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  • S. 3 made the provisions of Chapter of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
  • BOMBAY RENTS HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES CONTROL ACT
  • provisions of S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 4
  • provisions of S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • S. 14 and S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • S. 11(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 14 of the Rent Act, but S. 4
  • Act of 1948 in Cl. (c) of S. 4
  • S. 4(c) of the Tenancy Act
  • Act 26 of 1946 and S. 2A
  • S. 14 of the Tenancy Act
  • S. 4 of the Tenancy Act
  • S. 14 of the Rent Act
  • Tenancy Act of 1939
  • Tenancy Act of 1948
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • S. 3 made the provisions of Chapter of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
  • BOMBAY RENTS HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES CONTROL ACT
  • provisions of S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 4
  • provisions of S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • S. 14 and S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • S. 11(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 14 of the Rent Act, but S. 4
  • Act of 1948 in Cl. (c) of S. 4
  • S. 4(c) of the Tenancy Act
  • Act 26 of 1946 and S. 2A
  • S. 14 of the Tenancy Act
  • S. 4 of the Tenancy Act
  • S. 14 of the Rent Act
  • Tenancy Act of 1939
  • Tenancy Act of 1948
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Full Bench Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A landlord filed an application before a Revenue Authority seeking ejectment of his tenant for default in payment of rent. The tenant did not contest the landlord's application. The landlord joined two persons who were sub-tenants of the tenant, asserting that if the tenancy of the tenant were legally terminated the sub-tenants would have no right to remain on the land. The dispute required interpretation of the Tenancy Act (1948) to determine whether the Act affords protection to those sub-tenants who were lawfully cultivating the land under valid contracts of sub-tenancy created before the relevant statutory changes.

The Full Bench was convened because of conflicting Division Bench decisions on whether sub-tenants in such a position obtain protection under S. 4 of the Tenancy Act and related provisions. The Full Bench reviewed statutory provisions, the legislative history (including the Tenancy Act of 1939 and its amendments), earlier Division Bench decisions, and arguments of counsel, and ultimately referred the matter back to the Division Bench to decide the merits in light of the Full Bench's interpretation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether S. 4 of the Tenancy Act of 1948, which deems a person lawfully cultivating land belonging to another to be a "tenant", gives statutory protection to sub-tenants who were lawfully and contractually cultivating land when the tenancy between landlord and tenant is terminated.
  2. Whether the Tenancy Act (in particular Ss. 4 and 5) is inconsistent with S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — that is, whether the sub-tenancy automatically terminates on termination of the head tenancy or whether a statutory tenancy arises under the Tenancy Act.
  3. How to reconcile conflicting Division Bench decisions addressing the application and scope of S. 4 (and related provisions) in situations involving sub-tenancies and tenancies created by mortgagees in possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Landlord's Position

  • The landlord contended that if the tenancy of the tenant could be legally terminated, the sub-tenants had no right to continue to remain on the land.
  • Implicitly relied upon the ordinary rule under S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act that the sub-tenancy terminates on termination of the principal tenancy.

Arguments Presented by Mr. Patel (as reported in the opinion)

  • One suggestion was that S. 4 might have been intended to cover tenancies created by oral contracts or contracts difficult to prove — a contention the Full Bench found untenable because S. 4 does not deal with contractual tenants.
  • Another suggestion from Mr. Patel was that S. 4 is surplusage (i.e., unnecessary); the Full Bench rejected this as inconsistent with legislative purpose and the workable construction of the Act.
  • Mr. Patel also argued that giving the construction adopted by the Full Bench might lead to difficulties and anomalies; the Bench considered but concluded no serious difficulty would arise for the specific question before it.

Arguments Presented by Mr. Vaidya (as reported in the opinion)

  • Mr. Vaidya urged that the Legislature intended to restrict the landlord's right to terminate a lease to the cases enumerated in S. 14 of the Tenancy Act and that therefore a landlord could not rely on S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act to evict sub-tenants.
  • The Bench described this as a possible view and noted that S. 4 and S. 5 at least appear inconsistent with S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.

