Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.Our findings are:(1) House
  • provisions of s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • SECTION 90 A EVIDENCE ACT
  • 124.) s. 90 of the Evidence Act
  • s. 90 of the Evidence Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.Our findings are:(1) House
  • provisions of s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • SECTION 90 A EVIDENCE ACT
  • 124.) s. 90 of the Evidence Act
  • s. 90 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit filed by plaintiff Ramaji seeking a declaration of title to three houses (Nos. 190, 580, and 582, New Shukrwari, Nagpur), possession thereof, and mesne profits. The suit was dismissed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Nagpur. The properties originally belonged to Maroti (also referred to as Marotirao), who died in 1920, leaving behind his widow Sarubai and two daughters, Jaibai and Vithabai. Plaintiff is the son of Jaibai. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are grandsons of Vithabai, with other defendants being tenants in occupation of the houses.

The dispute centers on ownership and possession of houses Nos. 190 and 582, which were admittedly owned by Marotirao, and house No. 580, whose ownership is contested. Plaintiff claims that he is the next reversioner after Vithabai's death in 1950 and that house No. 580 also belonged to Marotirao. Defendants contend that house No. 580 never belonged to Marotirao, that the two other houses were sold by Sarubai to Vithabai in 1921 for payment of debts and maintenance, and that Vithabai and her descendants have been in adverse possession since then.

The trial court held that the parties were governed by the Benares school of Hindu law, that house No. 580 did not belong to Marotirao, that the 1921 sale deed was genuine and justified under Hindu law as a legal necessity, and that defendants had adverse possession of houses Nos. 190 and 582. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit was dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether house No. 580 belonged to Marotirao.
  2. Whether the sale deed dated January 10, 1921, by Marotirao's widow Sarubai in favour of Vithabai was bogus and not intended to be acted upon.
  3. Whether the sale by a Hindu widow was an absolute alienation of the property and was justified under Hindu law.
  4. Whether the parties are governed by the Benares school or by the Bombay school of Hindu law.
  5. Whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation.
  6. Whether the defendants have proved adverse possession for more than 12 years.
  7. What orders, if any, should be passed under s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • House No. 580 belonged to Marotirao, relying on prior judgments and municipal records.
  • The sale deed of 1921 was allegedly executed to forestall claims and was bogus.
  • Plaintiff claims to be the next reversioner after Vithabai and challenges the validity of the sale deed and adverse possession claims.
  • Contends that parties are governed by the Bombay school of Hindu law as they belong to the Marathi Teli community.

Respondents' Arguments

  • House No. 580 never belonged to Marotirao.
  • The 1921 sale deed was genuine and justified under Hindu law as a legal necessity for payment of debts and maintenance.
  • Parties are governed by the Benares school of Hindu law.
  • Defendants have been in adverse possession for over 12 years.
  • Claim reimbursement under s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act for expenses incurred on reconstruction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harihar Prasad Singh v. Must. of Munshi Nath Prasad [1956] S.C.R 1 Limits on using judgments as evidence; presumption under s. 90 of the Evidence Act regarding document execution. Clarified that s. 90 presumption applies only to execution, not to legal effect of alienations by Hindu widows.
Gopika Raman Roy v. Atal Singh 1929 L.R 56 I.A 119 Findings of fact in one case are not evidence in another case. Used to reject reliance on previous judgments for proving title to house No. 580.
Obala Kondama Naicker Ayyan v. Kandasami Goundar Burden of proof for absolute alienation by Hindu widow; reversioner’s rights. Established that burden lies on person relying on alienation; reversioner may treat alienation as nullity.
Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden 1918 21 Bom. L.R 640 Justifying circumstances for alienation by Hindu widow; presumptions and burden of proof. Applied to assess validity of 1921 sale deed and circumstances justifying alienation.
Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar Restrictions on alienation powers of Hindu widows; no absolute alienation without legal necessity. Rejected argument that business debts justify absolute alienation by Hindu widow here.
Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Chowdhuri Weight of recitals in ancient deeds and presumptions about legal necessity. Used to support presumption of legal necessity based on recitals and lapse of time.
Subrahmanyam v. Soorayya [1950] A.I.R Mad. 514 (Full Bench) Burden of proof and evidentiary requirements in alienations by limited owners. Emphasized that lapse of time alone does not dispense with proof of legal necessity.
Mukabasappa Bhimappa v. Hanmantappa Limits on presumption of legal necessity in ancient alienations. Rejected broad presumption that all ancient alienations are justified without evidence.
Kalipada Chakraborti v. Palani Bala Devi [1953] S.C.R 503 Limitation and adverse possession against Hindu widows with limited estate. Held that statute of limitation does not run against reversioner during lifetime of Hindu widow.
Babulal v. Maniklal [1941] Nag. 124 Presumption of legal necessity in ancient transactions over 30 years old. Applied to justify presumption of legal necessity in 1921 sale deed given lapse of time and absence of witnesses.
Magniram Sitaram v. Kasturbhai Manibhai 1922 I.L.R 46 Bom. 481 Presumption based on long possession and enjoyment in special circumstances. Distinguished from presumption in Hindu widow alienations; long possession alone insufficient.
Annamalai Chetty v. Subramanian Chetty 1928 31 Bom. L.R 280 Inferences from inactivity in face of challenge to title. Held that inactivity with direct challenge may suggest weakness of claim but no absolute presumption.
Babu Motising v. Durgabai 1928 I.L.R 53 Bom. 242 Determination of personal law by domicile or migration. Applied to assess whether parties governed by Benares or Bombay school of Hindu law.
Kesheo Rao v. Sadasheo Rao Lex loci and personal law of Maharashtrians in Central Provinces. Held lex loci of Nagpur is Benares school; Bombay school applies to Berar and Maharashtra Brahmins.
Bhaskar v. Laxmibai [1953] Nag. 187 Consistent authority that lex loci of Central Provinces is Benares school of Hindu law. Followed to affirm that parties are governed by Benares school.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined whether house No. 580 belonged to Marotirao and found the plaintiff's reliance on prior judgments and municipal records insufficient to establish title. It emphasized that judgments in other suits are only evidence of certain facts and not conclusive proof of title in the present case.

