners on December 3, 1957, wherein amongst other things they have stated as follows:—

    “Accordingly, we hereby confirm that we as the Continuing Partners have taken over the entire assets liabilities and goodwill of the said old partnership concern with intent and purpose that the Retiring Partner is not liable to pay any debts and liabilities due or owing by the said old firm to any person or persons whatsoever.”

    30. It may be mentioned that according to the petitioners the letter of September 28, 1957, was to be treated as an application. They have further accepted the position that the letter received by them from respondent No. 2 dated November 13, 1957, amounted to a rejection of their application. Along with this letter respondent No. 2 had also forwarded the copies of the documents enclosed by the petitioners along with their application dated September 28, 1957. These documents were again sent by the petitioners' attorneys to respondent No. 2 along with their letter dated December 3, 1957, and a copy of the deed of confirmation of the same date. In their letter addressed to respondent No. 2 and bearing the date July 8, 1958, the petitioners have characterised their letter of December 3, 1957, also as an application to respondent No. 2.

    31. Respondent No. 2 did not take any action on this application immediately despite the fact that the matter was very urgent with the result that the petitioners had to send not less than six reminders. Those reminders bear the dates January 8, 1958, January 11, 1958, January 16, 1958, January 31, 1958, February 4, 1958 and February 13, 1958. On February 21, 1958, respondent No. 2 informed the petitioners that the “registered declarations could not be accepted in place of the registered deeds” and that, therefore, the petitioners' request for transfer of the quota rights could not be acceded to on the basis of the documents furnished by them. On March 27, 1958, the petitioners and Shantilal executed a document called “the supplementary deed of dissolution of partnership and release” which inter alia states as follows:—

    “And whereas it was intended under the said Deed of Dissolution and Release that the partners have taken over to themselves the entire assets, liabilities as also the goodwill of the said old firm including the quota rights in the Export/Import Licences, it is felt that it was not so stated in clear terms in the said Deed of Dissolution and Release. Now therefore this Indenture witnesseth that in order to give clear effect and meaning to the said Deed Dissolution and Release. They the Continuing partners do and each of them doth hereby admit and confirm that. They the Continuing partners have in fact taken over for themselves all the entire assets, the name of the said dissolved firm… goodwill debts liabilities etc. as also all benefits rights and interests of and belonging to the Retiring Partner in the import/export licences and the quota rights thereunder…”

    32. They sent this document along with a fresh application dated April 27, 1958, to respondent No. 2. By his letter dated June 6, 1958, respondent No. 2 informed the petitioners that instructions were sent to respondent No. 1, the Joint Chief Controller of Imports, that quota licences admissible to the old firm on the basis of the past imports-exports should “in future” be issued in favour of the petitioners.

    33. It may be mentioned that on December 27, 1957, the petitioners had already applied to respondent No. 1 for grant of an import licence for the period October, 1957, to March, 1958. It is common ground that an application for grant of an import licence for this period had to be made on or before December 31, 1957. On June 23, 1958, respondent No. 1 informed the petitioners that their application could not be considered “under the existing instructions” received from respondent No. 2. On July 8, 1958, the petitioners wrote to respondent No. 2 requesting them to consider their case for the licence and issue instructions to respondent No. 1 to grant it. By his reply dated July 23, 1958, respondent No. 2 informed the petitioners that as they had failed to produce the documents within the licensing period i.e before March 31, 1958, their request for the licence could not be acceded to. It may be mentioned that the petitioners had in the meantime preferred an appeal before respondent No. 2 on July 21, 1958, and later they preferred a revision application on September 9, 1958. The appeal as well as the revision application were rejected by respondent No. 2. Thereupon the petitioners preferred a petition before the Minister of Commerce and Industry on November 27, 1958. This petition was also rejected. It was thereafter that they made a petition before this Court under art. 226 of the Constitution.

    34. The petitioners' case is that the order of respondent No. 1 dated June 23, 1958, the order of respondent No. 2 contained in the letter dated August 22, 1958, and the order dated October 4, 1958, are illegal and bad in law. The main ground on which the order of respondent No. 1 is challenged is that he had no power or authority to refuse to grant a licence after respondent No. 2 had given his approval to the transfer of the quota certificates of the dissolved firm in their favour. According to them, once the approval is granted the transfer of quota rights related back to the date of the dissolution of the old firm and, therefore, they would be entitled by virtue of that approval to the transfer of the quota rights to obtain import licences as from the date of transfer and not from the date of the approval of the transfer by respondent No. 2.