Contrary Reasoning in the Dinkar Bhagwant Salekar Decision (as summarized)

  • Mr. Justice Bavdekar (with Mr. Justice Gokhale) in Dinkar Bhagwant Salekar took the narrower view that S. 4 applies only to persons in possession "by the permission or authority of the owner" — effectively restricting S. 4 to those on the land with the landlord's leave (a licensee) rather than a broader class of lawfully cultivating persons including contractually-created sub-tenants.
  • That Division Bench considered the matter in the context of tenants of mortgagees in possession and concluded there was no incompatibility between Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act and the Tenancy Act, as understood by that Bench (a view the Full Bench questioned).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Special Civil Application No. 2491 of 1955 (Bombay), judgment of 1-2-1956 (Chagla C.J. & Dixit J.) Observed that a person lawfully cultivating land is deemed a tenant under S. 4 of the Tenancy Act and acquires the rights of a tenant under S. 2(18). The Full Bench cited and relied on this earlier view in support of the interpretation that S. 4 confers tenant status on lawful cultivators (including certain sub-tenants).
Special Civil Application No. 2192 of 1956 (Bombay), judgment of 9-1-1956 Expressed the same view as in Special Civil Application No. 2491 — that lawful cultivators become deemed tenants under the Act. The Full Bench noted this consistent view and used it to reinforce the interpretation that S. 4 creates a class of statutory tenants.
Dinkar Bhagwant Salekar v. Rau Babaji Mahamulkar, Special Civil Application No. 981 of 1956 (Bombay), judgment of 17-9-1956 (Bavdekar & Gokhale JJ.) The Division Bench held that only persons in possession with the owner's permission/authority fall within S. 4 (a narrow reading) and indicated no irreconcilability between S. 14 of the Tenancy Act and S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act in that context. The Full Bench carefully considered this contrary view, rejected the narrow construction (as importing words not found in S. 4), and held that the Dinkar Bench's reasoning about mortgagees in possession under the old Act was not correct. The Full Bench therefore did not follow the narrow construction in Dinkar for the present question and directed reconsideration on merits in light of its judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded in a step-by-step statutory and contextual analysis, grounded in the text of the Tenancy Act and its legislative history:

  • Statutory construction of S. 4: The court read S. 4 as creating a legal fiction whereby a person lawfully cultivating land belonging to another (subject to limited exceptions: members of the owner's family, servants, mortgagees in possession) is "deemed to be a tenant." The phrase "deemed to be a tenant" indicates that these persons would not, but for the statute, be tenants under ordinary law.
  • Interaction with the definition of "tenant": The court explained that S. 2(18) defines "tenant" to include agriculturists who hold land on lease and also persons deemed to be tenants under the Act. The court emphasized that the deemed-tenant branch of the definition is meant to apply to S. 4 and that mere possession without personal cultivation is insufficient.
  • Facts on sub-tenancy: The sub-tenancies in the present case were created under earlier legislation (Act 29 of 1939) at a time when sub-tenancies were not declared invalid; therefore the two sub-tenants held their position under valid contracts and were lawfully cultivating the land. The court concluded that they satisfied S. 4's requirement of "lawfully cultivating."
  • Effect on contractual sub-tenancy: While S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act would ordinarily terminate the contractual sub-tenancy on termination of the principal tenancy, the Full Bench held that the Tenancy Act steps in: upon termination of the contract the statutory fiction of S. 4 gives rise to a statutory tenancy protecting the person who was lawfully cultivating. Thus, the loss of contractual protection does not leave such a lawful cultivator a trespasser; the statute affords protection.
  • Inconsistency with Transfer of Property Act: The court identified at least two provisions of the Tenancy Act (S. 4 and S. 5) that are inconsistent with S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. S. 4 creates statutory tenants where the Transfer of Property Act would operate to terminate the sub-tenancy; S. 5 secures definite durations (cycles) to tenancies. The Bench held that these features show a legislative intention to protect actual cultivators even where ordinary transfer law might cause termination of contracts.
  • Legislative history: The court reviewed the evolution from the Tenancy Act of 1939 through the 1946 amendment (S. 2A) and the Tenancy Act of 1948 (S. 4A and S. 27). The legislative changes, including a one-year window for landlords to contest who was a protected tenant, indicate a legislative design to protect sub-tenancies created in a particular period which were not challenged, and to treat many lawful cultivators as protected tenants going forward.
  • Response to contrary interpretations: The Full Bench rejected the argument (advanced by the Dinkar division) that S. 4 should be narrowly read to require the landholder to be on the land with the owner's permission or authority. The court found no warrant to import such words into S. 4 and considered that to do so would unduly narrow the legislative protection the Tenancy Act sought to provide. The court also addressed the mortgagee issue, noting that the 1948 Act expressly excepts mortgagees in possession (S. 4(c)), which mitigates concerns about protecting tenants of mortgagees.
  • Practical approach: The court emphasized it was addressing the specific question before it (protection of lawful sub-tenants) and declined to attempt to resolve every potential anomaly across the statute at once, while expressing confidence that its interpretation would not cause serious operational difficulties.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Full Bench held that persons who came on the land under valid sub-tenancies and who were lawfully cultivating the land fall within the scope of S. 4 of the Tenancy Act and, upon termination of the contractual tenancy between landlord and tenant, a statutory tenancy arises in their favour; they are therefore protected by the Tenancy Act.