Regarding houses Nos. 190 and 582, the Court analyzed the 1921 sale deed executed by Sarubai in favor of Vithabai. While the trial court found the sale deed justified under Hindu law based on legal necessity, the appellate Court re-examined the evidence and legal principles. It held that the sale deed was not proved to be bogus, but also that it was not justified as an absolute alienation under Hindu law since the burden to prove legal necessity was not sufficiently discharged.

The Court discussed the principles governing alienations by Hindu widows with limited estates, emphasizing that the burden lies on the person relying on the alienation to prove its validity. It noted that mere recitals in the deed are insufficient unless supported by evidence and circumstances. It rejected the trial court’s absolute presumption of legal necessity, finding the evidence of debts vague and insufficient.

The Court also considered the applicable personal law. It rejected the plaintiff's contention that the parties were governed by the Bombay school of Hindu law, affirming that the lex loci of Nagpur is the Benares school, based on consistent judicial precedents. The Court explained that personal law depends on domicile and customs, and found no clear evidence of migration or customs to displace the Benares school.

On the question of adverse possession, the Court held that adverse possession against a Hindu widow does not run against the reversioner. Since the defendants claimed adverse possession through Vithabai, a Hindu widow with a limited estate, it could not be reckoned against the plaintiff as reversioner.

Finally, the Court addressed the application of s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, holding that the plaintiff should reimburse Rs. 4,000 to defendants for expenses spent on reconstructing house No. 582.

Holding and Implications

The Court's findings were as follows:

  • House No. 580 did not belong to Marotirao; plaintiff’s claim thereto fails.
  • The 1921 sale deed was not proved to be bogus but was not justified under Hindu law as an absolute alienation.
  • The parties are governed by the Benares school of Hindu law.
  • The plaintiff’s suit is not barred by limitation.
  • The defendants have not proved adverse possession for 12 years against the plaintiff.
  • The plaintiff succeeds in regard to houses Nos. 190 and 582, subject to payment of Rs. 4,000 to defendants under s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.

DISPOSED OF accordingly.

The decision directly affects the parties by affirming plaintiff’s title and possession rights to houses Nos. 190 and 582 and rejecting his claim to house No. 580. The Court did not set a new precedent but reaffirmed established principles regarding alienation by Hindu widows, burden of proof, personal law determination, and adverse possession against reversioners.

    Ramji Batanji v. Manohar Chintaman

    Raju, J.:— This is a first appeal by plaintiff Ramaji whose suit for a declaration of title to three houses Nos. 190, 580 and 582, New Shukrwari, Nagpur, for possession and for mesne profits was dismissed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Nagpur. The relevant facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows.

    2. One Maroti, son of Damaji, died in 1920 leaving behind him his widow Sarubai and two daughters Jaibai and Vithabai. Plaintiff is the son of Jaibai. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the grandsons of Vithabai, their father Namdeo having predeceased them in 1943. Defendant No. 1, who died during the pendency of the suit, was represented by his widow defendant No. 1(c) and his two minor sons defendants Nos. 1(a) and 1(b). Defendants Nos. 3 to 15 are tenants in occupation of the houses in dispute. It is common ground that Maroti, who died in 1920, owned three houses bearing Nos. 190, 579 and 582. The suit relates to two of these houses namely Nos. 190 and 582 and another house bearing No. 580. It is also common ground that after the death of Maroti in 1920 his widow Sarubai, who succeeded him and had widow's life interest, died in 1921 and that after 1921 the two daughters Jaibai and Vithabai became heirs under the Hindu law. Plaintiff claims that Marotirao owned house No. 580 in addition to the three properties admittedly owned by him. It is also the plaintiff's case that he is the next reversioner after the death of Vithabai who died in 1950, her sister Jaibai having predeceased her in 1936. According to the plaintiff, he being the daughter's son of Marotirao, is the next reversioner in preference to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who are the daughter's son's sons of Marotirao. Plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for possession of the houses bearing Nos. 190 and 582 which admittedly belonged to Marotirao and house No. 580 in regard to which there is a dispute as to whether it was the property of Marotirao or not.

    3. The defence of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was that house No. 580 never belonged to Marotirao, that the two other houses Nos. 190 and 582 which admittedly belonged to Marotirao had been sold by Sarubai widow of Marotirao to Vithabai in 1921 for the payment of the debts of her husband and for her maintenance and that after the sale deed, Vithabai, the grandmother of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 became the absolute owner of the two houses. It was also their case that Marotirao was governed by the Bombay school of Hindu law and that the two daughters of Marotirao became absolute owners of Marotirao's property as his heirs. A will dated December 26, 1949, by Vithabai was also alleged by these two defendants. But this will is not the subject of arguments in appeal. They also claimed that they were in adverse possession of the houses for more than 12 years before the suit. In the alternative they claimed that if the plaintiff succeeded in his claim the defendants should be reimbursed to the extent of Rs. 10,000 which were spent on reconstructing the houses Nos. 190 and 582, in view of the provisions of s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act… The learned Additional District Judge held that the parties were governed by the Benares school of Hindu law, that Marotirao owned only the houses Nos. 190, 579 and 582 but not house No. 580, that Sarubai widow of Marotirao sold the houses Nos. 190 and 582 on January 10, 1921, to her daughter Vithabai for paying off the debts of Marotirao, that the sale deed was not bogus, that after the sale deed dated January 10, 1921, Vithabai and after her defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were in exclusive and adverse possession of the houses. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, held that the plaintiff's suit in regard to house No. 580 should fail as it was not proved to be the property of Marotirao and that the suit should also fail in regard to houses Nos. 190 and 582 because these two houses had been sold by Sarubai widow of Marotirao to Vithabai for purposes justified under Hindu law. He, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit, although he gave a finding that if the plaintiff had succeeded the defendants would have been entitled to be reimbursed to the extent of Rs. 3,000 only which they had spent on house No. 582.

    4. Aggrieved by this judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's suit, plaintiff has now come up in appeal…

    5. The points for determination in this appeal are:—

    (1) Whether house No. 580 belonged to Marotirao.