    35. In order to appreciate this contention it would be desirable in the first place to refer briefly to the conditions upon which imports are allowed in India and then to the provisions of the relevant laws and instructions which govern this matter.

    36. Import trade control was first introduced in India in May, 1940, as a wartime measure, under the defence of india rules, primarily with the object of conserving India's foreign exchange resources. After the cessation of hostilities and the lapse of the defence of india rules in September, 1946, import control was kept alive by the Emergency Provisions (Continuance) Ordinance, 1946, for a period of one year, because of the conditions prevailing at that time. Eventually it was replaced by the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. This Act was originally intended to be in force for three years only, but apparently because exchange difficulties continued to exist it was expended from time to time and under the present extension it will remain in force till March 31, 1965.

    37. In exercise of the powers conferred by the Act the Central Government promulgated the Imports (Control) Order, 1955. Notifications have been issued by the Central Government from time to time on the basis of the Act and the Order. The Rules and the procedure governing the imports issued by the Government of India are to be found in the Book entitled “Import Trade Control Hand Book of Rules & Procedure, 1956”. The instructions contained therein are modified from time to time and these modifications are to be found in another publication of the Government which is issued by it every six months and which bears the title “The Import Trade Control Policy”.

    38. Mr. R.J Joshi, who appears for the petitioners, contends that these instructions are not only binding upon the authorities but have a force of law. Mr. Laud, who appears for the respondents, disputes this position, but says that for the purpose of this case, it may be assumed that they are not only binding upon the authorities but have a force of law. We are, therefore, deciding this case upon this footing.

    39. Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, confers power upon the Central Government to make provisions for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling in all cases or in specified classes of cases, and subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be made by or under the order, the import, export etc. of goods of any specified description. It was in exercise of this power that the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, was promulgated by the Central Government. Clause 3 of this Order provides that except as otherwise provided in the Order no person shall import any goods of the description specified in Schedule I, except under, and in accordance with, a licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by any officer specified in Schedule II. Clause 5 of the Order provides for the attaching of conditions to the licence. The conditions which could be imposed are set out in the Order thus:—

    “(1) The licensing authority issuing a licence under this Order may issue the same subject to one or more of the conditions stated below:—

    (i) that the goods covered by the licence shall not be disposed of, except in the manner prescribed by the licensing authority, or otherwise, dealt with without the written permission of the licensing authority or any person duly authorised by it;

    (ii) that the goods covered by the licence on importation shall not be sold or distributed at a price exceeding that which may be specified in any directions attached to the licence;

    (iii) that the applicant for a licence shall execute a bond for complying with the terms subject to which licence may be granted.

    (2) A licence granted under this Order may contain such other conditions, not inconsistent with the Act or this Order, as the licensing authority may deem fit.

    (3) It shall be deemed to be a condition of every such licence that:—

    (i) No person shall transfer and no person shall acquire by transfer any licence issued by the licensing authority except under and in accordance with the written permission of the authority which granted the licence or of any other person empowered in this behalf by such authority.

    (ii) that goods for the import of which a licence is granted shall be the property of the licensee at the time of clearance through Customs, unless the said licence is covered by a letter of authority issued by the licensing authority.

    (4) The licensee shall comply with all conditions imposed or deemed to be imposed under this clause.”

    40. Clause 6 of the Order deals with the circumstances under which a licence may be refused. Those circumstances are as follows:—

    “(a) if the application for the licence does not conform to any provision of this Order;

    (b) if such application contains any false, or fraudulent or misleading statement;

    (c) if the applicant uses in support of the application any document which is false or fabricated or which has been tampered with;

    (d) if the applicant on any occasion has tampered with an import licence or has imported goods without a licence or has been a party to any corrupt or fraudulent practice in his commercial dealings;

    (e) if the application for an import licence is defective and does not conform to the prescribed rules;

    (f) if the applicant commits a breach of the Import Trade Control Regulations;

    (g) if the applicant is not eligible for a licence in accordance with the Import Trade Control Regulations;

    (h) if the licensing authority decides to canalize imports and the distribution thereof through special or specialized agencies or channels.”

    41. The categories of importers specified in para 12 of the “Import Trade Control Policy” are as follows:—

    “(a) Established Importers.