Direct implications and orders:

  • The Full Bench disagreed with the narrow construction in Dinkar Bhagwant Salekar insofar as it would exclude lawful sub-tenants from S. 4's protection.
  • The Full Bench sent the matter back to the Division Bench to decide the matter on merits in the light of the Full Bench's judgment and interpretation.
  • Civil References (C.R. As.) Nos. 84 and 85 of 1954 were ordered to go back before a single Judge to be decided on merits.
  • The court answered the reference (noted in the opinion as "Reference answered").

Broader implications: The opinion resolves a conflict of Division Bench authority by endorsing an interpretation of the Tenancy Act that protects lawfully cultivating sub-tenants through the statutory fiction of S. 4, and it recognizes a legislative shift away from the automatic application of S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act in these circumstances. The Bench limited its exercise to the specific question and remitted factual and merit issues for further consideration.

End of summary — prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion.

    Jaswantrai Tricumlal Vyas v. Bai Jiwi

    Chagla, C.J:— A question of some importance arises for the decision of this Full Bench. The facts may be simplified in order to pose the question clearly. A landlord files an application for ejecting his tenant on the ground that he is in default for parent of rent. The tenant has no answer to the landlord's application. The landlord joins in that application, which is preferred before a Revenue Authority, two persons who were sub-tenants of the tenant and to whom the land was let out, and the landlord contended that if the tenancy of the tenant could be legally terminated, the sub-tenants had no right to continue to remain on the land. The question that we have to consider is whether the Tenancy Act gives any protection to these two subtenants. A very important and salient feature of this case is that the contract of sub-tenancy between the tenant and the sub-tenants was a legal contract and the sub-tenants were cultivating the land lawfully. It is true that under the ordinary law of the land, under S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, when the tenancy was terminated the sub-tenants would have no right to remain on the land, and that the contract between the subtenants and the tenant would automatically come to an end with the termination of the tenancy between the landlord and the tenant. Has the Tenancy Act made any change in this ordinary law and given a protection to the sub-tenants which the Transfer of Property Act does not vouchsafe to him?

    2. Now, we are concerned with the Tenancy Act of 1948 and the relevant section that we have to consider is S. 4 which provides that a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not and then we have three categories which are excepted. One is a member of the owner's family, the second is a servant, and the third is a mortgagee in possession. From the language of this section it is clear that the Legislature constituted a class of persons into tenants who in ordinary law and who by the strength of any contract would not be tenants. The expression “deemed to be a tenant” makes it clear that but for the legal fiction created by S. 4 the person would not be under the law a tenant. The conditions to be satisfied before a person can become as it were, an artificial tenant under S. 4 would be that he must lawfully cultivate any land belonging to another person. In our opinion, it is not possible to contend that S. 4 was dealing with a class of contractual tenants. If a tenant had his rights under a contract, then it was not necessary specifically to provide by S. 4 that a person should be deemed to be a tenant and should have his rights as a tenant. The definition of “tenant” in the Act makes the position even clearer. Section 2(18) defines “tenant” as meaning an agriculturist who holds land on lease and includes a person who is deemed to be a tenant under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, the definition of “tenant” falls into two parts. One is a tenant who is a contractual tenant under a lease, and the other class is a tenant who is deemed to be a tenant under the provisions of this Act, and the second part of the definition would apply to S. 4 which, as already pointed out, creates a class of artificial tenants. There is also the definition of “agriculturist” which means a person who cultivates land personally. Therefore, in order that the definition of a tenant should be satisfied, a person should not merely hold land on lease, nor must he merely be deemed to be a tenant under the provisions of the Act, but he must also cultivate land personally. Mere possession of land would not be sufficient.