    (2) Whether the sale-deed dated January 10, 1921, by Marotirao's widow Sarubai in favour of Vithabai was bogus and not intended to be acted upon.

    (3) Whether the sale by a Hindu widow was an absolute alienation of the property and was justified under Hindu law.

    (4) Whether the parties are governed by the Benares school or by the Bombay school of Hindu law.

    (5) Whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation.

    (6) Whether the defendants have proved adverse possession for more than 12 years.

    (7) What orders, if any, should be passed under s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    Our findings are:

    (1) House No. 580 did not belong to Marotirao.

    (2) The sale-deed dated January 10, 1921, is not proved to be bogus or one not intended to be acted upon.

    (3) The sale-deed is not justified under Hindu law and was, therefore, not an absolute sale.

    (4) The suit is not barred by limitation.

    (5) The defendants have not proved adverse possession for 12 years.

    (6) The parties are governed by the Benares school of Hindu law.

    (7) The plaintiff's suit, therefore, succeeds in regard to houses Nos. 190 and 582 only but under s. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act we hold that the plaintiff should pay Rs. 4,000 to the defendants in view of the money spent by Vithabai for reconstructing house No. 582.

    6. As regards house No. 580 the case of the plaintiff was that it originally belonged to Pandurang Damaji, sister's son of Marotirao, who sold the house along with other property to one Kashinath by a sale-deed of 1896 and that the sale-deed in favour of Kashinath was really benami in favour of Marotirao. In order to prove this case the plaintiff relied on two judgments, exh. 1-2P-9, judgment of the trial Court in a suit filed by Pandurang (Civil Suit No. 216 of 1918), and exh. 1-2P-8, judgment of the first appellate Court in the same litigation, and on the register of Civil Suits showing that Second Appeal No. 427 of 1919 in this matter was dismissed by the Judicial Commissioner's Court. They also relied on the entries in the municipal jamabandis at P-4 and P-4A showing that Vithabai's name was entered from 1920–1921 onwards and that up to 1920 there was the name of Maroti. Entries in the municipal jamabandis cannot prove title. Therefore reliance is placed mainly on the judgments. It is not clear from the judgment of the first appellate Court (exh. 1-2P-8) to what property that appeal related. Those proceedings arose out of a suit filed by Pandurang against Maroti and Kashinath and it is contented by the learned counsel for the appellant that this judgment is evidence of the fact that the sale-deed of 1896 in favour of Kashinath was benami for Maroti. There is no reference in that judgment to the sale-deed of 1896 although there is an observation in the judgment that the fact that defendant No. 2 Kashinath was a mere benamidar is proved beyond all reasonable doubt by the admission made by defendant No. 2 to the effect that defendant No. 1 was all along in possession of the house and by the evidence given by the said defendant in the witness-box to the effect that he executed a deed in favour of plaintiff Pandurang at the instance of Maroti defendant No. 1. According to the learned counsel for the appellant this appeal related to house No. 580, but the judgment shows that although originally the claim was in respect of a house, the plaintiff ultimately confined his claim only to a site shown by the letters CCDD in the sketch filed with the plaint. The sketch filed with the plaint has been referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is difficult to conclude that it has anything to do with house No. 580 which is the subject-matter of the present litigation. The boundaries as described in the present plaint do not at all tally with the boundaries as given in the sketch referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant.

    7. A judgment in another suit which is not inter partes may be evidence for certain purposes, namely, to prove the fact of the judgment; to show who the parties to the suit were; to show what was the subject-matter of the suit; to show what was decided or declared by the judgment; to show what documents had been filed by the parties in the proceedings; to establish the transaction referred to in the judgment; as evidence to show the conduct of the parties or particular instances of the exercise of a right or assertion of title (vide Harihar Prasad Singh v. Must. of Munshi Nath Prasad . [1956] S.C.R 1, 6.); or to identify property; or to show how property had been previously dealt with; to establish a particular transaction in which a right is asserted and the name of the person, if any, who is declared in the judgment as entitled to possession; but the judgment is not evidence to establish the truth of the matters decided in that judgment, Kesho Prasad v. Bhagjogna Kuer.2 The findings of fact arrived at on the evidence in one case are not evidence of that fact in another case: Gopika Raman Roy v. Atal Singh . 1929 L.R 56 I.A 119, 125, S.C. “The reasons upon which a judgment is founded cannot be regarded as nor can any finding of fact there come to other than the transaction itself be, relevant in another case.” Govinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh . 1931 L.R 58 I.A 125, 136, S.C, Lakshman v. Amrit . 1900 I.L.R 24 Bom. 591, S.C 2 Bom. L.R 386., Dinomoni Chowdhrani v. Brnjo Mohini Chowdhrani . 1901 L.R 29 I.A 24, S.C 4 Bom. L.R 167. and Mahamad v. Hasan . 1907 I.L.R 31 Bom. 143, 155. S.C.

    8. As already observed, even if the judgment is evidence for certain purposes, the finding of fact that defendant No. 2 was a banamidar in respect of certain transactions is not evidence in the present proceedings…. We, therefore, hold that the lower Court rightly dismissed plaintiff's claim in regard to house No. 580.

    9. In regard to the other two houses, namely, houses Nos. 190 and 582, which admittedly belonged to Marotirao, ordinarily plaintiff would be entitled to possession as the next reversioner, unless the sale-deed executed on January 10, 1921, by Sarubai, widow of Marotirao, in favour of Vithabai was justified under Hindu law. This is the most important point contested in the appeal. The lower Court held that the plaintiff's case that this document was a bogus one had not been proved, that the burden was on the defendant to prove that this sale-deed by a Hindu widow was justified by legal necessity, that this burden was discharged by drawing a presumption as the sale-deed was more than 30 years old as the transferor and the transferee and the attesting witnesses were dead, as Jaibai, sister of Vithabai, does not appear to have questioned the transaction during her lifetime and as Jaibai and her son (the plaintiff) acquiesced in reconstruction of house No. 582 by Vithabai and her son Namdeo after making applications to the municipal committee. The lower Court also relied on the conduct of Jaibai and her son (the plaintiff). According to the lower Court their failure to raise objections could justly and properly be attributed to their knowledge of the sale of the house by Sarubai in favour of Vithabai and that it was for a lawful purpose. The learned Judge also held that the existence of the debts of Marotirao to the extent of Rs. 400 was proved, and that the payment of husband's debts by a Hindu widow was a religious and charitable purpose for which the widow could alienate the property. Relying both on the evidence and on presumptions the learned Judge held that the sale by Sarubai in favour of Vithabai was justified by legal necessity and that it passed absolute property in the two houses in question to Vithabai. The learned counsel for the appellant challenges the findings and reasoning of the learned Judge, while the learned counsel for the respondents supports the findings and the reasoning of the trial Court.