    (b) Actual Users.

    (c) New Comers, and

    (d) Others, who do not fall in any of the above categories.”

    42. The expression “Established Importers” is defined in para 15 of this book as follows:—

    “Established Importers are persons or firms who have been actually engaged in import trade of the articles comprised in any one serial number or sub-serial number, as the case may be, of the I.T.C Schedule during at least one financial year (1st April to 31st March) falling within the basic period as specified for the particular serial number or sub-serial number.”

    43. We are concerned here with the imports for the period, October 1, 1957 to March 31, 1958. Under para 13 of the aforesaid book the last date for submission of applications by Established Importers for the grant of import licences was December 31, 1957. Paragraph 13 further provides that applications received after the said date were liable to be summarily rejected. It further provides as follows:

    “Firms which have undergone changes in their constitution should submit their applications for quota licences to the appropriate licensing authority, if they can do so, by the prescribed date(s), after the sanction regarding transfer of quota rights is issued in their favour.”

    44. The subject of “Transfer of Quotas” is dealt with in para 72 of this Book. After stating that the system of granting licences to Established Importers is on the basis of their past imports, it goes on to say that when a change occurs in the constitution of a firm, the re-constituted firm will not be entitled to the quotas of the original firm until the transfer of the quota rights in their favour has been approved by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. The general principles followed in regard to such cases are set out in sub-para (a) of para 72 which runs thus:—

    “(a) Transfer of quota rights:—

    (i) Where the business of a firm is transferred together with all its assets, liabilities and goodwill to another firm so as to constitute it as its successor in all respects, the transferee firm shall get the quota rights of the transferred firm.

    (ii) Where a firm is dissolved or wound up or ceases to carry on business without making provision for transfer of its business, assets, liabilities and goodwill, no one will be entitled to the quota rights admissible to that firm.

    (iii) Where a firm consists of several partners, and its constitution undergoes a change by retirement of some partners or admission of other partners, the reconstituted firm, continuing the original business in the same name and taking over all its assets and liabilities, shall be entitled to get the quota rights of the original firm. But the retiring partners starting a new business whether in the same line or otherwise would not be entitled to get any quota rights.

    (iv) Where a firm changes its name without any change in its constitution, its quota rights will be transferred to its new name provided it has ceased to do business in the old name and title.”

    45. Sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph provides that all transfers or changes in the constitution of a firm must be made by a deed or deeds registered with the Registrar of Documents except in certain cases. It is admitted before us that the present case does not fall within any of the exceptions. Sub-paragraph (f) deals with “Interim Relief” and we would quote it in extenso. It runs thus:—

    “(f) Interim Relief:—

    Registration of documents ordinarily takes about 2-6 months. To avoid hardship to the trade, claims for the transference of rights will be considered on the basis of a copy or copies of the relevant deed or deeds duly certified by a competent authority that it is a true copy of the original deed lodged for registration, with the Registrar of Documents. The original receipt issued by the Registrar should also be produced along with the certified copies of the agreement(s). In such cases, transfer of quota rights if otherwise due, will be allowed subject to production of the original deed or deeds in due course.”

    46. Paragraph 73 provides that parties claiming transfer of quota rights must produce certain documents. Sub-paragraph (iv) of this paragraph provides, among other things, that a partnership, concern should produce the deed or deeds of partnership and where a person has retired an affidavit of the retiring partner stating that he has retired and relinquished all his rights in favour of the continuing partner or partners. Now, while an application for grant of a licence could he made to the Joint Controller of Imports and Exports, an application for transfer of the quota rights has to be made to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, i.e to a different authority. It is only after the transfer of quota rights is sanctioned by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports that the re-constituted firm would be entitled to obtain an import licence. This position is not disputed before us.