    3. Now, under S. 14 of the Act, one of the grounds on which a tenancy can he terminated is that the tenant has sub-let the land, and under S. 27 a sub-tenancy has been made invalid. But at the time when the sub-tenancy in this case was created the sub-tenancy was regulated by the earlier act. act 29 of 1939, and at that time the subtenancy was not declared to be invalid, and therefore on the facts of this case it is clear that the two sub-tenants came on the land under a valid sub-tenancy and therefore when they were cultivating the land they were cultivating the land not as trespassers but under a valid contract, between them and the tenant. It could therefore be definitely said of these two sub-tenants that within the meaning of S. 4 they were lawfully cultivating the land. If that be the true position, it is difficult to understand how on the termination of the tenancy of the tenant these two sub-tenants could be evicted by the landlord. Undoubtedly, under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act the contractual tenancy between the tenant and the sub-tenants would come to an end, but on the termination of that contractual tenancy, by reason of the provisions of S. 4, a statutory tenancy would come into existence. Whereas before the termination of the tenancy the sub-tenants were protected by the terms of the contract between them and the tenant, on the termination of that contract they could look to the statute for their protection.

    4. It was urged that S. 3 made the provisions of Chapter of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, applicable to the tenancies and leases of land to which the Act applied, but the application was subject to this that the provisions should not be inconsistent with any provisions of the Tenancy Act, and in our opinion there are at least two sections of this Act which are clearly inconsistent with the provisions of S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 4 itself, which as already pointed out makes a person who is not a contractual tenant a tenant for the purpose of this Act, is contrary to the provision of S. 111(c), which provision puts an end to the contractual tenancy between the tenant and the sub-tenant and makes him liable to be evicted by the landlord. Then there is S. 5, which constitutes every tenancy of a definite duration, in the first place of 10 years and then it provides for various cycles of 10 years; and when one looks at the various sections of the Tenancy Act the position is rendered clear that what the Legislature had in mind was to protect the possession of a person who was actually cultivating the land and who was on the land lawfully and not contrary to law or as a trespasser. The one idea that runs through the Tenancy Act is that the actual tiller on the land should not be evicted provided the title of the actual tiller is derived from some legal incident and is not the result of an unlawful act, and if it is once conceded, as it must be conceded, that the title of the sub-tenants was a legal title and that they were actual tillers on the land, then in our opinion it would be defeating the object with which the Tenancy Act was passed to come to the conclusion that they were not protected by the provisions of this statute and they were placed in a different category from the other tenants to which the provisions of the Act applies.

    5. This history of this legislation is also significant as bearing out the same idea. The first Tenancy Act of 1939 had no provision with regard to statutory tenants, but that Act was amended by Act 26 of 1946 and S. 2A was incorporated and that section is in terms similar to S. 4 of the present Act, and it is rather important to note that a locus penetentiae was given to the landlord for a period of one year to make an application for a declaration that a particular person on the land was not a tenant. When the Act of 1948 was passed, S. 4A incorporated into this Act by Schedule I the provisions of Ss. 3, 3A and 4 of the Act of 1939, and S. 3A provided:

    “Every tenant shall, from the eighth day of November 1947 be deemed to be a protected tenant for the purposes of this Act and his rights as such protected tenant shall be recorded in the Record of Rights, unless his landlord has prior to the aforesaid date made an application to the Mamlatdar for a declaration that the tenant is not a protected tenant.”

    6. Then the Act of 1948, as already pointed out, by S. 27 rendered sub-tenancies invalid. Therefore, the Legislature had clearly this in mind that the sub-tenancies created during a particular period, and which had not been challenged by the landlord as provided by S. 2A and which inferentially the landlord had accepted, should be protected and the subtenants under these sub-tenancies should be continued to cultivate the land which they had been cultivating for some time.