    10. As regards the alleged bogus nature of the sale-deed, it is the case of the plaintiff that the sale-deed of 1921 was executed because Kashinath and other persons were putting forward claims to the property on the death of Maroti. As to the alleged bogus nature of the sale-deed the plaintiff himself has given no evidence because according to him he became aware of the sale-deed only after he had filed the present suit. The learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant, however, relies only on the evidence of Trimbak (P.W 7) who has deposed that Sarubai had told that some persons were putting forward claims to the property and she consulted him. He advised her to get the sale-deed executed in favour of her two daughters. It is doubtful if this statement alleged to have been made by the deceased Sarubai is admissible in evidence. In any case, the evidence of this witness is only on the point that the witness had given advice to Sarubai. It does not show that Sarubai had executed a bogus sale-deed merely with the intention of forestalling the supposed claims of Kashinath and others and not with the genuine intention of meeting legal necessity. We, therefore, agree with the finding of the trial Court that the alleged bogus nature of the sale-deed has not been proved.

    11. We have been referred at length to various authorities on the question of principles applicable to alienations by a Hindu widow, the presumptions to be drawn, the circumstances in which such presumptions can be drawn, the burden of proof, the importance of the recitals, and the purposes for which a Hindu widow can make an absolute alienation of her husband's property. The general principles applicable may be thus stated, before applying them to the facts of the instant case.

    12. In any suit where an absolute sale had been made by a Hindu widow, the burden would be on the alienee or the transferee from the alienee or the person who relies on the validity of the alienation, whether he is plaintiff or defendant, to show that the absolute alienation of the property was justified under Hindu law in cases in which the Hindu widow had only a limited estate. Obala Kondama Naicker Ayyan v. Kandasami Goundar,8 Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Choivdhuri . 1916 L.R 43 I.A 249., Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden . 1918 21 Bom. L.R 640, P.C and Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar.11 If the person relying on the validity of the alienation by a Hindu widow is the plaintiff, the burden of proof would, of course, be on him and the burden of showing that the alienation is justified under Hindu law would rest on him even if the defendant has not taken the plea that the alienation is not justified. It is for the plaintiff to allege and prove the circumstances which alone will give validity to the transaction. Defendants are not required to plead the absence of legal necessity. Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar, Obala v. Kandasami and Lala Amarnath Sah v. Rani Achan Kuar.12 Such a burden of proof rests on the person relying on the alienation whether he is defendant or plaintiff, because a Hindu widow who has a limited estate has no power to make an absolute alienation except under certain circumstances, and whosoever alleges that her absolute alienation of such property is valid must prove the existence of any such circumstances. The circumstances justifying absolute alienation by a Hindu widow under Hindu law are certain religious and charitable purposes and those which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of the husband, or legal necessity, or benefit to the estate, which may for brevity be referred to as justifying circumstances. Vide Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden and Karim-ud-din v. Gobind Krishna Narain . 1909 L.R 36 I.A 138, S.C 11 Bom. L.R 911.. Legal necessity is one of the circumstances justifying an absolute alienation by a Hindu widow. The existence of such circumstances may be shown by establishing that there was “such consent to the alienation, by such reversioners as might fairly be expected to be interested to quarrel with the transaction and such consent will be held to afford a presumptive proof which, if not rebutted by contrary proof, will validate the transaction as a right and proper one”: vide Rangasami v. Nachiappa. When there is no evidence of such a consent, the person on whom the burden of showing the validity of the alienation lies, may discharge the burden by proving that there were in fact circumstances justifying the alienation or that he made a proper enquiry about the existence of justifying circumstances and was led to believe that there were such justifying circumstances and that his belief in the existence of such justifying circumstances was honest. Rangasami v. Nachiappa, Kalishanker Das v. Dhirendra Nath Patra,14 Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayol Sahu,15 Sham Sunder Lal v. Aohhan Kunwar, Obala v. Kandasami and Ravancshwar v. Chandi.16 A mere recital in the deed of alienation of the existence of justifying circumstances is not enough to prove their existence. Rangasami v. Nachiappa and Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Chowdhuri. But, if the alienation is an old one and owing to the lapse of time direct evidence of the facts and circumstances recited in the deed of alienation has disappeared, the recitals acquire importance and may be presumed to be true and presumptions are permissible to fill in the details which had been obliterated by time. The recitals in the alienation deed, consistent with the circumstances and probabilities, will assume greater importance, vide Chintamanibhatla Venkata Reddi v. Rani of Wadhwan . 1919 L.R 47 I.A 6, S.C 22 Bom. L.R 541. and Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Choivdhuri. In such cases the recitals would also be clear evidence of the representation made to the alienee about the existence of justifying circumstances and in such cases when proof of an actual enquiry by the alienee has become impossible, if the circumstances were such as to justify a reasonable belief that an enquiry would have confirmed its truth, the recital coupled with the circumstances would be sufficient evidence to support the deed. In Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Chowdhuri their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows (pp. 252-253):

    “…it is well established that such recitals cannot by themselves be relied upon for the purpose of proving the assertions of fact which they contain. Indeed it is obvious that if such proof were permitted the rights of reversioners could always be defeated by the insertion of carefully prepared recitals. Under ordinary circumstances and apart from statute recitals in deeds can only be evidence as between the parties to the conveyance and those who claim under them.