    47. In accordance with the aforesaid provisions the petitioners did make an application to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports for the transfer of the quota rights of the dissolved firm to them. Along with that application they submitted, as already stated, copies of the deed of dissolution of the partnership and the affidavit of the retiring partner dated September 9, 1957. After a perusal of the deed of dissolution, the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports came to the conclusion that this document does not state in clear terms that the continuing partners have taken over the entire assets, liabilities and goodwill of the dissolved firm and upon this ground the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports rejected the petitioners' application. It was contended before us that this interpretation was not correct and that we should ourselves construe the aforesaid deed of dissolution. In our opinion, this is not a matter which we could go into in the writ jurisdiction. All that we are entitled to look into is whether the public authority acted within the ambit of its powers or transgressed these limits. It is not for us to say whether it has taken a correct view of the facts or an erroneous view of the facts or whether it has interpreted a document rightly or wrongly. Where a public authority has jurisdiction to decide a point, it can decide it rightly or wrongly. If it decides it wrongly, that would be unfortunate, and this Court would not be entitled to sit in judgment over the view taken by it. We, however, find that the interpretation placed upon the relevant recitals in the deed of dissolution cannot be regarded as an impossible or even an unreasonable view. The relevant recitals are as follows:—

    “In pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the premises and for the consideration of the said sum of Rs. 74,319.40 nP. by the Continuing Partners paid in manner aforesaid the said partnership be and shall be deemed to have been dissolved with effect from and after the 3rd day of August, 1957, and this Indenture further witnesseth that in consideration of the said agreement and for the consideration aforesaid. He the Retiring Partner doth hereby release and discharge absolutely for ever to and in favour of the Continuing Partners. All his share right title and interest claims and demands whatsoever in cash, capital etc. including goodwill of the said firm as also the export/import licences and quota rights thereof and the tenancy rights in the premises belonging to the same and All and Singular the outstanding debts and credits due and owing to the said firm from or by any person or persons whatsoever TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same respectively up to and to the use of the Continuing Partners absolutely.”

    48. It would be clear from this that the retiring, partner has surrendered or given up all his rights in the partnership business including the quota rights under the import/export licences standing in the name of the old firm and has said that he would no longer be liable in respect of dues from the partnership firm. There are, however, no recitals in the document to show that the continuing partners had taken over the assets and liabilities of the old firm. In these circumstances, it is clear that the petitioners cannot challenge the order of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, i.e respondent No. 2, rejecting their application for transfer of the quota rights.

    49. There is one more thing to be mentioned in this connection and that is that the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports is an authority who does not reside within the jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, under art. 2261 of, the Constitution we have no power to issue a writ to him for correcting any error made by him. Mr. Joshi, however, argued on the authority of the decision in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti, that where such authority has an agent within the jurisdiction of this Court it is open to this Court to issue a writ to that agent directing him to disregard the order made by his principal. The agent, according to Mr. Joshi, is respondent No. 1, i.e the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. We cannot accept this contention. In the matter of the transfer of quota rights respondent No. 1 can in no sense be regarded as an agent of respondent No. 2, because, he does not exercise any delegated function with respect to the transfer of quota rights. The grant of quotas and transfer of quotas is a matter which pertains exclusively to the jurisdiction of respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 1 is no doubt entitled to entertain and deal with applications for the grant of import licences, but he can do so only upon being satisfied that the applicants before him are armed with quota certificates. All that he is entitled to look into is whether a particular applicant possesses such quota certificate or not. It is not further open to him to consider whether that applicant, though entitled to a quota certificate, has been wrongly refused such certificate, or whether that applicant, though entitled to a transfer of the quota certificate, has been wrongly refused such a transfer by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. The decision in question, therefore, is of no assistance to Mr. Joshi.

    50. As already stated, the petitioners then made a second application to respondent No. 2 for the transfer of the quota rights and along with that application sent copies of the original deed of dissolution, declaration and the deed of confirmation.

    51. On February 11/21, 1958, respondent No. 2 informed the petitioners as follows:—

    “With reference to the correspondence resting with your letter dated 16-1-58 ton the above subject, I write to say that the registered declarations cannot be accepted in place of registered deeds. It is therefore regretted that your request for transfer of quota rights cannot be acceded to on the basis of the declaration dated 3rd of December, 1957, furnished by you.”

    52. Thereafter some correspondence ensued between the parties and eventually the petitioners executed a deed on March 27, 1958, called “supplementary deed of dissolution of partnership and release” and sent a copy thereof to respondent No. 2 along with an application for transfer of the quota rights in their favour. It may be noted that this application was subsequent to the expiry of the period for which the quota was asked for. The relevant portion of that document has already been, quoted above. Now, this document completely satisfied respondent No. 2 and thereupon, as already mentioned above, he sent a letter dated June 6, 1958, to the petitioners informing them that instructions were sent to respondent No. 1 that quota licences admissible to the old firm on the basis of its past imports-exports should “in future” be issued in favour of the petitioners.