    7. Mr. Patel with his usual fairness found it difficult to explain what object the Legislature had in mind in enacting S. 4. His first rather diffident answer was that the intention might have been to provide for tenancies created by an oral contract or a contract which it might be difficult to establish by evidence. That answer is obviously untenable because S. 4 does not deal with contractual tenants. A tenant under a contract whether it is a written or an oral contract, even if the contract is difficult to prove, is still a contractual tenant, and the language of S. 4 clearly negatives the suggestion that the Legislature was thinking of a particular type or class of contractual tenants. The other answer suggested by Mr. Patel was that S. 4 was a surplusage. Now, a Court must be very loath to bold that when a Legislature in an important social measure solemnly enacts a provision to give protection to a particular class of tenants, such a provision is a mere surplusage to which no effect should be given, and when we find that effect can be given to S. 4 and a large class of sub-tenants could be protected, then it is impossible to accept Mr. Patel's argument that we must ignore S. 4 and proceed to construe the Tenancy Act as if that section did not find a place at all in the statute. Mr. Patel has drawn our attention to various sections of the Act and he has suggested that if we put the interpretation upon S. 4 which we are doing, it may lead to certain difficulties and anomalies. Now, even a Full Bench should not try to cross more than one hurdle at a time, and here we are only concerned with the specific question which we have posed as the question which falls for the consideration of this Bench. But, undoubtedly, in construing a section one must look at the scheme of the whole Act and one must ordinarily try to avoid giving a construction to a section which would render the working of the Act as a whole difficult. But after giving our most careful consideration to all that Mr. Patel has said, we do not think that any serious difficulty or anomaly would arise if we construe S. 4 as we propose to do.

    8. It may be pointed out that the Legislature has carried out this particular policy of protecting sub-tenancies in another piece of legislation and that is in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 57 of 1947, where by S. 14 it is provided:

    “Where the interest of a tenant of any premises is determined for any reason, any sub-tenant to whom the premises or any part thereof have been lawfully sub-let before the coming into operation of this Act shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions as he would have held from the tenant if the tenancy had continued.”

    9. Undoubtedly, the language of S. 4 of the Tenancy Act is different from the language of S. 14 of the Rent Act, but S. 4 must be read in the context of the particular legislation which was being put on the statute book, and in our opinion the substantial effect of S. 4 is the same as S. 14 of the Rent Act and the effect is this that on the termination of a contractual tenancy between the tenant and the sub-tenant, if that sub-tenancy was valid in law a statutory tenancy comes into existence and the sub-tenant becomes the statutory tenant of the landlord. The statutory tenancy only comes into existence when the tenancy and the tenant are eliminated. So long as the tenancy and the tenant are there, the sub-tenant is protected by the contract between him and the tenant and under that contract he is protected and he can continue to remain on the land. But when that protection comes to an end by reason of the elimination of the tenancy between the landlord and the tenant the statute steps in and gives to the sub-tenant the protection which he would not otherwise have had. In our opinion, this view of the matter should facilitate the working of the Act and remove any difficulties which might arise if any other view was taken.

    10. The reason why this matter has been referred to this Full Bench is that there are conflicting decisions of Division Benches. A view was taken by me and Mr. Justice Dixit in Special Civil Application No. 2491 of 1955 on 1-2-1956 (Bom) (A) where in the judgment it was observed that a certain view taken by the Tribunal was erroneous because it overlooked S. 4 of the Tenancy Act which gave to a person lawfully cultivating any land the status of a tenant. He was deemed to the a tenant and by reason of the definition of “tenant” contained in S. 2(18) the position of the person who was deemed to be a tenant was the same as that of an actual contractual tenant. Further, if the sub-tenancy was not prohibited, then the petitioner was on the land lawfully and admittedly he was cultivating the land, in which case as soon as the Act of 1948 came into force he was deemed to be a tenant and as such acquired all rights of the tenant. The same view was expressed in Special Civil Application No. 2192 of 1956 on 9-1-1956 (Bom) (B).