    But in such a case as the present their Lordships do not think that these recitals can be disregarded, nor, on the other hand, can any fixed and inflexible rule be laid down as to the proper weight which they are entitled to receive. If the deeds were challenged at the time or near the date of their execution, so that independent evidence would be available, the recitals would deserve but slight consideration, and certainly should not be accepted as proof of the facts. But, as time goes by and all the original parties to the transaction and all those who could have given evidence on the relevant points have grown old or passed away, a recital consistent with the probability and circumstances of the case assumes greater importance and cannot lightly be set aside; for it should be remembered that the actual proof of the necessity which justified the deed is not essential to establish its validity. It is only necessary that a representation should have been made to the purchaser that such necessity existed, and that he should have acted honestly and made proper inquiry to satisfy himself of its truth. The recital is clear evidence of the representation, and if the circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable belief that an inquiry would have confirmed its truth, then, when proof of actual inquiry has become impossible, the recital, coupled with such circumstances, would be sufficient evidence to support the deed.”

    13. When there are no recitals in the sale-deed showing legal necessity, the Court may be justified in drawing presumptions about the existence of legal necessity provided such a presumption is supported by the evidence that may have been adduced and the circumstances of the case. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed in Subrahmanyam v. Soorayya . [1950] A.I.R Mad. 514. F.B as follows:

    “In those cases where there are not even recitals of necessity in deeds of sale by limited owners, mere lapse of time does not have the effect of rendering an alienation by the limited owner binding on the reversion…

    …The burden of proof is not altered nor is evidence of justifying necessity, direct or circumstantial, positive or presumptive, dispensed with by mere lapse of time.”

    14. These observations were followed by the Bombay High Court in Mukabasappa Bhimappa v. Hanmantappa.19 It is not correct to say that apart from circumstances and available evidence the Court will be justified in presuming that the alienation was for legal necessity merely on the ground that it was an ancient one (vide Mukabasappa Bhimappa v. Hanmantappa). If the sale-deed purports to have been made entirely for legal necessity and such legal necessity is either proved or presumed, but only a part of the amount for which the property has been sold is applied to satisfy the legal necessity, the whole sale will be upheld because a vendee is not bound by law to see that the whole amount paid by him is applied to satisfy the legal necessity. Vide Srikrishn Das v. Nathu Ram,20 Niamat Rai v. Din Dayal . 1927 29 Bom. L.R 886, P.C and Richhpal Chand v. Richhpal Singh.22 If the alienation is justified in part, but not in its entirety, the reversioner will be entitled to a decree for possession of the whole property on condition that he paid the alienee the consideration for the part of the same that was justified. Srikrishn Das v. Nathu Ram, Niamat Rai v. Din Dayal and Richhpal Ghand v. Richhpal Singh. If the alienation is not at all justified by legal necessity, then it conveys only the limited estate of the widow to the alienee…

    15. But in any case there must be clear evidence on the point and vague evidence cannot prove the existence of debts. In Medai Dalavoi v. Nainar Tevan . [1922] A.I.R P.C 307. their Lordships made the following observations (p. 311):

    “…there is no reliable evidence that at his death Shanmuga was a wealthy man or left personal property out of which his debts could have been paid; there are some vague statements of witnesses that he had been a wealthy man.”

    16. Vague statements cannot, therefore, take the place of positive and reliable evidence….

    17. The original account books were produced but they were returned after the Court placed on record a copy of the entries. It is true that under O. XIII, r. 5, Civil Procedure Code, when a document admitted in evidence is an entry in a shop book or other account book, a copy of the entry may be furnished and after the copy is examined, compared and certified and marked, the original may be returned to the person producing it. But where documents or books of account are admitted in evidence Courts admitting them in evidence must note that this provision relates only to account books in current use. If the original account book produced is not in current use, the Court should not return it. It is only if the original account book is in current use that the procedure under O. XIII, r. 5, may be followed. In the instant case, the account relates to the year 1917 and was produced in 1953. The Court should not, therefore, have returned the original…

    18. The trial Court also relied on s. 90 of the Evidence Act for drawing a presumption as to the existence of legal necessity. As already observed, if the alienation is an ancient one, and all the parties who could have given evidence about the circumstances of the alienation are dead, and lapse of time had obliterated the evidence regarding the circumstances, the recitals in the deed of alienation acquire importance and may be presumed to be true and presumptions are permissible to fill in the details which had been obliterated by time. Vide Chintamanibhatla Venkata Reddi v. Rani of Wadhwan. The Privy Council has not relied on s. 90 of the Evidence Act to justify such a presumption. In some decisions of some High Courts (see Babulal v. Maniklal . [1941] Nag. 124.) s. 90 of the Evidence Act has also been relied on to show that every document more than 30 years old may be treated as ancient. Under s. 90 of the Evidence Act a presumption may be drawn in the case of documents which are 30 years old and which are produced from proper custody that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person is in the handwriting of that person and that the document is duly executed and registered by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. In Harihar Prasad Singh v. Must. of Munshi Nath Prasad, their Lordships held that under s. 90 of the Evidence Act when a document is signed by a person P as agent of another person Q, there is no presumption as to the existence of authority on the part of P to represent Q. Apart from the presumption of due execution, there is no presumption that the document has the legal effect that it purports to have. In the case of an alienation by a Hindu widow, even if the execution of the document by her is admitted or proved, on the question whether she alienated only her life estate in the property or whether she made an absolute alienation, no assistance can be derived from s. 90 of the Evidence Act. The question as to the effect of a document after its due execution is admitted or proved is outside the scope of s. 90 of the Evidence Act. When a Hindu widow makes an alienation, the circumstances justifying the alienation such as legal necessity are matters extraneous to the execution of the document and s. 90 of the Evidence Act cannot be called in and to presume, matters extraneous to the actual execution…

    19. The trial Court relied on Babulal v. Maniklal for drawing a presumption that there was a legal necessity, and in particular, on the following observations at pp. 129 and 130:—

    “It is clear that in the case of an ancient transaction, it must be presumed that the alienation was lawful i.e, justified by legal necessity. The difficulty no doubt lies in fixing the length of time (intervening between the transaction and its challenge in a suit) that would be necessary to justify the application of that presumption. It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule. But it appears to us that on the principle underlying section 90 of the Evidence Act relating to documents 30 years old, the presumption in favour of the existence of necessity may well be applied to transfers more than 30 years old provided that the original parties and witnesses to it are not available at the trial for bearing testimony to the circumstances in which the transaction was concluded. The presumption will operate with greater force in a case where the reversioner fails to bring a declaratory suit during the life time of the alienor. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the failure to sue for declaration was due to the existence of evidence proving necessity. In any case, application of the rule as to presumption would depend on the particular facts of each case and we are decidedly of opinion that the facts and circumstances of this case are such as to justify the placing of onus on the reversioner of proving absence of legal necessity.”