    53. Now, according to Mr. Joshi, the words “in future” should be interpreted as referring to the point of time immediately following the dissolution of the firm and not following the date of the order of respondent No. 2 sanctioning the transfer of the quota certificates. In support of his argument, he has relied upon two decisions of the Madras High Court. The first one is of Balkrishna Ayyar, J. in Jain v. Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. The second one is Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports v. Jain. The latter decision is that of the Appeal Court from the decision reported in Jain v. Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Some of the facts of that case are similar to those of the case before us. Rajamannar, C.J who delivered the judgment, of the Court observed as follows (p. 857):—

    “…The only question then would be whether the rights of the quondam partners could be recognized only on and from the date of the approval by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and not from the date of the agreement among the partners to divide the business and the assets and liabilities of the firm. We agree with Balkrishna Ayyar, J., that there is no warrant for such postponement of the rights of the erstwhile partners even assuming that the approval of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports is necessary before licence could be granted. Once such approval is made the rights of the partners would date from the time when the firm was dissolved and the partners had agreed to divide the quota rights. Mr. Nambiar admitted that the order of the joint Chief Controller, dated 30th November 1956, that the case would be considered later after the transfer had been approved by the Chief Controller related to the period July-December 1956. Once that approval by the Chief Controller was communicated, such approval must be deemed to take effect from the date of the dissolution and the agreement between the partners. Much reliance was placed on the words ‘in future’ occurring in the letter of the Chief Controller, dated 9th April 1957. So far as we were able to discover from the papers placed before us by Mr. Nambiar there is nothing in the original order of approval expressly providing that the rights of the erstwhile partners to the quota would only come into existence on and after the approval of the transfer…. Mr. Nambiar conceded that it was open to the Chief Controller in his discretion to say that the quota rights would be recognized even for a period anterior to the date of approval and that it was open to the Chief Controller to direct the grant of licence for periods prior to his approval because there was nothing in paragraph 74 of the Import Trade Control Policy Book to limit his powers. We are unable to agree with this interpretation of paragraph 74.”

    54. Then the learned Judges quoted the following passage from the judgment of Rajagopalan, J. in Itta Venkataramiah Chetty, Proprietor, Rao & Co., Madras v. The Deputy Chief Controller of Exports, Madras:—

    “It is really a little difficult to understand the position taken by the respondent, that rights accrued to the petitioner only on 4th February 1955. That was not a relevant date at all. The respondent was prepared to admit the devolution of the rights of Janardhana Rao on the petitioner by the sale held by the Official Assignee on 26th November 1954. The sale deed was registered on 3rd December 1954. The devolution of rights was complete. It did not depend for its legal effect upon any recognition by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. But independent of that factor, even if 4th February 1955, should be taken as the guiding date for which really there is no justification, the petitioner's application was on 7th February 1955, and well within the period during which the quotas could have been issued and utilised by him. There was no real scope for misinterpreting even the letter of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, dated 4th February 1955, as the basis for refusing quotas.”

    55. And observed as follows (p. 858):—

    “We are in entire agreement with this reasoning. Sub-clause (b) of paragraph 74 is quite clear that where a firm is dissolved and the partners agree to divide its business, assets and liabilities the partners shall get their respective share in the quota rights according to the provisions of the agreement. Such rights would accrue to each of the partners from the date of the agreement. The fact that approval of the agreement (assuming such approval is necessary) is given by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports on a later date, it cannot be said that the rights of the partners would accrue only on and from the date of such approval. The words ‘in future’ can be understood to mean ‘from the date of the dissolution’.”

    56. With respect, we cannot accept the view taken by the learned Chief Justice and concurred in by the learned Judge. In so far as quota rights are concerned, Chagla, C.J in an unreported judgment in Chimanlal Popatlal v. B.M Choksey, observed as follows:—

    “But this quota has no market value; it is not ordinarily transferable or assignable. It is merely a licence or a permit given to a particular party to enable him to import paper into India and as such it has no inherent value.”