    11. The other view has been expressed by Mr. Justice Bavdekar sitting with Mr. Justice Gokhale in Dinkar Bhagwant Salekar v. Rau Babaji Mahamulkar*, Special Civil Application No. 981 of 1956 on 17-9-1956 (Bom) (C). We have given our most anxious consideration to this contrary view taken by these two learned Judges. Mr. Justice Bavdekar takes the view that only that person can be considered to be lawfully in possession of the land within the meaning of S. 4 who is there by the permission or authority of the owner. With great respect, to take that view of S. 4 is to add words to the section which the Legislature itself has not incorporate ed in the section. With very great respect, we do not see any warrant for reading into that section the words “a person lawfully cultivating any land with the consent or authority of the owner.” If the learned Judge meant by this expression the tenant himself who is undoubtedly on the land with the leave and authority of the owner, then he is a contractual tenant and it was not necessary to enact section 4 to deal with his case. If, on the other hand, the learned Judge meant a person other than a tenant who is on the land by leave and license of the landlord, then the learned Judge wanted to restrict the application of S. 4 to only a licensee of the owner. There is no reason why we should give such a narrow meaning to S. 4 when as already pointed out, in our opinion, the Legislature wanted to protect a much larger class of persons who were lawfully cultivating land and who did not hold that land under any contract which would permit them to continue being in possession of that land. The learned Judge also has come to the conclusion that he has, by holding that there is no provision of the Act which is inconsistent with Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and in this particular case S. 111(c) of the Act, and for that purpose he has only considered S. 14 of the Tenancy Act and he has taken the view that whereas S. 14 deals with the termination of the tenancy by the act of the landlord. S. 111(c) deals with the automatic termination of the lease by operation of law, and the learned Judge did not think that there was any irreconcilability between S. 14 and S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. Now, it is unnecessary for us to express an opinion whether S. 14 is or is not inconsistent with S. 111(c). Mr. Vaidya has forcibly pointed out that the Legislature wanted to restrict the right of the landlord to terminate the lease only to the cases mentioned in S. 14 and it was not open to the landlord to rely on any other cases mentioned in S. 11(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. That appears to us to be a very possible view, but without expressing any opinion it is clear that at least there are two sections in the Act to which we have already drawn attention which are inconsistent with the provisions of S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act and those are Ss. 4 and 5. If a sub-tenancy automatically comes to an end by reasons of S. 111(c), then effect cannot be given to S. 4 which creates a statutory tenancy, nor can effect be given to S. 5 which secures to every tenant whether contractual or statutory, the right to be on the land for a certain period of time, and if the statutory sub-tenant by reason of the provisions at the Act becomes a protected tenant, then his rights would be larger than those provided for in S. 5 and those rights would also be defeated if S. 111(c) was to be given effect. What seemed to have weighed with the learned Judge was the fact that he was dealing with a case of the tenant of a mortgagee in possession and naturally the learned Judge was oppressed by the consideration that under ordinary law on the redemption of a mortgage the tenancies created by the mortgagee in possession would come to an end, and therefore to give effect to S. 4 would mean that not only the tenants would be protected but also the tenants of the mortgagee in possession. It may be pointed out that the Legislature in the Act of 1948 in Cl. (c) of S. 4 has taken mortgagees in possession out of the category of statutory tenants. Therefore, whatever lacuna there was in the old Act has now been made good. The learned Judge relies on this fact for strengthening his view that mortgagees in possession were never intended to be treated as statutory tenants, and if the tenants of mortgagees in possession were not intended to be treated as statutory tenants, then on a parity of reason sub-tenants could not also be considered as statutory tenants. In our opinion, the amendment effected by S. 4(c) of the Tenancy Act strongly supports the view which we are inclined to take that under the old Act all persons lawfully on the land were intended to be protected, but the Legislature realising the difficult position in which the mortgagor would find himself if the tenancy created by the mortgagee in possession were to be protected and on redemption the mortgagor was prevented from getting possession of the land, made the necessary amendment by enacting S. 4(c). It is true that the learned Judge in his judgment expressly states that although he had considered the question of sub-tenancies and has examined the various provisions of the Act in order to decide the question that arose before him, viz., the position of the tenants of the mortgagees in possession, he did not expressly wish to decide that sub-tenancies did not come within the purview of S. 4. But if the learned Judge is right in the view that he has taken with regard to the tenants of the mortgagees in possession, it must logically follow that the position of the sub-tenants would be the same, and if the reasoning of the learned Judge is right with regard to the question that he was considering that reasoning would be equally applicable to the question that arises before us. Therefore, with very great respect, we must hold that the view taken by the learned Judge with regard to the position of the tenants of the mortgagees in possession under the old Act of 1939 is not the correct position and that as far as the old Act is concerned the position of the tenants of the mortgagees in possession and the position of sub-tenants was identical; they both become statutory tenants, one on the redemption of the mortgage and the other on the termination of the contractual tenancy.

    12. We will therefore send this matter back to the Division Bench to decide the matter on merits in the light of the judgment delivered by us.

    13. C.R As. Nos. 84 and 85 of 1954 will go back before a single Judge to be decided on merits.

    M.K.S
    Reference answered.
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    Jaswantrai Tricumlal Vyas v. Bai Jiwi
    (Dec 13, 1956)