    20. This case has been referred to in Mukabasappa Bhimappa v. Hanmantappa where Dixit J. observed that the principle was too broadly stated in the Nagpur case, that in the case of an ancient transaction relating to the alienation of a Hindu joint family property, it must be presumed that the alienation was lawful, that is, justified by legal necessity. As already pointed out, in the case of ancient transactions when all evidence relating to the circumstances justifying legal necessity has disappeared the presumption is that the recitals in the sale-deed may be presumed to be true if they are consistent with the evidence and other circumstances and that it may be presumed that representations were made to the alienee that the alienation was for purposes justified in Hindu law. The presumption is not an absolute presumption of the existence of legal necessity but a presumption with reference to the recitals in the deed of alienation and the circumstances.

    21. In the Nagpur case it was also observed that the presumption will operate with greater force in a case where the reversioner fails to bring a declaratory suit during the lifetime of the alienor. With great respect again, this proposition appears to be too broadly stated because, as observed by the Privy Council, a reversioner can treat an alienation by a Hindu widow or daughter as a nullity without the intervention of the Court, Vide Obala Kondama Naicker Ayyan v. Kandasami Gounder, and Bijoy Gopal Mtikerji v. Krishna Mahishi Dabi . 1906 L.R 34 I.A 87, S.C 9 Bom. L.R 602. which was a case where an alienation of 1863 was challenged after the widow's death in 1893. It is, therefore, not necessary for a reversioner to go to the Court to get a declaration that the alienation is a nullity. He can himself treat it as a nullity. The reversioner may expect that the widow may not live long and that he need not unnecessarily file two suits, one for declaration during the lifetime of the widow and another for possession after the death of the widow, or the reversioner may not like to hurt the feelings of the widow during her lifetime. In any case, even if he is aware of the alienation, he can treat it as a nullity. In the instant case it is the case of the plaintiff that he became aware of the alienation only after he filed the present suit. The mere failure to file a suit for declaration cannot, therefore, be treated as adding to the weight of the presumption which may be drawn in the case of ancient alienations.

    22. In some cases it was observed that the inactivity of the reversioner in not challenging the alienation may itself be a good ground for presuming the validity of the alienation and the Privy Council case of Magniram Sitaram v. Kasturbhai Manibhai . 1922 I.L.R 46 Bom. 481, P.C, S.C 24 Bom. L.R 584, P.C appears to have been relied on in support of the proposition. But if we look at that case, it would appear that decision is not an authority for the proposition that a presumption can be drawn from mere inactivity. In that case the question was whether the lease granted by a shebait in 1824 was a lease from year to year or whether it was a permanent lease. A shebait has in special circumstances the power of making a wider grant than one which enures only during his life. In 1909 a suit was brought alleging that the lease granted by the shebait was a lease from year to year and that the tenancy had been terminated by a notice. Their Lordships observed as follows (pp. 487-488):

    “In the case of Chockalingam Pillai v. Mayandi Chettiar . 1896 I.L.R 19 Mad. 485. it was pointed out that although the manager for the time being had no power to make a permanent alienation of temple property in the absence of proved necessity for the alienation, yet the long lapse of time between the alienation and the challenge of its validity is a circumstance which enables the Court to assume that the original grant was made in exercise of that extended power. Their Lordships have no hesitation in applying that doctrine to the present case. If in fact the grant was made by a person who possessed the limited power of dealing under which a shebait holds lands devoted to the purposes of religious worship, yet none the less there is attached to the office, in special and unusual circumstances, the power of making a wider grant than one which enures only for his life. At the lapse of 100 years, when every party to the original transaction has passed away, and it becomes completely impossible to ascertain what were the circumstances which caused the original grant to be made, it is only following the policy which the Courts always adopt, of securing as far as possible quiet possession to people who are in apparent lawful holding of an estate, to assume that the grant was lawfully and not unlawfully made.”

    23. This is a case where the alienation was challenged not because of the death of the shebait who made the alienation but on the ground that the lease was terminated by a notice given by the plaintiff and such a notice had been given long after perhaps more than 12 years after the death of the alienor shebait, and, therefore, the delay and the long lapse was used against the plaintiff. Their Lordships also observed that it is not plain that the original alienation in 1824 was made by anybody in the position of a shebait at all. That case was not, therefore, a plain case of alienation by a person with limited powers of alienation. The presumption of lawful origin drawn from long possession and enjoyment is a different one from the presumption that is drawn in Hindu law in the case of ancient alienations by a Hindu widow or daughter, because in the case of an alienation by a Hindu widow long possession and enjoyment of alienee may be due to the long life of the widow even if the alienation was limited to the lifetime of the Hindu widow and was not absolute. In some cases reliance was placed on Annamalai Chetty v. Subramanian Chetty . 1928 31 Bom. L.R 280, P.C in support of the proposition that a presumption may be drawn from mere inactivity on the part of the reversioner. But, with great respect, this authority of the Privy Council does not support such a proposition. That was a case where a suit was filed in 1919 by a member of the joint Hindu family, claiming a share in a dwelling house. Fourteen years earlier i.e in 1905 he himself had sought to mortgage his share of the house and his right to do so was challenged and the mortgage money was returned to him. In 1915 a public notice was also given to him that he had no power whatever to deal with the house and that the house was not joint family property. In 1919 he filed a suit claiming that the house was joint family property and that he had a share in it. It was in these circumstances that the Privy Council observed as follows (p. 284):

    “…Although time cannot run against a claim to partition joint family estate unless there has been definite exclusion, yet the fact that in 1905 when his right to mortgage was challenged the appellant took no steps, strongly suggests that at that time when evidence might have been more readily available he had no great faith in the value of his claim.”