    57. Thus, according to this Court a quota right is not ‘property’ which is transferable in law. If that view is correct—and with respect we think it is—it follows that by reason of the dissolution of the partnership, no transfer takes place with respect to quota rights. It is true, that the Import and Export authorities are required to take into account a transfer of quota rights, but that is so, because of the instructions specifically issued in this regard by the Central Government and which are to be found in the book entitled “Import Trade Control Policy”. These rights, such as they are, must be said to be a creation of the Government notifications and would necessarily be exercisable to the extent and in the manner provided in those notifications. In para 72 of the “Import Trade Control Policy” Book it is clearly laid down that when a change occurs in the constitution of a firm, the re-constituted firm will not be entitled to the quotas of the original firm until the transfer of the quota rights in their favour has been approved by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. It, therefore, follows that this transfer is a condition precedent to the grant of an import licence. The person, in whose favour such a transfer has been recognized or sanctioned, would consequently be entitled to rely upon that transfer only for a period subsequent to such sanction or recognition and not for any anterior period. The date of dissolution of the old firm has thus no relevance whatsoever in so far as the grant of an import licence is concerned. An import licence is granted by the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to a person not because he has acquired the rights of a dissolved partnership firm, but because the transfer of the quota rights made in his favour is recognised by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. We, therefore, agree with the learned single Judge that the transfer sanctioned by respondent No. 2 could not entitle the petitioners to obtain an import licence in respect of a period prior to the grant of the sanction.

    58. Mr. Joshi, however, said that he had made an application for the grant of an import licence well within the period specified in para 13 of the Import Trade Control Policy and if there was a delay on the part of respondent No. 2 to sanction the transfer of the quota in favour of the petitioners, they ought not to suffer. We entirely agree that no party should be permitted to suffer on account of the delay and laches on the part of any public authority. But, however that may be, we cannot assist the petitioners, because they were themselves remiss in the matter of taking the appropriate steps for securing the sanction of transfer of quota rights in their favour. The document of which they had filed a copy originally was not properly worded and, therefore, though they had made an application to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports long before the expiry of the period within which they had to make an application for grant of an import licence, they had to thank themselves for not executing a document which was properly worded and which would meet the requirements of the instructions laid down by the Government. Further, even when they were told as early as the middle of November, 1957, that document was defective, they did not execute an appropriate document and forward it immediately to respondent No. 2, but merely executed a deed of declaration or ‘confirmation’. If before the expiry of the period within which they could make an application for grant of an import licence they had executed a document like that of March 27, 1958, there would have been no difficulty in their way, but instead they chose to wrangle about the matter and took no satisfactory step till March 27, 1958. They must, therefore, at least share the blame for the resulting consequence.

    59. There is one more thing which we would like to point out and that is, that an application for the grant of an import licence to a firm, which has undergone a change in its constitution, could be made only after the sanction regarding transfer of the quota rights is issued in its favour. That is what is provided in para 13. Therefore, the application made by the petitioners to respondent No. 1 on December 27, 1957, cannot be regarded as a proper application at all. This is made clear in the form itself which amongst other things requires the following to be answered:—

    “Whether the constitution of the firm has undergone any change after the issue of the quota certificate to the firm? If so, quote No. and date of orders issued by the appropriate authority sanctioning transfer of quota rights in favour of the applicant.”

    60. It is clear from this provision that unless the quota certificate in favour of the reconstituted firm is sanctioned by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, that firm would not be entitled to obtain an import licence on the ground of its being an Established Importer and a grantee of a quota certificate.

    61. In these circumstances, we must hold that the mere fact that the petitioners made an application for grant of an import licence on December 27, 1957, is of no assistance to them.

    62. As already stated, their two previous applications for sanction of the transfer of quota were rejected by respondent No. 2 and it was for this reason that they made a third application on April 27, 1958, for the transfer of those quota certificates. They would be entitled to the grant of an import licence only subsequent to the sanction of the transfer of the quota certificates in their favour. This is precisely what the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports told them and what the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports told them. In our opinion, the view taken by the authorities is correct. We are further of the opinion that the petitioners' application for grant of an import licence made on December 27, 1957, though made within the time prescribed in para 13 and though made well before the expiry of the licensing period, could not be considered by respondent No. 1 because at the date of the application the petitioners were not recognized as transferees of quota rights. For these reasons, we affirm the order of the learned single Judge and dismiss the appeal with costs. The respondents' attorneys are at liberty to withdraw the amount deposited by the appellants in this Court towards their costs.

    Solicitors for the appellants: Taher Kadiani & Co.

    Solicitor for the respondents: G.M Divekar.

    63. Appeal dismissed.

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    Jagannath Prabhashanker Joshi v. Varadkar
    (Sep 9, 1960)