    24. Their Lordships merely used the facts as suggesting some inferences. There was no question of any presumption drawn. Moreover, a challenge had been thrown to the person and in spite of the challenge he took no steps. When a reversioner is inactive or keeps silent he does so not in spite of any challenge made to him but due to the fact that under law he can treat the alienation as nullity without intervention of the Court and generally the alienee does not challenge the reversioner's rights. The Privy Council case was a case of inactivity in the teeth of a direct challenge and certain inferences were drawn from it. In view of the clear right of a reversioner to keep silent and to treat the alienation as a nullity without the intervention of the Court, mere inactivity on his part cannot give rise to a presumption.

    25. Moreover, as already observed, when the presumption can be drawn, the presumption which is drawn is that the recitals in the deed of alienation may be presumed to be true provided the recitals and the presumptions are supported by the circumstances of the case. It is, therefore, necessary to look at the recitals in the deed of alienation. The deed of alienation recites that the houses had been sold for payment of the debts of creditors and for business purposes. The deed does not say that the creditors were the creditors of Marotirao, nor does it mention that there were also debts of the business left by Marotirao. It cannot, therefore, be inferred from the sale-deed that the debts were of Marotirao himself. As regards the other purpose mentioned in the deed of alienation, namely, the purpose of business, it is urged that such a purpose is justified under Hindu law. Mr. Bobde, learned counsel for the respondents, has drawn our attention to the following observations in Mulla's Hindu Law, 12th edn., para. 194A:

    “A widow or other limited heir may alienate or charge the estate for payment of debts properly incurred by her in connection with the business inherited by her from the deceased owner,”

    26. And reliance is placed on Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar. But in this case their Lordships of the Privy Council observed at page 192 that there is no exception from the restriction on alienation by a Hindu widow when the estate consists of or includes a business. They also observed that when a family business is being carried on by the manager of an undivided family estate, the manager of a family business has a certain power of pledging assets for the requirements of the business, but the position of the Hindu widow or daughter is not by any means the same as that of the head of the undivided Hindu family, and even in the latter case the validity of the mortgage by the manager of the family business, without the concurrence of the other members of the family or when some of those members are minors, depends on proof that the mortgage was necessarily entered into in order to pay the debts of the business. The powers of a Hindu widow or daughter are not the same as that of the manager of a Hindu family. This case does not lay down the proposition enunciated by Mulla. The Privy Council explained the powers of the manager and further stated that the powers of a Hindu widow are not the same. The Privy Council did not state what the powers of a Hindu widow are in regard to the debts properly incurred by her in connection with the business, inherited by her from the deceased owner. The case of Lala Amarnath Sah v. Rani Achhan Kuar also does not state the extent or limits of the powers of a Hindu widow in such matters. In any case, in the instant case there is no recital in the sale-deed that there were any debts of the business…

    27. The learned Judge of the trial Court was, therefore, wrong in drawing an absolute presumption of legal necessity in the circumstances of the case. We also hold that his finding as to the existence of legal necessity is wrong and we hold that the sale-deed of 1921 was not justified under Hindu law.

    28. It is then contended that even if the alienation is not justified, the parties belonged to the Bombay school of Hindu law, and that consequently, even if the alienation is not justified, the two daughters Vithabai and Jaibai would have an absolute estate in the property of their father Marotirao after the death of his widow Sarubai in 1921. According to the plaintiff, however, Marotirao belonged to the Benares school of Hindu law. The learned trial Judge held in favour of the plaintiff, observing that although in an affidavit sworn by defendant No. 2 in reply to plaintiff's interrogatories it was stated that Marotirao's ancestors migrated to Nagpur from Badnera in Amravati district, there was no evidence to show this migration, and that as the family lived in Nagpur they would be presumed to be governed by the lex loci of the place in which they reside.

    29. In such matters as the law of succession, a person is governed by his personal law unless he migrates to another place and there gives up his personal law in favour of the personal law of the place where he is domiciled afresh. If nothing is known about a man except that he lived in a certain place, it will be assumed that his personal law is the law which prevails at that place, but if evidence is led to show that the man had migrated from another place, then his personal law would be the personal law of the lex loci of the place-from which he had migrated unless he has given it up. Even if there is no evidence to show that he had migrated from another place, evidence can be led to show his manners of living, ceremonies and customs observed by him, and an inference can be drawn from such evidence that his personal law is not the same as the lex loci of the place where he is residing and that he must have hailed from another territory where such ceremonies and customs and mode of life are common. Vide Babu Motising v. Durgabai . 1928 I.L.R 53 Bom. 242, 249. S.C and Balwant Rao v. Baji Rao.30 In Pralhad Sheonarayan Chokhani v. Damodhar Ramkaran Vaishnao* . 1957 59 Bom. L.R 1178. it was observed that it is well settled that if nothing is known about a person except that he lived at a certain place it will be assumed that his personal law would be the law where he lives at such a place, but if more is known, then in accordance with that knowledge, his personal law must be determined unless it can be shown that he has renounced his original law in favour of the law of the place to which he has migrated. On the facts of the case it was held that in matters of adoption the family of the deceased Agarwal of Yeotmal in Berar originally belonged to Hissar district in Punjab and that the family was, therefore, governed in the matter of adoption by the customary law prevailing in Hissar district so far as it was at variance with the law of the domicile. This case is, therefore, relied on only for general principles and not for any decision in regard to the personal law applicable to Marathi Telis or the lex loci of the Nagpur district…

    30. It is, however, contended that the plaintiff in his evidence has admitted that they were Marathi Telis. It is, therefore, urged that Marotirao was governed by the Bombay school. In addition, it is also contended by Mr. Dharmadhikari for respondents Nos. 1(a) and 1(b) that the lex loci of Nagpur is itself the Bombay school of Hindu law. In view of the admission of the plaintiff that he is a Maratha Teli, reliance is placed on Balwant Rao v. Baji Rao,32 Kesheo Rao v. Sadasheo Rao,33 Laxman v. Gangabai,34 and Udebhan v. Vikram,35 for the contention that all Maharashtra Brahmins wherever they live are governed by the Bombay school of Hindu law. In Kesheo Rao v. Sadasheo Rao it was held that all Maharashtra Brahmins in Central Provinces are governed by the Bombay school even when migration was not proved. This case was followed in Laxman v. Gangabai. In Udebhan v. Vikram it was held that all families belonging to the Maharashtrian Teli community residing in Sausar, Chhindwara district, Madhya Pradesh, were governed by the Bombay school of Vyawahara Mayukh. There is no doubt from the authorities that all Maharashtrians wherever they live in India are governed by the Bombay school of Hindu law, and it is possible to include in the term ‘Maharashtrian’ all ‘Marathas’ although ‘Maratha’ represents a caste. All Marathas may, therefore, be treated as Maharashtrians for the purpose of personal law, but in the instant case there is no admission by the plaintiff that he is Maharashtrian Teli or a Maratha Teli. He has merely stated that be is a Marathi Teli. Marathi is the name of a language and not of a caste or community or race. Marathi cannot be treated as synonymous with ‘Maharashtrian’ or ‘Maratha’. In any case, even if there is an ambiguity we must remember that reliance is sought to be placed on what is termed an admission made by the plaintiff. If an admission is capable of two interpretations, an interpretation unfavourable to the person making it should not be put on his admission, especially because that is the only circumstance relied on this point. An admission must be clear, precise, not vague, or ambiguous. Vide Chandra Kunwar v. Narpat Singh . 1906 L.R 34 I.A 27, S.C 9 Bom. L.R 267. and Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao.37

    31. It is, however, contended by Mr. Dharmadhikari for respondents Nos. 1(a) and 1(b) that even the lex loci of Nagpur is the Bombay school of Hindu law and he relies on Kesheo Rao v. Sadasheo Rao where at page 478 it was observed that the earliest decision in the Central Provinces in Mst. Laxmibai v. Shri Krishna (Second Appeal No. 270 of 1877) was decided on October 27, 1877, Avhere the Judicial Commissioner after referring to an article on Nagpur in the Central Provinces Gazetteer, gave his decision, on examination of historical records, that the lexi loci of the Nagpur district was the law of western India. Reliance is also placed on the following observations at page 473:—

    “…These Provinces (Central Provinces) were not either a geographical or political unit till the advent of the British, and even then were not taken over wholesale, but were slowly amalgamated by the addition of tracts of territories from time to time from different persons and for different reasons. On the other hand Hindu religion and culture, its laws and traditions, with its varying usages and differing interpretations, had crystallized as entities long before this time. Therefore we have to visualise the scene as it existed before the British era. It does not follow that the ideas then prevailing in one section of the area now known as the Central Provinces were equally prevalent in another. It is impossible to make a sweeping assertion that this or that is the lex loci of the Provinces as a whole without finding out whether the influences at work which impressed themselves upon a particular locality to such an extent as to make them the predominating factors in determining its law and usages were also at work elsewhere and were equally successful.”

    32. The question as to what was the lex loci of Nagpur depends on the history of migration of people to Nagpur, of which there is not much record, but there are several cases where it has been held that the lex loci of Nagpur is the Benares school of Hindu law. Vide Ramlu v. Vithal,38 Bhaskar v. Laxmibai . [1953] Nag. 187, 198. and Udebhan v. Vikram. In the first of these cases it was held that although Central Provinces (p. 271):

    “are not an ethnic or linguistic entity, still the Mitakshara as interpreted by the Benares school is the law of this Province (excluding Berar). The Hindus of this province are accordingly governed by the Benares school and it is in this sense that the Benares school can be said to be the lex loci of this province.”

    33. Reliance was also placed on Rajeshwar v. Kesheo.40 In Bhaskar v. Laxmibai it was held at p. 198 that

    “It has been consistently held at least from the year 1887 that the lex loci of the Central Provinces is the Benares School of Hindu Law; Vide Hiralal v. Mt. Tani Bai and Jagram Sav (1887 2 C.P.L.R 18), Deorao Zamindar v. Mt. Sakhu Bai (1897 11 C.P.L.R 49), Rukhmabai v. Jaipal (1926 23 Nag. L.R 108), Rambhabai v. Totaram (A.I.R 1923 Nagpur 188, 190), Rajeshwar v. Kesheo (1944 N.L.J 291), Ganoo v. Beni (1916 14 Nag. L.R 82) and Kesheorao v. Sadasheo Rao (I.L.R 1938 Nagpur 469).”

    34. In such cases the principle of stare decisis is important. It is far more important in such matters that the law should be certain than that it should be correct or sound, because in such matters in the absence of sufficient historical records it may not be easy to give a correct decision. But ever since 1887 the general current of authority has held that the lex loci of the Central Provinces is the Benares school of Hindu law and that of Berar is the Bombay school of Hindu law. We are, therefore, not prepared to differ from this strong trend of authority. In any case, these decisions can work no hardship on any party because it is always open to any party to lead evidence to show that he or his ancestors migrated from another place and to show that his personal law is different or to show that he follows the customs and mode of living of persons belonging to a different school of personal law….

    35. As regards the contention that Vithabai had been in adverse possession from 1921 onwards, it is clear that the adverse possession against a Hindu widow cannot be treated as adverse possession against a reversioner.

    36. In this case adverse possession is claimed by Vithabai as the daughter of Sarubai, the Hindu widow in question. If the adverse possession of a stranger against a Hindu widow cannot be reckoned as adverse possession against the reversioner, the adverse possession of a daughter of a Hindu widow can a fortiori not he reckoned as adverse possession against a reversioner. In Kalipada Chakraborti v. Palani Bala Devi . [1953] S.C.R 503, 515. it was observed (p. 515):

    “…the statute of limitation does not begin to run against the reversioner when there is dispossession of a Hindu female holding a limited estate; and in such cases the reversioner has a right to institute a suit within 12 years from the death of the female heir…except where a decree has been obtained fairly and properly and without fraud and collusion against the Hindu female heir in respect to a property held by her as a limited owner,…”

    37. We, therefore, hold that in this case there can be no adverse possession as against the plaintiff who is a reversioner.

    38. [The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.]

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ramji Batanji v. Manohar Chintaman
    (Nov 20, 1959)